Aesthetic Value in Classical Antiquity

Edited by

INEKE SLUITER
RALPH M. ROSEN

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Aesthetic Value in Classical Antiquity

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CONTENTS

List of Contributors vii

1. General Introduction 1
Ineke Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen

2. *Amousia*: Living without the Muses 15
Stephen Halliwell

3. Is the Sublime an Aesthetic Value? 47
James I. Porter

4. More Than Meets the Eye: The Aesthetics of (Non)sense in the Ancient Greek Symposium 71
Alexandra Pappas

5. The Aesthetic Value of Music in Platonic Thought 113
Eleonora Rocconi

6. *Senex Mensura*: An Objective Aesthetics of Seniors in Plato's *Laws* .. 133
Myrthe L. Bartels

7. Allocating Musical Pleasure: Performance, Pleasure, and Value in Aristotle's *Politics* 159
Elizabeth M. Jones

8. Audience, Poetic Justice, and Aesthetic Value in Aristotle's *Poetics* .. 183
Elsa Bouchard

9. Authenticity as an Aesthetic Value: Ancient and Modern Reflections 215
Irene Peirano

10. Heraclides Criticus and the Problem of Taste 243
Jeremy McInerney

11. 'Popular' Aesthetics and Personal Art Appreciation in the Hellenistic Age 265
Craig Hardiman

12. Art, Aesthetics, and the Hero in Vergil's *Aeneid* 285
Joseph Farrell

13. *Tantae Molis Erat*: On Valuing Roman Imperial Architecture 315
Bettina Reitz

14. Poetry, Politics, and Pleasure in Quintilian 345
Curtis Dozier

15. *Talis Oratio Qualis Vita*: Literary Judgments As Personal Critiques in Roman Satire 365
Jennifer L. Ferriss-Hill

16. Captive Audience? The Aesthetics of *Nefas* in Senecan Drama...... 393
Carrie Mowbray

17. Creating Chloe: Education in Eros through Aesthetics in Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe* 421
Caitlin C. Gillespie

Index of Greek Terms.. 447
Index of Latin Terms.. 453
Index Locorum 457
General Index.. 475

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CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Ineke Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen*

1. *Introduction*

Two Greek theater-goers are watching a play. 'What do you think?', one of them whispers to his neighbor. 'I like it', 'I don't'. This was the kind of prototypical situation we had in mind when designing the project that resulted in this volume. Such a scenario, completely credible in itself, immediately raises two issues. The first is: did they care? Was 'liking a play' (or any other artifact) an important question at all, and, if so, why? The Greeks and Romans do seem to have cared and this suggests the existence of a 'value of "aesthetics"' in classical antiquity, a general value attributed to the experience of art (as we will call it for now). The second issue is: how would the theater-goers have *motivated* any initial answer they might have given? *Why* would they consider a play good, sublime, stupid, or boring? Their criteria, the motivations for such snap judgments (and those of other people asked to discuss their experience of 'artistic' production) would be part of the range of 'aesthetic values' in ancient discourse. Both the 'value of "aesthetics"' and 'aesthetic values' are included in this project.[1]

We will not be concerned in this volume with the question of 'the aesthetic' as a universal feature or faculty of humans (or not), nor will we engage with the problem of modern 'aesthetics' as articulated from the eighteenth century onwards.[2] We take our cue from the etymological meaning of the word, derived from the verb αἰσθάνομαι, 'to perceive', and will be looking for historicized, embodied, and (potentially) culturally specific reactions to

* We would like to thank Joe Farrell for his insightful comments on the topic of this introduction.

1 For the value attributed to 'art', see the chapter by Stephen Halliwell in this volume; for 'aesthetic values', see below, sections 3 and 4.

2 Ever since Baumgarten 1750; Kant 1790; Hegel 1835. An excellent introduction in Sheppard 1987.

and evaluations of how the outside world impinged on the senses of ancient Greeks and Romans. We are not interested in the experience of just any kind of sensory input, but we restrict our focus to those reactions provoked by material things *regarded as* artifacts by the observer, as 'special matter', obviously including reactions to song, dance, performance, and poetry.[3] In line with the discourse-oriented approach of the Penn-Leiden Colloquia on Ancient Values, we will study in particular how agents in the classical world *enunciated* and *conceptualized* their experiences. We will not make the notion of beauty our central issue. Moreover, although the philosophical tradition will play an inevitable part in this volume, we are also interested in moving beyond the philosophical roles attributed to sense experience and beauty in order to see whether we can identify a mediation of more everyday experiences and discussions of art, 'special stuff', and taste, even in texts with a primarily philosophical focus.[4]

2. *Fans and Experts, High-Brow and Middle-Brow*

Aristophanes offers various vignettes that point to what we might call a theater-goer's critical discourse. *Frogs* gives us a Dionysus showing every symptom of a rapt fan in his admiration for Euripides. He uses the vocabulary of a fan, claiming to experience ἡδονή, 'pleasure', and even πόθος, 'desire', when thinking of Euripides. For Dionysus, this is a physical reaction.[5] In this introductory chapter, it may also serve as a first indication of the potentially problematic, and at the very least ambivalent, aspects of the aesthetic reaction. ἡδονή is always related to the emotions and to irrationality, something in need of domestication and control. In fact, it mirrors on

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[3] In this respect, we take our cue from Habinek 2010. We will be looking at ancient reactions to 'special speech', 'distinguished from everyday verbal communication through addition, deletion, or intensification of ordinary linguistic features' (2010, 219) and 'artifacts made special through the addition or deletion of features' (2010, 220), but will not impose a universal category or faculty of 'aesthetics'. Nor will we engage in the discussion of modern versus ancient concepts of 'aesthetics', for which see Eagleton 1990, Bychkov and Sheppard 2010, xi–xiv; Porter 2010, ch. 1. For 'making special', see Dissanayake 2000, Boyd 2005, 148 on the transformation of objects and/or actions that centrally defines 'art'.

[4] For a very good collection of relevant texts from the ancient philosophical tradition, see Bychkov and Sheppard 2010.

[5] See e.g. Ar. *Ran.* 53 ff. (πόθος), 58 (ἵμερος), 103 (μαίνομαι). Cf. Rosen 2004, 311, and see now also Halliwell 2011, 93–154. On Euripidean 'fandom' also Rosen 2006. Physical reactions to songs are attested frequently from the *Odyssey* onwards, e.g. when physical restraint or ear protection is needed when Odysseus and his men row by the Sirens (Hom. *Od.* 12.165–200), or when Odysseus weeps when he hears the songs about the Trojan war (Hom. *Od.* 8.83–86).

the reception side the creative impulse, related to μανία,[6] which erupts time and again, and carries with it notions such as the sublime with its capacity to rupture the scale of aesthetic evaluation itself.[7]

Returning to the *Frogs*, it soon becomes clear that Euripides has a complete fanclub in the Underworld,[8] in fact that he, as the more 'democratic' poet, is the people's favorite.[9] In a similar vein, a different Aristophanic character, Pheidippides in the *Clouds*, regards Aeschylus as hopelessly outdated and bombastic; he clearly belongs to the fans of Euripides, to the utter bewilderment of his father Strepsiades, who does not get the new-fangled cleverness, which requires a sophisticated attitude.[10]

Physical excitement, an almost erotic desire, is not the only possible reaction to a 'clever' poet. The aesthetic subject may move through a whole range of reactions, from perception (not enough in itself), to physical reaction, to emotion, cognition, and action.[11] An example of a more intellectual response may again be derived from Aristophanes, who does not represent Euripides as the only poet eliciting appreciations of cleverness. In fact, he imagines that his own work, too, might become the object of highbrow interpretation. In the *Peace* the dung-shoveling slaves envisage what some of the more highbrow spectators might make of the dung-beetle (Ar. *Pax* 43–48):[12]

> I bet now one of the spectators will be saying—
> some young wise guy, 'what does this mean
> What does that beetle refer to?' And then
> Some Ionian sitting by tells him:
> 'I think that must be a riddling reference to Cleon,
> So shamelessly is that creature eating that dung'.

> οὐκοῦν ἂν ἤδη τῶν θεατῶν τις λέγοι
> νεανίας δοκησίσοφος, "τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα τί;
> ὁ κάνθαρος δὲ πρὸς τί;" κᾆτ' αὐτῷ γ' ἀνὴρ
> Ἰωνικός τίς φησι παρακαθήμενος·
> "δοκέω μέν, ὡς Κλέωνα τοῦτ' αἰνίττεται,
> ὡς κεῖνος ἀναιδέως τὴν σπατίλην ἐσθίει".

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6 The *locus classicus* is Plato's *Phaedrus* 244b–249e, esp. 245a (on poetic 'madness').

7 Cf. the chapter on the sublime by James Porter and that of Curtis Dozier, dealing with transgression, in this volume.

8 Ar. *Ran*. 771–778, cf. Rosen 2006, 35–36.

9 Rosen 2004, 312–313.

10 Ar. *Nub*. 1366 ff., discussed by Rosen 2006, 32–34.

11 Cf. the chapter by Joseph Farrell in this volume.

12 All translations are our own.

The verb αἰνίττομαι 'making riddling allusion to' refers to a certain understanding of a 'special language' text, assuming a surplus of meaning hidden under the surface. The fact that the interpreter is willing to go the extra length to make sense of a puzzling situation, is itself a testimony to the relevance attached to what is clearly perceived as 'special communication'. Only under those circumstances do people consider it worth their while to invest cognitive energy in pressing a text or, in this case, a scene in a play, for meaning.[13] The imagined behavior of the audience is evidence of 'the value of "aesthetics"'. However, it is not just any spectator who would be capable of using this method: it is here attributed to an Ionian, apparently regarded as a culturally sophisticated consumer of art.[14]

Whereas the puzzlement of Strepsiades may be considered a representation of lowbrow judgment, and the young man watching *Peace* is a wannabe, the Ionian is clearly a *connoisseur*, who moves at the high end of the art-appreciation spectrum. Since most of the explicit literary-critical and philosophical tradition dealing with art and beauty belongs to the same culturally elevated level, it usually takes some slightly roundabout strategies to discover the aesthetic preferences of the 'regular' Greeks and Romans: popular taste. Apart from its Aristophanic representation, we may also think of the 'practical aesthetics' we find embedded unselfconsciously in unlikely places, such as the light-hearted treatise of the Hadrianic period *The Contest of Homer and Hesiod*, which reflects a long tradition of debate about poetic style, form, and meaning, going back to the fifth century.[15] In this contest, Homer loses to Hesiod unexpectedly, and in spite of the general popular judgment: the people who witness the poetic battle certainly think that Homer should take the prize. It is only the king who is presiding, who in a sweeping statement proclaims that Hesiod, the poet of rusticity and agricultural peace, should best a poet such as Homer, who sings of terrible things like war and death. While the *Certamen* can be seen as an enactment of a philosophical search for aesthetic criteria, it also demonstrates the clash between experts and fans.

We do not just have representations of the reactions of 'ordinary' theater-goers or consumers of poetry. In a famous scene of Euripides' *Ion*, we see a

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13 This is in accordance with the tenets of Relevance Theory in linguistic communication, as articulated by Sperber and Wilson in many publications, e.g. Wilson and Sperber 2004.

14 Cf. Struck 2004, 39–41.

15 See Ford 2002, 272 ff. on poetic contests. Specifically on the *Certamen*, see Rosen 2004, Koning 2010, 239–268. For the relationship of the *Certamen* to the work of the fourth-century sophist Alcidamas, see Richardson 1981.

group of women in an orgy of the 'touristic gaze',[16] when they are confronted with the frieze of the temple of Apollo at Delphi. The women draw each other's attention to the different depictions, describe and identify what they see, sometimes with reference to a familiar framework (their own embroidery patterns, for instance, Eur. *Ion* 196–197) or emotional connection (Eur. *Ion* 211 'I see Pallas, *my* goddess', λεύσσω Παλλάδ', ἐμὰν θεόν).

In several chapters of this volume, too, we have tried to identify the manifestations of popular taste and the kind of discourse inspired by it, for instance through the study of material culture and the motivated reactions we may detect to materiality, shape, workmanship, use or purpose, and economic value—all categories under which an aesthetic object may draw people's attention and elicit comments.[17] Our shared focus on identifying the characteristics of different aesthetic subjects and objects has also sharpened our awareness of issues of class, and even of art as luxury, restricted to the elite, which play a role in several of the following chapters.[18]

3. *What Makes Art Good?*

If one thing became clear from the investigations presented below, it is the sheer variety of aspects that can be taken into account in expressing aesthetic values. Once the first step is taken of putting something on a pedestal for special inspection, regarding it as 'made special', and therefore deserving of our critical energy,[19] its quality can be assessed in almost any terms: beauty, of course, will play a role, which itself can be explained as being harmonious, or well proportioned; a representation may be commended for being lifelike, or vivid, authentic or original,[20] but appreciation can also be based on functional terms: representations, song or dance may be useful,

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16 Eur. *Ion* 184–219. Cf. Porter 2010, 191, calling the scene 'a veritable declension of verbs for (ecphrastic) seeing'. The most extensive analysis of this ecphrasis is by Zeitlin 1994.

17 See the chapters by Alexandra Pappas, Elsa Bouchard, Jeremy McInerney, Craig Hardiman, and Bettina Reitz in this volume.

18 See the chapters by Elizabeth Jones, Bettina Reitz, Curtis Dozier, and Caitlin Gillespie in this volume.

19 This is the crucial moment separating what is considered 'art' from business as usual. Normally, the economy of life requires the minimal expenditure of critical energy; we have to believe that the extra attention will be worth our while before we are willing critically to engage any phenomenon at higher interpretive intensity (cf. at note 13). Deciding that it comes under a label such as 'art' can be a first step. Cf. Sluiter 1998 on the Principle of Charity.

20 See the chapter by Irene Peirano in this volume.

helpful in creating the shared attention necessary for good citizenship, or conducive to the proper habituation of (future) citizens.[21] They may procure pleasure, or their effects may be healing, or educational. Social or conventional aspects also play a role, as when the object of criticism is in line with social decorum (*decorum* or τὸ πρέπον).[22] As we saw above, a work of art may also appeal to the educated, precisely because the correct interpretation is the result of a sophisticated process. In fact, its token of excellence may be the very fact that it appeals to the right kind of people, for instance the senior citizens.[23] More unexpectedly, maybe, speed of production, costliness, and the sheer difficulty of projects requiring excessive sweat, toil, and exertion, may be considered recommendations, and hence turn into 'aesthetic values'.

Ultimately, the 'proper' or full effect of an aesthetic experience may even depend on the ability of spectators to become performers themselves, to take a place in the chain connecting muse to poet to poetry to performer to audience and to critics. This physical engagement with the aesthetic object, and the changing roles a spectator must assume as an aesthetic experience comes into being is highlighted in several chapters below.[24]

4. *The Penn-Leiden Project*

The Penn-Leiden Colloquia on Ancient Values are a research project on the language, discourse, and conceptualization of values in classical antiquity.[25] Different aspects of the discourse of value have come to the fore in explorations ranging from one specific individual value (*andreia*, manliness and courage), to a value that presupposes a community of at least two (*parrhêsia*, free speech); from the conceptual organization of values (by looking at the way in which values are associated with and cluster around notions such as 'city' and 'countryside') to the negative approach (what are the anti-

[21] See the chapters by Eleonora Rocconi, Myrthe Bartels, and Elizabeth Jones in this volume.

[22] See the chapter by Curtis Dozier in this volume.

[23] See the chapter by Myrthe Bartels in this volume.

[24] See the chapters by Myrthe Bartels and Elizabeth Jones in this volume; for the opposite position, the necessity of critical distance for successful appreciation, see the chapter by Carrie Mowbray.

[25] For a description of the different aspects covered in the previous instalments, see Sluiter 2008, 2–4. Earlier book publications from the Penn-Leiden project: Rosen and Sluiter 2003, 2006, and 2010; Sluiter and Rosen 2004 and 2008.

values of classical antiquity?). We also turned to an investigation of the different and culturally specific ways in which the Greeks and Romans express the value they attach to other people.

This time, in our sixth volume, as we stated above our concern was with the ways in which the Greeks and Romans talked about their appreciation for their sensory experience of the world around them, both natural and man-made, but always under the aspect of its being 'special'. What does it mean to speak of the 'value' of aesthetic phenomena? And in evaluating human arts and artifacts, what are the criteria for success or failure? The chapters that follow not only explore the evaluative concepts and terms applied to the arts, but also the social and cultural ideologies of aesthetic value itself.

5. *In This Volume …*

One way of approaching and clarifying Greek perceptions of 'aesthetic value' is to ask what might be thought wrong with a life that lacks, shows no interest in, or even denies such value. In chapter two, Stephen Halliwell's examination of *amousia*, and its related terms and concepts, shows that this question was posed in a variety of contexts in classical Greek culture. He offers a general framework for understanding the relationship of *amousia* to educational, social, intellectual and musico-poetic terms of reference, especially in Euripides, Aristophanes, and Plato. These authors, Halliwell argues, point to a conviction that something vital is lost or denied when life is lived without meaningful engagement with 'the Muses'. Even Plato, according to Halliwell, was deeply concerned that his own aesthetic theorizing in the *Republic* not be viewed as a form of philistinism or a repudiation of *mousikê*.

Chapter three contains James Porter's investigation of the status of 'the Sublime' as an aesthetic value. The sublime is consistently situated at the limit of or even outside any system of values for which it plays a role. As an outlier, this elusive 'value' indicates excess, and it goes hand in hand with a vocabulary of over-extension. It may refer both to the mysteries of matter ('the material sublime') or be applied to the immaterial or even divine realm ('the immaterial sublime'). Porter argues that an understanding of the nature and uses of the sublime may point the way towards an understanding of any aesthetic value as an expression of *aesthetic intensity*. This makes the sublime not so much an aesthetic value, as an expression of excessive intensity, a measure of thought pressed to its utmost limits.

In chapter four, Alexandra Pappas explores the aesthetic aspects of the use of writing on sympotic pottery and poses the question of how pots complicate conventional modes of perception. Many inscribed vases feature a mix of 'sense' and 'nonsense', the latter consisting of letters or near-letters that do not straightforwardly represent linguistic utterances. These nonsense inscriptions mimic sense inscriptions in shape and placement and create an aesthetic space at the interstices between the verbal and the visual. Focusing on the experience of the reader or viewer, Pappas considers 'nonsense' a special language, whose parodic aural and visual qualities elicit a playful exchange with the viewer. Pappas also provides a political contextualization and a reading in terms of class of these inscriptions in the Greek symposium.

Chapters five, six, seven, and eight focus on Plato and Aristotle and explore from different angles the relationship between aesthetics and ethics. Chapter five, by Eleonora Rocconi, addresses specifically the aesthetics of music as theorized by Plato. She focuses on music 'in our terms': song, rhythm, melody, and instrumental production, and she analyzes Plato's discussion of musical ethics and aesthetics in the *Republic* and *Laws*. Rocconi demonstrates forcefully how inextricably linked music was in Plato's mind with moral behavior, but she also detects certain points in his discussion where he seems receptive to the idea that music could, and should, be valued in purely aesthetic—not only ethical and pedagogical—terms.

In chapter six, Myrthe Bartels concentrates more particularly on *Laws* and on the special position of the elders in the authoritative evaluation of musical performances. If different age groups have different musical preferences, whose judgment counts as the 'right' or 'just' or 'correct' one? The *gerontes* are singled out as the authoritative judges of the objectively best music, while this competence itself also makes them the authority to determine the best kind of life. The intricate intertwinement of music and politics, ethics and aesthetics advocated in the *Laws* regards those musical performances as 'the best' that represents the best dispositions. The best, most virtuous dispositions lead to the best behaviors—and in fact, those behaviors are expressed in true laws. An important rhetorical link in this argument is provided by the term *nomos,* which can refer both to types of music and to laws.

Chapter seven turns to Aristotle. Elizabeth Jones argues that in Aristotle's *Politics* 8 a distinction is drawn between two types of pleasure related to *mousikê*. The first type is a natural pleasure, available to each and every auditor as an emotional baseline, which may be related to 'mimetic pleasure'. The second, more highly regarded type is 'moral pleasure', which is

developed through habit-forming education, that is to say through performance. Performance experience will also create better audience members and better judges, capable of discerning the moral and technical qualities of a musical performance on the basis of moral, 'correct' pleasure. The existence of two types of musical pleasure creates a class distinction between, on the one hand, the general audience, reacting according to the baseline natural pleasure, and, on the other, those in possession of performance knowledge, and hence having the educational advantage of moral pleasure.

In chapter eight, Elsa Bouchard investigates aesthetic value in Aristotle's *Poetics*, and in particular offers a reconstruction of popular poetic taste as represented in ancient critical (high-brow) discourse.[26] Aristotle, she claims, distinguishes between the strict aesthetic standards of the art, as applied by rigorous critics, and the standards of the audience, which define whether a tragedy will actually prove to be popular and a successful competitor. In this way, she aims to resolve an apparent contradiction between chapters 13 and 14 of the *Poetics*, where first the *Oedipus Tyrannus* and then the *Iphigenia in Tauris* is declared the best tragedy: the former appeals to the educated critic, the second to popular taste—reading the term *philanthrôpôs* as 'popular', 'loved by humans'. The same distinction between types of audience would also explain why Euripides so frequently acquired a chorus to take part in the competition, but so rarely won first prize. Popular taste and aesthetic value is taken to reflect the moral premises of the general public: poetry in harmony with those premises will be a crowd-pleaser.

Chapter nine shifts from the analysis of the classical philosophical tradition to a different approach, taking a specific potential value as its point of departure. In it, Irene Peirano addresses one of the most enduring problems of literary aesthetics, the importance of authorial and textual authenticity. Since the nineteenth century especially, we have become obsessed with establishing a work's authenticity, and this preoccupation has created for us a genuine aesthetics of authenticity. Works which we might conclude to be spurious in one way or another are almost universally condemned, and the entire philological enterprise begins with the attempt to establish the proper authorship of manuscripts. Peirano discusses the striking contrast between ancient and modern perspectives on such questions, and argues that they reflect fundamental differences in how each era understood the very nature and purpose of literature.

[26] See below on the chapters by Jeremy McInerney, Craig Hardiman, Bettina Reitz.

Moving into the Hellenistic period, the question of non-elite taste, already touched upon by Elsa Bouchard, takes center stage in chapters ten and eleven. When looking into the history of aesthetics and trying to ascertain the value placed upon aesthetics in classical antiquity, a central issue remains whether or not we can speak of a 'popular' aesthetics. In chapter ten, Jeremy McInerney approaches this question through his analysis of the applied aesthetics of the work by Heraclides Criticus, *On the Cities of Greece*. The book was written in the mid-third century BCE, when the production of culture for Athenians by Athenians had given way to the production of Athenianness and Greekness for a wider audience. Without attaching undue importance to the label 'middle-brow' itself, McInerney sees the mix of description and instant, often stereotypical, evaluation as an expression of a 'middle-brow aesthetics', through which Heraclides' guidebook offers an easy-access anthropology of Greece.

From a different angle, Craig Hardiman also tackles the issue of popular aesthetics in chapter eleven. Distancing himself, like McInerney, from the perspective of the intellectual and philosophical traditions and the theoretical treatments that have come down to us from antiquity, Hardiman addresses the question of whether there was such a thing as 'personal art appreciation', unmediated by the commentary of ancient professionals and critics. Hardiman focuses on the appreciation of Greek sculpture in the Hellenistic period, and suggests that the textual and material evidence point at what he calls 'non-professional aesthetic criticism', where one's subjective engagement with a work's physicality could intersect with the social forces of history and myth to create dynamic and idiosyncratic aesthetic experiences.

The last six chapters are devoted to the Roman world. In chapter twelve, Joseph Farrell explores issues of art, aesthetics, and connoisseurship in Vergil, focusing in particular on the way in which Vergil represents Aeneas' reactions, his 'aesthetic responses', to works of art. Elements of aesthetic response, involving Aeneas' senses, his intellect, and his emotions, can be detected from his first encounter with a work of art (the temple of Juno in Carthage) onwards. But whereas Aeneas has a complete cognitive grasp of the representations on the temple and is capable of recognizing and identifying its figurative elements, the hero seems to follow a trajectory in the *Aeneid* in which he understands less and less: in his final encounter with an artifact, the baldric of Pallas, he no longer perceives a work of art, but rather experiences it as a spur to action, a sign that reminds him of (the fate of) its former owner and incites him to kill Turnus.

Chapter thirteen once again brings up the question of 'popular aesthetics',[27] but Bettina Reitz focuses on Roman monumental architecture and the aesthetic guidance to viewers ('viewing instructions') architects and builders incorporated into their works. Through a careful examination of inscriptions, technical and literary texts, Reitz urges us to move beyond the common assumption that 'beauty' is the fundamental criterion of ancient aesthetic value in the case of Roman imperial culture; rather, she argues that Roman viewers of large buildings also interacted aesthetically with various contingencies of their physicality and conception, such as their mode of construction or how much they cost to build.

The study by Curtis Dozier in chapter fourteen jumps into the debate between, on the one hand, those who have argued that aesthetics (broadly construed, but specifically here with reference to Greco-Roman antiquity) should never be separated from politics and ideology, and those, on the other, who claim that it exists autonomously and largely on a hedonic spectrum. Dozier focuses on Quintilian's views on poetry in his *Institutio Oratoria*, beginning with his remark that poetry 'aims exclusively at pleasure'. Dozier takes a middle ground in the debate over ideology versus autonomous pleasure, arguing that in Roman culture, poetry could both define and affirm the boundaries of a hegemonic elite.

The contribution by Jennifer Ferriss-Hill (chapter fifteen) discusses the idiosyncratic ways in which Roman Satirists could thematize poetic aesthetics, as if other poets and poetic forms were their own personal targets. Whether it be Lucilius mocking Ennius or Accius, or Horace attacking Lucilian poetics, for example, all were interested, she argues, in conceptualizing certain poets and genres as legitimate objects of mockery and satire. Such strategies have their provenance in the literary criticism we find in Aristophanes and other poets of Old Comedy, who also understood the comic potential of linking literary style with personal character.

Chapter sixteen contains Carrie Mowbray's detailed analysis of *nefas* in Senecan drama and addresses a classic question in the history of aesthetics: wherein lies the pleasure and delight audiences experience when a play provides graphic and explicit representations of extreme behavior that in the real world would be considered reprehensible and immoral? Focusing on three Senecan plays famous for just such scenes, Mowbray examines the intricate interplay between Seneca's internal audiences who bear witness to gruesome and unethical events within the plot, and the external

[27] See above on the chapters by Elsa Bouchard, Jeremy McInerney, and Craig Hardiman.

audiences who watch the plays in the theater and must negotiate for themselves how to respond to such scenes. Mowbray explains how Seneca often uses his internal audiences as a vehicle for aesthetic commentary, offering spectators some orientation for their own interpretation of the action.

Finally, in chapter seventeen Caitlin Gillespie traces a very specific literary development of the well-known philosophical notion that aesthetics play an educational role.[28] In the novel *Daphnis and Chloe*, the perception of (natural) beauty and the pleasures associated with that perception are the means of erotic education. Gillespie brings out in particular issues of gender, class, and location in Chloe's transformation from the young country girl responding to the aesthetic experience of rustic natural beauty into a beautifully adorned object of male aesthetic contemplation, suitable to be the wife of a young nobleman, in an urban environment.

We began the adventure of the Penn-Leiden Colloquia on Ancient Values in 2000, and with this volume will have co-edited six volumes between 2003 and 2012. The intensive collaboration between our departments, the Department of Classical Studies of the University of Pennsylvania and the Department of Classics at Leiden University, has been a great source of joy and satisfaction over the years, and we are deeply grateful to our colleagues and students for engaging in this enterprise so wholeheartedly and supportively. In all six colloquia and volumes, Leiden and Penn scholars and students have been active and present in various capacities, and our friends and colleagues in our home institutions have helped us in more ways (many hardly visible, but no less essential) than we can possibly recount here. It is an immense pleasure to know that this collaboration will continue and that changing teams of one scholar from Penn and one from Leiden will provide new impulses and ideas to our collaborative and interdisciplinary colloquia. When this book comes out, 'Penn-Leiden VII' will have just taken place in Leiden (June 2012) under the direction of Latinists Christoph Pieper (Leiden University) and James Ker (University of Pennsylvania)—an instant remedy to the slight but steady preponderance of Greek contributions to our volumes over the past years, something for which two Hellenists need hardly apologize, but which does bear rebalancing.

For this particular volume the editors owe many thanks for generous financial assistance to Penn's Center for Ancient Studies, the Department

[28] See in this volume in particular chapters five through eight, as described above. Caitlin Gillespie mostly refers to Plato's *Symposium.*

of Classical Studies of the University of Pennsylvania, OIKOS (the National Research School in Classical Studies, the Netherlands). The always efficient, 'unruffable', and cheerful Sarah Scullin assisted us in organizing the conference, in turn helped by administrative assistant Cheryl Graham-Seay: thank you both! We benefited from the expertise and competence of many colleagues in critiquing all contributions. A warm thank you to Joan Booth, Kim Bowes, Caroline van Eck, Casper de Jonge, Joe Farrell, James Ker, Cathy Keane, Emilie van Opstall, Christoph Pieper, Jim Porter, Marlein van Raalte, Susan Sauvé Meyer, and Folkert van Straten. Sarah Scullin and Joëlle Koning-Bosscher helped us with great care and a cheerful and expert eye for detail to prepare the book for publication, and in preparing the Index of passages. Hetty Sluiter-Szper graciously helped us with the Greek index. It was a great pleasure to get to work once again with Linda Woodward, whose personal expertise in the field of ancient aesthetics and professional competence as a copy-editor saved us from numerous errors. Caroline van Erp and Irene van Rossum were our sympathetic publishers at Brill. We would also like to thank the Center for Hellenic Studies, director Greg Nagy, and the CHS wonderful staff (in the library and elsewhere) for the hospitality and terrific research facilities offered to Ineke Sluiter in January 2012, and the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Wassenaar and its director and staff for welcoming both of us in the Spring semester of 2012.

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We dedicate this book to our colleagues and friends of our two Departments, in celebration of the study of Classics.

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CHAPTER TWO

AMOUSIA: LIVING WITHOUT THE MUSES*

Stephen Halliwell

1. *Introduction*

Without music life would be a mistake: 'Ohne Musik wäre das Leben ein Irrthum'. So, famously, wrote Friedrich Nietzsche in the first section ('Maxims and Arrows') of *Twilight of the Idols*.[1] As always, Nietzsche had deeply personal reasons for the force and pathos of this aphorism; music did indeed help to keep him alive. His words also betray an impulse, I think, to modify Schopenhauer's pessimistically unqualified statement in *Parerga und Paralipomena* that 'human existence must be a kind of error'.[2] But over and above those motivations, we can detect in Nietzsche's stark utterance, I would like to suggest, a trace and resonance of Greek feeling. We might even wonder whether in formulating his maxim Nietzsche was subconsciously remembering the passage in Plato's *Philebus* where Protarchus, asked by Socrates whether music, as one of the 'impure' arts, is needed for the mixture of a humanly desirable life, says that he certainly takes it to be necessary—'at any rate', as he puts it, 'if our life is really to *be* a life of some kind' (εἴπερ γε ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἔσται καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ποτε βίος, Pl. *Phlb.* 62c).[3] Without music, Protarchus supposes (and he seems to take the idea to be practically self-evident), human 'life' would hardly be worth the name at all. And

* I am very grateful to Ralph Rosen and Ineke Sluiter for inviting me to speak at the 2010 Penn–Leiden Colloquium, and to my fellow participants for their helpful responses to my ideas.

[1] *Götzen-Dämmerung*, 'Sprüche und Pfeile' 33, in Nietzsche 1988, VI, 64. For one account of the importance of music to Nietzsche, see Safranski 2002, 19–24.

[2] 'Daß das menschliche Dasein eine Art Verirrung sein müsse, …' [spelling modernized], *Parerga und Paralipomena*, vol. II, ch. 11 §146, in Schopenhauer 1988, V, 261 (for a translation see Schopenhauer 1974, 287).

[3] Cf. Frede 1997, 350–351 on the context. West 1992, 13–38 cites further evidence for the importance of music in Greek life.

it is Socrates, despite his lofty disdain for the philosophical 'imprecision' of music's technical resources, who prompts him to that conclusion.

Whether or not Nietzsche had this Platonic passage at the back of his mind when composing his own aphorism, we have strong justification for treating the question whether human life needs music as an authentically Greek concern: a concern which encompasses not just 'music' in the narrower denotation of the word but the whole of *mousikê* as the collective realm of the Muses and their contribution to the enhancement of existence.[4] If the Muses can be thought of as the divine source (or at least a projection onto the divine)[5] of distinctive forms of experiences, even forms of life, then one way of enriching our understanding of what they stand for is to engage with Greek reflections on what happens when they are absent from the lives either of individuals or of social groups. What I aim to do in this chapter is to treat the idea of a life lived without the Muses (or even, at an extreme, in *denial* of them) as a way of broaching some of the issues involved in attempts to identify and make sense of Greek conceptions of the 'value of aesthetics'.

The lack of any one-to-one correspondence between modern uses of 'aesthetic(s)' and the vocabulary of Classical Greek is a complex matter. But the complexity is not all the result, as sometimes alleged, of an ancient conceptual deficit; it arises just as much from the uncertainties and obscurities which attach to the modern terminology itself. I do not myself believe that there is anything like a stable modern understanding of 'aesthetics' or 'the aesthetic', only a set of competing models and values. There is no such thing as the 'purely aesthetic'; attempts to demarcate one come up against the multiplicity of both psychological and cultural factors which enter into all the relevant areas of experience. If we want to clarify the relationship between ancient and modern patterns of thought on this subject, we need to allow for a plurality of (partially overlapping) vocabulary, ideas, and imagery. We also need to be prepared to think dialectically: which is to say, be prepared to expose our own conceptions of what counts as aesthetic value to the force of various ancient arguments and attitudes, rather than reasoning from a fixed paradigm of the aesthetic. Part of the importance of

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4 For one account of the concept of *mousikê*, see Koller 1963, 5–16.

5 Greeks not only treat human experience of 'music' as a gift of the Muses; they see the Muses as integral to the gods' pleasure in their *own* existence. See, among much else, Pind. fr. 31 (Snell–Maehler), where the Muses are brought into being to satisfy a divine request to 'adorn' (κατακοσμεῖν) Zeus's world-order in song. For one reading of this Pindaric fragment, see Pucci 1998, 31–34.

ancient forms of 'aesthetic value', as I see it, resides precisely in their *resistance* to the modern presumption of a single, neatly circumscribed sphere of aesthetic experience. I have tried to undertake that kind of dialectical thinking for one major ancient concept (or 'family' of concepts) in my book *The Aesthetics of Mimesis*.[6] In the present chapter, I propose to treat notions of *amousia*—itself hard to translate by any single term, but embracing various failures and/or refusals to cultivate the values of 'music' (*mousikê*) and the Muses—as a clue to certain Greek ways of thinking which have a special bearing on the problems of aesthetics.

I shall be concerned not only with the terminology of *amousia* itself but also with a cluster of ideas and values with which it is associated or comes into contact. At the core of my argument will be the thesis that Greek culture gave rise to a conviction that to live 'without music' (to which the phrase μετ' ἀμουσίας, soon to be encountered, provides a close approximation) is to lack something essential to the most fulfilling kind of human existence: to lack, indeed, a particular type of 'life-value'. On this view, if the Muses and their extended domain of *mousikê*, are absent or neglected or even repudiated, then in some way *the whole of life* will be affected by that negative condition. This is not a claim that one can (or should try to) expound systematically on the basis of our Greek sources; it is not so much a doctrine as a sensibility, an outlook on life. But one can find hints and pointers towards it in many places. The present analysis will discuss three main test cases: first, the evidence of Euripidean usage, and above all a lyric passage which expresses the idea of life itself as somehow *needing* the gifts of the Muses (though voicing this idea within a context of inescapably tragic irony); secondly, two examples from Aristophanes which lend a characteristic twist of comic paradox to the notion of *amousia* and kindred terms; thirdly, a selection of passages from the dialogues of Plato, who pays a kind of compliment to the 'musical' values of his culture, but at the same time reinterprets and revalues them for his own purposes, by converting the idea of *amousia* into part of a distinctively philosophical 'aesthetic', making it a concept of what is lacking in the life/soul which lacks the ability to respond authentically to non-material forms of beauty and truth.

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[6] See Halliwell 2002, esp. 1–14, for my general approach to the history of 'aesthetics'; cf. Halliwell 2009 for a résumé of my view of ancient thought as usefully resistant to modern paradigms of aesthetics as a single domain.

2. *Euripides and Tragedy's Rejection of* amousia

The origin and earliest uses of the adjective *amousos*, as well as of the near-synonymous *apomousos*, are now impossible to reconstruct. The first surviving occurrence of *amousos* is in Empedocles 81 B74 DK, a single-line fragment in which an unknown feminine subject, often assumed to be the cosmic force of Love (Φιλία), is described as 'leading the unmusical tribe of prolific fish'.[7] While we can be confident that the significance of *amousos* here includes the idea of 'silent' or 'without speech', the lost context makes the word's further connotations uncertain; but what is evoked may have been the thought of the whole 'world' of fish as one which blocks out the sounds of human culture, both speech and music.[8] Rather different is the earliest occurrence of *apomousos* in a remarkable passage of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* in which the chorus recall the negative impression Agamemnon made on them when he originally led off the Greek army for Troy: '[you were] pictured in my mind … in exceedingly ugly colors', 'you were pictured very inartistically', 'you made a most unpleasing picture to me', are three attempts to capture the thrust of the boldly metaphorical phrase κάρτ' ἀπομούσως ἦσθα γεγραμμένος.[9] One implication of this figurative usage is that there was already available by this date a conception of *mousikê* which encompassed sensitivity to visual art. Another is that the values of *mousikê* are symbolically charged with more than surface meaning. What disturbed the Argives who watched the army depart was not in fact something purely visual about Agamemnon but his whole demeanor and state of mind, exhibited above all in his sacrifice of Iphigeneia (herself compared by the chorus, in an earlier passage, to a piercingly pitiful figure in a painting).[10] The flaws in the 'picture' of Agamemnon, as the Argive onlookers saw it, were flaws in the conduct of a life.

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7 φῦλον ἄμουσον ἄγουσα πολυσπερέων καμασήνων. Tr. Inwood 2001, 253 (his fr. 82); Graham 2010, I, 391 (his no. 137) translates *amouson* as 'uncultured'. For one possible context in the poem, see Guthrie 1965, 206 n. 2.

8 Cf. 'speechless' (ἀναύδων) fish at Aesch. *Pers.* 577, Soph. fr. 762, and the saying 'dumber than fish', ἀφωνότερος τῶν ἰχθύων at Lucian *Somn.* 1. Note a different evocation of the marine world in the phrase 'unmusical melody of the seashore' (ἄμουσον ἀκτῆς … μέλος), *TrGF* 2.705b.11, which may be post-classical.

9 Aesch. *Ag.* 801, with translations by Fraenkel 1950, I, 139 (cf. his discussion, ibid. II, 363); Denniston and Page 1957, 139; Collard 2002, 23.

10 See Aesch. *Ag.* 242, where the image of a gagged Iphigeneia who can nonetheless strike the onlookers through the eyes seems to play on something akin to Simonides' famous description of painting as 'silent poetry' (see esp. Plut. *Mor.* 346F, 748A).

Even after making allowances for gaps in our evidence, it is striking that after the two passages noted above the great majority of the other dozen or so surviving fifth-century occurrences of *amousos* (and *apomousos*)[11] are concentrated in Euripides, who apparently had a penchant for the vocabulary of *amousia* and whose work illustrates the subtlety of its semantics.[12] The terminology in question can refer directly to aspects of musical performance, denoting for example the cacophonous, drunken singing of figures such as Heracles and Polyphemus. Even in these cases, however, the quality of being *amousos*, though an attribute of the vocal sounds themselves, implies something about the condition or character of the singer: something temporary in the case of Heracles (a musically ambiguous figure in general—a fact which will recur below), something more intrinsically and irredeemably bestial in that of Polyphemus.[13] This implication is elsewhere strongly underlined by passages in which *amousia* is a negative attribute that extends explicitly beyond music as such into the wider realm of character and conduct. In a fragment from Euripides' *Ino*, someone takes it as a mark of *amousia* to fail to shed tears over pitiful things, treating the trait, in other words, as a kind of emotional insensitivity, though one with readily recognizable implications for responsiveness to poetry, song, and music.[14] Ion, in the play named after him, is induced by what he regards as a virtually

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[11] Eur. *Med.* 1089, 'not strangers to the Muse' (Page 1938, 151), οὐκ ἀπόμουσον, describes that minority of women, including themselves (cf. 1085, 'we too have a Muse', ἔστιν μοῦσα καὶ ἡμῖν), whom the chorus take to have the cultured education and wisdom to compete with a male understanding of life: the passage implies a conception of *mousikê* which, once again, combines ideas of musico-poetic sophistication and a broader 'culture' of the mind. Cf. Mastronarde 2002, 346–348. For ἀπόμουσος cf. also n. 13 below.

[12] The only surviving attestation from Sophocles has the form ἀμούσωτος, which may mean 'without having heard the music': see fr. 819 with Pearson 1917, III, 47 for Mekler's speculation about the lost context.

[13] Heracles 'howls' (an animal metaphor) 'unmusically', ἄμουσ' ὑλακτῶν, at Eur. *Alc.* 760 and likewise in fr. 907 (where the musical standard is bad enough for 'a barbarian to notice'); for his musical ambiguity, see section 3 with n. 46 below. The same term, ἄμουσα, describes Polyphemus' singing at Eur. *Cyc.* 426 (cf. 489–490, quoted in my text below). A further point shared by *Alc.* 760–762 and *Cyc.* 425–426 is the evocation of *clashing* sound registers: rowdy celebration set against weeping. The Sphinx's 'songs' at Eur. *Phoen.* 807, an ironic metaphor for her riddle, are 'most unmusical' (ἀμουσοτάταισι mss., emended to ἀπομουσοτάταισι for metrical reasons by Nauck).

[14] Eur. *Ino*, fr. 407, ἀμουσία τοι μηδ' ἐπ' οἰκτροῖσιν δάκρυ/στάζειν. Cf. Eur. *El.* 294, only the wise person (σοφός), not the ignorant (ἀμαθής), feels pity: see Denniston 1939, 85; Dover 1974, 119–123; Bond 1981, 134–135 for the cluster of associations which this exemplifies. *Qua* 'insensitivity', *amousia* would probably have counted as one form of ἀναισθησία (see Dover 1974, 59, 122–123; Diggle 2004, 333 for the scope of this concept), though no classical source makes the connection directly.

physical assault on him by Xuthus to generalize about those who are 'uncultured and mad' (ἀμούσους καὶ μεμηνότας, Eur. *Ion* 526). *Amousia,* it seems, can be manifested equally by an absence or a surfeit of emotion.

Such passages point towards a flexible conception of *amousia* (moving easily between the literal and the metaphorical)[15] which centers on a lack of sensitivity, sophistication, and finesse. The same is true of Euripides fr. 1033, in which one character evidently reproves another with the aphoristic statement, 'to be obtuse is, in the first place, to display *amousia*' (τὸ σκαιὸν εἶναι πρῶτ' ἀμουσίαν ἔχει). The conjunction with 'obtuseness' is informative. The adjective *skaios,* literally 'left(-handed)' and capable of conveying various shades of 'crass', 'uncouth', 'inept' or the like, is interestingly used in some contexts for insensitivity relating directly to musico-poetic art. The chorus at Aristophanes *Wasps* 1013 calls 'obtuse' (σκαιῶν θεατῶν) those spectators on whom the allusive significance of the play's *parabasis* might be lost. This brings the term within a familiar discourse used by the comic poet to praise or blame his audiences for their sophistication and cleverness or lack thereof: *skaios* (stupid, inept, crass) is the contrary of both *sophos* and *dexios,* which between them cover various kinds of cleverness, adeptness, and sophistication.[16] With *skaios* as with *amousos,* it is easy for the boundaries between various domains of activity to be blurred. Later in *Wasps* itself, Bdelucleon calls his father 'obtuse and uneducated' (ὦ σκαιὲ κἀπαίδευτε, Ar. *Vesp.* 1183) in an exasperated reaction to Philocleon's lack of sympotic adeptness. The 'aesthetics' of the symposium are a combination of social and musical skills.[17] Bdelucleon's two adjectives resonate with this interplay of values.

As it happens, these same adjectives are applied to Polyphemus in a passage of Euripides' *Cyclops* precisely with reference to that drunken singing which I have already mentioned is termed *amousos* elsewhere in the play.

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15 For a notable case of metaphor, see Pl. *Hp. mai.* 292c, where 'singing a dithyramb out of tune' (διθύραμβον τοσουτονὶ ᾄσας οὕτως ἀμούσως) refers to giving a flawed answer to a conceptual question; cf. n. 62 below. The note on this passage in Tarrant 1928, 59 is potentially misleading ('the word' refers only to the adverbial form).

16 On *Wasps* 1013 and the comic poet's treatment of his audience, see Imperio 2004, 270–271. For *skaios* and *sophos* as opposites see e.g. Eur. *Med.* 298–299, *HF* 299–300, *Heracl.* 458–459; for *skaios* and *dexios* (also spatial opposites *qua* 'left' and 'right': Pl. *Phdr.* 266a), see Ar. *Vesp.* 1265–1266 (with n. 17 below). Note also Pl. *Resp.* 411e2, quoted in section 4 below. On *skaios,* cf. Dover 1974, 120, 122; Chantraine 1956, 61–62.

17 Cf. Lissarrague 1990 for one approach to the idea of sympotic aesthetics, Ford 2002, 25–45 for another. When Amynias is called *skaios* at Ar. *Vesp.* 1266, it also seems to be for reasons related to his sympotic history (with a suggestion that he lacked the social-cum-musical finesse to maintain a place in wealthy circles like those of Leogoras).

The chorus dub Polyphemus 'an uncouth non-singer' (σκαιὸς ἀπῳδός) who 'tries to make music from hideous noise' (ἄχαριν κέλαδον μουσιζόμενος) and needs 'educating' for shortcomings which are simultaneously musical and social.[18] A character described as 'uncouth and rustic' (σκαιός ... κἄγροικος) in a fragment of Ephippus for talking crudely is accused of perpetrating the linguistic equivalent of a lack of sartorial stylishness (something else, we recall, true of Philocleon in the symposium rehearsal in *Wasps*).[19] In Aristophanes' *Clouds*, Socrates brands Strepsiades 'rustic and obtuse' (ἀγρεῖος εἶ καὶ σκαιός, Ar. *Nub*. 655) for his inability, among other things, to grasp the technicalities of metrical rhythms (a subject Socrates thinks can make one 'seem smart at social gatherings' like symposia, κομψὸν ἐν συνουσίᾳ, Ar. *Nub*. 649). Notwithstanding the double-edged humor of this last passage, the force of the term *skaios* as denoting ineptitude across a wide spectrum of socio-cultural behavior is clear. And it is hard to challenge the speaker of Euripides fr. 1033 for bringing the term, as we saw, within the ambit of *amousia*.

The evidence so far gathered suggests that *amousia* was a concept with broad evaluative ramifications, some of which will reappear at various stages of my analysis. While it could apply in a strict sense to defects in musico-poetic knowledge or proficiency, it was also extendable to a lack of refinement, understanding, or sensitivity which manifests itself in different areas of personal and social behavior. As a result, the idea of *amousia* cuts across what modern categorization might demarcate as separate domains of aesthetic, emotional, educational, and ethical experience. In what was to become a practically proverbial passage from Euripides' *Stheneboea* where the Nurse (?) says that 'Eros teaches (someone to become) a poet, even if he was previously *amousos*' (ποιητὴν δ' ἄρα / Ἔρως διδάσκει, κἂν ἄμουσος ᾖ τὸ πρίν, Eur. fr. 663), it is not easy to hold cleanly apart two nuances of the adjective: one, a lack of aptitude for, the other a lack of any interest in, poetry.[20] There are, moreover, hints in some of the passages already cited of a complementary implication, namely that the symptoms of *amousia* are not a matter of discrete features of a person but more like the disclosure (in the eyes of those who make the judgment) of the defective structure of a character, personality, or sensibility. *Amousia* can be thought of, in that sense, as the condition of a life and its values as a whole.

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18 Eur. *Cyc*. 488–493.

19 Ephippus fr. 23 KA: cf. Halliwell 2008, 240. Philocleon struggles with dress and deportment at Ar. *Vesp*. 1122–1173.

20 See Collard et al. 1995, 94.

There is one further passage of Euripides which brings out that last point with eloquent clarity and which I would now like to consider in some detail, though without attempting to provide anything like an integrated reading of the text in its full dramatic context. In the second stasimon of *Heracles*, the chorus of elderly Thebans celebrate the recent return of the hero and the prospect of his family's rescue from the tyrant Lycus. Picking up a theme from the end of their previous song (Eur. *HF.* 436–441), they start by reflecting in the first strophic pair on the attractions of youthfulness (νεότας, ἥβα) and the corresponding oppressiveness of old age.[21] Following on from those thoughts, the chorus then affirm, in the second strophe, their commitment to a life suffused with the values of the Muses (Eur. *HF.* 673–686):

I shall not cease to blend the Graces
with the Muses,
loveliest of partnerships.
May I never live without the Muses,
may I always live amidst garlands!
Old I may be, but I am still a singer
who proclaims with full voice the goddess Memory
and still sings for Heracles
the hymn of glorious victory
along with Bromios giver of wine,
along with the melody of seven-stringed lyre
and Libyan pipes.
I shall not yet put aside
the Muses who set me dancing.

οὐ παύσομαι τὰς Χάριτας
ταῖς Μούσαισιν συγκαταμει-
γνύς, ἡδίσταν συζυγίαν.
μὴ ζῴην μετ' ἀμουσίας,
αἰεὶ δ' ἐν στεφάνοισιν εἴην·
ἔτι τοι γέρων ἀοιδὸς
κελαδῶ Μναμοσύναν,
ἔτι τὰν Ἡρακλέους
καλλίνικον ἀείδω
παρά τε Βρόμιον οἰνοδόταν
παρά τε χέλυος ἑπτατόνου

[21] Bond 1981, 224–248 provides full commentary on this and other details of the stasimon; Parry 1965 offers a reading of the ode as a variant on Pindaric epinician; cf. Swift 2010, 129–131. On the second strophic pair, see Lanata 1963, 175–178. Wright 2010, 172–173 sees in this passage a clustering of conventional motifs of 'poetics'.

μολπὰν καὶ Λίβυν αὐλόν.
οὔπω καταπαύσομεν
Μούσας αἵ μ' ἐχόρευσαν.

Particularly marked here (making this another passage which might have been in Nietzsche's subconscious when he wrote his own aphorism) is the feeling that a life without the Muses, a life of *amousia*,[22] is radically impoverished and incomplete in value. The chorus of another, unknown Euripidean play (the fragment is sometimes speculatively assigned to *Antiope*), goes further still, counting a life without the Muses as a kind of death in life (Eur. fr. 1028):

> Whoever in youth neglects the Muses
> has perished for the whole of his past
> and is dead for the future as well.
>
> ὅστις νέος ὢν μουσῶν ἀμελεῖ
> τόν τε παρελθόντ' ἀπόλωλε χρόνον
> καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα τέθνηκεν.

As with the remark of Protarchus in Plato's *Philebus* (we need music 'if our life is really to *be* a life of some kind', section 1 above), the choruses of both these Euripidean texts voice a conviction that the realm of the Muses is no self-contained, detachable activity but a complete dimension of life itself, a dimension without which life would be badly diminished. A salient feature of the passage from *Heracles* is the expressive suggestion that what the Muses endow human existence with is a counterbalance to, and compensation for, the process of aging and dying: in a way which echoes many archaic Greek sentiments, the beauty of song resists and even transcends the condition of mortality.[23] This point is all the more poignantly significant in the light of the chorus's counterfactual thought-experiment in the first antistrophe of the same stasimon that if the gods could adopt a perspective of *human* wisdom they would allow the good a second life, a second enjoyment of youth (δίδυμον ... ἥβαν, Eur. *HF*. 657) as a visible sign of their virtue. The transition from acceptance that this can never be so to the chorus's double assertion, as aging singers (and, in the second

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[22] LSJ s.v. ἀμουσία II translate the term at *HF* 676 oddly as 'want of harmony'. The full force of 'without the Muses' is correctly seen by Lanata 1963, 176; Bond 1981, 239 (Euripides has 're-etymologized' the word).

[23] Cf. Wilson 1999–2000, 435 on 'the regenerative powers of *mousike*' in this passage, but setting it (433–439) against the imagery of destructive Dionysiac music which is to follow (cf. n. 30 below).

antistrophe, as a dying swan, Eur. *HF.* 692), that they will 'never cease' to dedicate themselves to the Muses, nonetheless transmits a subtle sense that the gifts of the Muses are a means of maintaining the value of a life in the face of its physical decline.[24]

The state of mind expressed by the chorus in this ode makes the Muses part of an intricate web of values. They represent a kind of compound, compendious *mousikê* in which vocal song, instrumental music (of both strings and woodwind), celebration (with garlands, victory hymns, and wine), choral dance, Dionysiac intoxication (Eur. *HF.* 682), and Memory (itself symbolizing a mixture of cultural tradition, memorialization, and musical facility) are all intertwined. In a familiar kind of tragic self-reference, the chorus's own performance embodies all these things in the theatrical moment itself, at the same time as the Theban elders avow them within the world of the drama.[25] The conjunction of the Muses with the Graces (an old one, of course, and the legacy of a deep-rooted archaic Greek aesthetic) adds an expanded suggestion of radiance and pleasure which reinforces the idea that what the chorus devotes itself to is a 'music' tantamount to the fullness and fulfillment of life at its most beautiful.[26] One might aptly compare Pindar's *Olympian* 14, a poem which on one level is about the power of song itself (including its capacity to transcend death, here by taking 'news' of the young victor's success to his father in Hades) and in which the Graces are described as the source of *all* the pleasures and rewards (physical, intellectual, social—and above all 'musical') of both human and divine existence.[27]

If one of the functions of the second stasimon of *Heracles* is to express and enact an ideal of aesthetic value, that ideal does not purport to be self-sufficient or detached from the rest of existence. The chorus are not voicing abstract feelings; their words have a social context and meaning: they are celebrating and memorializing a momentous event, the triumphant return of Heracles 'from the dead' as the latest achievement of his remarkable life. (They had surveyed his previous labors in the first stasimon of the

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24 See Hardie 2004, 30–31 for the view that *HF* 657–666 evokes the symbolism of mystery religion. Mystery religion is certainly relevant to the play more generally (e.g. Seaford 1994, 378–381) but any resonance of it in this passage is obscured, to my mind, by the counterfactual pathos of the chorus's sentiments.

25 See Henrichs 1996, 54–55; cf. Henrichs 1995 for choral self-referentiality more generally.

26 For the Kharites and Muses together, see West 1966, 177 on Hes. *Theog.* 64; cf. e.g. Ar. *Av.* 782, *Eccl.* 974a, fr. 348 KA. On 'blending' (συγκαταμειγνύς) the Graces with the Muses at *HF* 674–675, note the same verb at Xen. *Hier.* 6.2, where it denotes immersing the mind in sympotic celebrations (and escaping from life's problems); cf. Halliwell 2008, 112–113.

27 Pind. *Ol.* 14.5–6.

play, Eur. *HF.* 348–441, which was at the same time a kind of lament for his descent to Hades.) Moreover, in the second antistrophe they claim an explicitly ethical function for their songs. Comparing themselves to the Delian maidens who perform paeans at Apollo's temple on that island,[28] they think of themselves (and in a sense assume the role of) singing a paean outside Heracles' palace like a dying swan. In doing so they claim that 'what is right is the foundation of my hymns' (τὸ γὰρ εὖ/τοῖς ὕμνοισιν ὑπάρχει, Eur. *HF.* 694–695). Song is an affirmation of more than its own pleasure; in the present case, it revolves around allegiance to Heracles as a bastion of excellence and a protection against various evils. That is why the stasimon ends with a resounding proclamation of Heracles' status as a son of Zeus who has helped to rid the world of monsters and thereby made it safer for human life (Eur. *HF.* 696–700).

The ode as a whole, then, is a vehicle of self-consciously poetic and musical praise which situates itself within a cluster of interactive values: performative beauty of voice, instruments, and dance; intensity of pleasure in the awareness of how the Muses, in collaboration with the Graces, make possible a celebration of life in defiance of its physical failings and the prospect of death; and, finally, a commitment to ethical, religious, and social standards of virtue which can themselves be fitly memorialized in song. For these Theban elders, a life 'without the Muses', a life μετ' ἀμουσίας (Eur. *HF.* 676), would indeed lack much more than music *stricto sensu*.

Yet what the chorus enacts in this ode (as well as in their almost ecstatic rejoicing over the death of Lycus, soon afterwards, in the third stasimon, Eur. *HF.* 763–814) is overcast by a terrible cloud of dramatic irony. There will soon be nothing left to celebrate about Heracles' return or his relationship to the gods; quite the reverse. To consider what difference such tragic irony makes to the values espoused by the chorus would require, in a sense, a complete theory of tragedy itself. I shall have to limit myself, for present purposes, to the rather bald claim that it is precisely because tragedy is itself a form of experience which, for its own audience, depends profoundly on values of *mousikê* that the chorus's deprecation of a life 'without the Muses' (μετ' ἀμουσίας) cannot be, and is not, simply nullified by the appalling consequences of Heracles' madness later in the play.[29] That madness may itself be viewed through the imagery of perverted music and dance.[30] The

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28 See Henrichs 1996, 55–60; cf. Rutherford 2001, 29, 114–115.

29 For tragedy itself as part of *mousikê*, note Ar. *Ran.* 797; cf. n. 48 below.

30 See esp. the ironic metaphors of music and dance at *HF* 871, 879, 889–890, 895, 925, 1303–1304, with Henrichs 1996, 60–62; cf. n. 23 above.

chorus will not, however, stop singing when they hear of Heracles' crazed slaughter of his children. They will sing a *different* kind of song instead, a song of anguished lament (in the course of which they will refer again directly to the Muses).[31]

So in a deeply paradoxical way the tragedy as a whole bears witness, both dramatically and in its own performance, to the chorus's continuing need for song and to their aversion to a life without the Muses. In that respect *Heracles* is ultimately representative of a central element in Attic tragedy's intrinsic nature. Tragedy testifies, among much else, to the possibility of turning, and the *need* to turn, to the expressive resources of 'song' even in the face of the worst. For some of (though not all) the direct victims of tragic misfortune there may be only the silence of death, a silence specifically characterized by the chorus of *Oedipus at Colonus* as a loss of music ('without the lyre, without dancing', ἄλυρος ἄχορος, Soph. *OC* 1222).[32] But within the larger dramatic world of tragedy, as well as in the genre's performative relationship to its audience, there always remains space for a 'music' which even disaster cannot wholly destroy. Furthermore, behind this fundamental component of tragic poetics is an older Greek sensibility, which makes the Muses symbolic of the capacity of song not just to come to terms with, but to impose a kind of consoling order onto, *all* aspects of existence, including suffering and death. The image of the Muses singing a lament for the dead Achilles in *Odyssey* 24 is an instructive emblem of this point.[33] The voices of the 'real' Muses are indefeasibly beautiful, and that is the aspiration of all human music too, including tragedy. Set against this larger background, the *amousia* which the chorus of *Heracles* deprecate so emphatically is a negation, we might say, of an aesthetic for, and of, life in its entirety.

3. *Aristophanes and the Comic Ambiguities of* amousia

There is, however, another side to the matter. The chorus's aversion to *amousia* in the second stasimon of *Heracles* hints delicately at the idea that not everyone would necessarily feel as they do. Tragedy, as part of the 'grand tradition' of Greek poetry, is undoubtedly wedded to an elaborate

[31] *HF* 1022, though the text is vexed: see Bond 1981, 327. Note also the chorus's self-conscious questioning about what kind of 'song for the dead' and 'chorus for Hades' they should sing: *HF* 1025–1027.

[32] Passage from the famous third stasimon: for one recent account of the ode, see Easterling 2009, esp. 164–170. On the various uses of ἄλυρος, cf. Dale 1954, 89–90.

[33] Hom. *Od.* 24.60–62; cf. Halliwell 2011a, 63–65.

aesthetic of life-values. But did it speak for everyone in fifth-century Athens, or was the audience to which it appealed a pre-selected cultural elite?[34] And even if we accept that Athenian theater to some degree represented an institutional democratization of the values of *mousikê*,[35] does our own tendency (part of the legacy of Romanticism) to idealize the kind of sensibility sketched in the previous section not carry with it the risk of exaggerating the extent and depth of adherence to such values within Greek culture as a whole? Might there well have been Greeks who could happily live 'without the Muses', without ever 'having any contact with *mousikê*', as the Socrates of Plato's *Republic* puts it?[36]

It is clearly not feasible here to address these questions systematically. Available evidence does not, in any case, allow anything like robustly sociological modeling of the relative proportions of particular Greek communities, not even in classical Athens, who were fully committed to an aesthetic of *mousikê* or, on the other hand, manifested insouciance about *amousia*. We can turn, though, to one particular source, Old Comedy, for some clues and pointers which, with suitably careful handling, may help to illuminate the issues at stake. Comedy is all the more useful in this respect because of its contiguous but ambivalent theatrical relationship to tragedy. My argument in this section, focused on a small selection of pertinent passages, will aim to show that where the aesthetics of *mousikê* and the challenge of *amousia* are concerned, comedy runs not in simple opposition to tragedy but in complex counterpoint with it.

It so happens that the only surviving fifth-century occurrence of the *amousos* wordgroup not already noted is found in Aristophanes. It turns up in the scene early in *Thesmophoriazusae* where the young, supposedly effeminate tragedian Agathon is mocked by the old, uncouth Kinsman of Euripides. The whole context hinges on a comically intricate contrast which is both discursive and personal: a contrast in both speech styles and physical demeanor. The resulting collision is one to which connotations of *amousia* mentioned in the previous section are doubly germane: both in relation

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[34] For the current tendency to scale down the size of fifth-century audiences to perhaps 7000 or fewer, on the basis of a new archaeological reconstruction of the Theater of Dionysus, see Revermann 2006, 168–169, Csapo 2007, 97–100 (with the archaeological appendix by H. Goette, ibid. 116–121); Sommerstein 2010, 140.

[35] This is precisely the (jaundiced) point of [Xen.] *Ath. pol.* 1.13: democracy undermined the practices of *mousikê* as the preserve of an elite but made the rich pay for them in a form which benefited the demos. Cf. Wilson 2000, 13–14, 126–127.

[36] See Pl. *Resp.* 411c, quoted in section 4 below: sociologically, this is not a reference to the 'uneducated' *tout court* but to those obsessed with athletics.

to musico-poetic matters as such, and as a marker of more general socio-cultural values. The term *amouson* appears at the point at which Agathon, in response to the Kinsman's barrage of innuendo about his feminine attire (see below), has attempted to explain his costume as part of a 'mimetic' act of poetic creativity in which he is assimilating his whole manner to that of female characters. The Kinsman has twice interrupted this explanation with obscene comments (153, 157–158). Seemingly ignoring these, Agathon continues by asserting (Ar. *Thesm.* 159–160):

> Besides, it's such an uncultured sight to see a poet
> Who belongs in the fields and is shaggy all over.
>
> ἄλλως τ' ἄμουσόν ἐστι ποιητὴν ἰδεῖν
> ἀγρεῖον ὄντα καὶ δασύν.[37]

He then proceeds to invoke the counter-examples of figures such as Ibycus, Anacreon, Alcaeus and the early tragedian Phrynichus whose beautiful poetry and music were matched, he claims, by their fastidiously stylish dress and good looks.

Agathon's alignment of personal, even sartorial, deportment with the values of *mousikê* is a comically pointed version of a gesture of social and cultural exclusivity. Even his use of the term *amousos* itself, together with ἀγρεῖος (instead of ἄγροικος) for 'rustic', may have a precious, 'poeticizing' ring to it in this context.[38] There is more than one point of connection with passages cited in the previous section; we have already seen *amousia* equated with 'rusticity' and even with sartorial inelegance.[39] Aristophanes gives the concepts and values in question a racy immediacy, reinforced by the visual contrast between Agathon and the Kinsman, the latter himself decidedly shaggy and perhaps rustic too.[40] The Kinsman is no poet, of course (though

[37] The translation 'incongruous' for ἄμουσον in 159, LSJ s.v. ἄμουσος, is too bland, missing the resonance which the word derives from the scene's clash of poetic/cultural values. Miller 1946, 176 is unwarranted in seeing here a specific reminiscence of Eur. fr. 663 (cf. text at n. 20 above).

[38] See Austin and Olson 2004, 109 for both these linguistic points. We should not, however, jump to the conclusion that *amousos* was an exclusively poetic term in the fifth century: its standard fourth-century prose usage (meaning technically 'unmusical', the opposite of *mousikos*: e.g. Arist. *Gen. corr.* 319b25–30, and cf. n. 62 below on Plato) means that the lack of comparable fifth-century evidence may be accidental.

[39] See Ar. *Nub.* 655, cited in section 2 above, for rusticity (ἀγρεῖος there paralleling *Thesm.* 160; cf. previous note); see n. 19 above for a linkage between *amousia* and dress.

[40] The Kinsman's hair, both facial and bodily, is highlighted in the shaving scene at 215–246; he was treated by Agathon's servant as a rustic, ἀγροιώτας, within the paratragic mélange at 58.

he would be happy to create obscenities for a satyr play, Ar. *Thesm.* 157–158). But it is as if Agathon is subtextually telling him, 'We fine poets are not vulgar riffraff (like *you*)'. The tragedian and the old man see things from opposite but complementary angles; each of them perceives a nexus of poetic artistry and social style. Agathon's notion of *amousia* implicitly appeals to a compound aesthetic of specifically poetic activity and something broad enough to count as a 'lifestyle'. There is some affinity between the present scene and the debate which took place in Euripides' *Antiope* between Amphion the poet and Zethus the worldly pragmatist. We know that Zethus sneered at his brother's allegedly effeminate appearance, which he took to be a sign of the decadence of his devotion to a life of song.[41] We also know, as it happens, that in an ironic appropriation of his brother's language of values Zethus urged Amphion to 'practise the fine music of *physical work*' (πόνων εὐμουσίαν/ἄσκει, Eur. fr. 188)[42] and to make such things into his (sc. alternative to) 'song' (τοιαῦτ' ἄειδε, ibid.). Zethus, we might say, reverses the evaluative force of *amousia*. Not only can he live happily without the Muses. He thinks others should do so too.

But is the Kinsman of *Thesmophoriazusae* just a comically reductive equivalent to the principles of Zethus? The clash between him and Agathon, I suggest, involves something more complicated than that—more complicated, not least, for the aesthetic experience of Aristophanes' own audience. In the course of the first scene, the play sets up a series of polarized contrasts between, on one side, the intellectual-cum-poetic pretensions of Euripides, Agathon's slave, and Agathon himself, and, on the other, the Kinsman's traits of obtuseness, cynicism, and vulgarity. There is an important sense in which the comedy internalizes these polarities in order to make them an effective part of its own theatrical and poetic dynamics: it offers no one-sided resolution to the conflicts of styles and values between the characters. An audience of the play needs to have a degree of understanding for *both* sides of the divide—a feel for what makes the poets' pretensions *and* the Kinsman's crudity the sorts of stances they are—if it is to appreciate the various twists and layers of humor which give the scene its character. But that in turn opens up the possibility of perceiving in the scene

[41] Eur. fr. 185: the style of dress in question may have had Dionysiac connections. Cf. Amphion's response in fr. 199. Note that part of Amphion's case rested on a conception of beauty or beautiful things, τὰ καλά, fr. 198.2. Collard et al. 2004, 259–329 provide a useful discussion of the fragments.

[42] Note that the adjective cognate with *eumousia* appears in the song of Agathon's servant at Ar. *Thesm.* 112.

a comic exposure of the difficulty of identifying just where the boundaries of *amousia* are supposed to lie.

There is a further comic element to be factored in here: the incorporation in the Kinsman's character of something less simple than sheer ignorance of poetry. The clearest instance of this occurs when at 136–145 he displays the poetic knowledge to quote (or adapt) some extracts from Aeschylus' *Lycourgeia* in the very act of mocking Agathon with a virtuoso sequence of rhetorical questions. That 'knowledge', which cannot be fully rationalized but adds a layer of comic uncertainty to the Kinsman's relationship to poetry, brings with it a drastic shift of speech register from his earlier repertoire of verbal raspberries (βομβάξ, Ar. *Thesm.* 45, βομβαλοβομβάξ, 48) and sexual obscenities (Ar. *Thesm.* 50, 57, 62). Moreover, his resort to Aeschylean drama as a weapon of mockery against Agathon might be thought to activate a sense of historical changes in the style and ethos of tragedy: implicitly 'masculine' Aeschylus is pitted against the soft 'effeminacy' of modern Agathon—a clash of poetic qualities partly akin to the antinomies used to structure the contest of tragedians in *Frogs* and prefigured as early as *Clouds* in the dispute about poetry between father and son reported at 1364–1378. The Kinsman does not articulate any 'thesis' about the poetic differences between Aeschylus and Agathon. But, like Strepsiades (also a rustic, 'uncultured' figure) in *Clouds*, his lack of rapport with 'modern'[43] poetry is associated with a leaning towards the standards of the past, rather than with an aversion to poetry *tout court*.

This aspect of the scene not only illustrates the slipperiness of the Kinsman's cultural profile but draws out a teasing paradox that is built into the aesthetics of Aristophanic comedy itself. Aristophanes' own audience (or reader) must be able to see at least some of the issues raised by the idea of *amousia* from opposing sides simultaneously. In the case of *Thesmophoriazusae*, this means that they should be capable of a sort of vicarious *amousia* in relishing the Kinsman's mocking subversion of the elevated values—lyric beauty, self-conscious artistry, imaginative impersonations—affirmed by (some) contemporary tragedy, including its supporting poetics of 'creativity'. But at the same time they need to be able to regard the character of the Kinsman as in many respects crass and vulgar: the kind of person they would be embarrassed to resemble, one might say (adapting a comment on

[43] Cf. Strepsiades' reference to the 'modern' (or 'younger generation of') poets, νεώτεροι, at *Nub.* 1370. Note the description, earlier in the same play, of the performer of 'contemporary' music as 'doing away with the Muses', τὰς Μούσας ἀφανίζων (*Nub.* 972).

comedy made by the Platonic Socrates), in the real social world *outside* the theater.[44] My claim is not, of course, meant to rule out many conceivable variations of response on the part of individual spectators. But it is hard if not impossible to see how anyone who was not (at some level) interested in engaging with the kinds of poetic details and nuances exploited by Aristophanes' text could derive any real satisfaction from the scene. One might encapsulate the resulting paradox by saying that the Kinsman's (comically complicated) *amousia* is a means to the end of comedy's recuperation, on its own behalf, of the pleasures and values of *mousikê*.

It may be instructive to glance here at another Aristophanic passage which exposes the parameters of *amousia* to the pressures of comic manipulation. The encounter between Dionysus and Heracles in the opening scene of *Frogs* involves, among other things, a clash of values between a self-professed lover of tragic poetry (including, it is worth recalling, that of Agathon as well as Euripides: see lines 83–84) and someone who appears skeptical, even dismissive, of the value of such poetry altogether. Dionysus' decision to journey to Hades in search of a dead poet is itself a (comic) enactment of attachment to *mousikê* as a life-value. It is motivated by a conviction, comparable to the one voiced by the chorus of Euripides' *Heracles* (section 2 above), that life *needs* the experiences afforded by poetry and music: Dionysus has lost something for which he feels a yearning that combines quasi-erotic feelings with a sense of bereavement.[45] The god's feelings treat the death of Euripides as a diminution of the 'quality of life' for lovers of poetic drama. And his quotation of a line from Euripides' own *Oineus* ('some are no longer alive, and those that survive are worthless', Ar. *Ran.* 72: οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐκέτ' εἰσίν, οἱ δ' ὄντες κακοί, Eur. fr. 565) enlarges his point of view into a judgment on a whole cultural state of affairs.

Heracles, by sharp contrast, has the air of a kind of (comic) 'philistine', and thus one type of *amousos*, where poetry is concerned. Aristophanes is here creating his own version of a figure who, in his general mythological persona, stood in an unstable relationship to *mousikê*: a good enough musician, in some depictions, to play for the gods, but in others so bad a music pupil that he ends up killing his teacher, Linus.[46] In *Frogs*, Heracles can

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[44] See Pl. *Resp.* 606c; cf. Halliwell 2008, 255–256.

[45] For a reading of *Frogs* which makes Dionysus' 'love' of poetry a crucial part of the whole play's thematic trajectory, see Halliwell 2011a, ch. 3.

[46] Heracles as kitharist for the gods: Bond 1981, 238; Schefold 1992, 42–45. Heracles as murderer of his own music-teacher: Gantz 1993, 378–379. Cf. n. 13 above for the inebriated Heracles' unmusical singing at Eur. *Alc.* 760, fr. 907.

rattle off the names of 'lesser' tragedians (Ar. *Ran.* 73–87), just as the Kinsman was able to do in *Thesmophoriazusae* (Ar. *Thesm.* 168–170). But in addition to his sweeping contempt for Euripides (whose poetry he calls a 'con-trick', κόβαλα, and 'total rubbish', παμπόνηρα) he conveys a cool detachment about whether *any* tragic drama matters in the way Dionysus believes that it does. Even his suggestion that Sophocles would be a preferable choice to Euripides is tempered by the statement, 'if you really *must* bring back [sc. a poet] from there' (εἴπερ ἐκεῖθεν δεῖ σ' ἄγειν, Ar. *Ran.* 77). It is open to an audience of *Frogs* to perceive Heracles as emerging from the encounter with Dionysus as someone appreciative exclusively of the pleasures of the stomach. That is Dionysus' own take on their disagreement: 'Don't try to inhabit *my* mind', he tells his half-brother, 'just stick to your own' (Ar. *Ran.* 105), before adding, 'I'll take your advice where *food* is concerned' (Ar. *Ran.* 107).[47]

There are, for sure, other ways of weighing up the conflicting attitudes to poetry displayed by Heracles and Dionysus. One might perhaps, for instance, see Heracles as less of a philistine than I take him to be, and Dionysus as correspondingly more eccentric (or undiscerning) in the strength of his passion for Euripides. But however one positions the two characters on the spectrum that runs from the sensitivity of the *mousikos* to the uncouth (and/or insouciant) insensitivity of the *amousos*, it is clear that Aristophanes turns the scene into a vignette of the possibility of radical disagreement over the importance of poetic-cum-aesthetic value to life. As in the first scene of *Thesmophoriazusae*, this places the audience of *Frogs* itself in an ambiguous position where they need to be able to savor the clash of values as a form of experience made available by the distinctive poetic dynamics of comedy. As I have already suggested, Aristophanic comedy offers no one-sided cynicism in such matters. If it did, plays like *Thesmophoriazusae* and *Frogs*, with their sustained and intricately allusive fabric of quotation, adaptation, and parody, would be unintelligible: what kind of audience could sit through them without being able to draw on at least an instinctive appreciation of the kinds of stylistic and thematic details on which they depend, and without an underlying awareness of the cultural values which such appreciation presupposed?[48] No engaged audience of such comedies, in other words, could

[47] Dionysus had taken this line from the start of their conversation, using a basic culinary example (soup) to give Heracles some idea of the intensity of his own desires (62–64).

[48] Cf. Dionysus' own aspiration to judge tragedy 'with great finesse' or 'in the most cultured manner', μουσικώτατα (873): the qualities of poetry, *qua mousikê* (cf. *Ran.* 797, with

be unconcerned about a slur of *amousia,* whether or not *amousos* is the right description for Euripides' Kinsman in *Thesmophoriazusae* or Heracles in *Frogs*.

It is unnecessary to buttress this argument by dwelling on the familiar fact that Aristophanic comedy frequently advertises the importance of a conception of *mousikê* for its generic self-image and in the process appeals to standards of sophistication and finesse on the part of both the poet and his (ideal) audience.[49] But it is worth adding that Aristophanes can also rely on his audience's acceptance of the disreputability of *amousia* in framing satirical gibes against named individuals. One passage which falls into that category is the disdain expressed in the final ode of *Frogs* for Euripides' supposed abandonment of traditional norms of *mousikê* under the influence of Socratic intellectualism.[50] Rather than reconsidering here that famous and controversial passage, I shall end this section with a rather different example, the mocking vignette of Cleon's allegedly defective musical education which is found in one of the choral odes of *Knights* (984–991):

> There's another thing that amazes me:
> his swinish lack of culture!
> They say, you know,
> the boys who went to school with him,
> that the Dorian mode was the only one
> in which he used to tune his lyre—
> he refused to learn anything else!

> ἀλλὰ καὶ τόδ' ἔγωγε θαυ-
> μάζω τῆς ὑομουσίας
> αὐτοῦ· φασὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν οἱ
> παῖδες οἳ ξυνεφοίτων,
> τὴν Δωριστὶ μόνην ἂν ἁρ-
> μόττεσθαι θαμὰ τὴν λύραν,
> ἄλλην δ' οὐκ ἐθέλειν μαθεῖν.

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my next note), call for a matching sensitivity of appreciation (however unevenly Dionysus may actually live up to this aspiration).

[49] For appeals to a Muse or Muses as a badge of self-conscious comic *mousikê,* see esp. *Eq.* 505–506, *Vesp.* 1028, *Pax* 775, 816, *Ran.* 356, 674, 876, frs. 347–348 KA. Sommerstein 2009, 116–135 is a useful survey of the vocabulary/ways in which Old Comedians, esp. Aristophanes, construct a poetics of their genre.

[50] *Ran.* 1491–1499: discussions include Arrighetti 2006, 168–180 and Brancacci 2008, 35–55 (too anxious to see Plato and Xenophon as responding directly to this Aristophanic passage); cf. Halliwell 2011a, 151–152. The passage should not be read as critiquing a general 'sophistic' threat to traditional *mousikê, contra* Koller 1963, 88 (cf. n. 61 below).

A striking implication of this passage for my purposes is that musical values are culturally contestable. Cleon is portrayed as *amousos* (worse still, as badly educated as a pig, *huomousia* being a phonologically piquant variation on *amousia*)[51] in virtue not of incompetence but of deliberate resistance to anything more than a basic, conservative musical taste.[52] His restriction to the Dorian mode (which happens also to prepare the way for a pun on financial corruption in the Greek) probably implies a determination to retain a deliberately severe, manly public ethos, averse to refinements of *mousikê*.[53] It also carries echoes of the reputation of Themistocles, to whom Cleon compares himself at *Knights* 812 (cf. 884). We know from a fragment of Ion of Chios that Themistocles was believed to have had little or no musical education/ability; it seems also that he tried to make a virtue of this, contrasting the point with his great political achievements.[54] We can detect here the kind of polarization to which debates about the life-value of, in the widest sense, *mousikê* were susceptible. Themistocles and Cleon represent in the political sphere the kind of stance adopted by the mythological Zethus in Euripides' *Antiope* (section 2 above). Cleon may also have been self-consciously opposed in this respect to Pericles, who is presented by Thucydides as idealizing, and aligning himself with, Athenian 'love of beauty' as a key value of the city's culture.[55]

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[51] On the metaphorical lexicon of swinishness for cultural and intellectual shortcomings, see e.g. Ar. *Pax* 928, Pl. *Tht.* 166c, with Taillardat 1965, 254–255. Beta 2004, 88 compares 'stupid, pig-stylish talk' (λόγος ... ἀμαθὴς συοβαύβαλος) in Cratinus fr. 345 KA. It is germane that at Ar. *Vesp.* 35–36 Cleon's demagogic style involves 'the voice of a burnt sow': on the sense of this see Zuntz 1989; cf. Beta 2004, 33.

[52] The Dorian 'mode' (or tuning/scale) counts as the most important from a culturally conservative viewpoint at Pl. *Resp.* 399a, *Lach.* 188d. On the musical modes in the classical period, cf. West 1992, 177–184.

[53] Neil 1901, 138 compares Cleon's 'contempt of culture' at Thuc. 3.37–38 (the Mytilenean debate). In similar vein, Gomme 1956, 300 notes a connection between Cleon's brazen exculpation of 'ignorance', *amathia* (cf. n. 51 above), at Thuc. 3.37.3–4 and the depiction of Cleon in *Knights* as lacking in *mousikê*. Cf. n. 56 below. Note the conjunction of *amathia* with *amousia* at Pl. *Resp.* 411e, quoted in section 4 below; cf. n. 16 above.

[54] See Ion of Chios *FGrH* 392 F13, *apud* Plut. *Vit. Cim.* 9.1; cf. Plut. *Vit. Them.* 2.4, Phld. *Mus.* 4, col. 125.33–37 (Delattre 2007, with his note 7, II, 419–420), and perhaps a further allusion at Ar. *Vesp.* 959 (cf. 989), with the discussion in Harmon 2003, 352–361, who takes no account however of Ar. *Eq.* 984–991. Wilson 2004, 299–300 finds traces of ambiguity in the sources for Themistocles' relationship to elite musical culture.

[55] Thuc. 2.40.1. While Rusten 1985, 17 is right to say that this and nearby claims need not apply to every individual Athenian, he is wrong, in my view, to argue that Pericles is characterizing separate kinds of 'lives': rather, he is simply generalizing about Athenian values.

Whether or not the chorus in *Knights* is picking up some of Cleon's own rhetorical slogans, Aristophanes certainly feels able to count on his audience's appreciation and enjoyment of a charge of *amousia* carried to an extreme of 'swinishness': this, after all, is a premise of the entire play, as the Sausage-Seller was reassured at the outset.[56] However much Aristophanes may elsewhere exploit the ambiguities arising from ideas of *amousia*, and however much the real Cleon may himself have manipulated such issues for his own populist politics, the satirical priorities of *Knights* unmistakably show that Aristophanic comedy retains the right to tarnish others with accusations of *amousia*. While comedy can appeal, in some circumstances, to the social elitism which had traditionally belonged with an extensive education in *mousikê*,[57] its own theatrical *raison d'être* is tied to performance (with choruses of non-aristocratic citizens) at civic festivals whose audiences, whatever their exact size and composition, are typically treated as representative of the collective democratic citizenry.[58] Aristophanic comedy always positions itself deftly, in the end, on the side of the Muses. Or, rather, it presents those Muses in its own gaudy clothing and proclaims its allegiance to their aesthetic and cultural values as remade in its own image.

4. *Plato and the Philosophical Revaluation of* mousikê

In a famous passage of Plato's *Phaedo*, Socrates tells Cebes that on many occasions during his life he has had dreams in which various apparitions addressed him with the words, 'Socrates, compose and practice music' (μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου, Pl. *Phd.* 60d–61b). In his attempts to interpret the meaning of this injunction, Socrates had long assumed that his dreams were urging him to continue with (and intensify) his existing way of life, 'on the grounds that philosophy is the greatest music' (ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης

[56] At Ar. *Eq.* 188–193 the Sausage-Seller's lack of *mousikê* (above the level of basic literacy) is converted into an ideal *qualification* for a demagogue; cf. Eup. fr. 208 KA (Maricas = Hyperbolus) with Storey 2003, 201–202. Likewise being 'ignorant' (*amathês*): see n. 53 above.

[57] Ar. *Ran.* 727–733 is the most direct instance of this, but even this passage, with its special political nostalgia in the circumstances of 405, suggests that an education in the values of *mousikê* was widely shared in Athens: cf. Swift 2010, 43–55 on evidence (including comedy) for 'continuity of cultural values across the socio-economic spectrum' (51).

[58] Choral passages in Aristophanes which imply (from various angles) that the audience represents the male citizenry as a whole include: *Ach.* 628–664, 971, *Eq.* 576–594, *Pax* 759, *Lys.* 1194–1215, *Thesm.* 352–371, 785–845.

μεγίστης μουσικῆς, Pl. *Phd.* 61a).[59] But once he found himself awaiting execution in prison, he began to wonder whether the dream injunction might after all be using the term *mousikê* in its 'popular' sense. As a precaution, he accordingly composed a hymn to Apollo and versified some fables of Aesop.

The significance of Socrates' strange dreams remains unresolved for readers of the *Phaedo* as well as for Socrates himself. But it is notable that on both the philosophical and the poetic interpretations which he adopts at different times, Socrates understands his dreams to be instructing him to give *mousikê* an essential place in his life, even as he approaches the moment of his death.[60] The dream injunction does not disclose what the value of *mousikê* is supposed to be, but the earnestness with which Socrates responds to it presupposes that *mousikê* can somehow be made a life-defining activity. In a very different Platonic context, an idea of this kind is also found in the mouth of Protagoras, who espouses a theory of education (including the teaching of poetry and music to children) built on the principle that 'the whole of human life needs good rhythm and harmony' (πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται, Pl. *Prt.* 326b). However authentic or otherwise Plato's presentation of Protagoras may be, the views advocated by the latter must make sense as a culturally plausible ideal, an ideal akin to the one Protarchus affirms in the *Philebus* (section 1 above) and which links the value of *mousikê* to the larger goals of life.[61] This is certainly a Protagoras one can imagine concurring with the chorus's sentiment in Euripides' *Heracles*, 'may I never live without the Muses!' We might equivalently posit for Plato's (unlike Aristophanes') Socrates the view that 'a life without *mousikê* is not worth living'. But in his case, there seems more uncertainty about just what kind of *mousikê* it is which human life requires.

In the previous sections of this chapter I used selective evidence from Euripidean and Aristophanic theater to explore some of the ways in which problems of *amousia* form points of interference within the workings of Athenian/Greek cultural values and thereby draw attention to part of what

[59] Although this may be a Pythagorean idea, the reason for supposing it to be such in Burnet 1911, 17 does not meet the point: Aristoxenus fr. 26 Wehrli, reporting Pythagorean use of music for '*katharsis* of the soul', refers to actual music (cf. Burkert 1972, 212). For the philosopher as true *mousikos*, cf. e.g. *Resp.* 591d, *Phdr.* 248d, *Ti.* 88c.

[60] See Burnet 1911, 16–17 on ἐργάζεσθαι, which implies 'practicing' music as something like a way of life. On *Phd.* 60d–61b, cf. Brancacci 2008, 53–55.

[61] Koller 1963, 87 cites Pl. *Prt.* 326b as testimony to traditional 'musical' education, but on 88–90 he suggests, without convincing evidence, that such education was undermined by the sophistic movement. Cf. n. 50 above.

is entailed by those values. As that evidence helped to show, the values of *mousikê*, together with perceptions of the threat of *amousia*, attach themselves to core activities of song/poetry, music, and dance but also tend to configure themselves in terms of a number of social, educational, and ethical variables. They are, that is to say, a matter of aesthetics (in which ideas of beauty, form, expressiveness, and more besides, play a part) embedded in a larger matrix of cultural practices and standards. In this final section I turn my attention to Plato, whose dialogues, I shall suggest, do not represent a clean break with older ideas of *mousikê* and *amousia* but instead reappraise and partly redefine them for the purposes of a new philosophical ideal. That process of redefinition, together with some of its ambiguities (for which Socrates' shifting interpretations of his dream injunction in *Phaedo* are an apt symbol), is itself testimony to the importance of issues whose long preplatonic ancestry has been sampled in the earlier stages of my argument.

As it happens, the vocabulary of *amousia* occurs more often in Plato than in any other author from the classical period. His dialogues confirm that by the fourth century the semantics of the *amousos* wordgroup had settled into a pattern of usage (whose fifth-century precedents have already been noted) which embraced both a specifically musical sense and a looser denotation, each of them the opposite of a corresponding use of *mousikos* and its cognates. The first of these senses of *amousia* picks out a lack of more or less technical proficiency and/or appreciation: so, an inability (or disinclination) to sing, play an instrument, or follow a musical performance.[62] The other denotes a lack of refinement across a broader spectrum of educational, social and cultural behavior, its precise inflection depending on the presuppositions of particular contexts. It is the ramifications of this second sense within Plato's own thought, and its association with a philosophically redefined ideal of *mousikê*, which concern me here. For reasons of space, I shall restrict myself mostly to some observations on the *Republic*.

When Socrates impersonates the Muses in *Republic* 8, making them predict the inevitable decline of even as scrupulously designed a constitution as that of Callipolis, he gives them a vision of a future in which a debased generation of the Guardian class will become neglectful of the Muses themselves: 'in their role as Guardians, they will start to neglect *us* first, regarding the

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[62] Examples of the specifically musical sense of *amousos* in Plato include *Hp. mai.* 292c (metaphorical: n. 15 above), *Phd.* 105e, *Tht.* 144e, *Soph.* 253b, *Resp.* 335c, 349e, 455e (women). At *Leg.* 670a technical competence is nonetheless condemned as *amousia*: the Athenian is here speaking about supposedly meaningless instrumental virtuosity; cf. West 1992, 70. Halliwell 2011b provides an overview of the thematics of music in Plato's dialogues.

domain of music as less important than they should, and after that they will neglect the domain of gymnastics; the result will be that your young people will become less cultured (*amousoteroi*)'.[63] This should remind us (if some readers need reminding) that the entire structure of the *Republic*'s thought-experiment of an ideal city would collapse without its foundation on the practice of a form of *mousikê*. If the (undebased) Guardian class is imagined as attaining ultimately to a philosophically higher level of *mousikê* (see below), they nonetheless do so on the basis of a system which preserves the elaborately musico-poetic (as well as the gymnastic) elements of traditional Greek education.

The argument pursued by Socrates in the *Republic* involves a reappraisal, and at certain points a challenging critique, of the idea of *mousikê* as a cultural repository of life-values. But this reappraisal does not simply overturn existing views of 'the realm of the Muses' or the price to be paid for neglecting that realm (*amousia*). It preserves from such views a notion of *mousikê* as something which does not belong in a category of its own but can shape the qualities of life as a whole. In *Republic* 3, when setting out the principles of a (partially reformed) education in poetry and music, Socrates thinks of the properties of music *per se* as expressively connected to qualities of 'life': in a manner which probably reflects the ideas of Damon,[64] he suggests to Glaucon that they need to find rhythms and melodic tunings (*harmoniai*) which can match and convey in sound the ethical qualities of certain kinds of life, *bios* (Pl. *Resp*. 399e–401a). Soon after this, at 401, Socrates extends the link between musical/artistic form and life-defining character into a principle which he projects onto the entire cultural environment.[65] In this remarkable passage, he declares that not only the arts he has already discussed (poetry, song and music, and we can add dance too)[66] but also painting,

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[63] ἡμῶν πρῶτον ἄρξονται ἀμελεῖν φύλακες ὄντες, παρ' ἔλαττον τοῦ δέοντος ἡγησάμενοι τὰ μουσικῆς, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς, ὅθεν ἀμουσότεροι γενήσονται ὑμῖν οἱ νέοι: *Resp*. 546d. It would be at least legitimate to take φύλακες ὄντες as concessive, 'although (sc. supposedly) Guardians …'.

[64] *Contra* Barker 2007, 47 and n. 18, who queries whether Damon had much influence on Plato at all.

[65] 'Environment' is the apt term: Socrates uses metaphors of 'pasture', 'healthy location', and beneficial 'atmosphere', 401c. Burnyeat 1999, esp. 249–258, 319–324, emphasizes the *Republic*'s concern with the influence of artistic images on the culture as a whole.

[66] Although dance receives no explicit discussion, *Resp*. 412b makes it clear that it is subject to the same principles as poetry and music; cf. 373b for the inclusion of dancers in the class of practitioners of *mousikê* (οἱ περὶ μουσικήν), and 383c for a passing reference to the choral component of drama in the city's culture.

weaving, architecture, and related activities, as well as the human body and the structures of other natural objects, all exhibit a principle of good and bad form: 'in all these things there is the intrinsic possibility of beauty or ugliness of form' (ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστιν εὐσχημοσύνη ἢ ἀσχημοσύνη, Pl. *Resp.* 401a). This is a principle, he indicates, of mimetically *expressive* form (whether rhythmic, melodic, verbal, or visual): form which embodies, represents, and communicates qualities of ethical 'life', and whose beauty (or ugliness) will be absorbed into the souls of those who come into contact with it.[67] The passage promotes an ideal, therefore, which is self-evidently educational, social, and political. But its sensitivity to expressiveness and beauty of form makes its concerns also, in quintessentially Greek terms, a matter of irreducibly aesthetic value—a kind of experience which operates through the capacities for evaluative judgment that inhere in perception, *aisthêsis*.[68]

Socrates' notion of *euskhêmosunê* (beauty of form) covers *mousikê* in both the narrower and wider senses mentioned above. As we have seen, it is a notion which grows out of a discussion of the rhythmic and melodic possibilities of music (in its role as an accompaniment to poetry) but also serves, in its strongly ethical and 'life-expressive' slant, to transform the concept of *mousikê* into something far more than a sphere of technical competency. Following on from the passage just cited, Socrates describes the ideal *mousikos* as someone who will be capable of recognizing the 'patterns' or 'forms' (*eidê*) of ethical qualities (self-discipline, courage, etc.) both in their actual instances and in 'images' (*eikones*) of them (Pl. *Resp.* 402b–c). Such a person will be aroused to a powerful passion (*erôs*) for the most beautiful sights, above all for the person in whom there is discernible concord between body and soul; beauty of this kind is apprehended through the senses but has a value that is more than material (Pl. *Resp.* 402d). The impetus of his argument enables Socrates to reach the point where he can describe sexual desire that seeks fulfillment in merely carnal acts as itself a type of *amousia* and of insensitivity to beauty, *apeirokalia* (Pl. *Resp.* 403c). Immediately after this, he encapsulates his ideal in the grand

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67 For perceptive remarks on this passage, including the mimetic aspect of the theory, see Schofield 2011, 236–238; his article is the best analysis of the psychology of music in the *Republic*. Cf. Halliwell 2011b, 309–311.

68 Although the terminology of *aisthêsis* is no necessary part of my argument, I note that Socrates' ideals in this section of *Republic* 3 do in fact identify sense-perception (αἰσθάνεσθαι, αἴσθησις) as the channel of the evaluative experiences in question: see 401e3, 402c5, 411d5.

pronouncement that 'the practice of music should culminate in the erotics of beauty' (δεῖ δέ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά, Pl. *Resp.* 403c).

Correspondingly, Socrates develops the category of *amousia* into one which marks a deficiency of sensibility in regard to much more than music in the tonal sense. He does so in a way which once again illustrates how life-informing, life-defining values are at stake in matters of *mousikê*. Later in *Republic* 3, Socrates applies the term 'uncultured' (*amousos*) to the person who leads a life dominated by the body and who 'never has any contact with [or 'never touches'] music or philosophy' (μουσικῆς δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας μὴ ἅπτηται), who 'never keeps the company of a Muse' (μηδὲ κοινωνῇ Μούσης μηδαμῇ), and who lacks any concern for 'either reason or the rest of *mousikê*' (οὔτε λόγου ... οὔτε τῆς ἄλλης μουσικῆς). Such a person becomes 'a beast living in ignorance and insensitivity, with a lack of rhythm and grace' (ὥσπερ θηρίον ... ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ καὶ σκαιότητι μετὰ ἀρρυθμίας τε καὶ ἀχαριστίας ζῇ, Pl. *Resp.* 411c–e.). The scope of both *mousikê* and *amousia* in this part of *Republic* 3 expands from literal reference to music into a philosophically 'thickened' conception of the workings of mind or soul as a whole, so much so that Socrates seems to come close, as at *Phaedo* 61a (above), to fusing into one the ideas of *mousikê* and philosophy.[69] Yet that process of conceptual expansion does not lose its connection to the tonal, formal, and expressive properties of music as such (alongside poetry, dance, and more besides). On the contrary, the need for the right kind of music and for its carefully balanced incorporation into the structure of a life is reiterated by Socrates at 411a–b immediately before the characterization of the *amousos* paraphrased above. If Plato's dialogue, then, in a sense appropriates the value-terms of *mousikê* for its own purposes, it is just as true that the ideal of the philosophical soul advanced by Socrates retains an authentically musical dimension. We are dealing here with—among other things—a philosophical aesthetics.

Two further points about this stretch of the *Republic* are worth emphasizing. One is that while the line of thought represents a characteristically Platonic model of the soul's orientation towards ethically grounded beauty, it lacks anything like the metaphysical idealism found in the visionary sections of the later books of the *Republic*, Socrates' second speech on love in the *Phaedrus*, or Diotima's speech in the *Symposium*. All those other passages make aesthetics dependent on metaphysical hypotheses; *Republic* 3

[69] Cf. also Pl. *Resp.* 486d, where the nature of an un-philosophical soul is called 'uncultured and badly formed', τῆς ἀμούσου τε καὶ ἀσχήμονος φύσεως: both adjectives hark back to *Republic* 3.

does not, and to that extent its principles of form and expression are less far removed from the values of *mousikê* espoused elsewhere in Greek culture. The second point is that the argument gives a much more explicit, central place to the experience of certain 'art-forms' (including music, poetry, painting, architecture, etc.) than any of those other texts do, and arguably more than any other passage in the whole of Plato.[70] Is that—paradoxically—why, even now (with a few exceptions), it remains an often neglected, even a 'forgotten', text where many attempts to read an aesthetics in Plato are concerned?[71] Certainly, the relationship of the passage to others in Plato, even within the *Republic* itself, is problematic. How is it, for instance, that Socrates can so emphatically here count painting as an art 'full', as he puts it, of potential for ethically expressive beauty of form (i.e. *euskhêmosunê*), while in *Republic* 10 he will reductively use the same art as an example of 'mere' mirroring of appearances and superficial pretense? The orthodox answer to this question is simply to privilege one of these texts (*Republic* 10) as somehow definitive, Plato's 'final word' on the subject, while downgrading or ignoring the implications of the other. But large parts of the *Republic*, from *Republic* 2 to 8, are underpinned by a conviction of the importance of (a reformed) *mousikê* for the life of both body and soul. If *Republic* 10 seems to suggest something radically different, we should perhaps reconsider our ways of reading it.[72]

5. *Conclusion*

What, in fact, could be more telling for the purposes of my present argument, and as a conclusion to these compressed observations on Plato, than the way in which Socrates rounds off his critique of mimetic poetry in *Republic* 10 by both anticipating and defending himself against a potential charge of cultural philistinism? *Apologetically* appealing to the now famous motif of an 'ancient quarrel' between philosophy and poetry,[73] Socrates

[70] See esp. the reference to painting, weaving, architecture and more besides at 401a, cited in my text above.

[71] Annas 1981, 95–101 strains to minimize the positive aesthetic principles outlined at Pl. *Resp.* 401–403. Nehamas 2007, 73, despite his own platonizing strands of thought, ignores this passage when he states, 'Plato himself did not include art among the proper expressions of culture'; contrast Burnyeat 1999, esp. 217–222.

[72] For my own attempt at a new reading, see Halliwell 2011a, 179–207.

[73] In Halliwell 2011a, 191–193 I insist, against the grain of prevailing orthodoxy, on the apologetic function of the 'ancient quarrel' motif.

avoids the term *amousia* itself but uses others which belong to a cluster of vocabulary we have seen associated with it. He imagines the personified figure of Poetry (and, by implication, some of the 'lovers of poetry', *Resp.* 607d7, who read the *Republic*) accusing himself and Glaucon of 'uncouthness and crudity' (σκληρότητα ... καὶ ἀγροικίαν), i.e. uncultured insensitivity, in relation to poetry's bewitching power.[74] Stressing that in fact he and Glaucon know only too well what it is like to be 'bewitched' (κηλουμένοις, Pl. *Resp.* 607c7: an idea as old as Homer), and that they would in principle 'gladly welcome back' poetry (ἄσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα, Pl. *Resp.* 607c6) into their city (and souls) if only the right reasons for doing so could be found, Socrates appears deeply anxious to rebut a charge of philistinism—the kind of charge Aristophanes' *Frogs* 1491–1499 shows to have been at least an imaginable gibe against the historical Socrates.[75] Whatever else it signifies, Socrates' anxiety at *Republic* 607b–c discloses, I submit, that Plato himself is anxious that readers of the dialogue should not think that *Republic* 10's critique of poetic mimesis amounts to a philistine repudiation of *mousikê*, as opposed to a probing philosophical scrutiny of the foundations on which its values rest. In the light of the other evidence surveyed in this chapter, we can see this moment in the *Republic* as contributing to a larger debate about aesthetic value: more particularly, about whether the value of all those experiences provided by the art(s) of the Muses is indispensable to the best kind of human life. That debate would, of course, continue in various forms.[76] A history of intense commitment to *mousikê* was one of the defining features of Greek culture. It was a history always defined in part by complex interplay with the perceived threat of *amousia*.

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[74] For the vocabulary of σκαιότης and ἀγροικία, including their pairing in Ephippus fr. 23 KA and Ar. *Nub.* 655, see section 2 above.

[75] See n. 50 above.

[76] For one germane example, see Philodemus' response to those who accused Epicureans like himself of cultural philistinism (*agroikia*) because of their reductive view of music (in relation to poetry) at Phld. *Mus.* 4, col. 140.14–27, 144.1–6 Delattre: on the apparent reference to Plato's 'lovers of poetry' (*Resp.* 607d7) at *Mus.* col. 140.27, cf. Delattre 2007, II, 440–441, nn. 2, 5, but his idea that Philodemus is parodying Plato seems misplaced and his claim that Plato 'condemns' lovers of poetry is seriously misleading.

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CHAPTER THREE

IS THE SUBLIME AN AESTHETIC VALUE?

James I. Porter

Introduction: The Case for Aesthetic Values in Greece and Rome

The value of studying aesthetic values in antiquity ought to need little argument, but these subjects are rarely examined in Greek and Roman contexts, owing not least of all to the lamentable existence of a still greater gap in those same fields: the great dearth of interest in aesthetics *tout court*. Whether it is because aesthetic inquiry has fallen out of fashion or because aesthetics appears to involve more philosophy than philology, classicists today are simply not well versed in the language of aesthetic value—even if some signs are pointing to a gradual reversal in this area, the present volume being one prominent instance.[1] A second reason for this inattention has to do with the fact that value-studies in Classics have primarily been driven by material concerns: economic forms of value, exchange values, and (derivatively) cultural values have taken center stage.[2] But that is a poor excuse: even a bottom-up approach to value ought to include a more systematic appreciation of the arts and their aesthetic value. The arts are integral to economic forms of exchange in the ancient world. What is less obvious is how the characteristics of the arts get cashed out in these larger patterns of circulation and exchange. By what yardstick were they measured? Studies in the Renaissance have paved the way for such an inquiry, by mapping senses and sensibilities with patronage and production.[3] It

[1] See now also the essays collected in Platt and Squire 2010; Porter 2010; the section on aesthetic value in Papadopoulos and Urton 2011; and Destrée and Murray f.c.

[2] Representatively, in the work of Gernet 1982; Carson 1999; Kurke 1991; Kurke 1999; Seaford 2004.

[3] The unsurpassed example of this literature remains Baxandall 1988. See Tanner 2006 for a recent attempt at a sociological approach to classical Greek art. On Roman patronage, see Nauta 2002. Aesthetic value, when it is accorded specifically to art by Tanner, tends to be associated with the autonomization of art (which is said to take place in the late fifth to early fourth centuries; Tanner 2006, 160), an account I would want to dispute.

is high time for a comparable body of work to emerge from within Classics.

Whenever such a form of study is undertaken, it is likely to establish a few basic principles. First, it will (ideally) confront the general matrix of values in antiquity, out of which can be read not merely aesthetic values but also their relative value—the value of aesthetic values. These latter, while bound up with economic forces, are hardly reducible to such forces. Other considerations play a prominent role, and these include values which come paired with, or else are produced by, acts of attention, sensation (*aisthêsis*), pleasure and pain, experience, general conditions of living, every-day as well as ritualized occasions, and so on.[4] In other words, aesthetic values are intimately bound up with the deepest values of ancient subjects whose experiences of life in its variety of manifestations exhibit a wide range of meaningful aesthetic encounters. To give one example, in the *Protrepticus* Aristotle writes that 'the pleasure that comes from living … is the pleasure we get from the exercise of the soul; for that is true life',[5] which is to say, a life of contemplation (B 89–90 Düring). In Aristotle's eyes, human creatures are not only 'good' at living; they are also lovers of life. But they are the one insofar as they are the other (B 73 Düring):

> For in loving life they love thinking and knowing; they value life for no other reason than for the sake of perception, and above all for the sake of sight; they evidently love this faculty in the highest degree because it is, in comparison with the other senses, simply a kind of knowledge.
>
> τὸ γὰρ ζῆν ἀγαπῶντες τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀγαπῶσι· δι'οὐδὲν γὰρ ἕτερον αὐτὸ τιμῶσιν ἢ διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν ὄψιν· ταύτην γὰρ τὴν δύναμιν ὑπερβαλλόντως φαίνονται φιλοῦντες· αὕτη γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμη τις ἀτεχνῶς ἐστιν.

Later on, we will see how this same thought is not an aberration of a youthful protreptic writing by Aristotle; it permeates his most mature metaphysical thinking about god and the universe.

Coordinating value in this deeper sense with aesthetics in its common and narrower sense is a challenge, but one which must be met head on. Only so can one gain the fullest possible understanding of value as it is realized in each and every domain, from the economy to culture to art, and in its pertinence, if not fungibility, across them all. Microclimates of value will be

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[4] On the significance of everyday experience for aesthetic value, see Dewey 1989 [1934]; Mukařovský 1970 [1936]; Saito 2007.

[5] All translations, unless otherwise stated, are my own.

discovered, to be sure—from one community or social stratum to the next, and above all across time periods and cultures. But continuities are likely to be found as well.[6] The paradox here is that aesthetic values do double duty: they press at the limit of their own application, just as other value terms do. *Good* can be a term of moral, utilitarian (functional), or other approbation. What is of *value* can be valuable for life but also aesthetically valuable—and often for the same reasons (for instance, if the pleasure we take in vision gives both kinds of value, as it does for Aristotle).[7] Drawing a firm line between these domains is not always easy or necessary. That is the beauty of value terms, and the challenge of value analysis in ancient contexts for us today.

Within aesthetics proper (assuming we can establish the boundaries of such a domain),[8] value-relations exist in a form that is often difficult to organize from without, but, roughly speaking, they occupy a place within a system of sorts. One way we know they do is from the fact of their comparison in criticism: 'Homer (or Praxiteles) is better than Hesiod (or Lysippus) for the following reasons …'. Such comparisons posit a (provisionally) closed universe of terms and entities, as well as a scale of ascending values. Ancient contest culture was admirably well adapted to this sphere of comparisons, and in fact literary criticism never ceased to be agonistic in this sense. Contests of all kinds were typically held over such (admittedly general) characteristics as *beauty* (*to kalon*) and *excellence* (*aretê*, *to prôteuein*), terms which themselves merely denote high rather than low grades of aesthetic value.[9] But we should not be fooled. Such terms, which are summary judgments, rarely mean what they appear to say. They simultaneously conceal far more complex judgments about a work or author—which is one reason why modern students of ancient critical writings often feel short-changed by ancient criticisms, but also why it is essential to try to get behind the value labels and to establish what in any given case has led to their assignment.

2. *The Case for the Sublime*

If *beauty* and *excellence* are difficult to pin down within the ancient value lexicon, what are we to make of *sublime*? Sublimity confronts us with an even more difficult case of aesthetic judgment, because it appears to lie

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[6] For a first stab at establishing some of these larger frames of inquiry, see Porter 2010.

[7] See Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1174b14–23.

[8] See at next note.

[9] Isolating this kind of difference is a tricky maneuver. See further section 2.

outside the system of aesthetic values in antiquity (but also in much of modernity) virtually by definition: it is that which lies beyond beauty and the remaining values. To the extent that it does so, is it any longer even an aesthetic value? Or must we say that the sublime is an aesthetic value precisely to the extent that it remains parasitical on the values it exceeds? But that would seem a rather peculiar, backhanded argument for claiming that the sublime is an aesthetic value.

But surely, it can only seem nonsensical to ask whether the sublime is an aesthetic value in the usual sense of the term (that is, in the narrow sense as defined above). After all, the very presence of the sublime as an explicit category from Caecilius of Caleacte (in the late first century BCE) and Longinus (possibly mid-first century CE), both of whom wrote treatises titled *On the Sublime* (*Peri hupsous*), to Burke, Kant, and Lyotard pretty much guarantees that the sublime has been expressive of aesthetic value within the regime of literary criticism in Western culture and in the aesthetics defined by that regime—as does, say, the implicit presence of the same category among literary critics prior to Caecilius, from Aristotle to Cicero, wherever the *genus grande* or the high style is being invoked: the one implies the other.[10] That is, the sublime in antiquity was obviously treated as an aesthetic value on a par with other aesthetic values, such as beauty, charm, the ugly, originality, artistry, and the rest.

But while this is true, it is not the whole truth. My question regarding the value of the sublime—whether it is an aesthetic value and if so what kind of value does it register?—in another way is like asking what value a particular color has in a painting or a particular note has in a composition. But unlike colors and sounds, for which clearly established mechanisms exist for measuring their presence, which is to say their relative position in a system of formal relations, the sublime poses peculiar challenges. For one thing, the sublime registers presence, but in an incalculable way. It is staked on a kind of immeasurability. Its synonym in French is the *je ne sais quoi*, or the 'I haven't got a clue'. To compound matters, in Longinus and frequently elsewhere, the sublime's equivalent for this indeterminacy is the exact opposite of its capacity to be known: it is the notion that 'we all know what it is' (where 'we' operates in an exclusionary fashion). That is, the indefiniteness of the sublime is built into the circular nature of its very postulation.

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[10] Innes 2002 (on Caecilius); Burke 1968 [1757; 1759]; Kant 1790; Lyotard 1984.

Recall how Longinus, at the start of his treatise, chides his opponent Caecilius for wasting time explaining 'what sort of thing "the sublime is", *as though we did not know*' (ὅμως ὁ Καικίλιος ποῖον μέν τι ὑπάρχει τὸ ὑψηλὸν ... ὡς ἀγνοοῦσι πειρᾶται δεικνύναι, *Subl.* 1.1). In reply, Longinus never attempts to provide infallible markers of the sublime for precisely the same reasons: the sublime is a self-evident entity, given a certain literary and cultural background and privilege—though this presumption is a convenient ruse. It is a ruse, because such self-evidence merely papers over the indefinability of the category and the arbitrariness of its individual exemplifications once it has been presupposed as such. The self-evidentiary character of the sublime *in a given instance* and *for a given critic* further works to conceal the background polemics that go into defining this or that instance of the sublime whenever it appears. We thus tend to forget that Longinus' treatise *On the Sublime* is entirely staked on a dispute with forerunners, and not only Caecilius of Caleacte's earlier work of the same title, over what should and should not count as sublime.[11] The insecurities over what is sublime are detectable in various ways, for example in Longinus' use of the particle *ti*, which means 'something' but not 'this something in particular' as at *Subl.* 9.3, 'something awe-inspiring' (*thaumaston ti*), or at *Subl.* 12.1, 'some sort of sublimity' (*poion ti megethos*), or more insidiously, and from the opposite end, 'whenever we are working on something (*ti*) that needs elevation of speech and greatness of thought ...' (ἡνίκ' ἂν διαπονῶμεν ὑψηγορίας τι καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνης δεόμενον, *Subl.* 14.1), though Longinus crucially fails to specify just what would count as this sort of 'need'. The indefiniteness of the sublime, in other words, cuts two ways, whereby ineffability masks uncertainty. But in its ideal self-presentation, the criterion of sublimity is, to use another ancient critical jargon, 'irrational' (*alogos*)—as irrational as its effects on the hearer.[12] It is felt, not known. Either you get it or you do not.

In both its ancient and modern variants, then, if the sublime has a value, it is a value that cannot be quantified, and possibly not even qualified. In the extreme (but when is the sublime never this?), the sublime appears to subvert the whole system of existing aesthetic values, turning it on its head, whether in a moment of ravishing ecstasy or of panicked confusion. In fact, this failure of the value system of aesthetics is more or less how

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11 See Porter f.c. [a].

12 Cf. Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 50: 'There is in fact no single clear distinguishing mark (σημεῖον) which one should rely on to the exclusion of theirs, but ... only a character of his style'. That is, the mark is itself irrationally known.

the sublime was marked from its first appearances to its most recent. As an extreme of value, the sublime might be thought to operate in a perversely functional relationship *vis-à-vis* other forms of aesthetic value, both giving them content and receiving content from them in return—like a dysfunctional member of a family. (In other words, beauty, ugliness, wonder, charm, symmetry, and other familiar values cannot be adequately defined in the absence of sublimity, and vice versa.) As an outlier, the sublime might be thought to stand beyond all measure, and hence no longer to be discussable in terms of value. Hence, in a nutshell, a further aspect of my chapter's title, *Is the sublime an aesthetic value*?

But my title is meant to provoke a few different questions, not just about the immeasurability of the sublime and how immeasurability could possibly serve as a value of anything. Additionally, there is a question whether the sublime is a literary value, an aesthetic value, or neither of these in a strict sense. This last possibility is best viewed by considering the historical emergence of the sublime in antiquity prior to Longinus. For suppose that the sublime has a contaminated history that involves not only literary and extra-literary contexts that we would want to call aesthetic today (there being no equivalent of *aesthetics* in Greek, nor any demarcated area of inquiry comparable to 'aesthetics' as such), but also contexts that do not obviously involve either domain at all, such as cosmology or religion. In that case, the question whether the sublime is an aesthetic value takes on a real import, even urgency. All of these issues are of considerable relevance to Longinus' treatise, and the fact that his vision of the sublime is as expansive as it is may be the best clue we have to the innovativeness of his conception. That is, assuming that Longinus' work is something of a collecting point for earlier traditions of the sublime in antiquity, as I believe it is, then his originality may not lie in his particular conception of the sublime if he is merely inheriting and synthesizing earlier sublime traditions (and I believe we need to stress the plural and undisciplined nature of these strands of sublimity in antiquity prior to Longinus). Rather, what may be truly novel about Longinus is his attempt to harness these diverse strands under a single rubric within a single treatise of chiefly literary and rhetorical stamp, that of the rhetorical handbook, while in the process (inevitably) altering the look and function of this sort of treatise writing. If this is correct (and I think it is), then Longinus can offer a unique insight into the unlimited capacities of those earlier sublime traditions, which are being put on display for us in one convenient window in his work.

In what follows, I will try to tackle all the aspects of my title which I have enumerated so far, starting first with the question of the locatability of the

sublime, both as an aesthetic value as opposed to a literary value and in relation to whatever system of values it happens to stand in, and then passing on to the question of the widest boundaries of the sublime, understood both as a historical problem and as an aesthetic problem. Longinus will provide the starting point but not the terminus of this investigation, for the ultimate object is not to recover Longinus' understanding of the sublime, but antiquity's as a whole. In the course of this analysis, the sublime will throw an incidental light on the question of aesthetic value *tout court*. So, let us begin with the problem of locating the unlocatable sublime as a literary and aesthetic value.

3. *The Sublime at the Limit of Aesthetic Value*

Our starting point will be a proposition: the sublime in aesthetic contexts is a limit case of value, standing as it does less within a system of values than at the limit or outside any system of values. This is evident in the nomenclature that surrounds the word *sublime* itself: *hupsos* in Greek, *sublimitas* in Latin both suggest elevation and updraft. Synonyms for the sublime are mostly linked to terms that point to an unspecified place beyond rather than above. *Huper* (both 'above' and 'beyond') lies at the root of a plethora of words that attach to sublimity in Greek. Moreover, the sublime comes with a strong sense of spatial and temporal dislocation. This is apparent from the start of the treatise, where Longinus, having complained that his opponent Caecilius failed to give a satisfactory definition of the sublime, goes on to give his own rather elusive definition in turn (*Subl.* 1.3–4):

> Sublimity is a kind of preeminence of discourse. The greatest poets and prose writers excelled thanks to no other source than this, and it was from this they endowed their reputations with eternal life. Sublimity induces in hearers not persuasion, but ecstasy. Wonder together with amazement is always superior to what is persuasive and pleasing. If persuasion is for the most part up to us, amazement and wonder, exerting an irresistible power and force as they do, take control over every hearer. Experience in invention, and arrangement and organization of subject matter, are not apparent from one or two passages; they can be glimpsed only when we take in the whole context. Sublimity, by contrast, when it is executed at the right moment, disturbs everything like a whirlwind and exhibits the orator's complete power at a single stroke.
>
> ἐξοχή τις λόγων ἐστὶ τὰ ὕψη, καὶ ποιητῶν τε οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ συγγραφέων οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐνθένδε ποθὲν ἐπρώτευσαν καὶ ταῖς ἑαυτῶν περιέβαλον εὐκλείαις τὸν αἰῶνα. οὐ γὰρ εἰς πειθὼ τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ἀλλ' εἰς ἔκστασιν ἄγει τὰ ὑπερφυᾶ· πάντη δέ γε σὺν ἐκπλήξει τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν ἀεὶ κρατεῖ τὸ θαυμάσιον, εἴγε τὸ μὲν πιθανὸν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ταῦτα δὲ δυναστείαν καὶ βίαν ἄμαχον

> προσφέροντα παντὸς ἐπάνω τοῦ ἀκροωμένου καθίσταται. καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς εὑρέσεως καὶ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν καὶ οἰκονομίαν οὐκ ἐξ ἑνὸς οὐδ' ἐκ δυεῖν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὅλου τῶν λόγων ὕφους μόλις ἐκφαινομένην ὁρῶμεν, ὕψος δέ που καιρίως ἐξενεχθὲν τά τε πράγματα δίκην σκηπτοῦ πάντα διεφόρησε καὶ τὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος εὐθὺς ἀθρόαν ἐνεδείξατο δύναμιν.

Here, Longinus is firmly locating sublimity in discourse (*logoi*). Later he will extend its reach. But no sooner does he place the sublime within language than he removes it again: it is contrasted with standard rhetoric; it is not a matter of persuasion (*peithô*) but of ecstasy (*ekstasis*); it exceeds one's control; it is more like wonder and amazement. But there is a further dislocation, as if by a sleight of hand. For the sublime *appears* to be bound to the right moment (*kairos*), located in individual passages and not diffused through the whole texture like one of the larger stylistic effects, such as unity or development, which are organically spread out over the totality of a work as its *oikonomia* (distribution) and *huphos* (warp and woof, which makes for a punning contrast with *hupsos*). But appearances notwithstanding, no sooner do we put our finger on the sublime in its epiphanic present than it is gone, untraceable, like mercury, or as Longinus says, it vanishes 'at a single stroke', as in a whirlwind. Only, we would want to say that the sublime is not so much gone—because its effects are long-lasting (*Subl.* 7.1–2)—as it is what is left over after a hole (or gap) has been torn in the fabric of a totality; it is a rip or cut rather than a positive substance. It has the same indexical force as a wound, and it is just as affectively marked as well, being a pleasure that in its intensity borders on pain. We will want to come back to the notion of intensity in a moment. But first, let us continue to think about the language of sublimity as designating a limit that has been breached.

The vocabulary of hyper-extension, or *huper*-words, that is associated with the sublime in Longinus does a lot of the work of conveying the theory in the treatise, in an almost (at times) subliminal way. The passage just quoted contains a few signal instances, which I will simply enumerate:

– *ta huperphua* ('the supernatural', 'enormous', 'strange', and 'excessive');[13]
– *huperbolê* ('throwing over, beyond'), and its associated verb forms;[14]

[13] *Subl.* 1.4 (τὰ ὑπερφυᾶ), 9.4, 9.5; 16.2 (ὑπερφυῶν); 43.2 (ὑπερφυῶς).

[14] *Subl.* 16.2: τὴν δὲ τῆς ἀποδείξεως φύσιν μεθεστακὼς εἰς ὑπερβάλλον ὕψος καὶ πάθος καὶ ξένων καὶ ὑπερφυῶν ὅρκων; 43.2: ὑπερβάλλοντα δὲ τὸ πλῆθος; ὑπερβολή: 5.1, 9.5, 23.4, 38.1–6.

- *huperbaton*[15] and *huperbasis* (‘stepping over, beyond’; ‘transgressing’),[16] with their associated verb forms;[17]
- in some places, the prefix *huper-* seems to be used as an intensifier in an almost desperate fashion, as in the term *hupermegethês*, or ‘super-big’, much the way the postmodern theorist Jean Baudrillard makes use of the same prefix in his theoretical byword, the ‘hyperreal’. *Megethos* (‘big size, greatness’) is already a synonym for *hupsos*; so *hupermegethês* is, so to speak, *hyper*-sublime.[18] Likewise, *huperphuês*, which represents a stronger form of what is natural: ‘growing above, higher’, ‘overgrown’, then ‘enormous’, ‘hyper-natural’, ‘beyond natural’, and even ‘strange’;
- *to huperairon* (‘excelling, going beyond’)[19] and its associated forms;[20]
- *huperokhê* (‘excess, preeminence’);[21]
- *hupertetamena* (‘things stretched to the limit’, ‘exceeding the measure of’);[22]
- *huperhêmeron* (‘lasting beyond the morrow’, and specifically ‘beyond one’s own lifetime’);[23]
- *huperekptôsis* (‘exaggeration’, ‘excess’, as in ‘poetic fable’, and ‘myth’).[24]

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15 *Subl.* 22.1 (2x), 22.3.

16 *Subl.* 22.3, 22.4.

17 *Subl.* 15.11: διὸ καὶ τὸν τοῦ πείθειν ὅρον ὑπερβέβηκε τῷ λήμματι; cf. ὑπερβιβάζω (‘transpose’): 22.2, 22.3.

18 *Subl.* 33.2: αἱ ὑπερμεγέθεις φύσεις; 44.1: ὑψηλαὶ δὲ καὶ λίαν ὑπερμεγέθεις. Incidentally, *hupermegethês* is found in this sense from before Herodotus to the Homeric scholia and elsewhere (which does not diminish the force of the term in any way). Cf. [Sept. Sap.] *Apophthegm.* 1.9.3; Hdt. 4.191; 2.175; 7.126; Isoc. *Evag.* 61; Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.8; schol. Hom. *Il.* 13.63 D (van Thiel): περιμήκεος: λίαν μεγάλης, *ὑπερμεγέθους*; Poll. *Onom.* 88: περὶ τοῦ πολύ· ἄπλατον, ἄπλετον, ἄπειρον, ἀμύθητον, ἀμέτρητον, ἀναρίθμητον, ἀνεξαρίθμητον, ἀνήριθμον, πάμπολυ, παμπληθές, ἄπιστον τῷ πλήθει, ἀδιήγητον. πάμμεγα, μέγα, μέγιστον, παμμέγεθες, *ὑπερμέγεθες*, ὑπέρογκον, ἐξαίσιον, εὐμέγεθες; Porph. *ad Il.* (*Od.*) 18.79: βουγάιον ἀκουστέον ὑπερμεγέθη ἔχειν βοείαν ἀσπίδα ἐπὶ τοῦ Αἴαντος· ὦ Αἶαν ἁμαρτοεπὲς βουγάιε (N 824), ὡς εἰ ἔλεγεν ὁ γαίων ἐπὶ τῇ ἀσπίδι, ὡς τὸ κύδεϊ γαίων (A 405). ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ Ἴρου χαριεντιζόμενος λέγει ‘ὡς γαυριῶντος ἐπὶ τῇ ἀναισθησίᾳ’ ἢ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ὡς *ὑπερμεγέθη* ἂν ἔχοντος ἀσπίδα.

19 *Subl.* 36.4: τὸ ὑπεραῖρον, ὡς ἔφην, τὰ ἀνθρώπινα.

20 *Subl.* 3.4 (ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν οἰδοῦν ὑπεραίρειν βούλεται τὰ ὕψη); 15.8 (οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς μυθικωτέραν ἔχει τὴν πάντη *ὑπερέκπτωσιν*, ὡς ἔφην, καὶ πάντη τὸ πιστὸν ὑπεραίρουσαν). The close relatives based on συναιρ- and ἐπαιρ- have to do with lifting up rather than passing beyond.

21 *Subl.* 36.4 (τὸ δ’ ἐν ὑπεροχῇ), 38.4 (ἡ τοῦ πάθους ὑπεροχὴ καὶ περίστασις).

22 *Subl.* 10.1 (ὅτι τὰ ἄκρα αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπερτεταμένα δεινή); 12.5 (καιρὸς δὲ τοῦ Δημοσθενικοῦ μὲν ὕψους καὶ ὑπερτεταμένου); 38.1 (τὴν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπερτεινόμενα).

23 *Subl.* 14.3.

24 *Subl.* 15.8.

A first conclusion, then: *hupsos* is not just a matter of 'elevation' (positive or negative, as in *bathos*, or 'depth').[25] Most of the expressions just named capture the notion of extension and hyperextension, as in *hyperbolê*. Some of them are second-order expressions applied to sublimity itself, like *hupermegethês*. Consider two examples: (i) 'on account of the extremity/strained nature/excessiveness/perfection of the grandeur [or "sublimity"]', or 'magnitude' (διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ μεγέθους, *Subl.* 9.5), though on a different construction Longinus is saying, 'owing to [the way Homer] *oversteps sublimity*'.[26] Similarly, (ii) '[Demosthenes] transforms his demonstration into an extraordinary instance of sublimity and passion' (τὴν δὲ τῆς ἀποδείξεως φύσιν μεθεστακὼς εἰς ὑπερβάλλον ὕψος καὶ πάθος, *Subl.* 16.2), where the sublimity is transgressive twice over, first as sublime (ὕψος), and then in the qualification of its being ὑπερβάλλον ('extraordinary'; 'transcendent' [Roberts])—transcendently sublime, which is to say more than *just* sublime (or, as Boileau would later say, '*sublime, et plus que sublime*').[27] The sublime, in other words, is being defined not merely as an excessiveness (of 'the gods' high-thundering [horses] or of Demosthenic language), but either as being *in excess of measure* or (what amounts to the same thing) *in excess of itself*; and this latter is, one must hasten to add, its habitual condition in Longinus.

The sublime is naturally unstable and destabilizing: it challenges limits of all kinds. But, like all 'critiques from the margins', it also inhabits the very domains it unsettles, almost parasitically, and consequently it occupies a curious position in relation to them. In the case of Longinus, it could be shown how he strategically deploys the sublime to undo classical values in at least three domains: rhetoric, tragic theory, and classicism, while at the same time standing in a precarious relation to them all. There are good reasons why Longinus would wish to distance himself from all three value regimes: in each case, as a champion of the sublime he would be wary of allowing this supreme value to reduce to a mere artifice of rhetoric, the inherited ecstasies of tragic poetics (in particular Aristotelian catharsis; see *Subl.* 1.4, where tragedy is converted into sublime *ekstasis* and *ekplêxis*),

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[25] Wackernagel 1916, 213–214 discusses ὑψ- in Homer strictly in terms of height and elevation.

[26] Indeed, such a construction has led others to the conclusion that Longinus is blaming Homer, whether in earnest (Mutschmann 1917, 166–167; Grube 1957, 366) or ironically (Mazzucchi 1992, ad loc.), for having done so here. *Contra*, Russell 1964, ad loc. (who contrasts 3.4: ὑπεραίρειν τά ὕψη).

[27] *Apud* Boileau 2001, 143: 'Qui est-ce en effet qui peut nier, qu'une chose dite en un endroit, paroîtra basse et petite; & que la même chose dite en un autre endroit deviendra grande, noble, sublime, & plus que sublime?'

or to the staid virtues of classicism. In his emphasis on imbalance, excess, emotionality, ornateness, highly figured discourse (virtues that elsewhere would earn the label of Asianism), and in hazarding failure for the sake of greatness, Longinus steps outside the pale of classical values, or so it seems. He confirms this with his explicit, if outlandish, preference for the 'failed' Colossus (possibly of Rhodes), which he prefers to the perfect image of classical beauty, the Doryphorus by Polycleitus (36.3): 'In the case of statues, what is sought is something resembling the human form, whereas, as I said, in literature [and in the sublime] something higher than human (τὸ ὑπεραῖρον τὰ ἀνθρώπινα) is sought'. In looking beyond the human, Longinus has broached the realm of the superhuman, the natural, and the divine. Has he left aesthetic value behind as well?

4. *The Material Sublime and Natural Speculation*

An easy answer would be to concede that he has, at least some of the time, and to acknowledge the co-presence in his treatise of a number of contributing traditions stemming from the area of natural philosophical speculation of the sort that are found in a quasi-subliterary genre which also spills over into Greek and Roman literature. This subgenre includes such items as Crates' allegorical readings of Homer, Lucretius, the *Aetna* poet, Manilius, Seneca, and others.[28] Here, the emblematic instances of the sublime tend to be huge, mind-boggling, and breath-taking spectacles and events from the physical universe: volcanic eruptions, teeming cataracts, oceans, and rivers, cavernous voids, and starry skies. *De mundo* (*ca.* 50 BCE–50 CE) furnishes a good pre-Longinian instance ([Arist.] *Mund.* 391a1–5):

> I have often thought, Alexander, that philosophy is a divine and really godlike activity, particularly in those instances when it alone has exalted itself to the contemplation of the universe and sought to discover the truth that is in it; the other sciences shunned this field of inquiry because of its sublimity and extensiveness; philosophy has not feared the task or thought itself unworthy of the noblest things but has judged that the study of these is by nature most closely related to it and most fitting. (tr. Furley)

> Πολλάκις μὲν ἔμοιγε θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον ὄντως χρῆμα, ὦ Ἀλέξανδρε, ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔδοξεν εἶναι, μάλιστα δὲ ἐν οἷς μόνη διαραμένη πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὄντων θέαν ἐσπούδασε γνῶναι τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταύτης ἀποστάντων διὰ τὸ ὕψος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, αὕτη τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐκ ἔδεισεν οὐδ' αὑτὴν τῶν καλλίστων ἀπηξίωσεν,

[28] On Manilius see now Porter f.c. [b].

> ἀλλὰ καὶ συγγενεστάτην ἑαυτῇ καὶ μάλιστα πρέπουσαν ἐνόμισεν εἶναι τὴν ἐκείνων μάθησιν.

But we have witnessed one example already: lightning bolts or whirlwinds, from *On the Sublime* 1.4. The deepest origins of this tradition are to be found in a curious mingling of writings, both technical and paradoxographical, on meteorology, geology, and cosmology, which more or less originate in the Presocratics (though Homer provides a model), and which passes from there via Plato to Theophrastus (with residues found in fifth-century tragedy and comedy) and then on to the Hellenistic diaspora of learning. The obsession in this tradition is with matter and its mysteries. And when the appeal is to great heights, depths, and intensities of experience, this genre of speculation captures what I call 'the material sublime'.

An example of one of these residues is an unclaimed tragic fragment which reads 'your thoughts go higher than the air' (φρονεῖτε νῦν αἰθέρος ὑψηλότερον, *Trag. Adesp.* 2.127). The context is bound up with the sublime thoughts of the natural philosopher whose mind dwells in the heavens.[29] Plato in the *Phaedrus* connects 'ethereal speculation' (μετεωρολογία), in the context of Anaxagorean cosmology, with 'loftiness of mind' (τὸ ὑψηλόνουν).[30] But of even greater interest, Socrates there is either urging or subverting the claim that 'all the great arts need supplementing by a study of cosmological Nature', not least of all rhetoric (he has Pericles in mind).[31] Loftiness of mind is the first and most important of the five sources of sublimity named and discussed by Longinus in his treatise.[32] But if we assume that sublimity of matter is sponsored only by contact with physical grandeur, we should think again. Atoms spinning in the void, particles of speech, gaps in structural wholes, and gaps of time between letters on a page or in the ear can all conjure up a sense of the sublime. The tiniest objects, viewed from up close, resemble monuments or mountains. In the process, their perception (like their loving description at the hands of a philosopher or critic) takes greater and greater amounts of time. The longer the perceptual duration, the more palpable an object's sensuous qualities will be (or appear to be).

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[29] *TrGF* 2.127 = Diod. Sic. 16.92.3. Further, Capelle 1912; Quadlbauer 1958, 58; Dover 1968, lxvii–lxviii; Pucci 2006.

[30] Pl. *Phdr.* 270.

[31] *Phdr.* 269e–270a (tr. Hackforth, adapted): πᾶσαι ὅσαι μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν προσδέονται ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως πέρι. De Vries 1969, 233 and Rowe 1986, 203–204 read the passage as reflecting Plato's irony.

[32] *Subl.* 8.1; 9.1–4; 39.4: ὑψηλὸν ... νόημα. μεγαλοφροσύνη first appears in *Subl.* 7.3, but famously appears in 9.2 ('sublimity is the echo of an elevated mind', ὕψος μεγαλοφροσύνης ἀπήχημα), and its last appearance is in *Subl.* 36.1 (see below).

Time intensifies aesthetic perception. Indeed, time, when it is made into an object of sensation in its own right, becomes itself intensely palpable. All this suggests that the sublime may have less to do with grandeur *per se* and more with an increased sensory contact, on the part of the beholder, with the various dimensions of any given aesthetic object. *That is, the sublime may have more to do with an intensification of aesthetic experience than with some of the more conventional factors of sublimity*. The very clash of scales and effects can be a factor in this aesthetic process (understood in the broadest sense) and sufficient to trigger a powerful response.

5. *The Immaterial Sublime and the Sublimity of Divinity*

Now, the second major strand of the sublime in antiquity is to be found in a more ethereal kind of speculation, for instance about the divine. Here, it is again loftiness of mind that is of concern, only the mind in question is often no longer human, but itself divine. Longinus knows this tendency himself; it is built right into his conception of the sublime, as in *Subl.* 36.1: 'sublimity lifts us close to the high-mindedness of god' (τὸ δ' ὕψος ἐγγὺς αἴρει μεγαλοφροσύνης θεοῦ). If in the tradition of the material sublime it is the nature of matter and the structure of the world or universe that is felt to be sublime, here in what may be called the tradition of the *immaterial* sublime the opposite is the case: the farther one's perspective recedes from material reality, the more sublime does that perspective appear to be. Examples could be drawn anywhere from (again) Homer to the Presocratics to tragedy to later philosophers.

Consider the following from *Iliad* 15.78–83, a well-known passage about Hera's movement across the Aegean from Asia Minor to the home of the gods on Olympus:

> [Zeus] spoke, and the goddess of the white arms Hera did not disobey him
> but went back to tall Olympos from the mountains of Ida.
> As the thought flashes in the mind of a man who, traversing
> much territory thinks of things in the mind's awareness,
> 'I wish I were this place, or this', and imagines many things;
> so rapidly in her eagerness winged Hera, a goddess. (tr. Lattimore)

> ὣς ἔφατ', οὐδ' ἀπίθησε θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη,
> βῆ δ' ἐξ Ἰδαίων ὀρέων ἐς μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον.
> ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἀΐξῃ νόος ἀνέρος, ὅς τ' ἐπὶ πολλὴν
> γαῖαν ἐληλουθὼς φρεσὶ πευκαλίμῃσι νοήσῃ
> ἔνθ' εἴην ἢ ἔνθα, μενοινήῃσί τε πολλά,
> ὣς κραιπνῶς μεμαυῖα διέπτατο πότνια Ἥρη.

Hera's ability to return to tall Olympus from Mount Ida with the speed of thought in *Iliad* 15 pointedly strains the very limits of conceivability. Is the goddess' horizontal and upward movement physical or supernatural? Is she travelling with her body or her mind, or by urging her body with her mind? Beyond the difficulties of simply making out the logistics of the scene, there is a further kind of twist to the problem. These verses about Hera's traveling 'faster than the speed of thought' not only subvert the imagination; they also invoke the very process of imagination itself, and above all the limits of that process, in a way that is as vividly familiar in Homer as it is today. Hera's thought or mind is 'eager', and she imagines herself to be somewhere else in her thought, just as the mind of the man in the simile (μεμαυῖα corresponds to μενοινήῃσι for this reason):[33] as she thinks the thought, she accomplishes it in an instant, as no human could do—such is her superior mind's awareness.[34] The audience in turn strain to imagine the thought and its accomplishment, and, like the internal thinker, are left with a wish, or dream, and a barely imaginable god. There is a striking and I think significant intellectualism to this imagery, the identification of one of the gods' activities with *noos* or thought (which, I suppose, is what lies behind the action of Zeus' brows too), or better yet, the failure of the human mind to grasp the workings of the divine mind and its urges. And though Longinus does not treat the example, he treats others like it, as when he writes 'our thoughts often pass beyond the limits of our surroundings' (ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τοῦ περιέχοντος πολλάκις ὅρους ἐκβαίνουσιν αἱ ἐπίνοιαι, *Subl.* 35.4), an activity that puts us in touch with the divine in ourselves, if not quite with god himself (cf. 36.1, quoted above). So we can be fairly certain that Longinus would have considered the passage about Hera sublime, as the scholia seem to do (schol. Hom. *Il.* 15.80 *Arist.* A):

> 'As the thought flashes in the mind of a man': [This simile is of note] because the divine speed of flying from place to place is compared in an exaggerated [or 'extravagant', 'sublime'] way with the movement of thought, and because the proverbial phrase 'flew just like a thought' derives from these lines and from the line from the *Odyssey*, 'whose swift ships move like a wing or thought', which is found in no other poet.
>
> ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἀΐξῃ νόος ἀνέρος· ὅτι τὸ θεῖον τάχος τῆς ἐπιπτήσεως τῶν τόπων τῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν κινήσει ἀντιπαρέθηκεν ὑπερβολικῶς, καὶ ὅτι τὸ παροιμιακὸν τὸ 'διέπτατο δ' ὥστε νόημα' ἐκ τούτων καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν σύγκειται 'τῶν νέες ὠκεῖαι ὡσεὶ πτερὸν ἠὲ νόημα', οὐκ ὂν παρ' οὐδενὶ ποιητῇ.

33 See Janko 1992, ad loc.

34 See Thornton 1984, 195, who notes that the gods 'do not typically know what it means to *experience* time'; instead, they occupy 'a position outside time'.

The gods in Homer point to something greater than themselves, and they do so both in their incompleteness in the imagination and in the essential inconsistency of their representations. Too much a part of this world, they suggest something they cannot even embody. Simply to attempt to conceive them is to mimic their form, to exceed the powers of representation, and to enter into the realm of sublimity.

Along the same lines, consider Plato's depiction, in the *Phaedrus*, of the ascent of the immortal soul to a point from which it can glimpse 'a place beyond the heavens', (a *huperouranios topos*, Pl. *Phdr.* 247b–d). There, Plato describes how the souls of an elect few reach 'the summit of the arch that supports the heavens' (ἄκραν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἁψῖδα πορεύονται πρὸς ἄναντες, *Phdr.* 247a8–b1), and from there 'stand upon the back of the world' (πρὸς ἄκρῳ γένωνται, *Phdr.* 247b6–7). 'Straightway the revolving heaven carries them round, and they look upon the regions,' not down below, but 'without' (τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, *Phdr.* 247c2). Their vision reaches beyond the heavens into this *huperouranios topos*, which recalls, not fortuitously, 'a place beyond being' from *Republic* 6 (ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, *Resp.* 509b9): plainly, such a topography is part of Plato's metaphysical imagination. What the souls see is impossible to describe, let alone to fathom—and Plato carefully declines to offer a single detail. Instead he focuses on the impact of the vision on the observer. 'None of our earthly poets has yet sung [of it], and none shall sing [of it] worthily', we are assured, and the reason is clear: 'It is there that true Being dwells, without colour or shape, that cannot be touched; reason alone, the soul's pilot, can behold it' (ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατὴ νῷ, *Phdr.* 247c6–7). It is, in other words, an immaterial place that is devoid of phenomenal features. And yet the desire to leap into its ethereal condition renders a soul that is fused with a body into 'a seeker after wisdom or beauty, a follower of the Muses and a lover'—a contemplative lover of beauty, but not an active 'poet or other imitative artist' (*Phdr.* 248d–e). Plainly, Plato is naming a beauty that lies beyond beautiful things, and even beyond beauty itself. He is describing something like the sublimity of beauty or its essence. More to the point, he is naming an immaterial sublime, for which such distinctions are of little import and as meaningless as embodiment, matter, and appearances. His resplendent vision is that of a reality that lies beyond the realm of language, thought, and the imagination, even if he has created the vision using, rather illicitly, all three of these instruments. But then, we are dealing with an image, after all, and not the real thing (ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν, *Phdr.* 246a5). In fact, in order to attain this vision one must first transform oneself and come as close to divinity as is humanly possible (εἰκασμένη,

Phdr. 248a2)—or rather, one must shed as much of one's humanity as is conceivable, like so much dross, leaving only the sublimest elemental remains of an immortal soul behind, and from there move *beyond* into an even more ethereal realm of purity still (Pl. *Phdr.* 248a1–4):

> The soul that follows a god most likely, making itself most like that god, raises the head of its charioteer up to the place outside and is carried round in the circular motion with the others. (tr. Hackforth)
>
> ἡ μὲν ἄριστα θεῷ ἑπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη ὑπερῆρεν εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἡνιόχου κεφαλήν, καὶ συμπεριηνέχθη τὴν περιφοράν.

Hermogenes cites the description of Zeus in his winged chariot at 246a4–5—the paradigm of the soul's aspirations—as an instance of solemnity and grandeur (*Inv.* 4.11; 200.18–19 Rabe; *Id.* 246.17–18; 248.1 Rabe). Other examples of the immaterial sublime would include various of the Presocratics' insights into the zenith of cosmic perfection and the divine (these are often one and the same), or Aristotle's ghostly image of an unmoved mover that is stripped of material attributes and reduced, or else elevated, to a condition of pure and circular thought: God, here, is 'thought that thinks itself', and 'its thinking is a thinking on thinking' (καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις, Arist. *Metaph.* 1074b34–35)[35]—while such a thought is all that the world desires and strives to be ('[God] produces motion by being loved, and [he] moves the other moving things' (tr. Ross), κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον, κινούμενα δὲ τἆλλα κινεῖ, *Metaph.* 1072b3–4). God's thought is, in a word, the world, though in another way he is no longer even *part* of our world, being utterly discarnate and something like the idea of the world in its true vitality and actuality. He is absolutely beautiful (κάλλιστον, *Metaph.* 1072b32) and wondrous (θαυμαστόν, *Metaph.* 1072b25) more than he is awesome; but he also passes all human comprehension. He is sublime. Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* is merely realizing to the fullest imaginable extent the lessons he had laid out in his earlier *Protrepticus*, where he established the equivalence of three kinds of value: that of life, of knowledge, and of contemplation. The unmoved mover, being all *energeia* and no matter, is the pinnacle of these activities, albeit in a form that is rendered so potent as to be no longer contained by human creatures.

If the two sublimes (material and immaterial), sketched out all too briefly here, appear to be close relatives of each other, this is correct. They are,

[35] One hears echoes of Plato's formula for unsurpassed beauty here, from *Symposium* (211b1–2): αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μεθ' αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν.

after all, two species of the sublime. Let me explain. First, they are conjoined in their origins: both originate in a harsh confrontation with matter. In the case of the material sublime, a subject confronts matter; he or she has a perceptual experience (an *aisthêsis*); the experience of matter (and in particular, of matter's materiality) is felt to be sublime. The sublime, unlike beauty, arises out of the incommensurability between sensation and sensuous surfaces. The material sublime is an experience, in the first instance, of the radical otherness of matter and a reveling in this reductionism. While matter can evoke a range of aesthetic experiences, the sublime marks their greatest intensification and something of a limit point. And because all aesthetic experiences, I claim, involve a confrontation with sensuous matter,[36] the material sublime is simply the most intense form of sensuous aesthetic response possible, including within the realm of beauty itself (fig. 1).



Figure 1.

The alternative response to the encounter with brute matter is to recoil from the experience and to take flight in an idealized realm bereft of matter, the senses, surfaces, and tangibility of all kinds, and to discover a sublimity in this very deprivation of sensuality (fig. 2).



Figure 2.

[36] See Porter 2010.

This flight from materiality in its most intensified form is *the immaterial sublime*. This latter kind of sublimity culminates in the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition, which locates rapture in the purely formal conditions of experience purged of all traits of materiality. And yet, drawn to these pure exemplars of ultimate Forms, Platonic and Neoplatonist aesthetics admit of a rapture that is every bit as compelling as any plunge into matter's surfaces. The idealizing aesthetics are, however, based on a (sought-for) encounter with immateriality, rather than the intractability of sensuous matter. And in its peak moments, this brand of aesthetics reaches for the sublime, though such experiences are typically labeled 'beautiful'.

As an example of this latter, we might look at the way the fifth-century Neoplatonist Hermias interprets the fable of the cicadas in Plato's *Phaedrus*. There, it will be remembered, the cicadas sing to their heart's content at the cost of their lives. Quite forgetting to eat and drink, they enjoy the pleasures of their own voices until they eventually die 'without noticing' even this—whereupon the Muses award them the gift of rehearsing their own tragic existence from the start and forever more, singing without sustenance, and dying again, and so on (or so Plato's version has it). They are virtually pure voice.[37] Hermias in his commentary exalts the cicadas to a quasi-divine status. Here, they become the very picture of 'men who despise their bodies and, amazed by divine harmony, are elevated [to another plane of existence]' (οὗτοι οὖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τῶν αἰσθητῶν καταφρονήσαντες ἀνήχθησαν ἐκπληττόμενοι τὴν θείαν ἁρμονίαν, 216.1–3 Couvreur). They represent human 'souls who have become infused with music and made into gods of a sort' (αἱ ψυχαὶ αὗται μουσικαὶ ἐγένοντο καὶ θεοί τινες, 216.3–4). The upshot of the image (which is virtually an allegory, θεωρία, of a story, λόγος; 216.4–6) is this (216.6–10 Couvreur):

> The person who is both a lover of the Muses and a philosopher and who wants to be lifted up to the gods does not need to care for his body or bodily existence; he has no concern for this, because his wish is to recoil from the body. He practices dying, which is to say, a withdrawal from this life. For he knows that the body is a hindrance to him.
>
> ἡ δὲ θεωρία ὅτι ὁ κατὰ νοῦν ζῶν καὶ φιλόμουσος καὶ φιλόσοφος βουλόμενος ἀναχθῆναι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς οὐ δεῖται τῆς ἐπιμελείας τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς σωματικῆς ζωῆς, ἀλλὰ οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται αὐτήν, ἀποστῆναι αὐτῆς βουλόμενος· μελετᾷ γὰρ θάνατον, τουτέστιν ἀπόστασιν ταύτης τῆς ζωῆς· οἶδε γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς ὄχλον αὐτῷ ἐστι τὸ σῶμα.

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[37] Pl. *Phdr.* 258e–259d; Aesop. *Fab.* 1; cf. Porph. *In Harm.* 76.

Hermias blurs entirely the line between music and philosophy, and allows the philosophically inclined soul to pass into a kind of divinity via ecstasy and the death of his material self. In the process, he has in fact gone a step further than Plato, for whom the cicadas are decidedly not emblems of philosophy in its purest form. On the contrary, they pose a threatening distraction. The cicadas may be 'singing' overhead in the hot noon-day sun and 'conversing' very like model Socratic interlocutors (ᾄδοντες καὶ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμενοι, Pl. *Phdr.* 258e7–259a1), at least to all appearances. But Socrates states that his own resoluteness and that of Lysias will be apparent only if they manage to 'converse while steering clear of the cicadas as if these latter were Sirens and we were proof against their enchantments' (διαλεγομένους καὶ παραπλέοντάς σφας ὥσπερ Σειρῆνας ἀκηλήτους, *Phdr.* 259a6–7). The cicadas act as witnesses to true or aspiring philosophers, not as their models. Above all, they act as a kind of test of the latters' resolve (much as the Sirens did for Odysseus). Plato is harsher towards the arts than his successor in this case, and he presents a more complex, and forbidding, picture of the cicadas as well.[38] Plato's cicadas are a complex symbol. They are born when music comes into being (*Phdr.* 259b7–8), and so they are music's virtual stand-in.[39] But they are also more than this. They represent both music's original essence and its first (archetypal) victim—the audience—merged into one. They are thus a self-satisfying but also self-consuming totality, which makes them even that much more bizarre a figure to behold. A truly Platonic version of the immaterial sublime cannot contain a hint of materiality in it. Better candidates for this aesthetic value in the world of phenomena would be pure, unvarying, individual notes, but not melodies (*Phlb.* 51d6), and surely not a chorus of sounds such as the cicadas produce (*Phdr.* 230c2–3); whiteness, or rather whiteness in its purity and bordering on pure light (for it is 'the most perfectly clear color' of all; *Phlb.* 53a–b), but not color *per se* (which dazzles and confuses the mind; *Phd.* 100d; *Symp.* 211e); and bare geometric shapes, bordering on rarefied ideas of bodies (*Ti.* 33b–34b).[40]

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38 *Pace* Rowe 1986, 194, ad loc., who sees no complication here. By contrast, De Vries 1969, 192 does. My view agrees with those of Griswold 1986, 165–168; Ferrari 1987, 28.

39 Hermias must be thinking of this passage when he resorts to the phrase ἐκπληττόμενοι τὴν θείαν ἁρμονίαν in order to rehabilitate Plato's original: γενομένων δὲ Μουσῶν καὶ φανείσης ᾠδῆς οὕτως ἄρα τινὲς τῶν τότε ἐξεπλάγησαν ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς, ὥστε ᾄδοντες ἠμέλησαν σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν, καὶ ἔλαθον τελευτήσαντες αὑτούς (Pl. *Phdr.* 259b7–c1).

40 See Porter 2010, 85–95.

Finally, the two sublimes can be quasi-convergent in their end-products, but that is another story (fig. 3).



Figure 3.

6. *A Modest Proposal: Aesthetic Values as Aesthetic Intensities*

Let's take stock and return to where we set out from. First, if we adopt a sufficiently broad attitude towards the problem of aesthetic value, such value is impossible to divorce from non-aesthetic contexts. The example of Hera from Homer is a perfect case in point: an image of a god is being represented in a poem, or rather the problem of capturing divine attributes is being put on display within a poetic context. To be sure, Homer is offering a stylized picture of divinity, but then what picture of divinity is never this? Furthermore, the kinds of difficulties raised in *Iliad* 15—the dilemmas of a god lying outside the human scale of representation and the limits of human thought, existing somewhere on high, beyond or outside space and time in a world apart, and so on—are more or less constants in the patterns of divine representation in later literature and art, as the brief case studies of Plato, Aristotle, and Longinus above indicated. In each instance we have an example of a cross-over of categories between aesthetics and religion at a mutual point of failure and ecstasy. That meeting point is sublime.

Given the prevalence of religion in ancient life, representational dilemmas like these were guaranteed to be daily affairs. Aesthetic value bleeds irresistibly into religious value in antiquity. Similar breakdowns between areas of life and value that are nominally cordoned off in modernity will be found obtaining all the time in antiquity—and, I suspect, in our contemporary world if we look hard enough too. Accordingly, we can, if we like, continue to speak of aesthetics broadly conceived (awareness that is grounded in perception and sensation) and of aesthetics narrowly conceived (of the sort that is grounded in art), but the categories from the one inevitably cross over into those of the other and vice versa. I believe that a purely art-centered source of values is impossible to locate in antiquity or today because of the inevitably (and thankfully) rich, or contaminated, nature of all perceptions and sensations and of the discourse attaching to these. Within aesthetics narrowly conceived, values conventionally distribute themselves into categories that divide up into beauty, the ugly, the sublime, and so on. But a close look at ancient sources will establish not only that the boundaries between, say, beauty and sublimity are rarely sacrosanct, but also that those phenomena themselves are just as often interchangeable. The Homeric formula 'beautiful and grand' (καλός τε μέγας τε), with a legacy as old as the Homeric epics but found in Aratus and in various places in between (and later), is merely one case in point.[41] Longinus, for his part, shows no interest in keeping beauty distinct from the sublime: the two can work in tandem, and they can also modify each other. It is important to recognize this lack of division, because I think we need to go even a step further in disrespecting the surface categories that organize ancient aesthetic discourse. Let me propose instead that the terms and languages of aesthetic valuation from antiquity, which so often strike the modern ear as inadequate to their objects (but which are in fact no more inadequate than our own modern alternatives), do not describe neat compartments or hierarchies, or even clearly adumbrated aesthetic palettes, but are best understood as existing along a scale of aesthetic *intensities*. That is, let us think of aesthetic values as place-holders for aesthetic intensities.

Secondly, as we move away from standard, canonic categories to aesthetic values understood as points of saturation and intensities, we may also begin to question the very distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic as a useful category. In the past, the aesthetic realm has been narrowly tied

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[41] καλός τε μέγας τε (Arat. 1.43; 1.244; 1.397 = *Il.* 21.108 = *Od.* 6.276, all final); καλοὶ καὶ μεγάλοι (Arat. 1.210), etc. *pace* Van Groningen 1953, 85–88.

down to a closed system of the arts and its adjacent field of speculation that originated around 1750. But this is a dubious set of distinctions which, *inter alia*, renders aesthetic reflection off-limits to the ancients—absurdly so, in my view. Plato, in the *Phaedrus*, associates *to theion* with *to kalon* (τὸ δὲ θεῖον καλόν, σοφόν, ἀγαθόν, καὶ πᾶν ὅτι τοιοῦτον, *Phdr*. 246d8–e1), and further describes the assembled gods as an orderly *arrangement*, *spectacle*, and *chorus*.[42] In doing so, he is reflecting the broad reach that aesthetic values enjoyed in antiquity, but also the lack of respect for boundary divisions they showed—and, one should hasten to add, continue to show in modernity. Works of art today are never sites of so-called 'pure aesthetic' value. Once we rid ourselves of the prejudices of canonical aesthetic labels and make room for something like aesthetic intensities, we will be more accepting of such breaches of value, and of a more variegated landscape in which value intensities can be seen to be at work feeding off each other in a myriad of ways. Religious, cultural, artistic, economic, and political values, never cleanly distinct, create intensities of value that are poorly served by conventional labels. The sublime is merely a name for one of the most highly wrought of these intensities known in the ancient world. And Longinus is merely one of the later authors who gave expression to the discourse of sublimity, both material and immaterial, that runs from Homer to the modern world.

7. *Conclusion*

To conclude, then: the sublime, strictly speaking, is not an aesthetic value but a measure of thought pressed to its utmost limits, while thought in its various hues enjoys different aesthetic values. Historically, the sublime emerged in an effort to conceive entities that lay at the limits of thought (whether this was in confrontation with the materiality of sensation or the essence of divinity). *That* is the reason why matter and the immaterial are congenitally linked in the disparate traditions of the ancient sublime—which Longinus culminates but in no way originates.

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[42] τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐν τῷ τῶν δώδεκα ἀριθμῷ τεταγμένοι θεοὶ ἄρχοντες ἡγοῦνται κατὰ *τάξιν* ἣν ἕκαστος ἐτάχθη. πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ μακάριαι *θέαι* τε καὶ διέξοδοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, ἃς θεῶν γένος εὐδαιμόνων ἐπιστρέφεται πράττων ἕκαστος αὐτῶν τὸ αὑτοῦ, ἕπεται δὲ ὁ ἀεὶ ἐθέλων τε καὶ δυνάμενος· φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου *χοροῦ* ἵσταται (Pl. *Phdr*. 247a2–7).

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CHAPTER FOUR

MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE: THE AESTHETICS OF (NON)SENSE IN THE ANCIENT GREEK SYMPOSIUM*

Alexandra Pappas

1. *Introduction: Sense and Nonsense at the Symposium*

This chapter will deal with the phenomenon of mixed sense and nonsense inscriptions on vessels associated with the Athenian symposium. Of the thousands of extant inscribed Attic pots,[1] a full third feature so-called 'nonsense' inscriptions, that is, strings of letters or near-letters that make no semantic sense when read in serial order.[2] For the data I present, I want to suggest that actual, legible words work in important verbal and visual exchange with their nonsensical counterparts, which are arresting mimetic icons of writing, speech, and figural imagery all at once. Furthermore, these inscriptions create a fundamentally aesthetic space, existing at the interstices of the visual and the verbal. As such, these exchanges between sense and nonsense, the dialectic of these words-as-images and images-as-words do in fact 'make sense'. To elaborate the point, I will offer various models for how they may do so and for what kind of ancient viewing audience,

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[1] Henry Immerwahr has created an invaluable online resource that aims to document all inscribed Attic pots; in its current incarnation (revised January, 2009), his monumental *Corpus of Attic Vase Inscriptions* catalogues 8,173 such objects.

[2] Immerwahr 2006, 136. For an overview and breakdown of the different types of nonsense inscriptions on pots, see also Immerwahr 1990, 44–45. For peripherally related treatments of nonsense letters in ancient Greek culture, see Miller 1986 for their magical powers in the magical papyri and Touliatos 1989 for their use in musical notation.

focusing in particular on the role of such inscribed objects in the authoritative verbalization of cultural identity.

Such an engagement will also require us to address along the way the current scholarly debates over the Greek symposium and its participants, activities, and accoutrements. Following one theoretical model, we might assign these inscribed pots a place in the elite aristocratic symposium, which functioned, in Leslie Kurke's terms, as an 'anti-*polis*', and was an escape from Ian Morris' 'middling', egalitarian civic community.[3] On the other hand, scholars have recently urged a reappraisal of such a scheme, suggesting instead that the institution not only purposefully mirrored the larger civic community of the *polis*, but was a locus for the promotion of its egalitarian values.[4] Such theorizing has even led some to make over the sympotic audience, seeing in the latter part of the sixth century increasingly 'democratic' symposia and thus participants of more diverse social and economic backgrounds than has traditionally been assumed.[5] Oswyn Murray captured the central role of the social institution of the symposium when he termed it, simply, the 'organ of social control' in archaic politics.[6] Whatever its exact definition or function, we can safely conclude that any given symposium, no matter its attendees, actively engaged speech, sight, sound, scent, taste, and touch—with the wine vessels themselves often directing the sensual experience. Thus the symposium is an excellent context to locate and theorize the aesthetic value of these inscribed objects.[7]

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[3] See Hammer 2004 for a complete bibliography and a compelling critique of both scholars' formulations.

[4] E.g. Hammer 2004; Yatromanolakis 2009; Corner 2010.

[5] E.g. Lynch 2007.

[6] Murray 1983b, 196. On the symposium as a social institution, see among others, also Murray 1983a; 1990a; 1990b; 1995; Lissarrague 1990; Neer 2002, 9–26; Steiner 2007, 231–264.

[7] It is worth noting that the symposium was not the only ancient space to engage mixed inscriptions; audiences would also have encountered them at the gymnasium, e.g. on *aruballoi*, at the funeral, e.g. on white-ground *lekuthoi*, or at the fountain-house, e.g. on *hudriae*. Because each setting has a distinct audience governed by a range of social conventions and political, religious, and gendered behaviors, it is less desirable to assess all mixed inscriptions in all settings at once; such an approach risks oversimplifying audience response and interaction. Moreover, it can be extremely difficult to determine that a pot was used—and so engaged by a clearly identifiable audience—in one secure context. The mixed inscriptions on a black-figure *hudria* with a scene of women at the fountain-house on its body might seem a clear case of an object for women's work and thus a female viewership, putting aside for now debates about the class or status of the audience (e.g. London B 333, Immerwahr 2006, 162; 1990 no. 301, fig. 92; *CAVI* no. 4288). Because sense and nonsense inscriptions structure and frame the two pairs of conversing women in the foreground, they may be thought of as a commentary on women's speech, notoriously fraught as it was. But

There is also plenty of material for this analysis: by a conservative calculation, *circa* one hundred, or about seventy percent, of all Attic pots with mixed sense and nonsense inscriptions, can be connected securely to the symposium.[8] To arrive at these results I selected for a pot's shape, for example, a *kratêr*, which was used specifically to mix water and wine; or the meaning of a sense inscription, such as 'hello, and drink!'; or the contents of a painted scene, such as a symposium of reclining drinkers; or a combination of elements that might not be sufficient on their own but together are conclusive, such as the Euthymides *amphora* with its name-labels and *kômos*

before such analysis can go further, we observe the battle of two warriors on the shoulder and the play with 'sensical' *kalê*-inscriptions on the body. If this could be used by women for gathering water—and thus signify in one particular context—it might just as readily have been used to dilute the wine at a symposium—and thus signify quite differently for a substantially different audience. Based on ware, shape, decoration, inscription type, or a telling combination of all these, I would only consider a handful of pots in Immerwahr's *CAVI* list of combined sense and nonsense fairly securely non-sympotic, such as London B 633, a white-ground *lekuthos* (2006, 156; no. 4379) or New York 28.167, a white-ground bobbin (2006, 158; no. 5652).

8 This relative percentage seems to accord broadly with the Attic production of pots with figural decoration in general, and inscribed pots with figural decoration in particular. While the specific numbers will likely always be debated, sympotic wares clearly dominate the ceramic remains, whether inscribed or not: 'Far more than 50 per cent of *all* figure-decorated vases are what are generally designated symposium vases; and even many more if the quality of the vases and their suitability for inscribing are considered, as they should be' (emphasis original; Boardman 2003, 112, and with reference to Immerwahr 1990). Boardman goes on to suggest that as many as 90% of 'inscribable quality' vases may be considered sympotic (2003, 112, n. 8). See also Osborne and Pappas 2007, 141, table 5.2 for the comparatively high percentage of inscribed Attic pots relating to the symposium, and table 5.3 for a breakdown of inscription type and relative occurrence. I opted to err on the side of conservative accounting when determining whether a pot was securely sympotic. Of the remaining vessels with mixed sense and nonsense from Immerwahr's corpus that I excluded based on my rather cautious selection criteria (*ca.* 40), over half might reasonably be added to the sympotic group. For the purposes of this study, however, I chose a more secure method of calculation since the exact numbers do not affect my readings. Even so, the high percentage yielded by the corpus offers a large enough data set for fruitful analysis and, interestingly, makes clear that these ostensibly unusual mixtures of sense and nonsense actually conform to the larger trends of manufactured pottery. In sum, I focus my analysis of mixed inscriptions on the symposium because their relative numbers appear roughly representative of the relative numbers of contemporary Attic pottery with figural decoration, both inscribed and not inscribed; because the data set is large enough to allow for the observation of changes in chronology, shape, decoration, type of inscription(s), and more; and because they have much to add to the scholarly literature on the dynamics of object-speech interaction and games of the gaze in the symposium. Nonetheless, a separate study of the role of mixed sense and nonsense in their other social contexts—e.g., the gravesite or the fountain-house—is most welcome.

Figure 1: Euthymides red-figure amphora.
Munich Antikensammlungen 8730.
Staatliche Antikensammlungen und Glyptothek
München. Photograph by: Renate Kühling.

scene, discussed in section 2 (fig. 1). These numbers make it clear that sympotic space was suitable for viewing sense and nonsense together.[9]

Although the phenomenon of nonsense opens up many more fascinating questions than it resolves, scholars have tended to pay relatively little attention to these inscriptions, cursorily discounting them as inscribed by an illiterate painter or as the product of boredom.[10] A representative treatment is the scenario Sir John Beazley recreates in his imagined inner dialogue of the dispassionate painter: 'I may tire of inscriptions—I have written χαῖρε and ἐποίησεν and all that so often. I don't care if I am spelling right or not. I don't care if I write sense or nonsense'.[11] These views fail to account satisfactorily for the phenomenon of nonsense inscriptions—whose numbers alone demand more careful analysis—but they have nonetheless remained influential long after their publication. Other scholars still have understood nonsense as dictated not by painter but by illiterate audience, namely as a byproduct of the Etruscan market. Since the Etruscans were unable to read Greek, so the argument goes, there was no need to write Greek properly.[12] Not only is this an incomplete assessment of the larger context of author and audience,[13] none of these scholarly views approach nonsense from a critical

9 Sympotic poetry, too, engaged such navigations of sense and nonsense (Bowie, unpublished). He focuses on the ways that Theognis and Anacreon, among others, tease their audience with poetic ambiguities and incomplete information that require it to puzzle and labor over meaning. In one compelling example, Bowie allows for the third (and final) line of Anacreon 359 *PMG* to be intentionally nonsensical and meant to elicit audience response to it as such. Such an exercise, as I argue in this chapter, is precisely what the nonsense inscriptions on sympotic pots demanded of their audience, especially when they occur in the same context as sense.

10 Such sentiments are found, e.g., in Amyx 1988, 602: 'He [the writer] may have been illiterate, capable of nothing better. Or he may have had a friend put in the letters', and in Boardman 2003, 112, where nonsense inscriptions 'all seem to be either decorative or making a false pretence to literacy'. As Immerwahr 2006, 138 demonstrates conclusively, 'nonsense could be written by literate vase painters'. Besides the scholars I discuss more fully below, those who have touched, if briefly, on nonsense inscriptions include Guarducci 1967, 448; 1974, 493–495; Lissarrague 1987; Hurwit 1990; and Hatzivassiliou 2010, 57–96.

11 Beazley 1932, 194–195.

12 E.g. Smith 1936, 25, cited by Immerwahr 1990, 44, n. 28; Smith elaborates on Beazley's illiterate and/or tired painter by suggesting that we '[a]dd—if it is not obvious—the wish to teaze [*sic*] (the Etruscans or the tipsy?)'.

13 There are compelling reasons to view most nonsense inscriptions as Attic productions for Attic audiences, rather than determined by a foreign market. As Steiner has recently reviewed, we can discount the notion that nonsense inscriptions were meant to tease the Etruscans for the same reasons we can reliably use Attic pots as evidence for Athenian society despite their Etruscan find spots (2007, 234–236): the majority of pot shapes, iconographic conventions within scenes, and painters show no signs of alteration for a foreign market when compared to those found in Attica; these data, of course, allow for exceptions such as

standpoint, nor do they go any way toward elucidating the fascinating subsection of pots under review here, in which sense and nonsense mingle on the same vessel and which thus discredit any oversimplified 'illiteracy' arguments.

If pots with nonsense inscriptions have suffered at the hands of scholars, pots with both sense and nonsense inscriptions on them have suffered a nearly complete lack of scholarly attention, excepting the recent studies by Henry Immerwahr and Ann Steiner.[14] Building on their analyses, I will explore what more these tantalizing pots have to say, not only about their creators, but in particular about their Athenian viewing audience, which we frequently locate reveling in the fundamentally aesthetic space of the symposium: its participants commune in a lively atmosphere teeming with instrumental music, poetic song, decorated pots, and, sometimes, mosaics.[15] From the perspective of ancient aesthetics—stemming from the verb αἰσθάνομαι, 'perceive'—a symposiast by definition plays the aesthete as he responds to and participates in the multi-media artistic expressions that are inextricable from and ultimately constitute the event itself. An element of every symposium, then, is the aesthetic discourse of its attendees, albeit a discourse informally structured and enacted by non-specialists. Perhaps it is for these reasons that scholars have not fully explored the symposium's discursive aspect from a specifically aesthetic angle. Yet doing so allows us to investigate a particular set of tensions over which social class and political

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the Tyrrhenian *amphorai* (Immerwahr 1990, 39–45). The same painters and workshops, for example, regularly produced wares excavated both in Etruria and the Athenian Agora—a recent survey by Reusser 2002 shows that of the 83 Attic workshops or painters attested in Etruria, a total of 63 (75 %) of the same group painted pots excavated in the Athenian Agora.

14 Immerwahr 2006; 2007. Immerwahr's focus on the literacy of the pots' painters makes important advances in our data about painters and workshops. Beyond this, his work opens the door for considering not just the educational level or intention of the vessel's creator, but also the users of these objects. Steiner 2007, 260 ff. has also recently addressed nonsense inscriptions, which she interprets variously as jokes; as providing an egalitarian sympotic discourse brought on by an increasingly democratic ethos around 508 BCE; and as enabling elite competitive games. While Steiner does consider the role of the audience in provocative ways, my interpretations differ somewhat from hers, for example, I suggest that the open interpretations made possible by nonsense inscriptions offer power to the reader, while Steiner views the reader as passive, forced into the role of the *erômenos* by the writer.

15 Not all homes had a specifically dedicated *andrôn*, with mosaic floors and a raised ledge around the periphery for *klinai*, since this was a variable depending on the home's size and the wealth of its inhabitants. Multi-use rooms, we assume, could have been converted easily into a make-shift *andrôn* as needed. For mosaics, see Westgate 1998; for the archaeology of the *andrôn*, see Graham 1974; Cahill 2002; Ault 2005; Nevett 2010, 43–62.

ideology that sympotic discourse engaged. As this chapter aims to demonstrate, then, 'nonsense' on sympotic pots was not simply a matter of miseducation or *ennui*, nor solely the purview of its creator; rather, as Patrick Leigh Fermor puts it in 'The Art of Nonsense',[16] it offered the audience 'a perverse intellectual challenge'.

In section 2, I will discuss by way of appetizer a complex example from my corpus of about one hundred sympotic pots with mixed sense and nonsense: the Euthymides *amphora*. Then, I will explain my approach, which is based on reception aesthetics, and try to provide a first glimpse of the ancient viewing experience (section 3). In section 4, I give a typology of the inscriptions. In section 5, I study the nonsense inscriptions as a special form of verbal-visual communication. Section 6 will briefly deal with 'political nonsense', and section 7 contains the conclusion: it will turn out that 'nonsense' is actually a rich source of aesthetic communication.

2. *Mixing Sense and Nonsense*

A close reading of a well-known *amphora* illustrates the complexities inherent to objects with mixtures of sense and nonsense, and the kinds of important questions they raise. This late-sixth-century Attic vessel painted by Euthymides, a famed member of the Pioneer generation of red-figure vase-painters, is a finely crafted pot with mixed inscriptions.[17] Side A features Hector arming with Priam and Hecabe nearby, and vertical inscriptions label each of the three figures in lines parallel to their bodies. The writing on Side B is more dynamic, which accords with the dynamism of the scene's dance, the post-sympotic *kômos* (fig. 1).

On the left-hand margin, Euthymides has painted *h*ὸς οὐδέποτε Εὐφρόνιος, 'as never Euphronius', which, on a semantic level, points to a competitive rivalry between Euthymides and his older contemporary craftsman, Euphronius. Moreover, the phrase neatly frames the image, and so functions

[16] Although Fermor's 1977 review of George Seferis' poetry refers to a kind of nonsense (like that of *Jabberwocky*) rather different from the variety under analysis here, the sentiment nevertheless applies.

[17] Munich 2307; *ARV*² 26, 1 (no. 1620); *Para* 323; *Add*² 155–156; Boardman 1988, 33–35 (fig. 33); Immerwahr 2009, no. 5258. For this pot's and Euthymides' inscriptions in general, Immerwahr 1990, 65–66 (no. 369); Immerwahr 1992; Neils 1995; Neer 2002, 51–53 and 227 n. 74 for full bibliography, overview of interpretations, and debate over the craftsmen's *agôn*. Greek after Immerwahr 1990.

aesthetically beyond or in addition to its semantic function.[18] The figure on the far left holds a *kantharos* and dances, one arm and one leg lifted. His name, like his gaze and his gesture, projects forward, and he enacts the name-label he has been given, 'Revelry-leader' (Κόμαρχος), as he leads his companions in the dance.[19] The central figure of the *kômos*, Εὔ{ε}δεμος, is more subdued, but participates nonetheless. As the meaning of his name suggests, he is well minded civically, and indeed, his behavior corroborates this meaning; he joins in the revelry but maintains control—a trait Euthymides makes literal by arranging him with both feet on the ground. His stance, and by extension his behavior as a citizen, are articulated by the shape of his name, which extends toward the ground. It mirrors his foot and leg as it, too, turns toward the right, creating its own foot on which to rest. The last dancer in the line, like the other two, has a name that corroborates his behavior. Labeled as if to balance the first dancer, 'Revelry-leader', this figure is 'Last One' (Τέλες), and he does indeed complete the line of merriment. In contrast to the central figure, he lifts a leg and moves his arms, a difference further highlighted by the placement of the ambiguous inscription ἐλεοπι along his raised leg. Deemed a 'nonsense' inscription by Immerwahr since it bears no one-to-one correlation to any known ancient Greek word, ἐλεοπι invites additional exploration, particularly for its presence among the other legible and meaningful name-labels.

On the one hand, the word may not be fully nonsensical; it has been suggested to me that its vocalization produces something similar to the modern Greek cry 'Opa!' and would thus be particularly appropriate for the pot's internal sympotic scene and external sympotic context, just as it is a part of modern Greek convivial celebration.[20] On the other hand, and regardless of the semantic value of the 'word', the letter string functions aesthetically: it accentuates the motion of Teles' revelry by bending along and so outlining the contour of his leg raised in the dance. Paradoxically, though, it delineates this dancer physically and behaviorally from the one next to him, while simultaneously connecting the two figures by locating the only moment of bodily contact between any of the three komasts; it both penetrates and is penetrated by the space where Teles' foot brushes up against the shin of Eudemus. The way that the arc of letters articulates,

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[18] For more on the aesthetics of ancient Greek vase inscriptions, see Hurwit 1990; Osborne and Pappas 2007; Pappas 2011.

[19] For more on name-labels, see Wachter 2001, 255.

[20] I owe thanks to Jeremy McInerney for this suggestion and subsequent discussion.

separates, and connects these figures all at once is neatly analogous to its occupation of the liminal space between sense and nonsense—even if we do accept it as an exclamation in revelry. Thus, the inscriptions on Euthymides' *amphora* are literally and figuratively shaped by the contents of the scene and the action of its figures—a basic point that is easy to miss in modern study since our disciplinary divides have led to the publication of inscriptions separately from the pots themselves, and photographs of the vessels rarely render the inscriptions clearly, if at all.[21] It remains now for scholars to reconnect these elements that could never have been conceived of as separate by their ancient creators or audiences.

In my view, this wonderful and complex scene painted by Euthymides, along with those I explore in the remainder of this chapter, challenge, distort, or even dissolve the very boundary between 'writing' as a strictly defined medium and 'images' as another; as the viewer experiments with decoding these visual signs, the distinctions between 'reading' and 'viewing' collapse.

3. *The Ancient Viewing Experience*

In order to try and recoup the aesthetic experiences of ancient symposiasts, I have grounded this study theoretically in 'reception aesthetics', a more recent approach to aesthetics in which literary reception theory is applied to material culture with the aim of 'reading' objects as we might critically read a text. Following the notion famously put forth by Jacques Derrida and expanded by such scholars as Susan Suleiman, Robert Crosman, Wolfgang Iser, Stanley Fish, and Jesper Svenbro, I explore how readers, in addition to authors, make meaning.[22] In this vein, the work of Christopher Tilley, who applies such literary reception theory to material culture, is particularly useful.[23] One appeal of this approach is its emphasis on the experience of the 'reader'—which Tilley redefines as the audience or user of an object—rather than limiting our study to its author, artist, or creator. While I do not advocate disregarding the function or experience of the author/maker,

[21] See also Pappas 2004, 41–140; Osborne and Pappas 2007; Pappas 2008; Pappas 2011 for related studies of the aesthetic function of archaic and classical Greek pot inscriptions.

[22] Derrida 1976; Suleiman and I. Crosman 1980; R. Crosman 1980; Iser 1980a; 1980b; Fish 1982; Svenbro 1993. See, too, I. Crosman (1980) for a thorough and helpful (although now somewhat outdated) annotated bibliography of audience-oriented criticism.

[23] Tilley 1990; 1991.

I elect here to foreground the equally important role that readers/viewers play, which the traditional modern academic focus on authors/makers has tended to eclipse.[24]

The model offered by reception aesthetics is also attractive because our extant ancient sources have not proved especially vocal about the viewer's reaction to inscribed pots. Athenaeus preserves our most interesting literary exceptions when he defines the *grammatikon* as 'a drinking cup with letters (*grammata*) engraved on it' (Ath. 11.466d) and quotes two dramatic passages that describe the experience of viewing such an object.[25] In a comedy by Alexis, two characters reflect on the general appearance of an inscribed cup (Alexis fr. 272 KA) (Ath. 11.466d–e):

> (A.) First of all, let me tell you what the cup
> looked like. It was globular; quite small;
> old; its handles were badly damaged;
> and it had letters around the exterior. (B.) Eleven letters?
> of gold? saying 'Property of Zeus the Savior?' (A.) That's the name.

> (A.) τὴν ὄψιν εἴπω τοῦ ποτηρίου γέ σοι
> πρώτιστον. ἦν γὰρ στρογγύλον, μικρὸν πάνυ,
> παλαιόν, ὦτα συντεθλασμένον σφόδρα,
> ἔχον κύκλῳ τε γράμματ'. (B.) ἆρά γ' ἕνδεκα
> χρῦσα, Διὸς Σωτῆρος; (A.) οὐκ ἄλλου μὲν οὖν.

In Achaeus' tragedy, a satyr describes the serial order of the letters inscribing a drinking cup (Achaeus *Omphale, TrGF* 20 F 33):

> The god's *skuphos* has been summoning me for a long time now
> by showing me its inscription: *delta*; *iota*; third comes
> *ou*; *nu* and *u* are there; and after them
> *san* and *ou* announce their presence.[26]

> ὁ δὲ σκύφος με τοῦ θεοῦ καλεῖ πάλαι
> τὸ γράμμα φαίνων· δέλτ', ἰῶτα καὶ τρίτον
> οὖ, νῦ τό τ' ὖ πάρεστι, κοὐκ ἀπουσίαν
> ἐκ τοὐπέκεινα σάν τό τ' οὖ κηρύσσετον.

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24 The focus on the author does not seem to apply to theorists and scholars of antiquity: '... contemporary reader-response criticism seems to have much in common with classical literary theories. Classical commentaries on literature, after all, exhibit an overwhelming preoccupation with audience response' (Tompkins 1980, 202). Thus the theoretical approach afforded by reception theory is all the more fitting for rehabilitating the ancient audience response to material culture.

25 Greek text and English translation from Olson 2009, 260–265 = Athenaeus 11.466d–467c.

26 As Olson 2009, 262, n. 111 notes, the spelling indicated here is ΔΙΟΝΥΣΟ (for Διονύσου). See also his n. 112 for additional explanation of the uses of *omicron* and *omicron-upsilon.*

These fragmentary passages comprise some of the very little explicit evidence we have for how ancient audiences viewed inscribed pots. Although brief, they indicate careful viewership—Alexis' critics review the condition and age of the pot, the specific number of letters in its inscription, their precious material—and suggest that observing writing on sympotic objects was an important critical act, even if it is here filtered through a dramatic lens.[27] It is also significant that in the *Omphale* the cup is the active agent that guides the satyr's gaze: it calls on him to look, and does so by means of its eye-catching inscription, and the final two letters of Dionysus' name vocalize their presence, which κηρύσσω, the verb of heraldic proclamation, communicates. Just as these literary passages suggest that ancient audiences of inscribed drinking cups analyzed and discussed their appearance, it remains for us to recover and elaborate those viewing experiences.

4. *The Inscriptions*

We turn now to the inscriptions and a brief review of the vocabulary relevant to them. As we have already observed, Immerwahr calculates that approximately one-third, or *ca.* 2,500, of all inscribed Attic pots preserve nonsense inscriptions. If this comes as something of a surprise, so, too, does the fact that of all pots with nonsense inscriptions, *ca.* 140 are inscribed with both sense and nonsense on the same vessel.[28] In *Attic Script*, Immerwahr observes that nonsense inscriptions first emerge in the second quarter of the sixth century—well after the eighth-century emergence of sense inscriptions—and breaks them down into four types.[29] Each type, it is worth

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[27] It is worth recalling that these moments of viewing were part of staged dramatic performances and thus also assume the much broader audience of the ancient Greek theater. The social and political implications of these passages are worth exploring alongside other such guided viewing of letters and words on the stage, preserved, e.g., in Euripides, Agathon, and Callias (Pappas 2011).

[28] Immerwahr 2006, 138, and Appendix 2.

[29] Immerwahr 1990, 44–45. See Pappas 2004, 48–49 for discussion of the related inscriptions termed 'throwaway' and 'semi-throwaway' by Amyx 1988, 552–553, 602 and Wachter 2001, 254–257. 'Throwaway' names are legible, short, mostly bisyllabic stock names analogous to our 'Tom', 'Dick', and 'Harry', or 'Spot' for a dog. So, too, the longer compound name-labels deemed 'semi-throwaway' by Wachter are semantically generic with their repeated prefixes of πολυ-, εὐ-, or ἀντ(ι)-. Because throwaway and semi-throwaway inscriptions are so frequently used—on multiple vases or even multiple times on one vase—they become meaningless in their context; the information they relate does not assist in individualizing

noting, mimics in its shape and placement the established conventions of standard sense inscriptions. 'Mock' or 'near-sense' inscriptions bear a close relation to sense and prompt the reader to recall their 'sensical' referent, for example, ἐποιυεποιυεποιυνσυνεσυ suggests the formulaic signature word ἐποίεσε, 'so-and-so made it'.[30] 'Meaningless' inscriptions are those with clearly legible letter-forms, but that bear no close relation to actual words. Some inscriptions of this class visually resemble the physical form of individual words, but they may also appear as a lengthy, continuous stream of letters. 'Imitation' inscriptions, at one level further removed from a verifiable word, look as if they are comprised of a series of letters, but the specific letter-forms are unidentifiable. Finally, 'blot' or 'dot' inscriptions consist of rows of small painted blobs and suggest to the viewer that an inscription of a comparable shape might have stood in place of the stippling.[31]

The pots in my data set feature one or more of these types of nonsense alongside a range of sense inscriptions, which also divide into common types.[32] Some do not relate directly to the content of the scenes near or in which they appear: signatures that identify painter or potter; declarations of *kalos* that mark someone out as handsome; or greetings to be well and drink (or, in a cheeky twist on this formula, to be well and buy the pot). Others interact with a pot's figural representation more directly: labels that name a scene's figure or objects; words spoken by someone, painted to look as if

the person or animal whom they label. To name three different men Δίον, or two different horses Ϙυλλαρος in the same scene does not so much convey information as it fills up available space. Thus, although legible, these inscriptions function similarly to nonsense inscriptions in their contribution to the overall aesthetic decoration of the vase. Before ascribing these types of inscription too direct an intervening role between Attic sense and nonsense inscriptions, however, we must note that they appear almost exclusively on Corinthian and Chalcidian vases.

30 Berkeley 8, 358, a lip cup with the mock inscription in the handle zone: Immerwahr 1990, 54, no. 283; for similar Little Master cups and their nonsense inscriptions, Immerwahr 1990, 44–55; Beazley 1932.

31 Given the paucity of scholarship on nonsense inscriptions in general, it is no surprise that there has been essentially no approach that differentiates between these vastly different types; to treat them as a uniform epigraphic mode is to do them a disservice. Imagine, for example, the great variety of play and manipulation possible for mock and meaningless inscriptions that is simply not relevant to blot inscriptions. I do not explore in detail the different readings invited by each category here, but it remains an important aspect of future research.

32 For overviews of archaic and classical Greek vase inscriptions, see Lorber 1979; Lissarrague 1985; 1987; 1992; Immerwahr 1990, 7–127; Snodgrass 2000; Wachter 2001; Pappas 2004, 41–140; Osborne and Pappas 2007; Catoni 2010, 113–215; Müller 2010.

they issue forth from the mouth; or, rarely, scene titles. But it is not always so straightforward,[33] as one early example demonstrates.

5. *Nonsense as Special Language*

The Little Master lip cup crafted by Execias, *ca.* 545–530 BCE, features mixed sense and nonsense inscriptions and differs significantly from the bulk of the later corpus (figs. 2a–b).[34] The legible potter's inscription on Side A identifies Execias as its manufacturer, who is more familiar as the Athenian black-figure painter *par excellence*.[35] Carefully centered and neatly applied from left to right, the letters of Execias' signature dot the otherwise blank field between the cup's handles and thus comprise its primary decoration: Ἐχσεκίας ἐποίεσεν. The drinker lifting this side to eye level as he prepares to imbibe calls out the name of the craftsman of this fine object. As he does so, his companions on facing *klinai* observe the inscription on the cup's opposite side, which copies the arrangement on Side A and at first glance seems legible. A closer look, however, reveals that this is a mock or near-sense inscription, ἐνεοινοιοιεν, which seems to play intentionally with the combinations of letters of words familiar in sympotic contexts: Steiner identifies the echo of ἐποίεσεν in -οιοιεν—when one attempts to pronounce the letters on Side B, one makes sounds that approximate those on Side A—while Immerwahr posits a mockery of 'wine', οἶνος, which the nonsense letters very nearly create.[36] I add the observation that these aural and oral echoes find their analogue in the visual resonance of one side of the cup with the other; the symposiast's awareness of both the points of similarity and of difference that are played out verbally is directed by the visual as well. In a neat turn, multiple modes of sensory perception navigate the play between sense and nonsense.[37] I apply Steiner's reading of other, similar pots to this cup and suggest that the

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33 It could be debated, e.g., whether some *kalos*-inscriptions refer to a male figure in the scene.

34 Athens NM 1104; *ABV* 147, 5; Immerwahr 1990, 35, no. 146; Steiner 2007, 18–19, figs. 2.1–2.2; Immerwahr 2009, no. 741. Greek after Immerwahr.

35 *ABV* 143–146, 686–687, 714; *Para* 60–61; Boardman 1974; Immerwahr 1990, 31–36; Mackay 2010.

36 Steiner 2007, 18; Immerwahr 1990, 35.

37 Without developing the point further, Catoni 2010, 200 makes a similar observation of nonsense inscriptions in general: 'iscrizioni senza senso possono sollecitare non solo la vista—come pare più frequente—ma anche l'udito'.

Figure 2a–b: Execias Little Master Cup, Sides A and B. Athens National Museum 1104. National Archaeological Museum, Athens. Copyright: © Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Tourism/Archaeological Receipts Fund.

playful exchanges here between words and images result in a comic effect that turns on parody, that is, 'repetition with a difference'.[38]

In this early experimental stage of playing sense and nonsense against one another,[39] we can imagine the kind of sympotic competition this object

[38] Steiner 2007, 194–195, quoting Hutcheon 2000, 101.

[39] My analysis of mixed sense and nonsense sympotic inscriptions shows a clear chronological trajectory for the phenomenon, which loosely parallels the arc Immerwahr documents for nonsense alone (1990, 44–45). For my corpus, 2% date to 575–550 BCE; 14% to 550–530 BCE; 40% to 530–500 BCE; 24% to 500–480 BCE; and 18% to 480–450 BCE. Some deviations do exist between the popularity of mixed sense and nonsense and of nonsense alone, the significance of which I discuss below.

would have fostered, for, as John Heath has put it, 'the control of speech is central to *all* Greek hierarchical thought about status' (emphasis original).[40] Indeed, in Euripides' account of the development of human civilization, an anonymous god implanted intelligence and speech in humans as they evolved from their chaotic and 'beastly' (θηριώδης) state: 'Having first placed intelligence in us, then he gave us speech—the messenger of *logos*—so that we could come to know discourse' (Eur. *Supp*. 201–204). In a similar vein, Deborah Levine Gera has outlined the ways in which ancient Greeks conceived of speech as a specifically human act, and its role in rational thought—significantly, her examples of those groups that lack the full faculties of speech occupy the roles of 'Other' variously tried on by symposium attendees: 'The possession of speech, λόγος, is often thought to entail the capacity for rational thinking as well, and *logos* is, according to the Greeks, a specifically human ability, beyond the scope of animals … barking savages, weaving women, and talking parrots …'.[41] In ancient Greek culture, speech is inextricable from (male) human intelligence, indeed, from a human being's very differentiation from the world of beasts; to be unable to speak properly is, among other things, to act like an animal.[42] Heath understands this as broadly significant: 'The history of the West can be read as the development

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[40] Heath 2005, 171. Heath's larger study of the role of human speech in archaic and classical Greece focuses, in part, on representations of animal communication as its foil. Borthwick 1968 has explicitly addressed the relationship of animal 'speech' to nonsense, by studying Ar. *Pax* 1077–1079, and connecting the nonsense phrases there to proverbial sayings that are part of animal fable and lore. While the thesis is compelling, and nonsense speech in the context of animals deserves renewed scholarly attention—in particular on vases—it ultimately argues away nonsense rather than taking it on its own communicative terms.

[41] Gera 2003, 182. On speech and the 'Other', see also Heath 2005, 171–212. The function Miller ascribes to nonsense letters on magical papyri also supports our numeration of nonsense inscriptions among the ways symposiasts played the Other: 'The "inside", "other side", or even "underside" of ordinary reality is best spoken in a poetic language that scrambles ordinary words and shows their imaginal potential' (1986, 487).

[42] In the early fourth century BCE Ctesias reported on the *Kunokephaloi*, dog-headed barbarian natives of India who, although capable of understanding normative human speech, bark and gesticulate to communicate with one another and with other Indic peoples (*FGrH* 688 F 45.37). Indeed, Aelian later categorizes the *Kunokephaloi* as animals precisely because they cannot produce intelligible human speech (*NA* 4.46). Or, in the later second century BCE, Agatharchides documented the *Ikhthuophagoi*, fish-eating primitive people who lack not only cities, agriculture, and clothing, but also speech—they celebrate with nonsensical songs and they roar like cattle when searching for something to drink (*CGM* i.129–141, frr. 31–49 = Diod. Sic. 3.15–21). See Gera 2003, 184–195 for additional discussion.

of the social, political, moral, and ultimately metaphysical significance of *logos*. Animals, conspicuously lacking the word, have suffered accordingly, although not always in silence'.[43]

Likewise, the inability to speak could signify one's barbarian nature, a status anathema to those communing at an archaic symposium. Along with Gera, Thomas Harrison has surveyed how Herodotus in particular connected hierarchies of language and culture: the Scythian *Argippaioi* are bald, exist mainly on one kind of fruit, and speak a unique language (Hdt. 4.23.2); the cave-dwellers of Ethiopia eat reptiles and have their own language whose vocalization involves squeaking like bats (Hdt. 4.183.4); or, the man-eating *Androphagoi* possess their own language (Hdt. 4.106).[44] Keeping in mind the implicit connection between subversive habits of consumption and modes of speech in all these examples, we note that to communicate inarticulately is to be bestial; to communicate with perverse speech that deviates from the norm is to emulate the barbarian. On the contrary, communication in the common Greek language is among the foremost justifications for the Athenians' claim that they would never betray Greece (Hdt. 8.144.2).[45]

These later literary sources help contextualize the cup at hand, which issues a game of verbal one-upmanship. As Steiner has suggested, the literate, Greek-reading viewer of one side of this cup performs an intelligible speech-act, while those on the other side—ostensibly elites of equal status and education—trip over garbled speech, ironically made to enact the Other by sounding comically like drunken revelers in the very act of accurately reading the Greek letters before them.[46] Even more humiliatingly,

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43 Heath 2005, 315. For more on silence and *logos*, see Montiglio 2000.

44 Harrison 1998; Gera 2003, 192–195.

45 See also Sherratt 2003, 231ff. for negative Greek attitudes toward not only 'barbarophonism', the unintelligible noises of *barbaroi*, but also 'allothroism', or the speaking of other languages, both of which threw into high relief a definition of Greek ethnic identity based on the Greek language.

46 Steiner 2007, 83. Stephen Halliwell's analysis of the sounds of the voice in Old Comedy applies here, too (1990, 71–72). As he sees it, the jokes turned on ideas of civilized Greek identity, particularly as defined against uncivilized barbarians: '... where garbled but faintly intelligible Greek emerges from the background of opaquely exotic noises: here vocal sound activates a more subtle mechanism, as sense of some kind is found lurking in what seemed a context of nonsense ...'; such an experience plays on an instinctive feeling of 'superiority to the barbarians who make these noises, and this level of chauvinistic prejudice equally underlies the comic presentation of mangled Greek such as that of the Scythian archer in *Thesmophoriazusae*'.

though, these sympotic interlocutors might unwittingly mimic animals or barbarian speakers of foreign tongues. As we move toward the end of the sixth century, opportunities to unsettle sympotic discourse and the challenges issued to normative dynamics of power therein are ever more frequent.

About a generation after Execias, Smicrus added his legible signature to the same vessel on which he inscribed nonsense. While we identified the nonsense on the Execias cup as of the mock or near-sense type because it recalled actual words, Smicrus has painted 'meaningless' nonsense—his letters are legible as such, but do not evoke any specific Greek words. Since the Little Master cup lacked figural decoration, the letters themselves constituted the main decoration. With the additional complexity brought by figural scenes of which letters are a part, Smicrus' red-figure *amphora* investigates how sense, nonsense, and image could signify in a triangulated aesthetic exchange (figs. 3a–b).[47]

Both sides of the fragmentary *amphora* feature ithyphallic satyrs; the one on Side A wields a spear and *pelta*, while the other pipes a tune on the double *aulos*. Just as each side's satyr resonates with that on the other, so do the inscriptions, and these equivalencies invite the viewer's careful comparison of one to the other.[48] The inscribed name of each satyr dances above his head (figs. 3a–b): the remnants of a name beginning Στυσι are visible on Side A, and when complete probably connected the satyr's visual arousal to its verbal corollary, since στύω/στύομαι is a colloquial verb for getting an erection;[49] the satyr on Side B has an equally appropriate speaking name—fully preserved as Τέρπαυλος—that designates him as one who takes or gives pleasure in *aulos*(oboe)-playing, but must also allude more broadly to pleasure in all of its incarnations.

The visual echoes between sides persist in the final set of inscriptions on the *amphora*, but here the verbal parallels break down. Each inscription visually emphasizes the satyr's aroused state: The signature of Smicrus' painter, Σμῖκρος ἔγραφσεν, issues left-to-right from penis tip to foot, triangulating the space under the *pelta* on Side A. So, too, the string of letters

47 Berlin 1966, 19. *Para* 323, 3; *Add*² 154; Immerwahr 1990, 69, no. 404; Steiner 2007, 188–191, figs. 8.20, 8.21. Greek after Immerwahr.

48 Steiner 2007, 188–191.

49 Observed by Steiner 2007, 189, who cites Henderson, 1991. See Immerwahr 1990, 69 for the debate over reconstructing Στύσιπος καλός, which Immerwahr does not advocate.



Figure 3a–b: Smicrus red-figure amphora;
Sides A and B. Berlin Staatliche Museen 1966.19.
Photo Credit: bpk, Berlin/Antikensammlung, Staatliche Museen,
Berlin, Germany/Johannes Laurentius/Art Resource, NY



streaming from below the *aulos* on Side B composes an approximate triangle as it nearly connects the musical instrument with the satyr's other defining instrument. Significantly, though, there is a disconnect here between the verbal and semantic resonances on one side of the *amphora* and the other, for the letters seeming to emanate from the *aulos*, νετεναρενεγ(?)ενετο, do not correspond to any known words or phrases. Steiner, following several scholars, understands these syllables as simply reproducing the sounds of the *aulos*.[50] I submit in addition that the letter-string visually evokes a verbal song to accompany the *aulos*-playing, which various painted pots and a later literary text reinforce.

Sympotic representations of musically accompanied singing abound. Their popularity comes as no surprise in light of the important role of singing and speaking in the symposium, and we thus broadly understand these images—and their inscriptions, if present—as visual cues for the verbal performance of song among real-time symposium attendees.[51] Examples are too numerous to investigate fully here, but a brief review of two pots illustrates the point. Although earlier than the Smicrus *amphora*, the parallels on an early sixth-century Corinthian *aruballos* are striking (fig. 4).[52] An *aulos*-player labeled by the name Πολύτερπος shares the root of his name with the *aulos*-playing satyr Τέρπαυλος on the Smicrus *amphora*. The name on the *aruballos* also hints to its audience that his playing is very pleasing, and a line of hexameter verse flows from his instrument, artfully weaving amongst those singing and dancing to his tune. Thus this scene depicts poetic song together with the *aulos* music, and the writing graphically represents both song and instrumental accompaniment in its careful aesthetic arrangement. The sympotic scene in the *tondo* of a later Attic *kulix* is similarly suggestive of the connection between *aulos*-playing and song

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50 Steiner 2007, 190; Immerwahr 1990, 69; Lissarrague 1990, 127. See Immerwahr 1990, 69 for bibliography on the suggestion that the nonsense refers to νήτη, the highest musical note on the scale. Studies of Greek nonsense in other contexts also posit a relationship to music: Miller 1986 asserts that later nonsense letter combinations on magical papyri have to do with their musicality, and Touliatos 1989 more explicitly connects meaningless letters to music in his treatment of nonsense letters as musical annotation in the later Greek and Byzantine traditions.

51 *Pace* Boardman 2003, 112 who argues against the connection between vase-inscriptions and sympotic speech-acts, and states of nonsense inscriptions in particular, 'they are part of the look of the vase, nothing to do with reading'.

52 Corinth C-54-1. Lorber 1979, 35–37, no. 39, pl. 8; Amyx 1988, 165, C2, 556, 560, no. 17; Wachter 2001, 44–47. Greek after Wachter. See Pappas 2004, 87–89 and Osborne and Pappas 2007, 145–146 for additional discussion and bibliography.

Figure 4: Polyterpus aryballus. Corinth Archaeological Museum, C-54-1.
Photo: I. Ioannidou and L. Bartzioti. American
School of Classical Studies, Corinth Excavations.

Figure 5: Attic kylix by Douris; tondo. Munich Antikensammlungen 2646.
Staatliche Antikensammlungen und Glyptothek
München. Photograph by: Renate Kühling.

(fig. 5).[53] A course of letters pours forth from a symposiast's (closed) mouth, OUDUNAMOU, while he is accompanied on the double *aulos*.[54] Despite differences of provenance, chronology, and vase shape, this cup shares with the *aruballos* the elements of *aulos*-playing and song, both of which are represented and invited by inscribed letters neatly placed in each scene. The opening scene of Aristophanes' *Knights* provides a rough literary analogue.[55]

Two slaves of Demos bemoan that a new slave, Paphlagon, has managed to curry more favor with Demos than they have. The first slave suggests a lament over this state of affairs to the accompaniment of the *aulos*, and their nonsensical dirge duet ensues (Ar. *Eq.* 8–10):[56]

> FIRST SLAVE
> Then join me over here, and
> let's wail a tune by Olympus as a wind duet.
>
> FIRST AND SECOND SLAVES
> Hoo hoo hoo hoo hoo hoo.
>
> ΟΙΚΕΤΗΣ Α′
> δεῦρό νῦν πρόσελθ', ἵνα
> ξυναυλίαν κλαύσωμεν Οὐλύμπου νόμον.
>
> ΟΙΚΕΤΗΣ Α′ καὶ Β′
> μυμῦ μυμῦ μυμῦ μυμῦ μυμῦ μυμῦ.

After a number of quintessentially Aristophanic jokes rooted in word play and innuendo (Ar. *Eq.* 21–34), the slaves initiate a symposium of sorts, albeit an unorthodox one (Ar. *Eq.* 85–114). Hoping to light on a solution for managing Paphlagon, the first slave suggests a drink of unmixed wine (ἄκρατος) in honor of Agathos Daimon.[57] Not only does he engage the uncouth consumption of neat wine, this slave goes on to demand that the other one bring it to him in a *khous*, a pitcher holding about three liquid quarts. This great

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53 Munich 2646. *ARV*² 437, 128; 1653; *Para* 375; *Add*² 239; Immerwahr 1990, 87, no. 532.

54 For representations of sympotic song in general, and potential connections between this inscription and Thgn. 695 or 939, see Immerwahr 1990, 87 and Csapo and Miller 1991. Note, too, that the entry for this object on the Perseus website records the writing as a nonsense inscription, ΔΥΔΥΣΑΜΟΥ: www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/artifact?name=Munich +2646&object=Vase.

55 I thank Stephen Halliwell for the reference and the encouragement to explore the play's beginning as a comparandum.

56 Greek text and English translation from Henderson 1998.

57 Agathos Daimon was one of the spirits to whom libations were poured to mark the end of the meal and the beginning of drinking at the start of symposia.

amount of pure wine, the first slave asserts, will facilitate his critical thinking and enable a solution to their problem (Ar. *Eq.* 95–96):

> So quick, go in and fetch me a jug of wine;
> I want to water my wit and come up with something smart.
>
> ἀλλ' ἐξένεγκέ μοι ταχέως οἴνου χοᾶ,
> τὸν νοῦν ἵν' ἄρδω καὶ λέγω τι δέξιον.

It is during this drinking that a solution is found and the plot to unseat the power of Paphlagon progresses.

At lines 8–10, Jeffrey Henderson notes that Olympus was the founder both of *aulos* music and of the Phrygian and Lydian modes, which conservative Athenians considered the purview of slaves and barbarians.[58] With this inversion of a traditional, elite symposium—introduced by the nonsense speech and *aulos* tune of two slaves and made fully uncivilized by the solitary consumption of unmixed wine—Aristophanes parodies normative *aulos*-playing and song, and makes clear their connection to one another and their relevance to the symposium.

Keeping these comparable pots and selections from Aristophanes in mind, I suggest that the nonsense letters issuing from the satyr's *aulos* on the Smicrus *amphora* signify in general the notion of (*aulos*-accompanied) 'song', and in particular were meant to cue its sympotic performance musically and verbally. It is especially striking that this is the space in which the *amphora* sports nonsense, for rather than designate a specific song, as some depictions clearly do, this inscription necessarily insists on the possibility of a multiplicity of songs and meanings. Unlike the parodic humor generated by the 'imitation' inscriptions on the earlier Little Master cup, whose viewers ran the risk of misspeaking because of their proximity to legible Greek words, the 'meaningless' inscriptions on this later sixth-century vessel signal to the symposiast to contribute any song—its course is not prescribed and thus the speech-act cannot be in error. I return to the larger significance of this below, after a close reading of the work one additional pot requires of its audience.

A red-figure *kulix* by the Brygos Painter is representative of the shift from the late sixth century to the early fifth century, and exemplifies the evolving interactions of sense and nonsense (figs. 6a–b).[59] Tucked among interior

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58 Henderson 1998, 228–229.

59 London E 71. *ARV*² 372, 29; *Add*² 225; Williams 1993, 54, 42, fig. 10c; Immerwahr 2009, no. 4477. Greek after Immerwahr.

and exterior scenes of symposium and *kômos*, this cup's inscriptions require its audience to read sense against nonsense and to do so emphatically across disparate spatial dimensions: meaningless inscriptions pepper the amorphous background of the cup, while the lone clear sense word, *kalos*, stands out dark-against-light as if inscribed on the belly of the bucket under one of the *kulix* handles.[60]

In the *tondo*, a nude *aulos*-player dances to his own komastic tune and is surrounded by a number of letters (now hardly visible), some of which are clearly nonsense.[61] The cup's more complete exterior more clearly presents play between sense and nonsense. On Side B (fig. 6b), a symposiast reclines on a wineskin cushion and rests one hand on the back of a female *aulos*-player, who, in turn, faces a figure described by Dyfri Williams as 'a komast in an extraordinary pose'.[62] Bent over and rendered with extreme foreshortening, we focus our view on his anus, testicles, penis, and stomach. The nonsense inscriptions νον and ννον punctuate the space on either side of the *aulos*-girl's head and contrast the clear and 'sensical' καλός at the edge of the scene. A similar configuration of nonsense letters, υνονν, ναν, and *hh*ονο, appears on Side A of the cup in a thematically similar scene: A nude youth kneels on a *klinê* and threatens the central dancing figure with a wineskin, while a third youth pipes a tune on the far right (fig. 6a).

There are several ways to read this promiscuity of sense and nonsense. On one hand, we might understand the nonsense letters as evoking a song sung to the piping of the *auloi*, as with the Smicrus *amphora* above, a connection that Immerwahr also entertains: 'Note that the nonsense inscriptions seem to be connected with the flautists or the flute case: do they represent music?'.[63] In contrast to the *amphora*, however, the placement of these letters does not necessarily invite a direct association between the inscriptions and the instruments since they are widely distributed across the cup's surface. Rather, in my view, these meaningless inscriptions mimic more directly the conventional length and placement of name-labels and

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60 For additional treatment of multi-dimensional reading in the symposium, see Pappas 2008.

61 Immerwahr, who has had the benefit of autopsy, reports the nonsense in the interior: 'to the left of the flautist's back: ρε[.]ι, retr. Above the flutes: νονο' (2009). Williams 1993, on the other hand, submits *h*ο πα[ις]. δε[.]ι to the left of the *aulos*-player, instead of Immerwahr's ρε[.]ι. The discrepancies between Immerwahr's and Williams' readings on the cup's interior and exterior, perhaps to be attributed to Immerwahr's note that 'the vase was dirty when I saw it', do not affect the present interpretation.

62 Williams 1993, 54.

63 Immerwahr 2009, no. 4477, D.



Figure 6a–b: Brygos Painter red-figure kylix;
Sides A and B. London British Museum E 71.
Photo Credit: © The Trustees of the British Museum.

kalos-inscriptions.[64] Significantly, though, no specific names—whether of the internal scene's participants or the erotically desirable at the symposium—appear here to shut down the possible proclamations of beauty. Remarkably, the single legible *kalos*, rather than limiting meaning with its one-to-one correlation of content and form, instead participates in this subjectivity of reading since any masculine name could be attached to the adjective with a party-goer's declaration of praise. Indeed, the word's proximity to the emphatically displayed rear-end of the foreshortened man (fig. 6b) invites precisely this kind of participation—whether his pose is to be viewed as a comically grotesque contrast to more decorous displays of male beauty in the symposium or as a genuine erotically charged illustration of physical sympotic *kalos*. The audience pays special attention to this unique word for its legibility, its dark-on-light composition, its placement on an object within the scene, and the word play with the name of that very object, a bucket or urn called a *kados*. Only one letter separates *kalos* from *kados*, and *lambda* and *delta* can resemble one another closely.[65] Moreover, the graphic correspondence between the shapes of these letters seems to be enacted by the physical arrangement of the foreshortened symposiast's raised right arm and bent legs, which in their triangulation visually echo capital *lambda* and *delta*.[66] Thus the Brygos Painter compels the viewer to look at, read, and interpret quite carefully to derive an accurate reading of this lone legible word. To require this exercise in a context otherwise so insistent on an openness of reading and interpretation invited by the cup's nonsense inscriptions is surely significant and accords with the word's placement under the handle dividing the cup's exterior scenes: its spatial position is analogous to the inscription's intermediary position between

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64 For *kalos*-inscriptions, see Robinson and Fluck 1937; Slater 1999; Pappas 2008.

65 Compare, for example, the variations of letter forms as charted by Immerwahr 1990, xxii–xxiii.

66 I owe this observation to the keen eye of David Fredrick and add to it an additional correlation between bucket and symposiast: the essential function of the bucket is as a receptacle and this man is clearly disposed to serve the same receptive function for his lover. It is also relevant that the Brygos Painter playfully teases out the relationship of word and image elsewhere, e.g. on London E 65, a cup showing a figure labeled Χρύσιππος holding a golden *phialê*, of which Immerwahr observes: 'I cannot help feeling that Chrysippus owes his name to the fact that the phiale he holds is gilded' (1990, 88, no. 551). Of the roughly one hundred objects with mixed sense and nonsense, the Brygos Painter is responsible for a total of five and should thus be considered among the most prolific in the group, along with Oltus (six); the Telephus Painter (six); the Nicosthenes Painter and his Circle (five); the Epeleius Painter and those in his Manner (four); the Leagrus Group (three); and the Sappho Painter and his Circle (three).

sense and nonsense. For this cup, any male's name, like any song of Smicrus' *amphora*, is not only possible, but is by definition correct when paired with *kalos*. Thus the cup's audience enacts the meanings of its inscriptions and creates them anew at each utterance: In a Derridean turn, each audience becomes the text's author at each viewing.[67]

Like the other objects analyzed above, this cup resists clear-cut classification on either side of sense and nonsense, written and voiced, audience and author, and thus exemplifies a complex cultural dialectic of which it was also an integral part. The remainder of this chapter seeks to situate this aesthetic dialectic in its social and political context, in part by trying it out with competing theoretical approaches to the symposium.

6. *Political Nonsense*

As Athenaeus makes clear, riddles, twisting of language, and double entendres were all-pervasive in the symposium,[68] where social and cultural inversion were sanctioned and invited.[69] The central role of verbal games in creating that inverted space is widely acknowledged by scholars, and I submit that we must consider the visual qualities of language, too, as no less essential to these ludic sympotic exchanges. Furthermore, close analysis of the numerical and chronological data for the corpus under consideration makes clear that this kind of word-image game-playing could take on a particularly political valence.

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[67] E.g., Derrida 1976. This acknowledgment of—or, insistence on—an audience with multiple views, perspectives, and readings, as well as this aesthetic exploration of the power of speech, anticipate their more explicit exploration later in the fifth century by Gorgias (*Encomium of Helen* 8–14) and Aristophanes (*Frogs*).

[68] Ath. 10 *passim*. See Neer 2002, 13–14 for additional discussion of the sympotic *griphos*.

[69] The symposium and its ceramic utensils create the experience of a utopic countersite, or one of Foucault's heterotopias, real places 'in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted' (1986, 24). Foucault argues that heterotopias are common to every culture; that they are subject to functional evolution; that they put in juxtaposition several incompatible cultural 'sites' at once; that access to them is carefully prescribed—sometimes compulsory and other times contingent on performing rituals; and that their role can be to 'create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled' (1986, 24–27). Thus the symposium is itself a central heterotopic ritual site that creates cohesion in an otherwise fragmented world, and the inscribed and painted pots circulating within it are politically active creations that maintain relationships of dominance. See also Tilley 1991, 137 ff. for his discussion of Nämforsen, a Stone Age site in Northern Sweden, as a heterotopia.

The approximately one hundred pots that mix sense and nonsense and are associated with the Athenian symposium date broadly from *ca.* 575–450 BCE, and roughly sixty percent are drinking cups.[70] The earliest intersections of sense and nonsense seem to have served intra-sympotic competition, as borne out by the Little Master cup potted by Execias (figs. 2a–b), where the reader of nonsense produced an utterance so close to 'sensical' speech that his failure was made all the more prominent. But the corpus is not uniform: my research shows that a majority two-thirds of mixed sense and nonsense inscriptions cluster in the range 530–480 BCE, with most of those, in turn, falling in the period 530–500 BCE. Moreover, the red-figure technique dominates, accounting for seventy percent of the total corpus and just over eighty percent of the pots dating specifically from 530 to 500 BCE. While this preponderance of red figure more or less parallels contemporary stylistic trends and is clearly related to red figure's emergence *ca.* 530 BCE, it stands in stark contrast to the larger trends for nonsense-only inscriptions, which tend to date earlier in the sixth century and are mostly painted in the black-figure technique.[71] Thus the style and dates of my corpus appear to signal something new and different. Indeed, the slightly later type, exemplified by the products of Smicrus or the Brygos Painter (figs. 3a–b, 6a–b), exhibits a marked shift toward validating the audience's subjective reading by means of nonsense inscriptions that open up meaning completely. On one hand, this allows for the assertion of an individual voice within the otherwise deeply communal space of the *andrôn*—when there is no commonly accepted reading of nonsense words the speaker maintains authority and enacts his individual realization of their pronunciation and meaning. Here, the consuming audience appears to betray its interest in perceiving itself as made up of individuals who do not all follow, literally, the same cultural script. In contrast, though, these inscribed objects also ultimately equalize the symposiasts' contributions, whether of song, the designation of someone as *kalos*, or otherwise: not just one person, but every

[70] After the cup, the most common shapes to mix sense and nonsense are the *amphora* (10%); *hudria* (6%); *lekuthos* (6%); *kratêr* (5%); *oinokhoê* (3%); *rhuton* (2%); and *aruballos*, *stamnos*, *olpê*, *kantharos*, and *alabastron* at 1% each. This relative distribution, in particular with cups and *amphorai* as the top two most popular shapes, remains intact within each of the specific time periods 550–530 BCE, 530–500 BCE, 500–480 BCE, and 480–450 BCE, except that in 500–480 BCE *lekuthoi* and *kratêres* are more common than *amphorai*.

[71] Immerwahr observes that 'these inscriptions originate at the beginning of the second quarter of the sixth century and quickly become common' (1990, 44), and likewise that 'they become frequent rather suddenly in the second quarter of the sixth century' (2006, 136).

person who responds to these objects has authority since no one can be incorrect. Our broader contextualization of these contradictions will vary depending on the theoretical approach to the symposium we elect. A review of the recent scholarly debate will allow us to see what approach suits this corpus best.

As I have noted, the traditional scholarly view of the symposium maintains its exclusive and escapist political function, elite aristocratic participants, and, by extension, an elite aristocratic consuming audience of black- and red-figure sympotic wares.[72] From this perspective, it could be argued that the objects under study here significantly gained currency precisely during the upheaval for the Athenian aristocratic elite brought on first by the rule of the Peisistratids and then by the Cleisthenic reforms and their aftermath. That is to say, the aesthetics of nonsense may have taken on a particularly charged meaning within the elite symposium at the same historical moment in which elite aristocrats were struggling to maintain control while under the threat of losing it to a popular tyranny or a 'middling' demos championing *isonomia*.[73] This backdrop would then help explain the appeal of such inscribed pots in the elite marketplace.

Various scholars have analyzed comparable material evidence from precisely this angle. Jan Bremmer, for example, has observed that depictions of arms fade from sympotic scenes over time, and by 510 BCE are exceptional. Understanding politics as a factor contributing to the change—in particular the new world-order forced on the elite aristocracy under the Peisistratid tyranny beginning in the 540's—Bremmer concludes that:[74]

> The monopolization of political power by the Peisistratid family must have been a powerful stimulus for the aristocracy to move away even further from politics and war. It will therefore hardly be chance that from 530 new figures appear at the symposium. Athletes and courtesans now invade the banquet, and *komos* scenes become more frequent.

Furthermore, in this politically charged environment, young men and boys came to replace older, adult men in sympotic scenes. Bremmer suggests

72 See above, p. 72.

73 Missiou 2011, 143–149 summarizes the new role of writing in Attica after the Cleisthenic reforms: literacy was adopted as a tool to bind together the Attic demes into a single state and thus unite its citizens; Athenian citizens 'employed politically patterned communicative practices drawn up jointly on speech and writing' (145); and extensive functional literacy was achieved. Therefore, it is worth considering these mixed inscriptions in light of the contemporary renegotiation of the relationship of speech and writing to political power.

74 For this observation and the two quotes that follow, Bremmer 1990, 144–145.

that, 'These wide-ranging changes can only be interpreted as a complete disintegration of the life of the old elite, brought about by the strategic, social, and political developments of the Archaic age … Both adults and ephebes were now entering a new era where democracy was on the rise'.[75]

A similar hypothesis also informs the analyses of Kathleen Lynch, who has aimed to demonstrate how the increasingly democratic ethos of the late sixth and early fifth centuries may have affected the symposium—so long the purview of the aristocratic elite—not just in its imagery, but also in its vase shapes. As she observes, the quintessentially sympotic *kulix* itself underwent some telling changes, which she contextualizes politically:[76]

> In the case of 6th century [*sic*] kylikes, on the one hand, the subtle formal changes may be generated on behalf of social groups attempting to distinguish themselves both from the majority and from each other. For the users of the kylikes, the overall similarity of the cups may have held symbolic value uniting the greater community of symposium-participants, while the variations in the form and decoration might have distinguished factional groups or social cliques within the symposium-participants … In this way, material culture projects group cohesion, and in the case of mid-6th century [*sic*] Athens, the elites may have been seeking cohesion and definition in the face of factional threats from their peers or populist movements. The latter could include the policies of Peisistratos.

Thus we are encouraged to view the mid-sixth-century *kulix* as emblematic of politically fraught elites at once expressing solidarity and engaging in intra-elite competition with one another. Indeed, this complex double-valence could find its analogue in the mixed sense and nonsense inscriptions of comparable date, such as on the cup crafted by Execias (figs. 2a–b). As I suggested for that vessel, and extend to its contemporaries, in the second and third quarters of the sixth century, the mixture of sense and nonsense offers an opportunity for generating humor, since the person trying to read nonsense may have sounded drunk. Beyond, this, however, the mixture could be seen to facilitate the expression of elitism, since some read sense while others stumble over nonsense and thus a group of elite equals

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75 Oswyn Murray corroborates this view of the incompatibility between the symposium, as it was institutionalized by elite aristocrats early in the sixth century, and the political changes afoot at the end of the sixth century: 'The fundamental potential for opposition between drinking group and democracy is clear … the *symposion* remained largely a private and aristocratic preserve; but the social attitudes which it existed to promote required public display' (1990b, 141–142).

76 Lynch f.c. I am indebted to Kathleen Lynch for making her manuscript available to me before its publication. This quote: manuscript p. 12.

is transformed into those in the know and those who play the Other as they are momentarily unable to produce proper Greek speech from their reading. And, simultaneously, nonsense enables the confirmation of unified elite status above and beyond those outside the *andrôn* who might not read at all. Indeed, in the mid-sixth century, the presence of sense alongside nonsense creates parody, which in turn enables a complex host of expressions of elite power and powerlessness, whether imagined or real.[77]

But the audience of mixed sense and nonsense in the later sixth and fifth centuries seems to engage a rather different kind of socio-political negotiation (figs. 3a–b, 6a–b). One way to analyze this later material, and to maintain alignment with the traditional scholarly model of the elite aristocratic symposium, is to consider it alongside Richard Neer's reading of a set of contemporary red-figure pots. In his study, Neer aims to show how images of vase-painters and potters, whose social class surely excluded them from elite symposia in reality, became suddenly included by the Pioneers in sympotic scenes at a clearly defined and brief moment in the last decades of the sixth century.[78] He ascribes political significance to the phenomenon: 'Appropriation of sympotic rhetoric and reevaluation of social status appear simultaneously in the pottery and the "political history" of the revolutionary period'.[79] It is relatively straightforward to understand why lower-class potters and painters were daringly inserting themselves into elite sympotic scenes, so the argument goes, but it is rather more difficult to theorize why such scenes found currency in an elite marketplace. Neer's explanation lies in the ambiguous social exchanges these images enacted and the questions they worked to resolve: who has power, how can it be maintained, what is the relationship of class and wealth to political control, etc. In part, Neer suggests, the consumption of these painter- and potter-portraits enabled elites in the symposium to participate in an egalitarian fiction, 'a quintessentially Athenian statement to the effect that "We are all aristocrats now"', while simultaneously maintaining the class distinctions that defined them as a

[77] Steiner 2007, 258, sees a similar range of roles for parody in the symposium: 'First, elites make fun of each other, as part of a general compulsion to compete, to challenge one another for "top spot" as practice for skills needed in public life. Elites then seek vases that permit one-upmanship because they help to advance an important elite agenda. Prominence within their own group yields power. Second, those of high status mock persons and behaviors of low status in order to separate themselves from that lever. Both effects are important to affirm the elite status of the adults and to enculturate the rising generation with this ethos'.

[78] See, however, Guy Hedreen's recent challenge (2009) to Neer's reading, including the suggestion that the potter portraits and potter references are fictional.

[79] Neer 2002, 128.

group.[80] From this perspective, we observe an elite viewing audience collapsing binary distinctions because it was politically necessary to do so. So, too, in a study Neer draws upon, Ian Morris has argued that the archaic elite poetic tradition, as opposed to its middling counterpart, blurred the distinctions between 'male and female, present and past, mortal and divine, Greek and Lydian, to reinforce a distinction between aristocrat and commoner'.[81] Along such lines, then, with a view toward mixed sense and nonsense inscriptions, we could add that the participants in archaic elite symposia blurred distinctions between word and image, sense and nonsense, author and audience, and all to the same political effect. Indeed, the late-sixth-century political charge of these objects could be pressed further by noting that of the eight portraits Neer documents, every one either depicts or is painted by a craftsman who also created pots in my corpus.[82] Moreover, painter- and potter-portraits died out after the 480's when the political situation was more stable, which corresponds precisely to the decline in the numbers of mixed sense and nonsense inscriptions around 480 BCE.[83] If, as Neer has it, the elite sympotic audience purchased and used various pots—with the unsettling social exchanges they occasioned—in order to produce performances of the elites' own 'ambiguity of social position and selfhood' during a time when their power was directly threatened, perhaps my corpus should be thought to have served a similar function.[84] According

[80] Neer 2002, 131.

[81] Morris 1996, 35. Reiterated and discussed further by Neer 2002, 22.

[82] Compare the catalogue of potter-portraits and related inscriptions in Neer 2002, 133–134. Prominent names there that are familiar from this study include Smicrus, Euthymides, and Oltus.

[83] Only 18% of the total corpus of mixed sense and nonsense inscriptions dates 480–450 BCE. The gradual decline and eventual absence of painter- and potter-portraits and mixed sense and nonsense inscriptions during 480–450 BCE accords precisely with Murray's observation that in this period 'the *symposion* was part of the social life of considerable sections of the hoplite class' (1983a, 265). That is, the lack of these curious images or words-as-images corresponds to a period in which the concerns of the elite aristocracy of the late sixth and early fifth centuries over the loss of political power were no longer being processed through these channels—partly because political power had resettled to some degree in the hands of the demos (so there was less tension over whether it could and would happen) and partly because elites managed to maintain power in subtle and subversive ways. One example of the latter is that the *phratria*, which could grant and guarantee citizenship and had ceased to dominate political life by the end of the sixth century, took on a public function as part of Athens' formal organization. Through adaptations such as this, the aristocracy maintained a dominant position despite shifting ideologies and political structures (Murray 1983b, 198).

[84] Neer 2002, 87.

to such a reading, the necessary tension between the binaries of the individual and the communal would not only be reflected in, but also produced by inscriptions that are themselves at once sense and nonsense. But we cannot conclude with this interpretation without first considering the increasing body of scholarship that has recently pointed up the vulnerability of some of its fundamental premises.

Most of the above relies on the traditionally held views of the symposium as an exclusive, anti-*polis*, Near-Eastern inspired purview of the elite, and an intentional rejection of and escape from the egalitarian or 'middling' civic community at large. Recent scholarly reevaluations, however, have challenged every element of this definition, urging instead that 'the convivial community of the banquet appears to mirror the larger civic community of the polis'.[85] Rather than stand in opposition to the *polis*, the symposium can be seen rather to have promoted *polis*-oriented civic values, celebrated its Hellenic—not Near-Eastern—roots, and constructed its exclusivity not around an anti-*polis* model, but instead at some distance from the *oikos*, monitoring carefully the gender of its participants, rather than their class or status.[86] Furthermore, scholars have begun to reevaluate the very makeup of the symposium's attendees and their discourse, urging a rethink of the symposium as a uniformly elite aristocratic event.[87] With attention to the institution's emphasis on egalitarianism and commensal equality, some have gone on to hypothesize an ever-more 'democratic' sympotic participation after the reforms of the late sixth century by newly enfranchised citizens who were attempting to co-opt 'the trappings of the previously powerful—the aristocrats'.[88]

Against this backdrop of more recent scholarship, it is possible to generate an interpretation of the corpus at hand that is diametrically opposed to the one initially given, which aligned with more traditional views of the symposium. For example, one could find significance in the coincident chronology of the high percentage of pots with mixed sense and nonsense and the rise in 'democratic' symposia. If such a newly enfranchised group was participating in symposia, we could see this corpus as part of such

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85 Corner 2010, 354, and with references to like-minded scholarship. See also Yatromanolakis 2009 for a similar view.

86 Hammer 2004; Yatromanolakis 2009; Corner 2010; Topper f.c.

87 Yatromanolakis 2009; Corner 2010. An additional difficulty is deriving clear definitions of the fundamental terms 'elite', 'aristocratic', or even 'symposium', as Węcowski 2002, Hammer 2004, and Yatromanolakis 2009 illustrate.

88 Lynch 2007, 248.

newly conceived symposia, as enabling the participants to exercise their newfound political voices by means of multivalent inscriptions that validate the authority of any—and every—vocalization. Not only would these symposiasts be imitating aristocratic sympotic behavior, they would be appropriating it politically, engaging in an exercise that at once reflected and constructed their larger isonomic ethos.

How, then, are we to decide between these contrasting interpretations—themselves reminiscent of the contrast between sense and nonsense—which illustrate either an escapist elitist game or one that directly mirrored and contributed to an increasingly emergent democratic *polis* community? We can progress productively, I suggest, by drawing on elements from both models, and by taking particular care with some key terms and the assumptions around them.

In his critique of Leslie Kurke's work, Dean Hammer has demonstrated that there is no need to equate 'political equality with cultural egalitarianism'.[89] So, too, Marek Węcowski has iterated how the sympotic game of *kottabos* and the circular arrangement of communal drinking engage 'the crucial tension between the agonistic spirit and the egalitarian principle operating overwhelmingly within the aristocratic society of the archaic period'.[90] Thus the archaic symposium could be at once a competitive elite event that also insistently engaged equalizing activities. Increasingly, it seems an oversimplification to postulate that 'the aristocrats' were suddenly no longer powerful after Cleisthenes' reforms, and that the symposium was subsequently subsumed by new 'democrats' who were simply imitating their predecessors and rivals.

Keeping in mind that the terms 'elite', 'egalitarian', and '*polis*-oriented' are not mutually exclusive or even necessarily in conflict, I do want to maintain an elite consuming audience for the corpus I have presented. Such a reading helps contextualize how the verbalizations invited by mixtures of sense and nonsense activated the binary agonistic and egalitarian elements that are integral to archaic aristocratic culture—just as sympotic riddles or the game of *kottabos* must have done. The exchanges occasioned by the pots

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[89] Hammer 2004, 503; This view accords with Walter Eder's notion that the late-sixth-century isonomic movement was advanced not by a restless demos, but rather by aristocrats: 'By tradition in control of power before the rise of the tyrants, the aristocrats were the real losers during the Pisistratid period—much more so than the demos, which was not used to ruling in the polis—and therefore, after the expulsion of the tyrants, they were the real winners in regaining *isonomia* and *isegoria*' (1998, 127).

[90] Węcowski 2002, 352.

under review here, which render authority dynamic in a physical and social setting in which speech is typically prescribed and hierarchical, provide the perfect analogue for the shifting and no longer fixed identity of those whose political power is itself in flux; it makes sense, then, that this change be enacted through media whose own definitions are seen to shift, morph, and communicate variously with first one viewer, then the next. And just as Socrates asserts that speech is twofold, true and false (διπλοῦς, ἀληθής τε καὶ ψευδής, Pl. *Cra.* 408c), a modern theorist of aesthetics submits that 'the aesthetic, then, is from the beginning a contradictory, double-edged concept', both a politically emancipatory force and a powerful mode of political hegemony.[91] Thus we can envision how an elite audience might have mediated the ambiguities inherent among many apparent opposites—of sense and nonsense, of writing and image, of seen and heard, of audience and author, of individual and community—as a means of asserting key elements of their cultural identity. We can focus on class and politics, as scholars have tended to do, but such expression could surely have mediated other constructs, such as gender or ethnicity. Recall, after all, that proper verbal expression, together with proper habits of consumption, was one way to differentiate oneself from 'barking savages, weaving women, and talking parrots'.[92] Such authority and control of speech may be politically charged, but they are also more broadly 'of the *polis*'. As Hammer has put it, politics is more than 'who has dominance. It is an activity in which the fundamental problems of the organization of community life are shaped, challenged, and understood. If we are to understand this activity', he urges, 'we must be attentive to the symbolic processes by which individuals and groups talk to, and understand, each other as they shape and give meaning to community life'.[93] By being attentive to how the aesthetics of mixed sense and nonsense might have enacted individual and group discourse and the dialectic between them, we stand to recover a political space, broadly conceived, in which various cultural ideologies were being exercised at each utterance. And if the language of the late archaic age 'suggests a range of responses to, and attempts to understand, the profound social, political, and economic transformations',[94] we should include in that language the inscriptions in my corpus, which toy with the very fabric of language as

[91] Eagleton 1990, 8.
[92] See above, p. 85, n. 41.
[93] Hammer 2004, 506.
[94] Hammer 2004, 505.

they slide from sense to nonsense and back again, and exercise the full faculty of senses in doing so.

7. *Conclusion: The Aesthetic Value of Nonsense*

This chapter's aim has been to demonstrate both how aesthetic value is connected to social class and political ideology and how nonsense itself takes on an important role in making sense of contemporary social, political, and cultural issues. At least for the pots I have presented here, the descriptor 'nonsense' is a misnomer, far from signifying an actual void of sense or meaning. Rather, we have seen that 'nonsense' participates in exchanges rich in meaning and value—if, at its core, it does so in a disorderly way. Far from the antithesis of 'sense', nonsense calls attention to the ways in which we make sense, creating a topsy-turvy, culturally charged space that challenges ostensibly clear delineations between the powerful and the powerless. And navigating the interplay of sense and nonsense is fundamentally a matter of sensory perception, whether drawing on the eyes or the ears or multiple faculties at once, and is therefore at its core an aesthetic act.

I have also proposed that the ancient Greek symposium—where the dialectic of active and passive was played out over and over again, often through the medium of speech—is a rich context for examining more specifically the interconnected elements of nonsense, meaning, authority, and aesthetics. At this drinking party, to communicate clearly was to control, to assert, to direct; to complicate communication, in turn, complicated established dynamics of power. Thus this study has investigated fairly literally the 'aesthetic value' of the symposium's inscribed pots—that is, the ways they complicate conventional modes of perception as well as one-to-one correlations of value, and for what reasons they do so. For these inscribed objects, what you see is insistently not 'what you get', and the value of a word does a complicated dance with the value of sympotic speech-acts.

So, too, have I shown how the form of both nonsense and sense inscriptions has a complicated and shifting relationship to the content of a scene, and elaborated how this complexity is particularly germane to the viewing audience, however we choose to define it. The ability of 'nonsense' to enact a complex social discourse has framed our more specific exploration of how these pots' elite audience, which was likely fully literate, was emotionally and intellectually invested in exploring control over and access to writing, speech, and meaning. As Tilley has put it for another material context, the inscribed pots in this study enact 'a discourse in, for and of dominance' and

should be viewed as 'containers of power ... involved in the dynamics of social practices acting dialectically to structure and restructure social relations'.[95]

Finally, the ambiguity inherent in nonsense inscriptions both demanded and permitted differing modes of interpretation in antiquity and, in a fitting case of continuity, this ambiguity continues to require and allow for a broad interpretative range today. Just as these pots insisted on never shutting out the active role of the viewer in antiquity, this chapter aims not to close down discourse, but rather to invite the audience to continue to respond and thus continually create meaning, too.

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95 Tilley 1991, 154–155.

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE AESTHETIC VALUE OF MUSIC IN PLATONIC THOUGHT

Eleonora Rocconi

1. *Introduction*

The belief that music could influence the human soul is deeply rooted in ancient Greek culture, but becomes theoretically explicit only in philosophical writings. Apart from late and controversial references to early Pythagoreanism,[1] the most ancient and authoritative source on the psychagogic[2] power of *mousikê* is Plato, who, though famous for his censorship of poetry and music, had a great influence on modern philosophical inquiry into art and beauty. Indeed, especially in the works where he deals more extensively with the education of the soul by means of music (namely, *Republic* and *Laws*), Plato established important premises for subsequent theoretical speculation on the beauty and expressiveness of music, even if he does not seem to have elaborated an artistic conception according to which its aesthetic value might be evaluated independently of ethical (that is, educational) ones. In a famous passage of *Republic* 3 (398d–400d), where he discusses the most appropriate education for the guardians of his ideal city and explains the affinities between musical elements and types of characters, virtues, and vices through the mimetic quality of *mousikê* (i.e., its ability to represent moral qualities by means of words, rhythm, and melody), musical structures are selected following only the principle of their resemblance to a virtuous model.[3]

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[1] According to some late evidence, like Iamblichus' *On the Pythagorean Life* (whose several sources have not yet been identified with absolute certainty), 'corrections' of both psychic and physical *pathê* through the most suitable melodies and rhythms are ascribed to Pythagoras himself (see the usage of the verb *epanorthoô* = lit. 'to correct, amend', in Iambl. *VP* 64).

[2] Lit. 'leading' (or 'persuading') the soul.

[3] In Pl. *Resp.* 400a, rhythms are defined as *biou mimêmata* and it is said that 'we must make the foot and the melody follow the words proper to such a [i.e. an orderly and courageous] life' (tr. Barker 1984).

In this chapter I shall examine Plato's aesthetic concerns with music, specifically to see if, and to what extent, he believed it was possible to appreciate the qualities of musical composition independently of its educational value. Though I am well aware that, in Greek antiquity, the notion of *mousikê* (lit., 'the art of the Muses') described a much denser artistic reality than the same term does today, I will use the word 'music' throughout this chapter, since I believe that Plato's interest in *mousikê* refers in particular to both musical ingredients (such as rhythms and melodies) and verbal content, and that his intention in many of the passages I will address, is to discuss expressly musical and choreutic elements.

2. khoreia *and* paideia *in Plato's* Laws

I will focus my attention especially on *Laws*, usually taken to be Plato's last dialogue, where the three interlocutors discuss the foundation of a new colony in Crete to be named Magnesia.[4] According to Plato, a matter of prime importance for any legislator is the 'education' of his citizens: *paideia* is defined by him as that 'training from childhood in goodness, which makes a man eagerly desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, understanding how both to rule and be ruled righteously'.[5] For this reason it should be provided and controlled by explicit organs of the state, and its precepts are based on music and gymnastics, on the model of Spartan and Cretan public education. The theoretical fundamentals of this *paideia* are discussed by Plato in the first two books of the dialogue, but in *Laws* 7 he returns to the topic, giving practical recommendations about the type of education that should be prescribed in Magnesia's legislation.[6]

For Plato, the most important and effective means for educating and bringing order to society are provided by the *khoreia*, that is, the choral

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4 The 'second-best' city, as he calls it in *Laws* 5 (Pl. *Leg*. 739a–740c), that is, no longer the ideal society of the *Republic*. For an introduction to the main passages concerned with music in Plato's *Laws*, see Barker–Pöhlmann–Rocconi 2010.

5 Pl. *Leg*. 643e (tr. Bury 1926). For a clarification on the different shades of meaning of the term *paideia* within Plato's *Laws*, see Bartels in this same volume, pp. 137 ff.

6 *Contra* Bartels, p. 136 with n. 9, who interprets the two accounts of *mousikê* in *Laws* 2 and 7 as 'hardly consistent'. Although I agree that in *Laws* 2 Plato's purpose is not to establish what kinds of music have to be included in Magnesia's lawcode, but only to discover the qualifications that a reliable judge of music will need in order to make the youth acquire virtue, I consider the first exposition to be theoretically preliminary to the second one.

dancing and singing (*orkhêsis kai ôidê*) in honor of the gods. According to him, 'the educated man is to be reckoned adequately trained in the art of the chorus (*hikanôs kekhoreukota*)',[7] while the uneducated man (*apaideutos*) is anyone without choric expertise (*akhoreutos*), since suitable music and dances may train the soul to discern what is fine. Within Plato's philosophical system, the paideutic value of *khoreia* may be explained, as in the *Republic*, through the concept of *mimêsis*, according to which 'what is involved in choric performance is representations of characters (*mimêmata tropôn*),[8] appearing in actions and eventualities of all kinds which each performer goes through by means of habits and imitations'.[9] According to this view, what is said, sung, or represented through music and dance should then represent a 'good' (*kalon*) model,[10] since 'good postures' (*kala skhêmata*) and 'good melodies' (*kala mêlê*) act as a vehicle to lead people to virtues such as courage (*andreia*) and temperance (*sôphrosunê*).[11] For this reason, musical practices in the city should be closely controlled and regulated, and the people in charge of such a task should receive suitable training for being able to judge them correctly.

Unlike the *Republic*,[12] the *Laws* does not present a detailed theory of soul, but centers more generically on its internal psychic conflict and on the need to find an agreement (*sumphônia*) between its different tendencies, an agreement that is produced when the sensations follow the dictates of reason.[13] *Paideia* predisposes the individual through proper practices and habits to a correct management of 'pleasure' (*hêdonê*) and 'pain' (*lupê*), the first sensations felt by human beings. As Plato states, these sensations may act as vehicles for the 'goodness' (*aretê*) and 'badness' (*kakia*) of the soul (*Laws* 653a–c):[14]

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7 Pl. *Leg*. 654b (tr. Barker 1984).

8 On the meaning of *mimêma* in this context, see Lisi 2004. The debate on the meaning of the Greek term *mimêsis* (which lies at the core of the theories on representational arts in antiquity) has been opened by Koller 1954, according to whom the meaning of 'imitation' was only a later development and application of the word in areas like visual and plastic arts, to which this word did not originally belong. The most recent interpretation of this complex and variable concept in ancient Greek culture is in Halliwell 2002.

9 Pl. *Leg*. 655d (tr. adapted from Barker 1984).

10 Pl. *Leg*. 655d–e.

11 Pl. *Leg*. 802e. The same two virtues are pursued also in *Republic* 399a–c.

12 Plato's *Republic* involves the claim that the embodied human soul has three parts or aspects, namely reason, spirit, and appetite: the argument for this is presented in *Republic* 4, 440e–441a.

13 For a detailed survey on Plato's conception of the soul in the *Laws*, see Sassi 2008.

14 See Bartels in this volume, pp. 138–140, for another discussion of this passage.

> What I state is this, that in children the first childish sensations are pleasure and pain (*hêdonên kai lupên*), and that it is in these first that goodness and badness (*aretê kai kakia*) come to the soul; … I term, then, the goodness that first comes to children education (*paideia*). When pleasure and love, and pain and hatred, spring up rightly in the souls of those who are unable as yet to grasp a rational account; and when, after grasping the rational account, they consent thereunto through having been rightly trained (*orthôs eithisthai*) in fitting practices: this consent (*sumphônia*), viewed as a whole, is goodness, while the part of it that is rightly trained in respect of pleasures and pains, so as to hate what ought to be hated, right from the beginning up to the very end, and to love what ought to be loved, if you were to mark this part off in your definition and call it education, you would be giving it, in my opinion, its right name. (tr. Bury 1926)

> λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον … παιδείαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετήν· ἡδονὴ δὴ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν, αὕτη 'σθ' ἡ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετή, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις.

Indeed, the most striking novelty of this dialogue is the considerable attention Plato pays to the notion of 'pleasure', which, because it exercises an important influence on the irrational part of the soul,[15] requires continual discipline and regulation. Immediately after the opening remark on the main function of education, while commenting on the uniqueness of human beings in perceiving rhythmically ordered movements, he correlates choral dance with social order and emphasizes the entertainment value of pleasure. The gods—he says—have given to human beings 'the capacity to perceive rhythm and *harmonia* and to enjoy them (*meth' hêdonês*)', and have given choruses (*khorous*) their name 'by derivation from the joy (*khara*) that is natural to them'.[16] The fanciful etymology of *khoros* presented here is certainly indicative of a feature which Plato regarded as inherent in *khoreia*.

Plato also refers to the enjoyment of music in the treatment of musical 'goodness' (*to kalon*) that occupies the greatest part of *Laws* 2, and con-

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[15] Cf. Woerther 2008.

[16] Pl. *Leg*. 653e–654a (tr. Barker 1984): τούτους [sc. τοὺς θεοὺς] εἶναι καὶ τοὺς δεδωκότας τὴν ἔνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς … χορούς τε ὠνομακέναι παρὰ τὸ τῆς χαρᾶς ἔμφυτον ὄνομα.

cludes with the definition of *mousikê* as 'the vocal actions which pertain to the training of the soul towards virtue (*pros aretên*)'.[17] This long section discusses many theoretical aspects of the topic, spaced out by several digressions. It starts from the definition of what is *kalon* in music (654e–656a); then it points out the need for its learning by young people through training and habit (656b–657a), using songs as 'enchantments' (*epôidai*) since the souls of the young are unable to endure serious study (659e); finally (from 657b onwards) it progressively describes the interweaving criteria of its judgment: pleasure, correctness, and utility, more explicitly affirmed at 667b–671a.[18] This passage is opportunely anticipated by a long discussion on the interrelationships among justice, happiness, and pleasure in human life.[19] This discussion provides the theoretical basis for the subsequent treatment of the criteria of musical judgment.

3. *Musical 'Goodness' and its Learning through Training and Habit*

Musical 'goodness' and 'badness' are summarized by Plato at *Leg*. 654e–655b:

> Then what we must next track down, like hunting dogs, is good posture, good melody, good song, and good dancing (*skhêma te kalon kai melos kai ôidên kai orkhêsin*). If all these things run away and elude us, all the rest of our discourse about correct education, whether Greek or foreign, will be futile … Well then, what should we say constitutes good posture or good melody? Consider: when a courageous soul is caught up in troubles, and a cowardly soul in ones that are equal and the same, are their resulting postures and

17 Pl. *Leg*. 673a (tr. Bury 1926): τὰ μὲν τοίνυν τῆς φωνῆς μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδείας οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον ὠνομάσαμεν μουσικήν.

18 Pl. *Leg*. 667b–c (tr. Barker 1984): 'First of all, then, mustn't it be true of everything that is accompanied by any kind of delightfulness that its most important aspect is either this delightfulness itself, or some sort of correctness, or, thirdly, its usefulness? For instance, food and drink and nourishment in general carry with them, I would say, the sort of delightfulness that we would call pleasure: but their correctness and usefulness, what we regularly call the wholesomeness of the things that are offered us, this, I suggest, is really the correctest aspect of them' (οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ τόδε γε ὑπάρχειν ἅπασιν ὅσοις συμπαρέπεταί τις χάρις, ἢ τοῦτο αὐτὸ μόνον αὐτοῦ τὸ σπουδαιότατον εἶναι, ἤ τινα ὀρθότητα, ἢ τὸ τρίτον ὠφελίαν; οἷον δὴ λέγω ἐδωδῇ μὲν καὶ πόσει καὶ συμπάσῃ τροφῇ παρέπεσθαι μὲν τὴν χάριν, ἣν ἡδονὴν ἂν προσείποιμεν· ἣν δὲ ὀρθότητά τε καὶ ὠφελίαν, ὅπερ ὑγιεινὸν τῶν προσφερομένων λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ ὀρθότατον). More specifically on *kharis*, cf. Bartels, pp. 152ff. in this volume.

19 Pl. *Leg*. 662c–663b.

utterances alike? … But in music there are postures and melodies, since music is concerned with rhythm and *harmonia*, and hence one can speak correctly of 'well-rhythmed' (*eurhuthmon*) or 'well-harmonized' (*euarmoston*) melody and posture; while one cannot correctly speak—in the metaphor chorus-trainers use—of melody or posture as 'well-colored'. One can also speak correctly of the 'postures' and 'melodies' of the coward and the brave man, and it is correct to call those of the brave man 'good' (*kala*), and those of the coward 'ugly' (*aiskhra*). To forestall a lengthy discussion about all this, let us agree that all the postures and melodies belonging to goodness of soul or body—to virtue itself or any image of it—are good, while those belonging to badness are altogether the opposite. (tr. Barker 1984)

ταῦτ' ἄρα μετὰ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν αὖ καθάπερ κυσὶν ἰχνευούσαις διερευνητέον, σχῆμά τε καλὸν καὶ μέλος καὶ ᾠδὴν καὶ ὄρχησιν· εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' ἡμᾶς διαφυγόντα οἰχήσεται, μάταιος ὁ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν περὶ παιδείας ὀρθῆς εἴθ' Ἑλληνικῆς εἴτε βαρβαρικῆς λόγος ἂν εἴη … εἶεν· τί δὲ δὴ τὸ καλὸν χρὴ φάναι σχῆμα ἢ μέλος εἶναί ποτε; φέρε, ἀνδρικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν πόνοις ἐχομένης καὶ δειλῆς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ ἴσοις ἆρ' ὅμοια τά τε σχήματα καὶ τὰ φθέγματα συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι … ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ μουσικῇ καὶ σχήματα μὲν καὶ μέλη ἔνεστιν, περὶ ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν οὔσης τῆς μουσικῆς, ὥστε εὔρυθμον μὲν καὶ εὐάρμοστον, εὔχρων δὲ μέλος ἢ σχῆμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπεικάσαντα, ὥσπερ οἱ χοροδιδάσκαλοι ἀπεικάζουσιν, ὀρθῶς φθέγγεσθαι· τὸ δὲ τοῦ δειλοῦ τε καὶ ἀνδρείου σχῆμα ἢ μέλος ἔστιν τε, καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν ἔχει τὰ μὲν τῶν ἀνδρείων καλά, τὰ τῶν δειλῶν δὲ αἰσχρά. καὶ ἵνα δὴ μὴ μακρολογία πολλή τις γίγνηται περὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν ἅπαντα, ἁπλῶς ἔστω τὰ μὲν ἀρετῆς ἐχόμενα ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος, εἴτε αὐτῆς εἴτε τινὸς εἰκόνος, σύμπαντα σχήματά τε καὶ μέλη καλά, τὰ δὲ κακίας αὖ, τοὐναντίον ἅπαν.

Despite the clear reference to ethical values (i.e., *andreia* and its opposite *deilotês*) with which we should necessarily equate what is fine (*kalon*) or what is not (*aiskhron*) in music, Plato introduces into the discussion references to the 'pleasure and pain' (*hêdonê kai lupê*) felt when someone welcomes what is good and abhors what is not good,[20] and to the 'delight' (*khairein*) perceived by those who find congenial to their own *phusis* or habit what is said, sung, or represented through music and dance.[21] Certainly the pleasure afforded to the soul by good music cannot be identified with the *mousikês orthotês*, as most people instead seem to think.[22] According to Plato, however, the reason for this misunderstanding is to be identified just with that pleasure indissolubly linked to the appreciation of musical goodness (*Leg.* 655c–e):

20 Pl. *Leg.* 654c–d.
21 Pl. *Leg.* 655d–e.
22 See Pl. *Leg.* 655c, quoted *infra*. Cf. also Pl. *Leg.* 668a–b (quoted at n. 50).

> Yet most people certainly say that musical correctness (*mousikês orthotêta*) consists in the power to provide pleasure (*tên hêdonên*) for the soul. But that assertion is intolerable and cannot even be uttered without blasphemy. It is more likely that what leads us astray is this … Since what is involved in choric performance is imitations of character, appearing in actions and eventualities of all kinds which each performer goes through by means of habits and imitations, those people to whom the things said or sung or performed in any way are congenial (on the basis of their nature or their habits or of both together), enjoy them (*khairein*) and praise them (*epainein*), and must call them good (*kala*) … (tr. Barker 1984)
>
> καίτοι λέγουσίν γε οἱ πλεῖστοι μουσικῆς ὀρθότητα εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πορίζουσαν δύναμιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὔτε ἀνεκτὸν οὔτε ὅσιον τὸ παράπαν φθέγγεσθαι, τόδε δὲ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς πλανᾶν ἡμᾶς … ἐπειδὴ μιμήματα τρόπων ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς χορείας, ἐν πράξεσί τε παντοδαπαῖς γιγνόμενα καὶ τύχαις, καὶ ἤθεσι καὶ μιμήσεσι διεξιόντων ἑκάστων, οἷς μὲν ἂν πρὸς τρόπου τὰ ῥηθέντα ἢ μελῳδηθέντα ἢ καὶ ὁπωσοῦν χορευθέντα, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ ἔθος ἢ κατ' ἀμφότερα, τούτους μὲν καὶ τούτοις χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν αὐτὰ καὶ προσαγορεύειν καλὰ ἀναγκαῖον, οἷς δ' ἂν παρὰ φύσιν ἢ τρόπον ἤ τινα συνήθειαν, οὔτε χαίρειν δυνατὸν οὔτε ἐπαινεῖν αἰσχρά τε προσαγορεύειν. οἷς δ' ἂν τὰ μὲν τῆς φύσεως ὀρθὰ συμβαίνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς συνηθείας ἐναντία, ἢ τὰ μὲν τῆς συνηθείας ὀρθά …

The ability of an audience to experience pleasure from song and dance relies, then, on a correspondence between the quality of their own 'nature' (*phusis*) and 'habit' (*ethos*) and the musical goodness represented in the performance. That is to say, the appreciation of *kala skhêmata* and *kala melê* is also a question of training, as the Egyptians, who prescribed that the young men in each city must become practiced in good postures and good melodies, had already understood a long time ago.[23]

Similar remarks may be found also in the *Republic*, where the main goal of musical *paideia* (there defined as the *kuriôtatê trophê*, 'the supreme form of education') is its training in *euskhêmosunê* (lit. 'gracefulness'), with a particular concern for its 'enjoyment' (Pl. *Resp*. 401d–402a):

> For these reasons, then, Glaucon—I said—isn't training in *mousikê* of overriding importance (*kuriôtatê en mousikêi trophêi*), because rhythm and *harmonia* penetrate most deeply into the recesses of the soul and take a powerful hold on it,[24] bringing gracefulness (*tên euskhêmosunên*) and making a man graceful (*euskhêmona*) if he is correctly trained, but the opposite if he is not? Another reason is that the man who has been properly trained in these matters would perceive most sharply things that were defective, and badly crafted or badly grown, and his displeasure would be justified. He would praise and

23 Pl. *Leg*. 656d.

24 The reference here is to specifically musical elements, such as *rhuthmos* and *harmonia*.

rejoice in fine things (*ta men kala epainoi kai khairôn*), and would receive them into his soul and be nourished by them, becoming fine and good: but he would rightly condemn ugly things, and hate them even when he was young, before he was able to lay hold on reason. And when reason grew, the person trained in this way would embrace it with enthusiasm, recognizing it as a familiar friend. It seems to me—he said—that the purposes of a training in *mousikê* are of just these kinds. (tr. Shorey 1930)

ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, τούτων ἕνεκα κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία, καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἅπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφῇ, εἰ δὲ μή, τοὐναντίον; καὶ ὅτι αὖ τῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ' ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ τραφεὶς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαίρων καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλός τε κἀγαθός, τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὤν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφείς; ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τῶν τοιούτων ἕνεκα ἐν μουσικῇ εἶναι ἡ τροφή.

These remarks on the pleasure inherent in the perception of 'good' artistic products (i.e., works which not only imitate and represent good ethical values, but also display a pleasant and graceful appearance),[25] as well as on the role of musical education in developing the capability of appreciating such 'formal' features, recur also in subsequent discussion of musical *paideia*. In Aristotle's *Politics*, for example, music is 'naturally among the things that give delight'[26] and is important not only because it has the power to modify the character, but also 'to habituate people in correct forms of enjoyment (*khairein orthôs*)'.[27]

The same approach may be found in Aristoxenus of Tarentum, the Peripatetic philosopher traditionally regarded as the major musical authority of the ancient world. We may consider the anecdote on the musician Telesias of Thebes, trained in his youth in the 'finest' (*kallistê*) kind of music (i.e., that of Pindar, Pratinas, and other composers of the past), but 'seduced' (*sphodra exapatêthênai*) in later life by theatrical music of more recent times (i.e., by compositions of Philoxenus and Timotheus). According to the Aristoxenian account of this story, 'when he had then set out to compose melodies, and tried his hand at both styles (*diapeirômenon amphoterôn tôn tropôn*)—that of Pindar and that of Philoxenus—he could achieve no success at all

[25] Mostly lying in a good proportion of parts: see Pl. *Ti.* 87c.
[26] Arist. *Pol.* 1340b (tr. Barker 1984).
[27] Arist. *Pol.* 1339a (tr. Barker 1984). On musical pleasure in Aristotle's *Politics*, see Jones in this same volume.

in Philoxenus' manner. And the reason lay in the excellent training (*tên kallistên agôgên*) he had had from his childhood'.[28] This episode relies on a slightly different conception of musical *êthos*,[29] since the author talks here about Telesias' failure in finding the musical resources more appropriate to modern composition 'style' (*tropos*)—that is to say, failing to convey any specific emotion expressed by this kind of music—without giving any reference to *mimêsis* of any particular virtue or vice. Nevertheless the importance of early training and experience of musical beauty in order to preserve musical taste as well as character is something that Aristoxenus shares with Plato. As Strabo relates, Aristoxenus considered musicians 'educators' (*paideutikoi*) and 'correctors of characters' (*epanorthôtikoi tôn êthôn*),[30] while Plato points out that 'when someone passes his life from childhood up to the age of steadiness and sense among temperate and ordered music, then when he hears the opposite kind he detests it, and calls it unfit for free men'.[31]

Plato seems then more optimistic than Aristoxenus concerning the effectiveness of a good musical education in preventing the hearers from the dangerous appeal of modern music.[32] But it is clear that perception and progressive assimilation of musical beauty—one of Plato's main concerns from the *Republic* to the *Laws*—remained a very important issue also when the expressiveness of music began to free itself from an explicit mimetic conception.

4. *The Three Criteria of Musical Judgment*

But how can the elders become able to judge what is *kalon* in music? As we proceed in the *Laws*, we encounter the long and difficult passage (Pl. *Leg.*

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28 [Plut.] *De mus.* 1142B–C = Aristoxenus fr. 76 Wehrli (tr. Barker 2007): ὁρμήσαντά τ' ἐπὶ τὸ ποιεῖν μέλη καὶ διαπειρώμενον ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τρόπων, τοῦ τε Πινδαρείου καὶ τοῦ Φιλοξενείου, μὴ δύνασθαι κατορθοῦν ἐν τῷ Φιλοξενείῳ γένει· γεγενῆσθαι δ' αἰτίαν τὴν ἐκ παιδὸς καλλίστην ἀγωγήν.

29 According to Aristoxenus, a composition (*poiêma*) and its performance (*hermêneia*) are the two main objects of the critical judgment of a *teleos mousikos* and *kritikos* (that is, a philosopher), whose goals are not only the ethical but also the aesthetic understanding and appreciation of what is 'appropriate' (*oikeios*) in music. On such a topic, see Barker 2007 (esp. 229–259) and Rocconi 2011.

30 Strabo 1.2.3 = Aristoxenus fr. 123 Wehrli.

31 Pl. *Leg.* 802c–d (tr. Barker 1984): ἐν ᾗ γὰρ ἂν ἐκ παίδων τις μέχρι τῆς ἑστηκυίας τε καὶ ἔμφρονος ἡλικίας διαβιῷ, σώφρονι μὲν μούσῃ καὶ τεταγμένῃ, ἀκούων δὲ τῆς ἐναντίας, μισεῖ καὶ ἀνελεύθερον αὐτὴν προσαγορεύει.

32 Cf. also Pl. *Leg.* 657b: 'for pleasure and pain, in their constant pursuit of new music to indulge in, have little power to destroy a choric art that is sanctified, just by mocking its antiquity' (tr. Barker 1984).

667b–671a) in which Plato discusses the criteria of musical judgment. The question is introduced a few lines earlier (at 666a–d), when the Athenian Stranger asks 'what sort of music would be appropriate to godlike men', that is, to men over the age of forty (i.e. the members of the chorus of Dionysus), who should be arbiters of such a judgment (more specifically on this, see Bartels in this same volume).

After a section in which Plato restates the 'mimetic' (*mimêtikê*) and 'representative' (*eikastikê*) power of music,[33] he finally enunciates the three qualifications that 'anyone who is to judge intelligently (*emphrona kritên*)' must have: first, he must know 'what' the original of such imitation is (*ho te esti*); secondly, how 'correctly' that particular representation is made (*hôs orthôs eirgastai*); thirdly, how 'well' it is made (*hôs eu eirgastai*) in words, melodies, and rhythms.[34]

The first of these qualifications had already been explained at 668c, where the author stated that 'the man who is to make no mistakes about compositions must understand the nature of each one of their details. For if he does not understand its essence (*tên ousian*), what it means (*ti pote bouletai*),[35] and of what it is really a representation (*eikôn*), he can hardly decide whether its intention is correctly fulfilled or its execution in composition is incorrectly accomplished'.[36]

The second requirement seems to be concerned with the correct technical realization of such a representation: a person who does not understand 'what is correct' (*to orthôs*, 668d) will never be able to distinguish 'what

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33 Pl. *Leg*. 668a–c.

34 Pl. *Leg*. 669a–b (tr. Barker 1984): 'Isn't it the case, then, that in respect of each individual representation, whether in painting or music or any other field, anyone who is to judge intelligently must have the following three qualifications? Mustn't he know, first, what the original is, secondly, whether the particular representation is made correctly, and thirdly, whether it is made well?' (ἆρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ ἑκάστην εἰκόνα, καὶ ἐν γραφικῇ καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ πάντῃ, τὸν μέλλοντα ἔμφρονα κριτὴν ἔσεσθαι δεῖ ταῦτα τρία ἔχειν, ὅ τέ ἐστι πρῶτον γιγνώσκειν, ἔπειτα ὡς ὀρθῶς, ἔπειθ' ὡς εὖ, τὸ τρίτον, εἴργασται τῶν εἰκόνων ἡτισοῦν ῥήμασί τε καὶ μέλεσι καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς;).

35 According to this interpretation (paper 1 by A. Barker in Barker–Pöhlmann–Rocconi 2010), τί ποτε βούλεται comes to be synonymous with ὅτου ποτ' ἐστὶν εἰκὼν ὄντως said immediately after, hence realizing a hendiadys.

36 Pl. *Leg*. 668c (tr. Barker 1984, modified): δεῖ δὴ καθ' ἕκαστόν γε, ὡς ἔοικε, γιγνώσκειν τῶν ποιημάτων ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐν αὐτῷ μὴ ἁμαρτήσεσθαι· μὴ γὰρ γιγνώσκων τὴν οὐσίαν, τί ποτε βούλεται καὶ ὅτου ποτ' ἐστὶν εἰκὼν ὄντως, σχολῇ τήν γε ὀρθότητα τῆς βουλήσεως ἢ καὶ ἁμαρτίαν αὐτοῦ διαγνώσεται. At the end of this sentence, the masculine or neuter *autou* cannot refer to the feminine term *boulêsis* previously quoted, but it most probably refers to *poiêma*. For a discussion on the interpretation of this passage, see paper 1 by A. Barker in Barker–Pöhlmann–Rocconi 2010.

is good and bad' (*to eu kai to kakôs*) about it. Plato is here talking about accuracy and precision in reproducing the imitated body (mainly referring to visual arts),[37] that is to say, the capacity of the artist's *tekhnê* to realize a 'correct' correspondence to the model. According to Plato, however, these abilities are still not enough to judge reliably whether an artifact is *kalon*.[38]

The third qualification, by which we know 'how well (*hôs eu*) the representation has been made', is the most vague and obscure of the passage. Since it is presented as a distinct requirement from the one previously quoted (*hôs orthôs*), it must be concerned with a more advanced level of judgment, according to which we are able to decide whether a musical composition possesses *to eu* and is *kalon*.[39]

In *Laws* 669b5 ff., the Athenian stresses the fact that such a judgment is particularly difficult (*khalepon*) in reference to music, since musical art possesses the serious power to work deleterious effects on its audiences.[40] After this remark, however, instead of facing this third qualification, the Athenian launches into a long discussion on the need for a strict regulation of musical composition and performance, according to which the most relevant rule that a musician must observe appears to be the 'appropriateness' in the combination and employment of technical elements (such as rhythm, melody, words, and so on) in musical composition:[41] words suitable for men, for instance, cannot be combined with a melody that has a coloring proper

37 Such as sculpture and painting, see Pl. *Leg.* 668d.

38 Pl. *Leg.* 668e–669a: 'Suppose next that we know that the thing painted or sculpted is a man, and that the artist's skill has given it all the parts, colours and shapes that belong to it. Must it follow that if someone knows this, he also knows at once whether it is beautiful (*kalon*) or in what respect it falls short of beauty?—If it were so, pretty well all of us would know which pictures are beautiful' (tr. Barker 1984).

39 As a subsequent passage seems to clarify, see Pl. *Leg.* 670e: 'the third subject, whether a given representation (*mimêma*) is good or not, is one of which he [i.e. the composer] need have no knowledge' (tr. Barker 1984). The two expressions (*to eu* and *to kalon*) recur together at Pl. *Leg.* 668d1 and 669b3.

40 Pl. *Leg.* 669b–c: 'Then let us avoid saying what it is that is so difficult about music; for since it is more highly esteemed than other representations, it requires the most cautious treatment of them all. Anyone who made a mistake about it would be most seriously damaged, by favourably embracing bad dispositions, and his error would be very difficult to detect, because human composers are much poorer composers than are the Muses themselves' (tr. Barker 1984).

41 As a recent study has opportunely pointed out—cf. Barker f.c.—this passage of Plato's *Laws* on the criteria of musical judgment is clearly echoed by the Aristoxenian inquiry on the *kritikê dunamis* (that is, the business of forming a judgment about a piece of music) handed down by [Plut.] *De mus.* (1142B–1144F).

to women, and rhythms proper to slaves and servile persons cannot be fitted to melody or postures of free men.[42]

At the end of this long disquisition, he returns to the question about the qualifications required by the musical judges, but he seems not to focus on the last criterion of judgment about *to kalon*, as we would have expected, since he is still concerned with the question of 'correctness'. In fact he states that the elders in charge of musical judgment are required to have 'both acute perception (*euaisthêtôs ekhein*) and understanding (*gignôskein*) of rhythms and *harmoniai*' as well as to 'understand correctness (*tên orthotêta*) in melodies, the correctness of the Dorian *harmonia*, for instance—what it is suited for and what it is not—and of the rhythm which the composer has attached to it, correctly (*orthôs*) or incorrectly'.[43] The role of *aisthêsis* seems here to become quite important in the process of musical judgment,[44] but it needs to be completed by a rational understanding (*gignôskein*) of technical elements such as rhythms and *harmoniai*. These two devices are of course not sufficient in themselves to make someone *sophos* in musical matters, as the existence of a third qualification of musical judgment clearly shows.

Correctness in melody, Plato goes on to explain, may be obtained only when its constituents are 'appropriate' (*prosêkonta*),[45] that is, when its technical elements are opportunely selected (*eklegesthai*) and used during the performance,[46] in order both to let the elders gain 'enjoyment' (*hêdôntai*) from their songs and to make them attract the younger men towards noble manners (*Leg*. 670c–671a):

> It appears, then, that we are now discovering once again that our singers [i.e. the members of the chorus of Dionysus], whom we are calling on and compelling, in a sort of way, to sing of their own free will, must be educated up to the point where they can follow every element in the movements of

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[42] Pl. *Leg*. 669c–d.

[43] Pl. *Leg*. 670a–b (tr. Barker 1984): ... ἢ πῶς τις τὴν ὀρθότητα γνώσεται τῶν μελῶν, ᾧ προσῆκεν ἢ μὴ προσῆκεν τοῦ δωριστί, καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ ὃν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτῷ προσῆψεν, ὀρθῶς ἢ μή; On the skills required by the members of the chorus of Dionysus, see the Aristoxenian echo in [Plut.] *De mus*. 1143C: 'it is evidently when judgment is allied to experience of music that a man will be a discriminating musical expert (*ho akribês en mousikêi*). A man who knows the Dorian, but without understanding how to judge where its use is appropriate (*tên tês khrêseôs autou oikeiotêta*), will not know what it is that he is producing: he will not even maintain its *êthos*' (tr. Barker 1984).

[44] We can compare it to the Aristoxenian concerns on the need, for the student of harmonics, to 'train his perception to accuracy' (Aristoxenus *Harm*. 44.3–6 Da Rios).

[45] Pl. *Leg*. 670c.

[46] Also according to Aristoxenus the *êthos* of a musical composition arises from the way in which melodic and rhythmic elements are associated with each other (see [Plut.] *De mus*. 1144B–C): on this see Rocconi 2012.

the rhythms and the notes of the melodies. The object is to enable them, when they survey *harmoniai* and rhythms, to select (*eklegesthai*) things that are appropriate (*ta prosêkonta*), and suitable (*prepon*) for people of their age and character to sing, and so to sing them; and to enable them, through their singing, to have enjoyment (*hêdôntai*) of harmless pleasures then and there, and also to become leaders of the younger men in appropriately (*prosêkontos*) embracing high standards of behavior. If they were educated up to this level, they would have had a more thoroughly detailed training (*akribesteran paideian*) than that of the mass of the people, or indeed than that of the composers themselves. For though a composer must understand *harmonia* and rhythm, the third subject, whether a given representation is good (*kalon*) or not, is one of which he need have no knowledge. But our singers must understand all these, so that they can pick out what is best and what is second-best, or else there will never be a singer of incantations (*epôidon*) who is capable of attracting the young to virtue (*pros aretên*). (tr. Barker 1984)

τοῦτ᾽ οὖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνευρίσκομεν αὖ τὰ νῦν, ὅτι τοῖς ᾠδοῖς ἡμῖν, οὓς νῦν παρακαλοῦμεν καὶ ἑκόντας τινὰ τρόπον ἀναγκάζομεν ᾄδειν, μέχρι γε τοσούτου πεπαιδεῦσθαι σχεδὸν ἀναγκαῖον, μέχρι τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι συνακολουθεῖν ἕκαστον ταῖς τε βάσεσιν τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ ταῖς χορδαῖς ταῖς τῶν μελῶν, ἵνα καθορῶντες τάς τε ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, ἐκλέγεσθαί τε τὰ προσήκοντα οἷοί τ᾽ ὦσιν ἃ τοῖς τηλικούτοις τε καὶ τοιούτοις ᾄδειν πρέπον, καὶ οὕτως ᾄδωσιν, καὶ ᾄδοντες αὐτοί τε ἡδονὰς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀσινεῖς ἥδωνται καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις ἡγεμόνες ἠθῶν χρηστῶν ἀσπασμοῦ προσήκοντος γίγνωνται· μέχρι δὲ τοσούτου παιδευθέντες ἀκριβεστέραν ἂν παιδείαν τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος φερούσης εἶεν μετακεχειρισμένοι καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτούς. τὸ γὰρ τρίτον οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη ποιητῇ γιγνώσκειν, εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε μὴ καλὸν τὸ μίμημα, τὸ δὲ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ σχεδὸν ἀνάγκη, τοῖς δὲ πάντα τὰ τρία τῆς ἐκλογῆς ἕνεκα τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ δευτέρου, ἢ μηδέποτε ἱκανὸν ἐπῳδὸν γίγνεσθαι νέοις πρὸς ἀρετήν.

In this passage we are also told that, if the technical knowledge necessary to realize (and judge) a 'correct' correspondence of musical imitations to the model is something that the elders share with the *tekhnitai*, only the former have the ability to assess the most important kind of musical excellence (*to eu* and *to kalon* in music). Unfortunately Plato adds nothing here about this third qualification. He only says that such excellence enables them to attract the youth to virtue by 'enchanting' it,[47] and by allowing them to enjoy

[47] Pl. *Leg.* 671a, cf. *Leg.* 812b–c: 'We said, I believe, that our sixty-year-old singers to Dionysus must have acquired good perception in respect to rhythms and the constitution of the *harmoniai*, so that when considering a representation in song, whether it is done well or badly—a representation in which the soul comes under the influence of the emotions—each of them shall be able to pick out the likeness of both the good kind and the bad, and while rejecting the latter, shall bring the former before the public, and sing them to enchant (*epaidêi*) the souls of the young, summoning each of them to pursue the acquisition of virtue in company with them, by means of these representations' (tr. Barker 1984).

(*hêdôntai*) harmless pleasures (*asineis hêdonai*).[48] Thus the members of the chorus of Dionysus may succeed in becoming arbiters of both 'aesthetic' and 'moral' taste in the citizen community.

It seems clear, then, that in his evaluation of a work of art Plato indissolubly linked formal and moral beauty, joining the 'goodness' aroused by the musician's abilities (the 'mimetic correctness' in musical compositions and performances,[49] based on 'likeness to what is good')[50] to the 'goodness' of the models imitated (i.e. the virtues expressed by the musical works).[51] But if, at a more general level, he rejected the autonomy and independence of musical *tekhnê* from the ethical values such a *tekhnê* is designed to express, identifying aesthetic with ethical goodness,[52] nonetheless he wished a correspondence between form and content in musical artworks. In other words, he believed that the formal (i.e. technical) aspects of music ought to be appropriate to the model of *mimêsis*.[53] This led him to reassess the role of perception in the identification of these formal aspects by senior judges, and to constantly stress the importance of a 'pleasant' perception by the listeners in order to fulfill the main goals of music education, that is, the acquisition of virtue.

Plato contributions to aesthetics, then, seem to have been twofold: first the importance of consistency between form and content in artistic produc-

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48 Visual and acoustic pleasures had already been described as 'the most harmless (*asinestatai*) and the best (*beltistai*) of pleasures' in Plato's *Hippias Major* 303e (on which see also n. 52 below). Cf. also Pl. *Leg*. 667d–e: 'the only thing that could be correctly judged by the criterion of pleasure is that which produces no usefulness or truth or likeness, nor indeed any harm …' (tr. Barker 1984).

49 Also for Aristoxenus a composition (*poiêma*) and its performance (*hermêneia*) are the two main objects of the critical judgment of a *teleos mousikos* and *kritikos*: see [Plut.] *De mus*. 1144D–1145A.

50 Pl. *Leg*. 668a–b: 'Then when someone says that music should be judged by the criterion of pleasure, what he says must be totally rejected, and music that gives pleasure, whatever is to be found, is not to be pursued as something of importance: such importance belongs only to the kind that bears a likeness to an imitation of what is good … Then those who are looking for the best kind of singing and music must look not for the kind that is pleasant but that which is correct: and as we have said, an imitation is correct if it is made like the object imitated, both in quantity and quality' (tr. Barker 1984).

51 Halliwell 2002, 65, happily calls it an 'ethical aesthetics'.

52 Cf. Arist. *Rh*. 1366a33–34: '*kalon* is that … which is both good (*agathon*) and also pleasant (*hêdu*) because good'. A purely aesthetic evaluation of *to kalon* is rejected also at the end of Plato's *Hippias Major*, where the hypothesis that 'beauty is the pleasure that comes from seeing and hearing' (Pl. *Hp. mai*. 298a) is discussed—and finally rejected—by Socrates as the last possibility of identifying 'the beautiful'.

53 Cf., e.g., the unsuitable usage of rhythms proper to slaves and servile persons, when we are composing a melody that represents, instead, free men (Pl. *Leg*. 699c).

tions, second the emphasis on the role of the listener in the final assessment of their value (of course not just any listener, but the old and wise members of the chorus of Dionysus). Yet Plato seems to have been unable or unwilling to give any unequivocal and clear definition of the most important rule a judge must follow in order to identify musical beauty, being conscious of the complicated interrelationships between the criteria of pleasure (*hêdonê*), correctness (*orthotês*), and ethical utility (*ôphelia*) in a proper evaluation of a work of art.[54]

5. *Plato between Tradition and Innovation*

Plato's discussion of 'appropriateness', however, introduces a further important element in critical judgment, as seems to be suggested also by some of his remarks in *Laws* 7. All dancing and all melodies—Plato explicitly states—must be dedicated to religion. First, those in charge of such matters (that is, the *nomothetês* and the *nomophulax*, *Leg.* 799a–b):

> [...] should determine the festivals (*tas heortas*), putting together for the year a list of which festivals should be held at which times, in honor of which individual gods, which children of the gods, and which demi-gods. Next they should determine which song ought to be sung at each of the sacrifices to the gods, and what sort of dancing should adorn the various sacrifices. These ordinances should first be made by certain persons; and then all the people should join in common sacrifice to dedicate them to the Fates and to all the other gods, consecrating each of the songs, with a libation, to the appropriate gods and other beings. If anyone brings forward other hymns or dances beyond these for any of the gods, the priests and priestesses, with the guardians of the laws, will be acting with both religious and legal property in excluding him; and the man who is excluded, if he does not accept his exclusion voluntarily, will be liable for the whole of his life to prosecution for impiety by anyone who wishes. (tr. Barker 1984)
>
> τοῦ καθιερῶσαι πᾶσαν μὲν ὄρχησιν, πάντα δὲ μέλη, τάξαντας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς ἑορτάς, συλλογισαμένους εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἅστινας ἐν οἷς χρόνοις καὶ οἷστισιν ἑκάστοις τῶν θεῶν καὶ παισὶ τούτων καὶ δαίμοσι γίγνεσθαι χρεών, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν θεῶν θύμασιν ἑκάστοις ἣν ᾠδὴν δεῖ ἐφυμνεῖσθαι, καὶ χορείαις ποίαισιν γεραίρειν τὴν τότε θυσίαν, τάξαι μὲν πρῶτόν τινας, ἃ δ' ἂν ταχθῇ, Μοίραις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι θεοῖς θύσαντας κοινῇ πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, σπένδοντας καθιεροῦν ἑκάστας τὰς ᾠδὰς ἑκάστοις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἂν δὲ παρ' αὐτά τίς τῳ θεῶν ἄλλους ὕμνους ἢ χορείας προσάγῃ, τοὺς ἱερέας τε καὶ τὰς ἱερείας μετὰ νομοφυλάκων ἐξείργοντας ὁσίως ἐξείργειν καὶ κατὰ νόμον, τὸν δὲ ἐξειργόμενον, ἂν μὴ ἑκὼν ἐξείργηται, δίκας ἀσεβείας διὰ βίου παντὸς τῷ ἐθελήσαντι παρέχειν.

[54] Pl. *Leg.* 667b–c, cf. Halliwell 2002, 65–71.

In Plato's ideal Magnesia, then, the most significant duty of the lawgiver and the law-warden is to establish and maintain the exact relationship between specific deities and their most appropriate choral types,[55] as the philosopher restates in many other passages of *Laws* 7.[56] Hence it is essential, for people charged with such a responsibility, 'to distinguish in outline what are suitable songs (*prepousas ôidas*) for men and women respectively' and 'match them appropriately (*prosarmottein*) to *harmoniai* and rhythms. For it would be dreadful for singing to be wrong in its entire *harmonia*, or rhythm in its entire rhythm, if he assigned *harmoniai* and *rhuthmoi* that were quite unsuitable (*mêden prosêkonta*) for the songs. Hence it is necessary to lay down at least the outlines of these by law as well'.[57] That is to say: all the elements of the *mousikê* have to be consistent with one another and need to fit into that particular genre by law.[58]

Indeed the main activity of humans, Plato says in *Leg.* 803e, is to 'live out our life playing at certain pastimes, sacrificing, singing and dancing, so as to be able to win the gods' favour and to repel our foes and vanquish them in fight. By means of what kind of song and dance both these aims may be

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[55] We should remember that, in antiquity, every city had its own pantheon in which some gods were more important than others and were celebrated according to specific local cults. This is most probably the sense also of the famous passage in Pl. *Leg.* 700a–701b (cf. Kowalzig 2004), in which the author recalls how the musical genres of the past were properly distinguished (i.e. hymns, lamentations, paeans, dithyrambs, and so on), as it was not permitted to use one type of melody for the purposes of another.

[56] Cf. Pl. *Leg.* 812e ('As for the melodies and the words themselves, we have already discussed all the types which the chorus-trainers ought to teach, and we said that when they have been consecrated to religion, each kind being fitted to its appropriate festival, they would be of good service to the cities, providing them with enjoyment/*hêdonên* and good fortune', tr. Barker 1984); and Pl. *Leg.* 816c ('These dances the lawgiver should describe in outline, and the law-warden should search them out and, having investigated them, he should combine the dancing with the rest of the music, and assign what is proper of it to each of the sacrificial feasts, distributing it over all the feasts', tr. Bury 1926).

[57] Pl. *Leg.* 802e (tr. Barker 1984): … καὶ ἁρμονίαισιν δὴ καὶ ῥυθμοῖς προσαρμόττειν ἀναγκαῖον· δεινὸν γὰρ ὅλῃ γε ἁρμονίᾳ ἀπᾴδειν ἢ ῥυθμῷ ἀρρυθμεῖν, μηδὲν προσήκοντα τούτων ἑκάστοις ἀποδιδόντα τοῖς μέλεσιν. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ τούτων τὰ σχήματά γε νομοθετεῖν.

[58] We should remember that, in Greek antiquity, the word *nomos* also had a technical meaning in music (cf. n. 61 below). The same discipline needs to be observed in serious dancing (see Rocconi 2010), within which the two main kinds are the warlike dance, which represents 'the motion of fighting, and that of fair bodies and brave souls engaged in violent effort', and the pacific one, the *emmeleia*, which represents 'the motion of a temperate soul living in a state of prosperity and moderate pleasures' (Pl. *Leg.* 814e, tr. Bury 1926). Both dances need to be disciplined and regulated by very strict rules, as is clearly stated in Pl. *Leg.* 817e: 'Let such, then, be the customs ordained to go with the laws regarding all choristry and the learning thereof, keeping distinct those for slaves and those for masters, if you agree' (tr. Bury 1926).

effected, this has been, in part, stated in outline, and the paths of procedure have been marked out …'.[59] It seems, then, that for Plato good music should represent (by virtue of its deep establishment in the religious tradition) the most important ethical values suitable for a desirable social and political order.[60] By virtue of this, the *ôidai* have become *nomoi*[61] and the members of the chorus of Dionysus are in charge of singing 'the best kind of song' (*hê kallistê ôidê*), that is to say, the law.[62]

Once these fixed norms governing the different musical genres appropriate to each god are given, however, it is essential, Plato adds, that variety of every kind (*pantôs … poikilia*) is provided when the city as a whole sings incantations to itself, 'so that the singers have an insatiable appetite (*aplêstian tina*) for the hymns and enjoy (*hêdonên*) them'.[63] Musical *poikilia*[64] is here unexpectedly presented as a necessary condition for stimulating a pressing desire (*aplêstia*)[65] for singing and the pleasure (*hêdonê*) associated with this activity. Plato here seems to imply that, although he normally repudiated innovation of any kind,[66] they are necessary in controlled settings

59 Tr. Bury 1926: παίζοντά ἐστιν διαβιωτέον τινὰς δὴ παιδιάς, θύοντα καὶ ᾄδοντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἵλεως αὑτῷ παρασκευάζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ νικᾶν μαχόμενον· ὁποῖα δὲ ᾄδων ἄν τις καὶ ὀρχούμενος ἀμφότερα ταῦτα πράττοι, τὸ μὲν τῶν τύπων εἴρηται …

60 On the importance of the religious framework in shaping the presentation of the political theory of the *Laws*, see Schofield 2003 and Ostwald 1996.

61 Pl. *Leg.* 799e: 'We are saying, then, that the strange fact should be accepted that our songs have become *nomoi* for us, just as in ancient times people gave this name, so it appears, to songs sung to the *kithara* …' (tr. Barker 1984). Plato is here referring to traditional solo pieces (sung or purely instrumental, which were generally thought of as conforming to their own fixed patterns) conventionally called *nomoi* (see Barker 1984, 249–255).

62 Pl. *Leg.* 666d–e: 'the truth is that you have had no experience of the best kind of song. For your constitution is that of an army rather than that of townsmen' (tr. Bury 1926).

63 Pl. *Leg.* 665c: 'That every adult and child, free and slave, female and male, and the city as a whole, must sing incantations to itself of the sorts we have described, without ceasing; and that these should be continually altered, providing variety of every kind, so that the singers have an insatiable appetite for the hymns, and enjoy them (τὸ δεῖν πάντ' ἄνδρα καὶ παῖδα, ἐλεύθερον καὶ δοῦλον, θῆλύν τε καὶ ἄρρενα, καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει ὅλην τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν αὑτῇ ἐπᾴδουσαν μὴ παύεσθαί ποτε ταῦτα ἃ διεληλύθαμεν, ἁμῶς γέ πως ἀεὶ μεταβαλλόμενα καὶ πάντως παρεχόμενα ποικιλίαν, ὥστε ἀπληστίαν εἶναί τινα τῶν ὕμνων τοῖς ᾄδουσιν καὶ ἡδονήν)' (tr. Barker 1984).

64 A specific term in music literature, often used to refer to the embellishments of rhythms and melodies by virtuosi of late fifth-fourth century BCE. Cf. Plato's negative description of such *poikilia* in Pl. *Leg.* 812d.

65 For a negative usage of *aplêstia*, see Pl. *Leg.* 831d.

66 Cf. Pl. *Leg.* 656d–e: 'in Egypt … it was forbidden, as it still is, for painters or any other portrayers of postures and representations to make innovations beyond these, or to think up anything outside the traditional material, in these areas or in *mousikê* in general' (tr. Barker 1984).

for maintaining a desire for singing in the older citizenry. In the passage immediately following, he seems to show a similar attitude towards drinking wine: though this is normally a bad thing for the youth who has wild propensities, it can be very useful, if properly controlled, for elders, in order to free them from their shame of singing and dancing.[67] So if good ethical values are to be kept alive in every adult and child, free and slave, female and male (665c) through good music, all citizens must constantly renew their enjoyment by means of new (and controlled) ways of expressing the right values.[68]

We have seen, then, that the ambiguous and changeable (that is, positive or negative) use in *Laws* of the concepts of musical 'variety' and 'pleasure' may be interpreted as Plato's effort to make the best possible use of mimetic arts in the *polis*. As he says in the *Politicus*, these arts would disappear, with terrible consequences for the lives of human beings, if inquiry (*to zêtein*) and the search for novelty were forbidden, and the *technitai* had to rely entirely on written rules.[69]

6. *Conclusion*

In this chapter, I have examined the most relevant passages in Plato's discussions of the 'pleasure' aroused by listening to music and performing it, and tried to identify which kind of aesthetic value, if any, Plato attributed to it.

Certainly his remarks on the mimetic arts, and on music in particular, appear deeply implicated in the cultural and religious context in which he

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[67] Pl. *Leg.* 665d–666c: 'As he becomes older, everyone loses the confidence to sing songs, and enjoys it less ... So how shall we encourage them to be enthusiastic about singing? ... Isn't it true that everyone whose disposition has been changed in this way [through wine] will be more enthusiastic and less diffident about singing songs or 'incantations' ...?' (tr. Barker 1984). Cf. Pl. *Leg.* 672a: 'Then we must no longer, without qualification, bring that old charge against the gift of Dionysus, that it is bad and unworthy of admittance into a State' (tr. Bury 1926).

[68] If new ways of expressing the right values through music were not constantly sought by composers, the city would have no use for them, once the first generation of suitable melodies had been established.

[69] Pl. *Plt.* 299d–e: 'Now if these regulations which I speak of were to be applied to these sciences, Socrates ... what would you think of carrying all these in such a way, by written rules (*kata sungrammata*) and not by knowledge (*mê kata tekhnên*)?—Clearly all the arts would be utterly ruined, nor could they ever rise again, through the operation of the law prohibiting investigation (*zêtein*); and so life, which is hard enough now, would then become absolutely unendurable' (tr. Fowler 1921). Music is not explicitly mentioned here by Plato, but at *Plt.* 299d he refers to painting and all other mimetic *tekhnai*.

lived. In proposing to restore a pedagogical ideal that he felt was in danger,[70] Plato first of all restates the fundamental importance of traditional rites and religion, even those that may appear irrational (as we saw in the case of his endorsement of Dionysiac rites),[71] well aware that the ritual aspects of his choral performances could help guarantee the stability of the *polis*.[72] Nevertheless, the importance he places on consistency between form and content in the arts and the tentatively positive evaluation of 'variety' in musical practice is unusual in Plato, and leaves open the possibility that in the *Laws* he was trying to theorize the emotional response[73] of music performances in Greek society.[74]

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70 Cf. Jaeger 1999, 399 f.

71 See the benefits of wine (described as a *pharmakon* to put *aidôs* in the soul) illustrated above. On this aspects see especially Belfiore 1986.

72 See Kowalzig 2007, esp. 1–12.

73 This had a religious relevance too: indeed literary sources all agree in pointing out the importance of the 'pleasure' derived from the musical ingredients of religious ritual. Cf., e.g., Strabo 10.3.9 (probably drawing on Posidonius).

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CHAPTER SIX

SENEX MENSURA: AN OBJECTIVE AESTHETICS OF SENIORS IN PLATO'S *LAWS*

Myrthe L. Bartels

1. *Introduction: An Objective Standard amidst Differences of Taste*

Who would win a musical contest in which the sole criterion is the pleasure of the audience? The anonymous Athenian in Plato's *Laws* 2 hypothesizes that such an open contest will probably invite a wide variety of performances (Pl. *Leg*. 658a6–b5): a rhapsodic performance, a cithara recital, tragedy, comedy, and perhaps even a puppet show (658b7–c1). Apparently, all of these could lay claim to providing pleasure of sorts. But the Athenian's concern is more specific: who, he asks, will win such a competition *justly* (τίς ἂν νικῷ δικαίως, 658c3)? Which outcome would be the 'right' one?

To interlocutor Cleinias this seems a peculiar question to ask (ἄτοπον ἤρου, 658c4) because it cannot be answered 'in the way of someone who knows' (ὡς γνούς, 658c4–5). One would need to hear the performances oneself first (πρὶν ἀκοῦσαί τε, καὶ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἑκάστων αὐτήκοος αὐτὸς γενέσθαι, 658c5–6). Cleinias' reaction still assumes that the standard is pleasure: anyone in the actual audience will know what performance gave him the most pleasure. But whose vote counts? The Athenian predicts that the final outcome would depend on the constitution of the audience: little children would opt for the puppet show; the somewhat older children would choose comedies, whereas tragedy would be favored by the educated women, the youngsters, and probably by the large majority of the spectators. The fourth and last group is the people of the age of the interlocutors themselves (ἡμεῖς οἱ γέροντες, 658d7, cf. ἕνεκα γήρως, 635a4): they would award the victory to the rhapsodist. So which of these winners is the correct one (τίς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἂν νενικηκὼς εἴη;, 658d8–9), since preference varies with age? The Athenian now simply claims that the elderly will select the correct winner, because they have the best 'habituation' (ἔθος, 658e3–4). But why should their favorite performance be the 'correct' winner?

In this chapter, I will argue that the *Laws* turns the oldest people (the *senes*) into the authoritative judge of the objectively best music. And since different musical genres are held to represent different kinds of life, the seniors are also the authority on the objectively best way of life. The ambiguity of the term *nomos* plays a key role in a worldview according to which both ethics and aesthetics are governed by the same norm.

In this introduction, I will briefly discuss a central aspect of the ancient conceptualization of μουσική relevant to my argument concerning the *Laws*. An important part of the Greek tradition on music assumes that μουσική (which is more comprehensive than our notion of 'music') has the power to influence human behavior and that genres or types of music display a particular character.[1] Key concepts uniting the fields of music and psychology are ἦθος ('character', 'disposition') and τρόπος ('style', 'way of life'). According to both Plato and Aristotle (as well as later philosophically oriented musical theorists), both the human soul and elements of music (melodies, *harmoniai*,[2] and rhythms) are held to exhibit a particular ἦθος or τρόπος.[3] They (and the later musical tradition going back to them) conceive of musical *harmonia* as a 'representation' (μίμημα, μίμησις) or 'likeness' (ὁμοίωμα) of a

[1] From the Hibeh papyrus (in Barker 1984, 183–185) to the Epicureans. An explicit statement is Arist. *Pol.* 1340a28–1340b19. See for discussion of this idea for instance Lippman 1963, esp. 193–197 and 1964; Anderson 1966; West 1992, 246–253; Pelosi 2010, 29. We may also think of the association between high pitch and 'high moral standards', and low pitch and a 'low character'.

[2] Such as Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, Mixolydian, etc. It is not clear what exactly the musical *harmoniai* are. Although the intervallic structure of the constituting tetrachords is an important aspect, it is not the whole story. Perhaps the best way to describe the *harmoniai* would be with Barker, 'melodic styles' (1989, 14). The Greeks from the seventh century onwards knew several of these, 'associated with different regions or peoples of the Aegean area', which later on were 'credited with distinct emotional, aesthetic and moral effects, and found their places in different religious or cultural niches' (ibid.). In any case, our musical notion that comes closest to it is 'mode'. West notes that *harmonia* 'implies above all a distinctive series of intervals in the scale, though it has usually other connotations in addition' (1992, 177, cf. Barker 1984, 163–168 and 1989, 17). For an overview of literature on Platonic ἁρμονία and ἁρμονία in general see Schöpsdau 1994, 263. The notion of ἁρμονία also figures prominently in pre-socratic and Platonic cosmology; for an overview see Lippman 1964, ch. 1.

[3] E.g. Aristid. Quint. 1.12; 2.12–14. In *On Music* 1, ch. 12, 8–15, he notes that compositions differ from each other in several respects, e.g. τόνος (such as Dorian and Phrygian), τρόπος (such as nomic, dithyrambic), and ἦθος. For instance, we call a melody 'depressing' through which we stir up painful emotions (δι' ἧς πάθη λυπηρὰ κινοῦμεν), 'exalting' one through which we awaken the spirit, and 'intermediate' one through which the soul is brought to peace. 'These were called "characters" because it was primarily through them that the conditions of the soul were diagnosed and put right' (tr. Barker) (ἤθη δὲ ταῦτα ἐκαλεῖτο, ἐπειδήπερ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς καταστήματα διὰ τούτων πρῶτον ἐθεωρεῖτό τε καὶ διωρθοῦτο).

particular temper and type of character, and the way of life proper to it.[4] But they are also convinced that the character of music influences the character of the listener.[5] The *Republic* and *Laws* (although the latter does not refer to specific *harmoniai*) conceive of *harmoniai* and rhythms as representations of kinds of *life*, and on that basis dismiss a number of them as unsuitable.[6]

The *Laws* exploits this interconnection between music and politics, between ethics and aesthetics. Of course the term νόμος lies at the center of this ambiguity: it denotes both a specific type of musical composition, and political law.[7] Although this ambiguity has been taken notice of in the cases where Plato himself makes the connection explicit (for instance in *Resp.* 424c3–6 and *Leg.* 700a7–701b3), I submit that the discussion of μουσική in *Laws* 2 should in its entirety be read on these two levels. This means that whenever the Athenian is talking about the best kind of songs or music, we must keep in mind that the point he is ultimately after is

4 E.g. Pl. *Resp.* 398e1–400e3, *Leg.* 655d5–7, cf. 814d7–816d2; Arist. *Pol.* 1340a38–b13 (Aristotle more often uses the term ὁμοίωμα, e.g. *Pol.* 1340a33); Arist. *Poet.* 1450b23–25, 1451a30–34; [Arist.] *Pr.* 19.48 (922b10–28) (the difference between the ἦθος of the actors and chorus and which *harmonia* is appropriate to them); Sext. Emp. *Math.* 6.48–49 (states that μελῳδία is called ἦθος by the musicial theorists ἀπὸ τοῦ ἤθους εἶναι ποιητική). See on the ἦθος of music: Morrow 1960, 307; West 1992, 157–158, 177–184, 246–253. After Lippmann 1964, Anderson 1966, West 1992, 246–253 and Halliwell 2002 (esp. ch. 8), the most recent contribution about the theory of ἦθος and musical *mimêsis* is Pelosi 2010, ch. 1. Ultimately, it must probably remain speculative why a particular *harmonia* (e.g. Dorian) is felt to express a particular human ἦθος (ἀνδρεία). Even a 'natural association' (Pickard-Cambridge 1953, 264) is of course itself a cultural variable.

5 E.g. Pl. *Leg.* 655b1–7.

6 That rhythms and *harmoniai* are representations of particular kinds of life is clearly implied by Pl. *Resp.* 399a5–c4. In the discussion of rhythms, Socrates addresses the question which rhythms are those of an orderly and courageous *life* (βίου ῥυθμοὺς ἰδεῖν κοσμίου τε καὶ ἀνδρείου τίνες εἰσίν, 399e9–400a1), and admits that he is not able to say what kind of rhythms are representations of what kind of life (ποῖα δ' ὁποίου βίου μιμήματα, λέγειν οὐκ ἔχω, 400a7–8). His suggestion that Damon be consulted about this implies that he sees the problem as a matter of (technical) expertise. See, for passages in Aristotle and later writers on music as imitation of kinds of life: Halliwell 2002, ch. 10, esp. 287, n. 3.

7 Passages signaling a connection between political and musical νόμοι: Pl. *Leg.* 799e10 ff., 734e5, 775b4. See also *Suda* ν 478, (Adler III 477), [Plut.] *De mus.* 1133b–c, and [Arist.] *Pr.* 19.28 (919b38). Damon seems to have preceded Plato in assuming an intimate connection between musical and political νόμοι. The thesis of Damon's lost oration *Areopagiticus* 'was undoubtedly that the guardianship of good law and order should remain as the function of the Areopagus, (…), and that this function was best discharged through music, which in affecting the human soul could similarly affect the soul of the state—its laws and political constitution' (Lippman 1964, 69). Damon thus established the same interdependence between musical styles and political laws as *Resp.* 424c3–6 and *Leg.* 700a7–701b3: the musical τρόποι will not change without affecting the πολιτικοὶ νόμοι οἱ μέγιστοι.

the best kind of laws. Conclusions established in the discussion on music pertain directly to politics. The true judge of music *is* a good judge in matters of ethics: he knows what good τρόποι and ἤθη are, whether in musical styles or human beings. Authority in musical virtue is based on the *same* knowledge as authority in human virtue—in fact, the true musical judge thinks about music in terms of what is 'beneficial' (ὠφέλιμον, i.e. it does you well; this presupposes an objectively virtuous condition). In this chapter, I will analyze the arguments in the *Laws* for the existence of an objectively best kind of music. It will turn out that the authoritative competence to identify this best music equals authority to determine the best kind of life.

The argument of *Laws* 2 culminates in the conclusion that true εὐδαιμονία by necessity depends on possessing virtue—one of the most fundamental issues in Platonic philosophy, explicitly problematized at *Leg.* 660d11–663e4.[8] I will thus defend a more 'programmatic' reading of the discussion of μουσική than the current interpretation, which takes *Laws* 2 as a description of the musical customs of the future colony (completed in *Laws* 7).[9] The Athenian introduces μουσική in a deliberately competitive setting that enables him to speculate on the winning musical composition—itself the up-beat for the idea of an *objectively* best kind of musical composition. The scenario of the theater in which trivial performances are decided by an unqualified audience is replaced with the 'ideal' scenario of the true theater, in which the performances are representations of the virtuous ways of life, watched and enjoyed by truly virtuous persons. The theater in its ideal form thereby comes to be an illustration of the virtuous disposition itself: to prefer, and take pleasure in, objectively good dance postures and uses of the voice. And here Plato can play his trump card: the best ways of behavior are the true νόμοι.

This chapter consists of four sections. Section 2 will analyze the *Laws*' conception of ἀρετή that prepares the ground for the metaphor of the theater. The *Laws* optimistically presents virtue (ἀρετή) as a dynamic and

[8] The εὐδαίμων and the virtuous life are identical, and even if they were not, there does not exist a more advantageous fiction (ψεῦδος λυσιτελέστερον, 663d9) that the lawgiver could make the young believe.

[9] Such as the one defended, e.g., by Rocconi in this volume. However, the expositions of *mousikê* in *Laws* 2 and 7 are hardly consistent, and no consistency is needed: the regulations of *trophê*, *paideia*, and *orkhêsis* in *Laws* 7 do not form an addition to or (partial) modification of *Laws* 2, but the purpose of the preliminary discussion (not embedded in the lawcode itself) is to get the interlocutors to agree on the nature of *aretê*, and on the need for good laws to bring *aretê* about. This need is then addressed in the subsequent actual legislation, e.g. in *Laws* 7.

teleological process with subsequent phases. Virtue is a *natural* potential innate in all human beings, which will be advanced by good *paideia*: children already from birth possess a kind of 'elementary virtue', manifest in their sensitivity to music. The teleological process of the acquisition of virtue is then parallelized to, or one might even say identified with, the process of ageing.

Section 3 deals with the second stage of *paideia*, for which *khoreia* is of vital importance. In the setting of an (ideal) theater the acquisition of virtue is portrayed as impersonating the behavior (τρόπος) of the virtuous person—and that is the prototype of moderation, the old man (γέρων). Furthermore, only the νόμοι (*paideia*) that are correct by nature are a continuation of the natural correctness of elementary virtue.

Section 4 focuses on the progression of the curriculum: different age groups engage in different forms of χορεία, but the oldest citizens have a separate task altogether. They choose the songs. It is generally accepted that people derive most pleasure from the kind of performance that represents their own τρόπος. The ideal situation hypothesized here is that the best music is delighted in by the best people, because, of course, that best music is a representation of their own τρόπος. In this ideal situation the audience are the elderly people (above sixty), and the music they favor most are the true νόμοι.

In section 5, I will argue that *Laws* 2 likens complete virtue to being a spectator in an ideal theater. Instead of ἡδονή, the elderly spectator identifies and experiences χάρις, a pleasant sensation of a wholly different kind than ἡδονή. Ultimately, this χάρις is only available on the basis of the insight that comes with experience. One must have lived through all of life's phases. Thus, the preferences of the *senex* are the virtuous measure of what is 'best' in the theater and life.

2. *Humans' Potential for ἀρετή: First-Stage* paideia *and Sensitivity to Music*

At the beginning of *Laws* 2 the Athenian has argued that symposia enable their leader to discern people's natural dispositions (τὸ κατιδεῖν πῶς ἔχομεν τὰς φύσεις, Pl. *Leg.* 652a2–3). But if set up correctly, symposia also convey another benefit (ὠφελία): they guarantee the preservation (σωτηρία) of the correct education (ἡ ὀρθὴ παιδεία, 653a1). Later on, it becomes clear that drinking wine has a function within a curriculum of χορεία: it is a 'drug' (φάρμακον) to make people above the age of νέος (18) participate in χορεία. To

show in what way festivals of drinking and dancing preserve ἡ ὀρθὴ παιδεία, the Athenian first must define what he means by that (Pl. *Leg.* 653a5–c4):[10]

> I assert that the earliest sensations that a child feels in infancy are of pleasure and pain, and in these virtue and vice first accrue in the soul. But insight, and unshakable true opinions, those are an enormous felicity for the one to whom they come, even towards old age. A man who possesses them, and all the good things they entail, is complete. The initial acquisition of virtue in children I call education. Whenever pleasure and affection, pain and hatred well up correctly in the souls of those who are not yet capable of grasping these with ratio; and whenever, once they have grasped the ratio, their emotions will agree with the ratio that they have been correctly habituated by the appropriate habits: that concord is the whole of virtue. But that part of it [*aretê*] that has been nurtured correctly with respect to pleasure and pain, so that we hate what we ought to hate right from the beginning till the end, and love what we ought to love—when you isolate it in speech and call it 'education', you will, according to me, give it its correct name.[11]
>
> λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ' εἶναι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους εὐτυχὲς ὅτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο· τέλεος δ' οὖν ἔστ' ἄνθρωπος ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐν τούτοις πάντα κεκτημένος ἀγαθά. παιδείαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετήν· ἡδονὴ δὴ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν, αὕτη 'σθ' ἡ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετή, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις.

This passage contains several definitional 'innovations', two of which I will address in this section: the relation between ἀρετή and παιδεία, and the definition of ἀρετή itself. The overall complexity of this passage is due both to the fact that its content diverges significantly from that of other Platonic texts, and that its full implications can only become clear in the rest of *Laws* 2 (and, I hope, of this chapter).

The above passage strikingly defines correct *paideia* as virtue (ἀρετή), specifically 'the initial appearance of virtue in children' (παιδείαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετήν).[12] This is admittedly an odd use

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10 On *khoreia*, see also the chapter by Rocconi in this volume, section 2 (pp. 114–117, where this passage from *Laws* 2 is also discussed).

11 Translations, unless otherwise stated, are my own.

12 *Contra* my anonymous referee, who holds that 'this initial susceptibility is an earlier stage than the first stage of *aretê* and … the latter is the only stage identified as *paideia*'. S/he

of the term.[13] What is especially striking about it is that its equation with ἀρετή gives the latter a non-intellectualist dimension: virtue here denotes a characteristic of infants or little children. In this 'childish' form, virtue is elementary perception (παιδικὴ αἴσθησις) and a correct emotional response to the perception of order in music.[14] The basic structure of virtue must thus consist of two elements: the perception of an objective quality of reality (τάξις, most easily perceptible in the phenomenon of music)[15] *and* the correct emotional evaluation thereof (pleasure in the case of order, ἡ ἔνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησις μεθ' ἡδονῆς, *Leg.* 654a2–3; aversion in the case of disorder). There is an overlap between ἀρετή and παιδεία which defies a simple model of 'process (*paideia*)—result (virtue)'. The Athenian clearly does not restrict virtue to a select council or philosopher-kings.[16]

Plato applies the term virtue to different phases in a human life-span: to the beginning as well as the end. These phases, then, form part of the *same*, continuous development, and the term ἀρετή applies to all. Throughout, ἀρετή is the correct emotional response to perception. The most significant difference between earlier and later phases is that the elementary virtue

identifies the first stage of *aretê* with properly nurtured (τὸ … ὀρθῶς τεθραμμένον, *Leg.* 653b6–7, cf. c7–8) feelings of pleasure and pain. I take this to refer to the initial capacity of children to respond correctly to order in music.

13 Why Plato has the Athenian define *paideia* this way will be discussed in the next section.

14 Order in movement is known by the name 'rhythm' (τῇ … τῆς κινήσεως τάξει ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἴη, *Leg.* 664e8–665e1); order in the voice, a mix of high and low pitched sounds, goes by the name of 'harmony' (τῇ … τῆς φωνῆς [sc. τάξει], τοῦ τε ὀξέος ἅμα καὶ βαρέος συγκεραννυμένων, ἁρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο, *Leg.* 665a1–3).

15 Τάξις can be used, as far as I have been able to work out, to refer to order in music in two ways: (1) to refer to the attunement and scalar system (of a lyre for instance). So in a fragment ascribed to Ion of Chios, where an eleven-stringed lyre is said to have a τάξις with ten steps, i.e. with ten intervals (ἐνδεκάχορδε λύρα, δεκαβάμονα τάξιν ἔχοισα, 36 B5 DK). (2) For the steps that constitute a melody (for instance #c–e–#d). The τάξις that is meant here seems to be of the latter kind. It is melody (itself of course made possible by the underlying attunement of the string instrument) that is recognized by children (a sequence of notes that counts as 'musical'). In the analogy between elementary virtue and the virtue of old age, the musicality of ordered sound (τάξις) for which children possess a perceptivity is substituted with the more specific good music (νόμος) of which the elderly are uniquely perceptive.

16 The particle δέ in *Leg.* 653a7 does not draw a contrast between many/one, but between two phases of life. Virtue in (a) young, uneducated children, and (b) defined as *perception* is not exactly what one would *expect* ἀρετή to be, either on the basis of familiarity with other Platonic texts (which the *Laws* often appears to presuppose), or on the basis of what has been said about ἀρετή earlier, 631c5–d2. It is this surprise which the Athenian appears to address when he says 'but wisdom (on the other hand) …' (φρόνησις δέ …).

of children lacks φρόνησις (and λόγος).[17] Since a human being can become 'complete' (τέλεος) in this process, virtue itself is conceptualized as a teleological process.[18]

This teleological process of virtue is related to the process of human ageing. Human children are uniquely endowed with what we might call a 'sensitivity to music', the capacity to perceive structured sound and movement (*Leg.* 653e4–5, 654a2–3 cf. 664e3–665a3, 672c8–d1). The quality ascribed to old people is a natural preference for moderation. The development from παιδικὴ αἴσθησις to φρόνησις must thus itself, by implication, be a natural process. Ageing itself becomes a teleological process of maturing (*via* correct education); it is the normative, natural development towards the best condition, and obtaining virtue is conceptualized as 'ageing in the right way'. Thus, the old man, who is typically moderate and restrained, becomes the paradigm for the virtuous condition and *paideia* should be a deliberate *mimêsis* of the old man's disposition (τρόπος) (see section 3). Furthermore, old age is a necessary condition for acquiring φρόνησις: although some people may never attain φρόνησις and ἀληθεῖς, βέβαιοι δόξαι, it is clear that whoever does attain it, will be old.[19]

It may have become apparent by now that virtue and education in this passage are far from being premised on the idea of expert knowledge (τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη), which results from a highly specialized education in mathematics, etc.[20] If my reading is correct, the implications are even more sweeping.

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[17] Cf. Pl. *Resp.* 401e1–402a4.

[18] It seems that this dynamic conception of virtue is fundamentally different from the idea that virtue (or the soul) has parts. I believe that *Laws* relinquishes the idea of virtue having parts, enunciated in among other texts, the *Protagoras* and *Republic*. It is rather a basic 'structure' that remains isomorphous in different contexts (sensible control of fear is courage, of emotions moderation; cf. ἐν οἷς in *Leg.* 963c3 and the discussion about the unity of virtue in *Leg.* 963a1 ff.).

[19] This is my interpretation of *Leg.* 653a8: *phronêsis* is a fortunate thing if someone gets it, even though one cannot get it unless one is old. Cic. *Fin.* 5.58 seems to have interpreted the sentence in this same way: *beatum cui etiam in senectute contigerit ut sapientiam verasque opiniones adsequi possit.*

[20] Education in the *Laws* is usually characterized as paying more attention to emotional conditioning and in particular pleasure than the *Republic*: Belfiore 1986, 427; Stalley 1983, 9, 43; Klosko 2006, 219; Woerther 2008, 95–96. It has therefore been supposed by some (Stalley 1983, 57; Kraut 2010) that the kind of virtue described in the *Laws* is, or at least bears a close resemblance to, the virtue of the auxiliary class in the *Republic*. However, I think it is more instructive to try to understand how the *Laws*' conceptualization of ἀρετή makes sense in the contexts of the text as a whole. It is for instance of cardinal interest that the *Republic* portrays μουσική as training habits (*Resp.* 522a3–b2), which do not seamlessly pass into knowledge (and philosophical virtue). Bobonich 2002 argues that in the *Laws*, non-

Human beings are claimed to have a natural potential for ἀρετή:[21] it is a universal and innate human capacity to be able to perceive order in movement and sound.[22] The *Laws'* conceptualization of virtue therefore is surprisingly more reminiscent of Protagoras' conceptualization of human virtue in the *Protagoras* than of that of the *Republic*.[23] *Êthos* is overwhelmingly important.[24]

3. *Second-Stage* paideia*:* khoreia*, Virtue, and the Importance of ὀρθότης in Music*

In the passage discussed in the previous section, the Athenian emphatically re-defined *paideia* (Pl. *Leg*. 653b6–c4). By ὀρθὴ παιδεία he means virtue that first accrues in children, and consists in the correct sensation of pleasures and pains. Now it is this *paideia*, these correctly grown pleasures and pains (τούτων … τῶν ὀρθῶς τεθραμμένων ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν, 653c7–8), he continues, that become slackened and annihilated in the course of life (κατὰ πολλὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ, 653c9).[25] It is important to note that what the Athenian asserts here is

philosophers 'are now capable of forming and possessing beliefs and desires that suffice for genuine virtue' (217); therefore they have a larger and more important place in the life of the virtuous person (291, cf. 294). Although I agree with Bobonich's main claim that the *Laws'* conception of virtue is more generous than that of the *Republic*, I feel that he does not offer much reflection on what virtue for these people consists in: what their mind-set is, and what kind of 'appreciation' 'non-philosophers' have of 'virtue's good-making properties'.

21 Similarly, Aristotle in his *Politics* calls the pleasure accompanying the perception of music ἡδονὴ φυσική (*Pol.* 1340a4).

22 A more elaborate recapitulation of this point is given at *Leg*. 664f.3ff.

23 Protagoras also assumes a naturally given sense of justice and self-restraint, which needs subsequent cultivation as the young are being socialized and acquire *politikê tekhnê* (Pl. *Prt*. 322e2ff., the myth, followed by the *logos* part, 324d6ff., with emphasis on the identity of the norm in the domains of politics and aesthetic/musical training).

24 An overview of ἦθος in the *Laws* shows that the importance of acquiring the right ἦθος resides in the dependence of the welfare and preservation of the *polis* as a whole upon the correct ἦθος of the citizens (*Leg*. 679b8, 705a5, b5, 708c7, (in the context of marriage regulations: 773c1, c5, 775d3, 776a5, 788b3, 797c5, 798d3, etc.); a person's ἦθος is not just of interest to their immediate peers or friends—it is *socially* relevant.

25 The verbs χαλᾶται and διαφθείρεται do not have an explicit subject. But it seems likely, considering the apposition παιδειῶν οὐσῶν (to indicate that the Athenian is talking about the exact same thing as he had just been defining), and Cleinias' reaction (that both what the Athenian said earlier and what he has just said παιδείας πέρι seem correct to him), that the subject is παιδεία. Cf. England 1921 *ad* 653c9. χαλᾶσθαι 'being slackened' (opp. τείνειν) is a verb that can be used also both to describe the tightening of strings and for human character; see West 1992, 179; Pelosi 2010, 37–42. First *paideia* consists in the correct attunement of the pleasures and pains. The ἡδοναί and λύπαι have to be well tuned—'well' in the sense of having

emphatically *not* that the effects of *paideia* provided by the choruses wears off. This is what is commonly assumed in the literature. Such a reading has brought interpreters to the pessimistic conclusion that the *Laws* represents human nature as requiring constant correction if it is to preserve a more or less virtuous disposition. However, the Athenian distinguishes two kinds of *paideia*, and moreover uses the term *paideia* for what in fact is a natural capacity. The standard assumption is that *paideia* refers to the education of children (by their mothers?) during the first years of their life. But by calling the innate human capacity to take pleasure in rhythm and *harmonia* (τὴν ἔνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, 654a2–3) '*paideia*', the Athenian in fact claims a divine source for this human capacity. The term 'education' suggests a source, the educators. The first correct perceptions, then, become a reflection of a divine mode of behavior.[26] These gods (the Muses, Apollo, Dionysus) are the very same ones that have given human beings festivals with χορεία, in order to preserve and re-correct this first *paideia* with which they have endowed human beings to begin with. In line with this train of thought, dancing in a chorus turns out to be 'moved by the gods': the Muses, Apollo, and Dionysus move us by *khoreia*, they are the leaders of the choruses and string us to each other by songs and dances (ᾗ δὴ κινεῖν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ χορηγεῖν ἡμῶν τούτους, ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεσιν ἀλλήλοις συνείροντας, 654a3–4). And not surprisingly, this true order of things is reflected in language: the gods have assigned the term χόροι to this kind of activity because human beings by nature experience pleasure in chorus-dancing (τὸ τῆς χαρᾶς ἔμφυτον, 654a5).[27] To put it succinctly, the first *paideia* that is innate in human children (or in most of them, at least) needs safeguarding through a second

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the right τόνος, tension of the string. What happens when the *paideia* in correct maintenance of ἡδοναί and λῦπαι is 'slackened' is not the 'wearing off' of a certain effect; when strings are slackened, the result is a *different harmonia* altogether, cf. the χαλαραὶ ἁρμονίαι (Iastian or Ionian and Lydian) in Pl. *Resp.* 398e10. The *paideia* thus has to keep the ἡδοναί and λῦπαι at the right tension, so that the correct *harmonia* is preserved.

26 Cf. Pl. *Ti.* 47d6–e2: *harmonia* is given to human beings by the Muses as a σύμμαχος to bring the derailed *periodos* of the soul (τὴν γεγονυῖαν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνάρμοστον ψυχῆς περίοδον) into order and concord with itself (εἰς κατακόσμησιν καὶ συμφωνίαν ἑαυτῇ). This connection is also made by Pelosi 2010, 50 (and 68–69 n. 1 with references to passages in the *Laws* and other dialogues where music is linked to Apollo, Dionysus, and the Muses).

27 Cf. what is implied by Aristotle in his *Politics* (1339a42–1339b4) about the Spartans: without having learned music they are yet competent to judge it correctly (οὐ μανθάνοντες ὅμως δύνανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς). Apparently, their natural capacity to know what is good has not been corrupted by constant innovations and professionalism in their musical tradition and education, as was the case in Athens. For the etymological link between *khoros* and *khara*, see also the chapters by Rocconi and Jones in this volume (p. 116 and 161).

kind of *paideia*, which is *khoreia. Khoreia* is the most natural behavior for human beings: it is a continuation of the divine gift of primary emotional attunement.

So how does χορεία work? The Athenian says that chorus-performances (τὰ περὶ τὰς χορείας) are 'representations of characters' (μιμήματα τρόπων, 655d5; cf. 668a6–7). The actors are to represent virtuous people in various kinds of actions and circumstances both by drawing on their own habits (ἤθεσι) and acting in imitations (μιμήσεσι).[28] In this context, being καλῶς πεπαιδευμένος means that one is able to sing and dance well (καλῶς) (654b6–7). The adverb καλῶς, however, has nothing to do with skill in singing and dancing here—if it had, that would imply that the standard for music simply consists in pleasure, since professionalism in music is seen as originating with composers who make it their job to give the audience as much pleasure as possible.[29] So singing and dancing well must mean something entirely different; and if the most beautiful music is to be evaluated by pleasure, it cannot be the pleasure of random people (τῶν γε ἐπιτυχόντων, 658e7–8). The most beautiful music is the sort of music that delights the best and the sufficiently educated people (ἥτις τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένους τέρπει, 658e8–9).

In fact, by putting it this way, Plato creates a shift from the real-life situation, in which different audiences opt for different winners, to an ideal scenario, in which the most beautiful music is watched and enjoyed by a qualified audience. The realistic portrait of evaluations of theater-performances (see section 1) suggests that people in general prefer the kind of performance that comes closest to their own character (children prefer puppet shows, etc.). Bear in mind that character (τρόπος) is conceived of as dependent upon age (and gender, which receives less emphasis in the *Laws*).[30] The assimilation of a virtuous character to that of a person of a

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28 'That is, by using his own ingrained habits (to represent characters like himself), or imitations of others where the character represented is foreign to his own', Barker 1984, 143 n. 63.

29 This is of course exactly the objection Socrates makes against the rhetoricians in the *Gorgias*. In such a situation, the public is the educator of the poets and composers, instead of the other way around, as things should be, *Leg*. 658e6–659b5.

30 The connection between someone's pleasures and preferences (τρόπος) and his age has not received much attention in the scholarly literature. Yet we encounter the idea of a natural connection between musical ἁρμονίαι or τρόποι and particular age groups not only in the *Laws*, but also in, for example, Arist. *Pol.* 1342b17–33, and Aristid. Quint. 2.5: 'The susceptibility of souls to different types of melody also varies with their sex and age: the souls of children are led to sing by pleasure, those of women, for the most part, by grief, and those of old men by divine possession, by breaths of inspiration during festivals, for example' (tr. Barker).

certain (old) age enables the Athenian to hold that virtuous people prefer performances that represent the τρόποι of the elderly (ὁ γέρων) (Pl. *Leg.* 659c9–e1):

> This is, I imagine, the third or fourth time that our discourse has described a circle and come back to this same point—namely, that education is the process of drawing and guiding children towards that principle which is pronounced right by the law and confirmed as truly right by the experience of the most reasonable and the oldest. So in order that the soul of the child may not become habituated to having pains and pleasures in contradiction to the laws and those who obey the law, but in conformity thereto, being pleased and pained at the same things as the old man, therefore, etc.
>
> (tr. Bury, adapted)
>
> δοκεῖ μοι τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν περιφερόμενος ἥκειν, ὡς ἄρα παιδεία μέν ἐσθ' ἡ παίδων ὁλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγὴ πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρημένον, καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεστάτοις καὶ πρεσβυτάτοις δι' ἐμπειρίαν συνδεδογμένον ὡς ὄντως ὀρθός ἐστιν· ἵν' οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παιδὸς μὴ ἐναντία χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐθίζηται τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου πεπεισμένοις, ἀλλὰ συνέπηται χαίρουσά τε καὶ λυπουμένη τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις οἷσπερ ὁ γέρων, τούτων ἕνεκα, κτλ.

The τρόπος that is being represented should be that of the old man. Training in virtue—*paideia*—is thus in fact conceived of as acting: impersonating the τρόπος of someone else. And since the τρόπος that has to be enacted is that of the old person, who is better qualified to be the judge of this performance than the old person himself?

The three interlocutors agree that it is their task to trace τὸ καλόν in song and dance (654d5–e7), and thus also to get to know correctly who is educated or not, since this is the only way to know whether there can be a safeguard (φυλακή) of *paideia*. It seems a curious move that the Athenian here implies that the standard on the basis of which μουσική must be judged is first-stage *paideia*. How exactly can this be a standard? After announcing that χορεία constitutes the representation of virtuous τρόποι (655d5), the Athenian distinguishes three groups of actors. For some, the things said (τὰ ῥηθέντα), sung (μελῳδηθέντα), or danced (ὁπωσοῦν χορευθέντα) are 'true to character' (οἷς μὲν … πρὸς τρόπου, 655d7), i.e. they match the actor's own τρόπος. In this case, the actor will take pleasure in virtuous representations and necessarily call them 'fine' (καλά). For others, the choreography is contrary to nature (παρὰ φύσιν), character (τρόπον), or a certain habituation (τινα συνήθειαν). These people are unable to rejoice in the impersonation of virtuous persons, and call the songs, etc. 'condemnable' (αἰσχρά). But there is a third group. In these people φύσις and συνήθεια are in conflict (Pl. *Leg.* 655e5–656a5):

> And when men are right in their natural taste but wrong in those acquired by habituation, or right in the latter but wrong in the former, then by their expressions of praise they convey the opposite of their real sentiments; for whereas they say of a performance that it is pleasant but bad, and feel ashamed to indulge in such bodily motions before men whose wisdom they respect, or to sing such songs (as though they seriously approved of them), they really take a delight in them in private. (tr. Bury)
>
> οἷς δ' ἂν τὰ μὲν τῆς φύσεως ὀρθὰ συμβαίνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς συνηθείας ἐναντία, ἢ τὰ μὲν τῆς συνηθείας ὀρθά, τὰ δὲ τῆς φύσεως ἐναντία, οὗτοι δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐναντίους προσαγορεύουσιν· ἡδέα γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστα εἶναί φασι, πονηρὰ δέ, καὶ ἐναντίον ἄλλων οὓς οἴονται φρονεῖν αἰσχύνονται μὲν κινεῖσθαι τῷ σώματι τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἰσχύνονται δὲ ᾄδειν ὡς ἀποφαινόμενοι καλὰ μετὰ σπουδῆς, χαίρουσιν δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς.

This conflict between nature (φύσις) and habituation (συνήθεια) can assume two forms: either one's nature is correct and one's habituation is not, or one's habituation is correct and one's nature is not. These people will utter praise contrary to their feelings of pleasure.[31] They say that these things are pleasant, while they *are* wicked (πονηρά); and although αἰσχύνη prevents them from indulging in this type of music, they enjoy it among themselves.[32] The phrase ἡδέα γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστα εἶναί φασι, πονηρὰ δέ, illustrates the opposition between these people's evaluations and their pleasures; and since the idea is that they take pleasure in things that ought to be *dis*liked, πονηρά must refer to the things as they truly are.[33] This phrase might therefore as well be read as: 'they say of all of these things that they are pleasant, *while they know* that they are wicked'. Such a reading makes clear that this group of people is in fact in a condition that other dialogues label as *akrasia*: these people knowingly do (here: rejoice in) bad things.

By implication, the remedy, at least in the case of people of whom the nature is correct but the habituation is not, would be correct *paideia*. It seems that they would simply need a recalibration of their emotional responses. But what about the other group, the group whose nature is no good,

[31] This sentence signals that calling something pleasant is not considered an expression of praise; what, by implication does count as ἐπαινεῖν is calling something 'καλόν'.

[32] The particle γάρ signals that the following sentence is meant as an explanation or illustration, but whereas until this point the object of evaluation has been virtuous representations, here it seems that the Athenian is thinking of representation of bad characters.

[33] Since ἡδοναί are directed at what is wicked, the implication is that pleasures are not exclusively dependent upon either nature or habituation, but can have both as their source. In the first case, their pleasures have been corrupted by incorrect habituation; in the second case, their pleasures are by nature bad but to some extent are being kept hidden by correct habituation.

while their habituation is correct? They are apparently the ones who conform to public decorum under the influence of αἰσχύνη. But their condition is extremely serious, because they will unavoidably assimilate to the types they rejoice in, even if they may be reluctant to actually praise these in public (656b4–6). The Athenian acknowledges that αἰσχύνη will not suffice as a corrective instrument; it can only keep people's real condition hidden. Given the limited effects of αἰσχύνη if one's φύσις is corrupt, is there a salvation for these people?

In Egypt it was known what kind of dance-postures and songs possess a natural correctness (μέλη τὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα φύσει παρεχόμενα, 657a7–8). They were even able to lay down in writing which they were (ἅττα ἐστί) and of what kind (ὁποῖ' ἅττα) (656d8–9, 657a4–8). It is this ὀρθότης that the interlocutors are after: if they are able to grasp the correctness of those songs in any way, those songs must be given the form of law (νόμος) and rule (τάξις, 657b3). Songs possessing a natural correctness, and *only* those, are taken to have the power to correct bad people's pleasures. 'Naturally correct' songs, or music in general, have a much more thorough-going effect than other forms of habituation (the latter may result in feelings of αἰσχύνη, but will not establish lasting changes of character). In other words, it is *because* the music is naturally correct that people's souls, and, it would seem, even a bad φύσις, can be corrected. Only the songs that are in accordance with φύσις can have this much impact—the assumption being that there is a correct φύσις 'out there', to which human φύσις must be assimilated. And, indeed, in children either παιδικὴ ἀρετή or κακία may manifest itself (653a6–7).[34] Naturally good music, music that truly deserves the name *paideia*, is consistent with the true φύσις, the φύσις to which the φύσις of the people with ἀρετή corresponds. This is how the secondary *paideia* of *khoreia* works.

[34] The term φύσις thus refers to what was previously called (primary) *paideia* (the first correct or incorrect sensations of pleasure and pain). Good φύσις can be labeled *paideia*: first virtue is a gift of the gods. But Plato apparently wants to leave open the possibility of people with a bad φύσις (initial κακία), and this of course he cannot attribute to the gods. φύσις is a more general term, that is able to cover both initial goodness and badness, while leaving the causes of initial badness implicit. (One may compare the remarks of the Athenian in *Laws* 10, where he acknowledges that there are two souls: a good one and a bad one, *Leg.* 896e4–897d1. Whether this refers to a cosmic evil soul or evil human souls is a matter of dispute; Mayhew 2008 opts for the former, Carone 1994 for the latter.)

4. *The Three Choruses and the Elderly* muthologoi

In the previous section, we have seen that music (χορεία) that possesses ὀρθότης represents the τρόπος of the old man. However, it is still unclear what exactly makes the τρόπος of an old man superior to that of other, younger persons. We still need an authoritative perspective for the truth of this system. The curriculum of χορεία and the way it is fleshed out in the *Laws* establish a meaningful difference between elderly people and all the others. The Athenian envisages three choruses: a chorus of children, dedicated to the Muses (Pl. *Leg.* 664c4–6), of people between 18 and 30, dedicated to Apollo (664c6–d1), and of people between 30 and 60, dedicated to Dionysus (664d1–2).[35] A fourth group, however, is excluded from χορεία on the grounds that the old men can no longer sustain songs (φέρειν ᾠδάς).[36] These the Athenian calls *muthologoi*: 'And the people after that—for they are not capable anymore to bear songs—are left over as myth-tellers about the same dispositions through divine utterance' (τοὺς δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα—οὐ γάρ ἔτι δυνατοὶ φέρειν ᾠδάς—μυθολόγους περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἠθῶν διὰ θείας φήμης καταλελεῖφθαι, 664d2–4). The principle distinguishing between the choruses, and between the choruses and the *muthologoi*, is age. And since age is the main factor determining τρόπος, the τρόπος of these elderly *muthologoi* must be fundamentally different from that of the younger citizens—in fact, this divide is so fundamental that the other three choruses can in a sense be lumped together as χορευταί.[37] In the passage about the theater contest,

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[35] The references to this third chorus vary, but all are within the category of 30–60 (30–60: *Leg.* 664d1–2, 665b5–6; 40: *Leg.* 666b2; over 50: *Leg.* 670a5, b1). The only reference to the third chorus after the first two books ('60-year-old-choristers of Dionysus', 812b5–c7) simply reactivates what the interlocutors earlier agreed upon (670b2–3) and does not imply that the chorus will be a Magnesian institution. The official in charge of education (ὁ παιδευτής) will lay down prescriptions for lyre music (812d1–e10) in line with what this third chorus 'knows' (τῶν … ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς ἐστιν εὐαισθήτως ἔχειν καὶ γιγνώσκειν). This brief moment of retrospection simply explicates the *basis* of the actual laws, as is clear from the transition τούτων τοίνυν … χάριν in 812d1, often (e.g. 776a7) used to mark the transition from a more gnomic principle to actual laws.

[36] This must be the meaning of φέρειν ᾠδάς, and is this is how Bury 1926, Barker 1984, 149, Saunders 2004, and Schöpsdau 1994 interpret it. A strong argument in favor of this reading over 'bear' in the sense of 'endure' is the phrase referred to by England 1921 ad loc.: πᾶς που γιγνόμενος πρεσβύτερος ὄκνου πρὸς τὰς ᾠδὰς μεστός (665d9). Moreover, the elderly will in fact listen to the songs sung by the younger citizens, so apparently they *are* able to bear them. The Athenian presents the exclusion of the elderly as necessitated by their age—entirely in line with the fact that old people are virtuous and do not need to be trained in virtue anymore.

[37] Contrary to what is usually assumed, then, (Anderson 1966, 96; Klosko 2006, 221; Woerther 2008, 100 n. 53, Kamtekar 2010, 127), the *paideia* of *Laws* 1 and 2 does not last as long

briefly mentioned in section 1, the Athenian also distinguished four kinds of audience on the basis of age, the oldest audience being similar to the group here designated as *muthologoi*. The oldest audience favors the performance of a rhapsode, who gives a beautiful recital of Homer or Hesiod, *muthologoi par excellence*. In the present passage the oldest people are said to be *muthologoi* themselves. This shows once again that people by nature favor the imitation resembling their own disposition.

Cleinias is very surprised to hear the Athenian out of the blue mentioning a chorus consisting of elderly men, dedicated to Dionysus (μάλα γὰρ ἄτοπος γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὥς γε ἐξαίφνης ἀκούσαντι Διονύσου πρεσβυτῶν χόρος, 665b3–4)—and he is not the only one. Modern commentators have repeatedly wondered to what extent people of 50, even up till 60, are literally supposed to sing and dance.[38] Cleinias' doubts about this third chorus seem to stem from the cultural assumption that singing and dancing is untypical (they normally do not feel inclined towards it) and unseemly (it is deemed inappropriate) for people of that age (cf. 665d9–e3).[39] To institutionalize singing and dancing for this age group thus elicits charges of resisting both natural inclination and custom. In fact, it turns out that one would require a 'drug' (φάρμακον, namely wine) to overcome the sense of αἰσχύνη ('sobriety') proper to people between 30 and 60. Cleinias' reaction is based on what is 'normal behavior' for people of a certain age, and by a *prima facie* faith in the reasonableness of the customs of the Dorians and other Greeks (that people over 30 do not sing, for example). He apparently assumes that Greek customs in principle conform to what is normal in the natural sense. So,

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as one lives. It is limited to the age of 60. People over 60 have outgrown the need for *paideia* and do not need to engage in *mimêsis* of virtuous character. Rather, they are themselves the object of *mimêsis* (see section 3).

[38] Ritter 1896, 50: 'Nun ist es mir warscheinlich, dass von Anfang an, wo von dem ᾄδειν der erwachsenen Männer die Rede ist, auch an den Gesang nicht zu denken sei'. Cf. England 1921 *ad Leg.* 665c4, who remarks that the ἐπᾴδειν (instead of ᾄδειν) 'makes it easier for us to recognize that the χορεία here spoken of is often a mental process, not a bodily performance'. Morrow 1960, 318 wonders 'whether [the chorus of elders] is to be taken as more than a symbol for the supervisory role of the elders, particularly as critics and censors of dance and song. A definite state organ it cannot be, for the various references to it are by no means consistent'.

[39] Barker 1984, 149 n. 68 takes Cleinias' surprise to originate from the idea that it would be unsuitable for men of that age to dance and sing the music associated with Dionysus, which is 'orgiastic and unrestrained'. However, the formulation (εἰ ἄρα: 'if I understood you correctly and it is apparently your intention that they *really* are to sing and dance …', *Leg.* 665b4–6) suggests that Cleinias is startled primarily by the Athenian's expectation that people of this age will actually sing and dance at all.

if Cleinias is to support this proposal, an account is needed (λόγου ... δεῖ, cf. λόγον διδόναι) of 'in which respect this [*sc.* chorus] when organized like that will be a sensible thing' (ὅπῃ τοῦτο εὔλογον οὕτω γιγνόμενον ἂν γίγνοιτο, 665b7–8): Why is this third chorus a reasonable proposal (εὔλογον) in spite of the fact that it flies in the face of both custom and common sense?

It is agreed that every person, man and child, slave and free, female and male, that the whole city must never stop 'enchanting' the whole city (τὸ δεῖν ... ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει ὅλην τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν αὑτῇ ἐπᾴδουσαν μὴ παύεσθαι, 665c2–5).[40] At first it may seem inconsistent that the Athenian wants his interlocutors to agree that the *whole* city ought to sing these songs—were the elderly not excluded from the singing just now? But it is significant that the Athenian, instead of 'sing' (ᾄδειν), says 'enchant by singing' (ἐπᾴδειν).[41] The perspective is subtly changed: this is not a neutral description of what the citizens will be doing; rather, it takes, as it were, a perspective from outside, to assess the true status of the songs and their effect. The image of the whole city enchanting itself creates the idea of a unified object for which good songs must be selected, if it is to be a virtuous *polis* (we may recall that attaining virtue is thought to consist in adopting the τρόπος of the γέρων). But there must be an agency composing or selecting the songs that the city has to sing. This must be what the Athenian has in mind when he asks 'How will this outstanding [element] of the *polis*, by age and wisdom most persuasive of the [elements] in the *polis*, singing the most beautiful songs, provide the greatest goods?' (ποῦ δὴ τοῦτ' ἡμῖν τὸ ἄριστον τῆς πόλεως, ἡλικίαις τε καὶ ἅμα φρονήσεσιν πιθανώτατον ὂν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ᾆδον τὰ κάλλιστα μέγιστ' ἂν ἐξεργάζοιτο ἀγαθά;, 665d1–3). That the Athenian is referring to the element that is to select the songs[42] is confirmed by the fact that he says it must be πιθανώτατον: the whole city must be persuaded to adopt the right songs.[43]

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40 That this is agreed upon is apparently because the songs that are to enchant the singers are songs that possess correctness: and it was earlier agreed that it was ὀρθότης in music that they were after, precisely because once that was known, the correct kind of song would be laid down in law, as had been done in Egypt.

41 For another reason than England 1921 notes in his commentary ad loc., however (see n. 38).

42 This seems to be generally agreed upon by the commentators, although they take the Athenian here to refer to the third chorus, not the people above 60, as the 'outstanding element of the *polis*'.

43 As I will argue at greater length in my dissertation (in preparation) on the authority of the laws in the *Laws*, I take *to ariston tês poleôs* to refer, not to the third chorus, but to the group over 60. I also interpret *pou*, not as 'where', but as 'how'. The third chorus is in no position to select the songs for the whole city, nor is it the oldest group. However, for the oldest citizens, deliberately isolated from all the *khoreutai* in the three choruses, the three

But we already know that it is the *legislator* who selects any kind of story that he may think necessary to create a truly virtuous *polis* (663e3–9).

The persuasiveness of this 'best element', then, refers back to the people's credulity and the lawgiver's persuasiveness. The fact that people have even been willing to believe the crazy story about the sown teeth from which armed soldiers originated is a great example of persuasion for a lawgiver (μέγα γ' ἐστὶ νομοθέτῃ παράδειγμα τοῦ πείσειν ὅτι ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ τις πείθειν, 663e9–664a1). It shows that it is not necessary to focus on anything other than what will provide the *polis* with the greatest good once he has persuaded the *polis* of it (οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτὸν δεῖ σκοποῦντα ἀνευρίσκειν ἢ τί πείσας μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσαιτο ἂν πόλιν, 664a2–3). In fact, the good lawgiver must make the same kind of decision (what will be the μέγιστον ἀγαθόν for the *polis* to believe or be enchanted by) as τὸ ἄριστον τῆς πόλεως in 665d1. This is the most authoritative element (κυριώτατον) about 'the most beautiful and beneficial songs' (τῶν καλλίστων τε καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτων ᾠδῶν, 665d4–5).

So, what are 'the most beautiful song(s)' (665d3, cf. 665d4–5, 666e1), that are 'nobler than the music of the choruses and the theaters' (667b2), and that provide the 'greatest goods'? They are a kind of music (μοῦσα) that befits the θεῖοι ἄνδρες (666d6) of the oldest age category; but they are also a kind of music that the third chorus will not be ashamed to perform (665b3–6, cf. 667a10–b3 a music (*mousa*) more beautiful than the music of the common theaters). Cleinias replies that he and Megillus, who are of course themselves γέροντες, would not be able to sing other songs than what they had grown accustomed to 'in the choruses' (666e9). Although this refers to the choruses in Sparta,[44] like 667b2, this creates room for a divide between chorus-music and another *kind* of music. The Athenian reacts to Cleinias by accusing the Dorian legislators of never having instituted the καλλίστη ᾠδή. And here the language of the Athenian betrays that he is not just thinking about songs, but about νόμοι, about political νόμοι.

His subsequent explanation does not refer to music at all but reverts to the theme and language of *Laws* 1, to a political discussion of the goal (σκόπος) of good laws and his critique of the Spartan preoccupation with war and courage (ἀνδρεία) instead of good leadership of the city (666e7–667a5). The whole context points to the fact that the 'most beautiful song' here must be the correct νόμος: the νόμος that aims at the whole of virtue (see

elements mentioned in this passage make perfect sense: (i) τὸ ἄριστον τῆς πόλεως, ἡλικίαις τε καὶ ἅμα φρονήσεσιν πιθανώτατον ὂν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, (ii) τὰ κάλλιστα and (iii) μέγιστα ἀγαθά.

44 On choruses in Sparta, see Morrow 1960, 303–304; Schöpsdau 1994, 306.

the discussion in *Laws* 1, esp. 630d9–631d2).[45] The switch from musical to socio-political context is made possible by the ambiguity of the term νόμος.

Now, as we saw, the oldest group of people is in the same position as the legislator: he is an example (παράδειγμα) to them. The legislator must do what he can to inculcate one principle (that the virtuous and εὐδαίμων life are the same), whether through songs, myths, or accounts (664a2–7).[46] The legislator is therefore also a *mythologos*: in mythical form his stories will proclaim the identity of the virtuous and εὐδαίμων life. That the myth is true can, however, only be acknowledged by citizens of such an advanced age that they have personally experienced the truth of this message. The fourth age-group are *mythologoi* 'of the same characters through divine utterance' (τῶν αὐτῶν ἠθῶν διὰ θείας φήμης) (664d3–4).[47] The very oldest people are capable of expressing virtuous ἤθη (the same that are represented in χορεία) in mythical form. They are distinguished from the younger citizens by the fact that they have access to some kind of knowledge of virtuous ἤθη (that goes beyond merely impersonating them), as well as by the fact that what they say to the younger people takes the form of a *muthos*. The source for this knowledge is claimed to be a divine inspiration, of the kind we find in Homer and the prooemium of Hesiod's *Works and Days*. These *muthoi* may be considered to be on a par with the legislative preambles, which are called *muthoi* in their own right (ὁ πρὸ τοῦ νόμου μῦθος, 927c7–8; similarly, παραμύθιον is used 'as a synonym for προοίμιον').[48]

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45 Morrow 1960, 314–315 proposes that by this means philosophy and attributes the most beautiful songs to the third chorus. He refers to the μεγίστη μουσική of Pl. *Phd.* 61a3 (cf. Pl. *Ti.* 88c5). But the third chorus is treated together with the other two in *Leg.* 666a2–c6; and the problem there is how the men of the third chorus can be made willing to sing and dance (προθύμους … πρὸς τὰς ᾠδάς, 666a2–3). This is solved by wine, which is capable of softening the *bodily* rigidity and rejuvenating the older men—a device which only makes sense if the third chorus is literally to sing and dance.

46 Perhaps these three devices (ᾠδαί, μῦθοι, and λόγοι) are the mechanisms to be deployed for each of the three choruses?

47 England 1921 ad loc.: 'i.e. of an inspired character'. He aptly refers to *Leg.* 624b2, where the Athenian asks Cleinias if it is not true that the Cretans say, following Homer, that Minos had a congregation with his father every ninth year and put down laws 'in accordance with his utterances' (κατὰ τὰς παρ' ἐκείνου φήμας).

48 England 1921 *ad Leg.* 927c7. Preambles are called παραμύθια in *Leg.* 720a1, 773e5, 880a7, 885b3, 923c2. Strikingly, the description in *Resp.* 399b3–c2 of the ἁρμονία representing the moderate person resembles closely both the description of the virtuous person in general and the 'context' of his virtue (not war but peace, εἰρήνη) stipulated by the Athenian in *Laws* 1. It strongly resembles the description of the preambles and their supposed effect (πείθειν, διδάσκειν) on the citizen: see for instance *Leg.* 722a7–723a7. This would imply that the ἁρμονία of the moderate person is the ἁρμονία or ἦθος used in the προοίμια of the *Laws*.

5. *The Pleasure (χάρις) that Comes with Old Age*

The third chorus' natural reluctance to sing and dance in public presupposes a sense of what is appropriate dependent on, and varying with, age. There are νόμοι that accommodate such natural feelings of αἰσχύνη, inherent to a certain age category. Hence such 'laws' must possess a natural correctness of their own. However, this claim itself needs a philosophical justification: how can we know that these laws constitute the true laws? The justification, or authorization, is offered within the theater metaphor. The elderly are the ones competent to judge music correctly, because they are the best judges of the representation of their own τρόπος. And if this is accepted, one must also grant this to the analogous scenario of virtue itself: virtuous persons are the (only) ones competent to judge the behavior of other people. We might now ask why Plato has chosen to give the roles of virtuous judges and actors to people of different age categories.

In the *Laws*, Plato conceives of virtue (in its complete form) as the kind of knowledge that comes to a person with experience and age—worldly wisdom. The ἔθος of old people is the best (Pl. *Leg.* 658e1–4) because they have had the proper amount of life experience and have developed that rudimentary sense of order that started as sensitivity to music. Only such an experienced person can oversee the whole of life (because he has reached its end), and understand different kinds of lives, and human characters. The qualification for being an authority on good music, laws, and the best life is the 'insight' (φρόνησις)[49] that is claimed to come—*if* it comes—to a person at the end of his life.

Similarly, the true correctness of the νόμος will also be assessed by the people who are qualified by their age and experience (τοῖς ἐπιεικεστάτοις καὶ πρεσβυτάτοις δι' ἐμπειρίαν συνδεδογμένον ὡς ὄντως ὀρθός ἐστιν, 659d3–4). The νόμοι selected by those competent to do so are a representation of the objectively best kind of life. It is part of this way of conceptualizing musical compositions, i.e. as representations of 'kinds of lives', that the Athenian calls the νόμοι formulated in the *Laws* 'the truest tragedy' (τραγῳδία ἡ ἀληθεστάτη, 817c5). They represent the objectively best way of living.

This most advanced development of virtue also brings with it a kind of pleasure superior to ἡδονή. The Athenian states that all things having the quality of being τὸ σπουδαιότατον (including musical τέχναι) are accompanied by a pleasant sensation, which he calls χάρις (Pl. *Leg.* 667b5–c3):

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[49] Rather than the standard translation 'practical wisdom'.

> Is it not so that this—the fact that it is most serious—must hold for all things that are accompanied by a kind of pleasant sensation, either (i) this very thing [*sc.* that it is most serious], or (ii) a certain correctness or (iii) a benefit? I mean for instance that eating and drinking and taking nourishment in general are accompanied by the pleasant sensation that we designate as 'pleasure'; as regards correctness and benefit, we invariably speak of the 'wholesomeness' of the foods we serve, and in their case the most 'correct' thing in them is precisely this.[50]
>
> οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ τόδε ὑπάρχειν ἅπασιν ὅσοις συμπαρέπεταί τις χάρις, ἢ τοῦτο αὐτὸ μόνον αὐτοῦ τὸ σπουδαιότατον εἶναι, ἤ τινα ὀρθότητα, ἢ τὸ τρίτον ὠφελίαν; οἷον δὴ λέγω ἐδωδῇ μὲν καὶ πόσει καὶ συμπάσῃ τροφῇ παρέπεσθαι μὲν τὴν χάριν, ἣν ἡδονὴν ἂν προσείποιμεν· ἣν δὲ ὀρθότητά τε καὶ ὠφελίαν, ὅπερ ὑγιεινὸν τῶν προσφερομένων λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ ὀρθότατον.

Something is either (i) (just) σπουδαῖον, (ii) ὀρθόν and therefore σπουδαῖον, or (iii) ὠφέλιμον and thereby σπουδαῖον. χάρις accompanies τὸ σπουδαιότατον εἶναι, and therefore applies to each of these three cases.[51] Something that is ὠφέλιμον, for example, shares in τὸ σπουδαιότατον εἶναι and is therefore also accompanied by χάρις. This reading demonstrates that we here (again) have a description of the structure of virtue. We may recall that in section 2 it was said that virtue is the psychological quality of responding in the right way to an aspect of objective reality. In section 2, children were said to have the natural potential to respond μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς to τάξις in sound and movement, in short, to music. Here the same idea returns, but in a much more sophisticated form: in this case, it is the σπουδαιότης and ὠφελία (of certain kinds of music for example) that are the facts of objective reality (in Plato's universe, that is). The people capable of perceiving these characteristics will derive pleasure from it precisely because of this aspect, as children derive pleasure from music because it is *structured* sound, it has rhythm and *harmonia*. In the case of complete virtue, τὸ σπουδαιότατον (and ὀρθότης

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50 Other interpreters assume that *kharis* itself is the first of the three criteria. However, as I will argue at greater length in my dissertation (in preparation), the kataphoric pronoun τόδε points forward to τὸ σπουδαιότατον εἶναι.

51 We are not to think of these three alternatives as exclusive. There may be things that fall exclusively in the first category and do not have any of the other qualities (ὠφελία, ὀρθότης, or ὁμοιότης). These and only these can be judged on the basis of χάρις and concern a group of things which provide ἀβλαβὴς ἡδονή. But it is evident that truly good music possesses χάρις because of its ὀρθότης *and* ὠφελία: the true νόμοι constituting the *paideia* of the third chorus will have σπουδαιότης in virtue of their correctness and benefit, and therefore are accompanied by χάρις.

and ὠφελία) in individual musical compositions replaces τάξις that creates the phenomenon of music itself.[52]

It now becomes clear why Plato has opted for the term χάρις instead of ἡδονή to denote the pleasure in this context. The notion of χάρις differs from ἡδονή in several respects. Unlike ἡδονή, χάρις can be conceived of as a quality of an object.[53] In the above passage it is said to 'accompany' something (ἅπασιν ὅσοις συμπαρέπεταί τις χάρις, 667b6) that is σπουδαιότατον. For instance, a musical composition can be said to possess χάρις (667c9–d1); in this case we would be tempted to translate it as 'charm' or 'grace'. But in our discourse of aesthetic evaluation, 'grace' is a subjective term. We could say of a piece of music that it has charm because, for instance, we think that its melodies are charming, or because it is well executed, in a way that is aesthetically appealing or that matches our sense of how it ought to be performed (wherever this sense may come from, as a result of listening to different performances, an acquaintance with the instrument or with the piece itself, or a formal education in music performance, etc.). This is the kind of evaluation of musical performances that Cleinias has in mind when he says that to judge correctly requires that one has heard the performance oneself. To the Athenian, on the other hand, judging music correctly is κρίνειν: seeing if it has a certain characteristic or quality or not—something that can be asserted as a matter of objective fact. The sort of objectivity Plato here suggests about the quality of musical compositions (or works of art in general) is the kind of objectivity that allows us to assert that the color of the horses in a painting is blue, or that the composition is written in the key of c sharp minor.

But as χάρις can also denote a sensation of pleasure it can also be used almost synonymously with ἡδονή (cf. 667d1–3). In that case it denotes a sense of gratification on the part of the perceiver. But an important difference between ἡδονή and χάρις is precisely that χάρις does not have the

52 In Pl. *Ti.* 80a6–b8, two evaluations of music are contrasted: the ἄφρονες experience 'pleasure' (ἡδονή), the ἔμφρονες experience 'delight' (εὐφροσύνη). The pleasure of the ἔμφρονες is of a different kind because they recognize that the musical harmony is a 'representation' (μίμησις) of 'the divine harmony' (τῆς θείας ἁρμονίας). The object is the same (piece of music), but the basis for the pleasure, and thus the *kind* of pleasure, is different for each audience. Cf. Bobonich's analysis of *Tim.* 80a4–b8: different kinds of pleasure are to be distinguished on the basis 'one's grasp of the sort of order involved', 2002, 360. Different faculties can perceive different kinds of order. Pelosi 2010, 102, notes that εὐφροσύνη has its basis in the faculty of νοῦς: 'The level of awareness implied by *euphrosynê* conforms well with a type of listening to music oriented by the *nous*'.

53 See van Berkel [diss. in prep.].

elasticity of ἡδονή: the latter term may apply to all kinds of pleasures, including enormous, overwhelming ones; the concept itself does not imply that there is a limit to the quantity of ἡδονή.[54] Because of its ambiguity the semantic structure of χάρις[55] makes it particularly useful in a philosophical attempt to claim an objective basis for pleasure: it is there to be perceived—and the *senes* are claimed to be the only ones who are competent to perceive it (658e1–3, cf. section 1). We can now appreciate that the theater metaphor is an illustration of the structure of complete virtue itself: the rejoicing in objectively good things, in virtue itself.

The *Laws*' *nomoi* represent the good life and are 'the truest tragedy', while the old people are the spectators of that play and diagnose χάρις. This brings to mind the *Poetics*' notion of *katharsis*, and implies the kind of pleasure that the spectators will experience. Whereas pleasure and relaxation in the *Poetics* results from the *katharsis* of pity and fear (ἔλεος) and (φόβος) (cf. *Pol.* 1342a14: τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς), in the *Laws* χάρις may not only have to do with taking pleasure in watching a performance of virtuous τρόποι, but also in a relief from the emotions that are still powerful in the earlier phases of one's life.[56] The superior kind of relaxation of the *beata vita* is proper to old age; it is therefore in old age that the virtuous and εὐδαίμων life are the same. The concepts of εὐδαιμονία and *katharsis* in their outlines bear a striking resemblance to each other. On the one hand, *katharsis* occurs in the people who have a detached point of view, the view of an audience. The people who watch a tragedy know what the truth is—the elderly audience in the *Laws* know better than the others what is good for them. The *Laws* thus seems to make use of the notion of tragic irony to

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[54] Fisher 2010, 74 n. 8 states that the difference that is suggested between ἡδονή and χάρις is that '*hêdonê* seems to be the more general term, whereas *kharis* is the major element in music and dancing, in learning and education, and in commensality, which makes them all so pleasurable, convincing, and attractive'.

[55] Something similar seems to be the case for χάρις as a term to describe reciprocity in interpersonal relationships. In her dissertation, van Berkel reconstructs the 'social script' of χάρις as follows: when person (A) bestows upon another person (B) a favor, this is called χάριν δίδοναι ('generosity'). This in turn raises expectations as to the return of the favor by B, who ideally acknowledges A's action as 'friendly' and recognizes that he has received a favor from A (χάριν εἰδέναι) which finds expression in the reciprocation of χάρις by B (χάριν ἀποδίδοναι). In social discourse χάρις thus also has a more 'objective' and 'subjective' side. van Berkel ([diss. in prep.] ch. 3): 'The vital point is that the χάρις in the phrases χάριν ἔχειν and χάριν εἰδέναι is, essentially, the same χάρις as the one bestowed'.

[56] Laks 2010, 231 argues that the Aristotelian passions (*Poet.* 1452b32–34), although 'formally absent from the definition of the best Platonic tragedy, (…) still form part of the Platonic background to it'.

illustrate the difference between the true authorities and the others. On the other hand *katharsis* itself is such that it can only be attained by having *gone through* the whole plot oneself from the beginning till the end—and in the case of the *Laws*, having gone through the whole of life: one must have gone through the whole of life if one is to reach true virtue and εὐδαιμονία at all.[57]

But the final implication of the 'truest tragedy' is not just to illustrate that the laws are the best kind of life, but to point towards a difference in perspective. The νόμοι are of course of a serious status: they participate in τὸ σπουδαιότατον εἶναι (*paideia* is σπουδαία). But designating the νόμοι as the 'truest tragedy', at the same time signals that following the laws is in fact acting, a choreography (*paideia* is παιδιά).[58] Human life is not real in the way that a tragedy is not real—but it requires the insight of a spectator, the detached position of a γέρων, to acknowledge this. Human life is a fiction compared to true εὐδαιμονία, ἀρετή, and φρόνησις. But, as paradoxical as it is necessary, these can only, if at all, be obtained by living it.

6. *Conclusion*

In this chapter, I have argued that *Laws* 2 develops an intricate argument that singles out the γέροντες as the only persons competent to select the best kind of music. Therefore, the elderly who are the judges of music are also the authority on the best kind of life. The ambiguity of νόμος enables Plato to establish the consequences of his argument also on the political level. And it is in fact precisely in the domain of human life, of ἦθος and τρόπος, that the qualification of age and overseeing the whole of human life acquires its full significance. According to the *Laws*' teleological theory of natural virtue, only the stage of life of the *senex* is that of complete virtue and εὐδαιμονία. Their virtue is structurally similar to the elementary virtue of children, but of a completely different kind. They perceive objective goodness (σπουδαιότης) of the νόμοι, and their pleasure (χάρις) is based on this objective quality. The

57 This idea of 'having to go through' something is also prominent in *Politics* 8, where taking active part in performing music is vital for the acquisition of virtue. See the chapter by Elizabeth Jones in this volume.

58 The division between play and seriousness creates two 'levels': that of human life and human experience, and a true perspective: that of the gods. The paradox is that the singing and dancing constituting *paideia* may be experienced as *paidia* (a 'game'), but is in truth most serious because it concerns an education in what is really of the highest importance: virtue. See Stalley 1983, 130; Jouët-Pastré 2006.

Laws construes a conception of insight that comes with life experience and can only be attained by going all the way through life itself.[59]

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CHAPTER SEVEN

ALLOCATING MUSICAL PLEASURE: PERFORMANCE, PLEASURE, AND VALUE IN ARISTOTLE'S *POLITICS*

Elizabeth M. Jones

1. *Introduction*

In *Politics* 8, Aristotle describes a system of education in which musical pleasure is used to teach the young about virtue. In the course of this discussion, Aristotle theorizes about *mousikê* and remarks on a number of pleasures associated with it. In this chapter, I will examine Aristotle's conceptualization of the pleasures of music in *Politics* 8. Previous discussions of pleasure in the *Politics* have focused on the role of pleasure in education, but have ignored the other kinds of pleasure mentioned by Aristotle and his special interest in the role of pleasure in the evaluation of music (*mousikê*).[1] In the central part of this chapter (section 3) I argue that Aristotle differentiates between two separate kinds of pleasure associated with music, a moral pleasure only accessible to those who have learned to perform and a natural pleasure felt by all listeners regardless of performance experience. Moreover, he attributes different values to each kind of pleasure. In this way, Aristotle distinguishes himself from Plato, who never explicitly imposed such a differentiation, even in his last work, the *Laws*, in which he discusses extensively issues related to pleasure and performance (section 2). As a result, Aristotle articulates both a sociology of pleasure in which pleasure is divided along class lines (section 4) and a hierarchy of aesthetic experience (section 5).

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[1] E.g. Lord 1982; Anderson 1996; Kraut 2002.

2. *Pleasure and Performance in Plato's* Laws

Despite the fact that Aristotle mentions only Plato's *Republic* in his discussion of music in *Politics* 8, it is actually Plato's *Laws* which bears the closest resemblance to the *Politics* both in terms of attitude and content. Plato's negative attitude towards the utility of *mousikê* in the *Republic* is well known. In the *Laws*, however, Plato puts forth a new model of the *polis* in which musical pleasure is not necessarily problematic. Rather, it is utilized as a key component in the moral education of the city's inhabitants. In the *Politics*, Aristotle presents a model of education similar to that which Plato recommends in the *Laws*, emphasizing that *mousikê* is an educational tool useful for instilling moral virtue in the young. The chapters by Rocconi and Bartels in this volume offer excellent introductions to Plato's views on music in the *Laws*, so I will limit myself to only a few observations on this text.

In *Laws* 2, the Athenian articulates his views on emotional education (Pl. *Leg*. 653a–b):

> I maintain that the earliest sensations that a child feels in infancy are of pleasure and pain, and this is the route by which virtue and vice first enter the soul … I call 'education' the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred, that well up in his soul are channeled in the right courses before he can understand the reason why.[2]
>
> λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον … παιδείαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετήν· ἡδονὴ δὴ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν.

The Athenian advocates a system of emotional training in which young citizens learn to feel emotion in appropriate ways. He argues that human beings first learn about virtue through their experiences of pleasure and pain. Since virtue involves feeling pleasure toward the morally good and pain toward the morally bad, pleasure can be used to instill morally good habits in the young.[3] This process of moral habituation, as it is frequently called in scholarship, works through a pleasurable activity: *mousikê*. The Athenian also asserts that children naturally delight in singing and dancing (*Leg*. 653d–654a). Since this is the case, if they learn to represent morally

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[2] All translations of the *Laws* are by Saunders 1997 unless otherwise noted.

[3] Bobonich 2002, 360 f. discusses why Plato has pleasure play such an important role in ethical education in the *Laws*. He does not, however, discuss pleasure specifically in relation to *mousikê*.

good characters with their voices in song and noble bodies through dance, they will associate the natural pleasures taken in choral performance with the morally good. Consequently, children will begin to take pleasure in virtue and perform virtuous actions. The Athenian states that when these students become older, they will come to understand the intellectual reasoning behind the virtuous habits which they acquired through their emotional training (Pl. *Leg.* 653b):

> Then when he does understand, his reason and his emotions agree in telling him that he has been properly trained by inculcation of proper habits. Virtue is the general concord of reason and emotion.
>
> λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν, αὕτη 'σθ' ἡ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετή.

As one matures, reason is overlaid onto previously trained emotions, and both intellect and habit work together to encourage and reinforce morally correct behavior. An intellectual understanding of virtue alone is not enough to motivate virtuous action, and so pleasure is employed as a tool to help one form an emotional attachment to the good. *Mousikê* provides an appropriate paideutic framework in which a performer can simultaneously participate in a pleasurable activity and engage with representations of good characters, and through this interaction, associate the pleasure with the good.

For Plato in the *Laws*, musical pleasure is viewed and defined in terms of performance,[4] and participation in performance is the key to moral habituation through music. In order to exploit the pleasures inherent in singing and dancing, the Athenian recommends that the civic population be divided into three choruses based on age (*Leg.* 664d), each of which performs in public festivals until its members are too old and weak to continue. Plato stresses that while this process of moral habituation through *khoreia* begins in childhood, it continues to be and in fact must be practiced throughout

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[4] Pleasure is derived not primarily from listening or spectating, but from actual participation in performance, specifically the actions of singing and dancing. See e.g. Pl. *Leg.* 653e–654a (tr. Bury, modified): 'The gods … have granted the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony, whereby they cause us to move and lead our choruses, linking us one with another by means of songs and dances; and to the chorus they have given its name from the "cheer" implanted therein' (τοὺς θεοὺς … τούτους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς δεδωκότας τὴν ἔνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ᾗ δὴ κινεῖν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ χορηγεῖν ἡμῶν τούτους, ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεσιν ἀλλήλοις συνείροντας, χορούς τε ὠνομακέναι παρὰ τὸ τῆς χαρᾶς ἔμφυτον ὄνομα). Note how Plato emphasizes the pleasure inherent in choral performance by proposing an etymological link between *khoros* and *khara*. See the chapter by Bartels in this volume (pp. 133–158).

life: 'it is the duty of every man and child—bond and free, male and female—and the duty of the whole state, to charm[5] themselves unceasingly (ἐπᾴδουσαν μὴ παύεσθαί ποτε) with the chants we have described, constantly changing them and securing variety in every way possible, so that the singers have insatiable appetite for and pleasure (ἡδονήν) in the hymns' (*Leg.* 665c).[6]

Plato describes an aesthetic environment in which, because each citizen is involved in choral performance throughout life, musical pleasure is experienced specifically through the lens of performance. Even the pleasure that spectators feel is phrased in terms of the performer. So, the old men who have reached retirement age and no longer perform describe the spectator of *mousikê* as a vicarious performer (Pl. *Leg.* 657d):

> Our youngsters are keen to join the dancing and singing themselves, but we old men think the proper thing is to pass the time as spectators. The delight we feel comes from their relaxation and merry-making. Our agility is deserting us, and as we feel its loss we are only too pleased to provide competitions for the young, because they can best stir in us the memory of our youth and re-awaken the instincts of our younger days.
>
> ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἡμῶν οἱ μὲν νέοι αὐτοὶ χορεύειν ἕτοιμοι, τὸ δὲ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν ἐκείνους αὖ θεωροῦντες διάγειν ἡγούμεθα πρεπόντως, χαίροντες τῇ ἐκείνων παιδιᾷ τε καὶ ἑορτάσει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν ἡμᾶς ἐλαφρὸν ἐκλείπει νῦν, ὃ ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀσπαζόμενοι τίθεμεν οὕτως ἀγῶνας τοῖς δυναμένοις ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστ' εἰς τὴν νεότητα μνήμῃ ἐπεγείρειν.

For the old men, says the Athenian, choral performance causes them to remember their own youthful participation in these contests and the pleasure which accompanies it. Saunders' translation ('instincts') suggests that the spectator conjures up a bodily memory of movement and dance,[7] but Bury's translation ('… contests for those who can best arouse in us through recollection the dormant emotions of youth') suggests rather that an emotional memory is evoked. The text is vague—it literally says 'to awaken us to youth in memory'—but surely alludes to the recollection of the full per-

[5] Cf. Pl. *Leg.* 659e. These 'charms' (ἐπᾴδουσαν) are those songs which use pleasure to produce a concord between reason and emotions and therefore 'charm' one into desiring virtue.

[6] Translation is a modified version of Bury 1926.

[7] The body and its involvement in *mousikê* are an important part of Plato's argument about pleasure and musical education but is largely absent from Aristotle's similar discussion in the *Politics*. See e.g. the discussion of gesture (*skhêma*) and *êthos* at *Leg.* 669b–d and the discussion of *gumnastikê* starting at *Leg.* 672e, where training of the body is described as 'other half of *khoreia*'. Aristotle mentions *gumnastikê* as another component of education (*Pol.* 1338b9–38), but one that is not related to the study and practice of *mousikê*.

formative experience, including singing, dancing, and its attendant pleasurable emotions. For Plato in the *Laws*, there is one type of musical pleasure which cannot be separated from performance.

3. *Pleasure and Education in* Politics *8*

In *Politics* 8, Aristotle discusses the role of *mousikê* in education and describes a process of moral habituation through music which is similar to that which Plato recommends in the *Laws*. Although holding similar views regarding the uses of pleasure in education, Plato and Aristotle diverge in a few important ways. First, Plato's citizens participate in choral performances throughout their lives and undergo what the Athenian describes as a continuous educational process. Aristotle's prescribed educational system, however, entails that citizens learn to play and perform musical instruments only while young. This education and participation in performance ends at adulthood. Secondly, Aristotle's discussion of music does not mention dancing and remarks minimally on singing. Instead, he focuses on instrumental music and the aural attributes of *mousikê*, namely rhythm (*rhuthmos*), harmony (*harmoniai*), and *melos* (roughly, 'melody').[8] A

[8] See e.g. Aristotle's discussion of appropriate musical instruments for students to play at *Pol.* 1341a17 f. Aristotle does mention singing at *Pol.* 1340b20 where he notes that the young should learn to play instruments and sing. At *Pol.* 1341a25, he condemns the *aulos* because one cannot play the instrument and speak at the same time. But while Plato emphasizes singing as the vehicle for words and *logos*, Aristotle's emphasis is rather on the musical attributes of vocal song. In the *Poetics*, *melos* tends to refer to a lyric poetic composition as a whole, including words, rhythm, and harmony, but in the *Politics* it seems to have a narrower meaning like 'tune' or 'melody'. It can refer to the melody of a song verbally sung or to the melody of a purely instrumental song (cf. Kraut 1997, 198: 'In its narrower use, *melos* can be used interchangeably with *harmonia*'). In the former case, it describes a certain aural attribute of the sung words, without taking into account the content of the words themselves (although presumably, the content of the words will reflect the *êthos* of the melody). At *Pol.* 1340a10, *melos* is used to describe the *aulos* music of Olympus which is purely instrumental. In section 8.7 Aristotle discusses kathartic *melos* and afterwards introduces the topic of poetry, as if poetry was not what he was talking about before (e.g. *Pol.* 1342b5–6: 'and these [meters] find their suitable accompaniment in the Phrygian *melê* among the harmonies', τῶν δ' ἁρμονιῶν ἐν τοῖς φρυγιστὶ μέλεσι λαμβάνει ταῦτα τὸ πρέπον, tr. Rackham). In this case, *melos* accompanies words in meter. On the use of *melos* at *Pol.* 1339b20–21, I follow Ford 2004, 320–321 who persuasively argues that *melos* here (as well as throughout the *Politics*) does not encompass words. Finally, Aristotle's student Aristoxenus in his treatise on harmonics treats *melos* as a purely musical concept divorced from the verbal components of poetry. Barker 2007, esp. 159–164 discusses Aristoxenus' conception of *melos* and notes that he views it in a similar way to Aristotle.

number of scholars have misunderstood Aristotle's primary focus on instrumental music and assumed that the word *mousikê* in this context operates in the broad sense of the word and therefore includes the verbal components of poetry. As a result, many have posited a system of Aristotelian education based on literary study and minimized the book's analysis of music.[9] Andrew Ford, however, has argued recently that throughout most of the book Aristotle is employing the narrower meaning of *mousikê*—music, as we tend to understand the word—and I follow his reading here. Aristotle emphasizes the specific powers of *rhuthmos*, *harmonia*, and *melos*, and here focuses on a person's ethical and emotional engagement with *mousikê* instead of one's intellectual engagement with it as he does, for example, in the *Poetics*.[10] The most important difference between Plato's and Aristotle's discussions of musical education is that for Plato musical pleasure is qualified as a pleasure intricately tied to performance. To take pleasure in *mousikê* means to take part in singing and dancing and to engage in musical performance. Aristotle, however, seems to suggest in *Politics* 8 that there are two kinds of musical pleasure, a moral pleasure gained specifically through learning to perform, and a natural pleasure which is felt by all listeners and not linked to performance experience. That Aristotle makes reference to two sorts of pleasure in music has not been acknowledged by previous studies.

3.1. *'Natural Pleasure' in Music*

Like Plato, Aristotle claims that music is naturally pleasurable (Arist. *Pol.* 1340a2–6):[11]

> It is proper not only to participate in the common pleasure that springs from [music], which is perceptible to everybody (for the pleasure contained in

[9] E.g. Lord 1982, 85–89; Nichols 1992, 160–161; Swanson 1992, 153 f.; Kraut 1997, 178 f.; Kraut 2002, 202; Depew 1991. Cf. Newman 1986 and Ford 2004. I am not saying that poetry is not a part of education at all (in *Politics* 7 (1336b20–21) Aristotle advises keeping young children away from *iambos* and comedy, and so he is thinking about appropriate verbal content), but that his discussion in *Politics* 8 specifically focuses on the attributes of music rather than the verbal poetic content.

[10] Ford 2004, 314: 'Always seeing poetry in Aristotle's *mousikê* intellectualizes musical education as a form of ethical instruction through literature. But this flattens out the argument by neglecting Aristotle's keen and sustained attention to the powers of music itself'. Aristotle stresses at *Pol.* 1339b20 that great musical pleasure lies in 'bare music', i.e. without accompanying poetry (here I accept Susemihl's emendation). At *Pol.* 1340a17 f. rhythms and melodies are said to be mimetic of *êthê* and offer ethical examples for the young to follow.

[11] Translations of the *Politics* are by Rackham 1944 unless otherwise noted. I will use the terms 'music' and '*mousikê*' interchangeably throughout my discussion.

> music is of a natural kind, owing to which the use of it is dear to those of all ages and characters).
>
> δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἧς ἔχουσι πάντες αἴσθησιν (ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τιν' ἡδονὴν φυσικήν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστι προσφιλής).

Aristotle identifies in human beings an innate sense of pleasure in music. This *hêdonê* is apparent to all people and can be experienced similarly despite differences in age, moral character, education level, or knowledge of performance practices. He expresses similar sentiments a little later (Arist. *Pol.* 1340b17–19):

> Music is by nature a thing that has a pleasant sweetness. And we seem to have a certain affinity with tunes and rhythms; owing to which many wise men say either that the soul is a harmony or that it has harmony.
>
> ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν ἡδυσμάτων ἐστίν. καί τις ἔοικε συγγένεια ταῖς ἁρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς εἶναι· διὸ πολλοί φασι τῶν σοφῶν οἱ μὲν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, οἱ δ' ἔχειν ἁρμονίαν.

Again, Aristotle remarks on the natural pleasure which music evokes in human beings. It is a ἥδυσμα, a food-related word which literally means 'seasoning' or 'sweetener'.[12] By associating music with the bodily necessity of eating and the natural pleasure taken in food, Aristotle perhaps suggests that music likewise provides pleasure to all human beings innately and naturally. The next sentence is the closest Aristotle comes to explaining why human beings take pleasure in music—we are akin to it.[13] He appeals to others, probably philosophers of music such as Damon, for a more detailed explanation of why this is the case.[14] This universal or 'natural' pleasure in

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12 Aristotle uses the noun seven other times. It is specifically related to food and the body at *De an.* 414b13, *Eth. Nic.* 1170b29, *Mete.* 381b30, [*Pr.*] 923a28, *Rh.* 1406a18, and *Sens.* 442a10. It is used in relation to song at *Poet.* 1450b16 where it describes how song-making is the greatest of the adornments of a tragedy (ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων).

13 Aristotle presents this as an empirical observation. He has observed that all sorts of people enjoy listening to music, and therefore there must be an innate and natural love of music encoded into the human psyche. His reference to *sophoi* points to other philosophers who take a similar approach to music and who make conclusions about the nature of the soul based on its apparent resonance with music.

14 The Pythagoreans seem to have had a complex view on the relation between *harmonia* and the soul and the idea of soul as harmony. See Barker 1989, ch. 1 and Barker 2007, esp. 328–363. Plato in the *Timaeus* discusses the harmonics of the soul (see esp. Barker 2007, 323–327), also in *Phaedo* 93. The Athenian musicologist Damon is only preserved in part through the comments of Aristides Quintilianus in his *De musica* but is presumed to have had a great influence over both Plato and Aristotle (see e.g. Lord 1982 and Anderson 1966; differently

music, because it does not require any knowledge of performance techniques or experience as a performer to be evoked, acts as a sort of emotional baseline available to each and every auditor.

Aristotle asserts that music's natural pleasure along with its ability to evoke emotion makes music a useful tool for moral education and emotional training (Arist. *Pol.* 1340a8–18):

> But it is clear that we are affected in a certain manner, both by many other kinds of music and not least by the melodies of Olympus; for these admittedly make our souls enthusiastic, and enthusiasm is an affection of the character of the soul. And moreover everybody when listening to imitations is thrown into a corresponding state of feeling … And since it is the case that music is one of the things that give pleasure, and that virtue has to do with feeling delight and love and hatred rightly, there is obviously nothing that it is more needful to learn and become habituated to than to judge correctly and to delight in virtuous characters and noble actions.
>
> ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γιγνόμεθα ποιοί τινες, φανερὸν διὰ πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἑτέρων, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν Ὀλύμπου μελῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικάς, ὁ δ' ἐνθουσιασμὸς τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἤθους πάθος ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς … ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡδέων, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, δεῖ δηλονότι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μηθὲν οὕτως ὡς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν·

Aristotle describes the experience of listening to music as primarily emotional. When one listens to the auletic (instrumental) melodies of Olympus, for example, the enthusiasm represented in the music is reproduced and evoked in oneself (one becomes συμπαθής). These emotional reactions are related to the *êthos*, the moral state, represented by the music, and can be utilized in education.[15] Aristotle does not explicate this process at great length, but the main idea is that if children are exposed to musical represen-

Barker 2007). In the most basic sense, I understand Aristotle to mean that just as music is composed according to a certain harmony and therefore possesses a specific structure (i.e. ratio of chords), so is the soul made up of a certain structure. People enjoy music because their souls recognize a similar structure in music and like enjoys like. Cf. *De an.* 408a5–10.

[15] Aristotle states that music represents ethical states (*Pol.* 1340a39), but these ethical states are manifested through specific *pathê* which are likewise reproduced in the listener. At certain points, he seems to treat *êthos* and *pathos* as synonyms. For example, at *Pol.* 1340a18, he speaks of *orgê*, anger, as an ethical state which music can imitate, but in the *Rhetoric* 2.1, he defines anger as an emotion. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, *êthos* is described as an emotional orientation. For example, anger is an emotion, but one's character is based on whether one feels anger at the right times, at the right objects, etc. (*Eth. Nic.* 1125b27 f.). In this sense, emotional habits make up ethical attributes.

tations of good characters (*êthê*), the natural pleasure they feel in listening to music will aid them in assimilating their own characters to those represented. Because they are enjoying listening to music, their souls will want to take on the characteristics of the *êthos* which is represented and will want to continue to experience the emotions evoked by the song. Soon, they get into the habit of feeling pleasure along with specific emotions.[16] He notes that the emotions felt in response to musically represented characters are 'close to feeling them towards actual reality' (*Pol.* 1340a25), and so music helps children to delight in virtuous characters occurring in the real world.[17] As a result, Aristotle recommends a system of education in which children learn to sing and play instruments (see below, section 3.2). The styles of music used in education are carefully selected so that children are only exposed to representations of morally good *êthê* and so that they will consequently form good emotional habits. This 'education by habit' takes place before 'education by reason', and by the time that the students are old enough to understand virtue intellectually, they will already have virtuous habits instilled in them. At this point, presumably, when the fully educated person either hears representations of morally bad characters (to which he was not exposed in his youth) or sees them in reality, his good habits and his moral reason will clash with the bad characters. Then he will be pained instead of pleased.

3.2. mousikê *and* êthos

Two properties of music aid in this process of moral education. First, music is a direct representation of an *êthos* (Arist. *Pol.* 1340a18–23):

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[16] Aristotle does not really explain how pleasure helps in ethical development. I am assuming that it plays two roles. First, taking pleasure in musical representations of morally good characters helps one to associate pleasure with the good and transfer the pleasant feelings evoked by music onto the experience of virtue itself. Second, when a child is exposed to the good through a pleasant activity such as music, the pleasantness of the experience will make the child want to continue to explore the parameters of the good. In this sense, learning becomes an enjoyable experience and spurs one on toward further education. Note also that music evokes two sets of emotion: pleasure and whatever *pathos* the song represents, enthusiasm being the example listed above. In this educational process, pleasure becomes correlated with specific emotions. For example, one might learn to feel pleasure when undergoing calmness (*praotês*, 1340a20). See also Sherman 1989, 184–190 concerning Aristotle's views on the pleasure inherent in practice.

[17] Aristotle's views on education have been discussed extensively elsewhere. I discuss the issue only as it relates to my argument. For further information on moral habituation, see e.g. Anderson 1966; Lord 1982; Fossheim 2006; Woerther 2008.

> In rhythms and melodies there is the greatest likeness to the true natures of anger and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance, all of their opposites, and the other characters. This is obvious from the facts: we undergo a change in our souls when we listen to such things. (tr. Kraut)
>
> ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος, ἔτι δ' ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθῶν (δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων· μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων)·

In this passage, Aristotle uses the term *homoiômata* to describe music's representational quality, but elsewhere he uses *mimêmata*.[18] He sets music's ability to directly imitate *êthos* in opposition to the indirect capabilities of the visual arts, which are only able to convey *signs* of character.[19] This means that *mousikê* offers a controlled environment in which to experience and explore different emotions and characters. Secondly, our souls change (μεταβάλλομεν) while listening to music. For the duration of the song, we leave our own characters behind and experience the *êthos* represented and its corresponding emotion, in a sense temporarily changing the disposition of the soul. This power of music is described in terms of those listening (ἀκροώμενοι) to a performance,[20] but Aristotle suggests that listening to music is not enough to provide the moral education which he advocates. The change which occurs in the soul of the listener is merely

[18] *Mimêsis* is used at *Pol.* 1340a13 and *mimêmata* at *Pol.* 1340a40 (ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἔστι μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν). Homoiômata is used at *Pol.* 1340a18, 1340a29, 1340a32. Cf. Aristotle's comments in *Poetics* 4 where he states that children come to understand the world through *mimêsis*. Sörbom 1994 discusses further Aristotle's views on music as representation. He suggests that music, inasmuch as it provides 'images' of character, offers to the listener a 'universal' or paradigm of whatever *êthos* is represented. See also Pépin 1985 and Halliwell 2002, 234–249.

[19] *Pol.* 1340a32–35: ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν, ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰ γιγνόμενα σχήματα καὶ χρώματα τῶν ἠθῶν, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν· The signs given in the visual arts are bodily reactions to emotions, but not themselves representations of emotions. This is an important point and one difficult to fully comprehend—when listening to music we are hearing in a sense e.g. *sôphrosunê* itself. Cf. Simpson 1998, 272: 'One might also note that music is a motion, something that Aristotle mentions in the case of rhythm, and that passions and actions too are motions. Music is, of course, a motion in sounds while passions are motions in the soul, but one motion can properly be said to be "like" another motion (while a shape or color cannot be); and since it is manifest that the motions of some music excite motions in the soul … it is perhaps not unreasonable to say that the musical motions contain "likenesses" of the motions they excite'.

[20] See *Pol.* 1340a23 quoted above. A similar verb is used at *Pol.* 1340a42: καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ φανερόν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις, ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἑκάστην αὐτῶν.

temporary, and ethical education requires that the moral state experienced become a permanent disposition.

Aristotle states that music will be more effective at instilling ethical habits if students learn to sing and play instruments themselves, that is, to participate in performance (Arist. *Pol.* 1340b22–26):

> It is not difficult to see that it makes a great difference in the process of acquiring a certain quality whether one takes part in the actions[21] that impart it oneself; for it is a thing that is impossible, or difficult, to become a good judge of performances if one has not taken part in them.
>
> οὐκ ἄδηλον δὴ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι ποιούς τινας, ἐάν τις αὐτὸς κοινωνῇ τῶν ἔργων· ἓν γάρ τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ χαλεπῶν ἐστι μὴ κοινωνήσαντας τῶν ἔργων κριτὰς γενέσθαι σπουδαίους.

Presumably, performing music allows one to become more familiar with the characters represented than mere listening would allow.[22] This additional level of familiarity is necessary for the purposes of education. The performer knows how to craft the representation of an *êthos* and so will be better able to craft and implement such an *êthos* in his own soul and life. The moral habituation which music facilitates does not merely consist in habitually feeling a certain emotion or possessing the traits of a certain *êthos*, but implementing such an *êthos* and enacting appropriate emotion in response to each situation. Also, note that while Aristotle begins this passage with a focus on the educational process, he then introduces an additional goal of learning to perform—to become a good judge. Aristotle is primarily concerned with the real-life consequences of learning to perform (the effective acquisition of virtuous habits), and so it is interesting that he also stresses that it is equally important for the morally habituated student to be able to judge the correctness of musical performances. Aristotle advocates learning to *perform* music in order to become an ideal, or at least serious, audience member.

A little later in the text, Aristotle elaborates on the idea of the performer as judge (Arist. *Pol.* 1340b36–40):

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21 Aristotle also uses *erga* to refer to performance (see e.g. *Pol.* 1340b33), as Rackham understands it in the next sentence, and so an alternative translation would be 'to take part in performances oneself'.

22 Sherman 1989, 183 notes: 'those who are to judge and delight correctly in fine actions and characters *must practise such actions themselves* [my emphasis], making the sorts of judgements and coming to have the sort of emotional responses that are appropriate to the characters'. Cf. also *Eth. Nic.* 1103a30 f.

> Inasmuch as it is necessary to take part in the performances for the sake of judging them, it is therefore proper for the pupils when young actually to engage in the performances, though when they get older they should be released from performing, but be able to judge what is beautiful and enjoy it rightly because of the study in which they engaged in their youth.
>
> πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ἐπεὶ τοῦ κρίνειν χάριν μετέχειν δεῖ τῶν ἔργων, διὰ τοῦτο χρὴ νέους μὲν ὄντας χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἔργοις, πρεσβυτέρους δὲ γενομένους τῶν μὲν ἔργων ἀφεῖσθαι, δύνασθαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς διὰ τὴν μάθησιν τὴν γενομένην ἐν τῇ νεότητι·

Aristotle suggests here that knowledge of performance is a prerequisite for any judge. In this sense, the trained performer, by which I mean one with knowledge and experience in performance, has access to an exclusive and enhanced auditorial perspective. But this passage qualifies the role of the judge further: those educated through music are able to judge what is beautiful (*kala*). The semantic range of *kalos* is wide, and it is unclear exactly what falls under the judge's purview. Does Aristotle refer to *kalos* in a moral sense, or does he also allude to a technical or even aesthetic judgment? Furthermore, Aristotle remarks earlier in the text that it is necessary to learn to judge *correctly*.[23] As with *kalos,* ὀρθῶς can be understood to refer to both a moral and technical understanding of judgment. Lord argues that the judge of music only judges the moral dimension of performance.[24] In his reading, students learn to judge whether a certain musical piece represents morally good characters or not. Aristotle is certainly suggesting that one's ability to make moral judgments be developed. But Lord makes a separation between the moral and technical that is too strict. Because music is an artistic *representation* of an *êthos* (a moral quality), the moral dimension and the technical execution are necessarily related. To understand how to craft an ethical representation in music and vice versa, to reenact the same ethical actions in life, would require a technical understanding of how *êthos* is constructed and reproduced. The judge with performance experience must be able to evaluate technical qualities in addition to moral attributes.[25]

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[23] *Pol.* 1340a18: δεῖ δηλονότι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μηθὲν οὕτως ὡς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν.

[24] Lord 1982, 99–100. Musical training makes good judges only in the moral sense, not the technical sense, because 'the young will only learn and practice one musical mode—the Dorian', instead of the entire range of rhythms and harmonies. He treats moral judgment and 'aesthetic' (which he seems to conflate with 'technical') judgment as mutually exclusive arenas of thought.

[25] In this sense, a good judge is able to both judge the moral standing of a piece of music (whether it is virtuous or not) and how well it is executed. For example, the Dorian

Only one who has learned how to perform has access to this specific insight into music.

Unlike the inhabitants of Plato's ideal city who engage in *khoreia* throughout their lives in a perpetual process of emotional and ethical training, Aristotle's students are able to be fully trained through music. At this point, they stop engaging in performance without being at risk of 'the effect wear[ing] off' as in the *Laws* (χαλᾶται, 653d). The result of training in musical performance is an ability to judge beautiful things and to enjoy music correctly. Besides judgment, there is a second goal of musical training introduced here, that of taking pleasure in music *correctly*.[26] It seems clear from Aristotle's previous comments on *hêdonê* that 'correct' pleasure entails taking pleasure in the good. The process of moral habituation is complete and the performer now delights in virtuous characters and actions.[27] The goal of this emotional training is of course to form correct and appropriate pleasure in (real-life) virtue, but interestingly and importantly, χαίρειν ὀρθῶς is emphasized by Aristotle as a response to musical performance, one which arises in tandem with musical judgment.[28] This correct pleasure in music no longer looks like the natural pleasure in music available to everyone; it is a specific sort of pleasure linked not to music *per se*, but to its moral dimension, and experienced only by a specific subset of people.

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mode is a style of music approved by Aristotle which represents a virtuous *êthos*. The good judge does not simply recognize the Dorian as morally good, but understands the technical qualities necessary to represent and enact good *êthos* and understands why it is good. In addition, a well executed Dorian piece should be more correct and more beautiful that a poorly executed one. This is not quite a disinterested 'aesthetic' judgment in the modern sense, but it is an aesthetic outlook which exists under the umbrella of a moral perspective. Depew 1991, 368 emphasizes the technical knowledge required by the judge of music, but attributes more intellectual involvement to judging than is made explicit in the text: 'this technical knowledge is crucial to the subsequent development of both practical and theoretical knowledge'. Cf. also *Eth. Nic.* 1181a19–21: καὶ τὸ κρῖναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικήν. οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι' ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποίοις συνᾴδει·

[26] ὀρθῶς. The same adverb is used to describe both the quality of judging (*krinein*) and of feeling pleasure (*khairein*). One must judge correctly and feel pleasure correctly.

[27] Cf. *Pol.* 1340a18. One goal of musical education is: τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· ὀρθῶς now refers to pleasure acting in accordance with virtue.

[28] And as with musical judgment, because pleasure is now aligned with virtue, correct pleasure is evoked in response to the moral dimension of music. Technique is a source of pleasure inasmuch as it underlies the successful representation of an *êthos*, but Aristotle is not advocating a disinterested appreciation of technique. Cf. Susemihl and Hicks 1894, n. 1065: 'Also there is no true pleasure apart from a right moral and aesthetic judgment'.

3.3. *Moral Pleasure and the Performer*

It seems to follow from Aristotle's argument that when moral habituation is complete, even if the educated are exposed to musical representations of bad characters, they will be emotionally unaffected, because they can no longer feel pleasure in *all* music but *only* in that which corresponds to their own complete and virtuous characters.[29] Their past experience and knowledge of performing has imparted to them an ability to understand and evaluate the moral implications of the music which they are now watching and hearing, and the pleasure they feel in response to music has been delimited to a certain moral sphere. Thus it seems that for Aristotle's educated person, the natural pleasure felt by all, the baseline pleasure of the listener, has been replaced by moral pleasure: the correct pleasure acquired by the one educated through performance.[30] If this is correct, Aristotelian education, although dependent on the existence of natural pleasure in music in order to make moral education attractive, at some point transforms this pleasure into a different sort altogether.

Previous scholars have tacitly assumed that this is the case: the natural pleasure which gets boys interested in learning to perform music initially is *changed* into a purely moral form of pleasure in music.[31] There is, however, an indication that Aristotle understood there to be two kinds of pleasure felt by the educated man *simultaneously* in response to music. In *Politics* 8.6, when Aristotle is discussing why boys should not receive professional-style education in music, he qualifies the level of musical education they should receive (Arist. *Pol.* 1341a13–17):

> … but also only practiced exercises of that sort until they are able to enjoy beautiful tunes and rhythms, and *not merely* the charm common to all music, which even some lower animals enjoy, as well as a multitude of slaves and children.

[29] Kraut 1997, 202 makes this point: 'His claim at 1341b12–18 about the corrupting influence of vulgar taste is that some music is bad music even though it is pleasurable to the vulgar, and that those who are musically educated will not enjoy it'.

[30] To be clear, when I refer to the moral pleasure acquired by one with performance experience, I do not mean that this moral pleasure is experienced only while performing. Rather, it is acquired through performance training and felt by one who understands the mechanics and techniques of performance, even when acting as a auditor. Remember that performative education creates a good (auditorial) judge of music.

[31] Fortenbaugh 1975, 48 is the only scholar I have found who explicitly says that natural delight is done away with: 'children begin by delighting in the natural or common pleasures of music (1340a16–18, 1341a15–16), but soon transfer this delight to the noble characters and actions that are depicted in song and dances'.

> … ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέχρι περ ἂν δύνωνται χαίρειν τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσι καὶ ῥυθμοῖς καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔνια ζῴων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πλῆθος ἀνδραπόδων καὶ παιδίων.

Aristotle reiterates here his claim that musical education is complete when the students take pleasure in noble (*kalos*) kinds of music. But this pleasure in noble things is introduced in contrast to a different sort of musical pleasure, that common delight in music which is felt by everyone, including the uneducated: slaves, children, and even some animals.[32] The educated feel *not only* the common pleasure, but also moral pleasure: two separate pleasures in response to music.[33] Is this delight in the common aspect of music the natural pleasure (ἡδονὴ φυσική, *Pol.* 1340a5) which music provides to all? If so—and I think it must be given the similar language used in each passage (e.g. pleasure, *koinos*)—Aristotle seems to be saying two things: first, it is the natural pleasure of music which sweetens the study of music for boys (*Pol.* 1340b17),[34] a pleasure independent of moral evaluation and based purely on non-rational attraction; but, second, during the educational process, another kind of pleasure is formed in response to the moral dimension of music—specifically those rhythms and melodies that represent noble characters and actions. This second pleasure is one which is only

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32 Kraut translates this passage differently in his commentary 1997: '… they are able to enjoy noble melodies and rhythms, and not only the common sort of music'. This translation seems to make a contrast between morally good music and 'common' music and to understand *koinos* to mean something like 'bad', 'vulgar', or 'of the common people'. But Aristotle in this text *always* uses *koinos* to mean 'shared' or 'common to all people', and so it seems easier to understand τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς to refer to taking pleasure in those aspects of music which are pleasurable to all people regardless of moral orientation or performative experience, with κοινῷ here picking up the sense of χαίρειν from the previous clause to denote 'common pleasure'. This way of understanding the phrase seems to align with Lord 1982 who translates 'not merely the common element of music' and therefore reflects the passage's introduction of two ways to find pleasure in music. Cf. also *Pol.* 1340a2–6 above (section 3.1) in which *koinos* explicitly modifies *hêdonê*.

33 It is possible that there is one pleasure felt in response to two different aspects of music: noble melodies and rhythms and that aspect of music which pleases all human beings. But since taking joy or pleasure in the noble strictly delimits the content in response to which one can feel pleasure (thus eliminating much of the music which evokes 'natural or common pleasure'), the passage can only be read as referring to two different sorts of pleasures in music in response to two different aspects or characteristics of music.

34 This statement that music is necessary for education because learning is painful (*Pol.* 1339a29) seems to contradict Aristotle's statement in *Poetics* 4 that learning is pleasurable. In the *Politics*, however, this idea is fundamental to his argument, because the fact that learning is painful is one major reason why musical pleasure is used as an incentive toward education. Koller 1956 sees *Pol.* 1340b17 and 1339a29 as contradictory. Both Kraut 1997 (ad loc.) and Lord 1982, 72 argue against his views.

available to the man who as a youth engaged in continuous musical practice, has assimilated to the noble characters represented, and understands how to musically perform the same *êthos*.

If Aristotle is indeed suggesting a dual pleasure—one the pleasure available to any and all listeners, the other the pleasure of the one with performance knowledge—what we have is not a natural pleasure in music morphed into or delimited to a different sort of pleasure, as I suggested earlier as an interpretive possibility, but rather two kinds of pleasure experienced side by side. This means that an educated person, when attending a musical performance, may experience two separate and perhaps even contradictory responses: pleasure in response to music *per se* and pleasure or pain in response to the noble or ignoble status of melodies and rhythms. If the two pleasures act in consonance, the musical experience is doubly pleasurable, but if they clash, one's moral preference presumably would take precedence over any natural delight in music. Aristotle clearly values the moral pleasure over the natural pleasure. It involves an ethical and cognitive element which is absent from the latter.[35] Nevertheless, he still presents natural pleasure as a valid emotion which continues to have its place in the adult lives of the educated. Aristotle classifies this pleasure as harmless (ἀβλαβῆ, *Pol.* 1339b25) and outlines other important uses for it.[36]

4. *The Sociology of Pleasure*

In *Politics* 8.7, Aristotle lays the benefits of musical training aside and, by describing the conduct of the professional musician, alludes to the dangers of performing. In the same passage, he outlines what 'incorrect pleasure' felt by the uneducated might look like (Arist. *Pol.* 1341b9–19):

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[35] This moral pleasure felt in music is not simply an emotional orientation, but involves a cognitive element as well. The educated aristocrat is able to judge the moral and technical merits of music in a conscious, self-reflective way. Pleasure in this sense is based on the convergence between habit and reason.

[36] Presumably, because Aristotle's educated are fully habituated, even if natural pleasure is evoked in response to a musical representation of a bad character, it is not harmful to their characters. This is in contrast to Plato's inhabitants, who never reach a complete state of virtue and are always at risk of character corruption through music. But, to be fair, Plato does not differentiate between two different kinds of pleasure as Aristotle does. Other uses for natural pleasure include relaxation and leisure. I understand the *telos* of *Pol.* 1339b25 to refer to leisure (*diagôgê*). Of course, given the vast bibliography on leisure, it would take another chapter to argue that natural pleasure in music (and not a moral pleasure or intellectual pleasure) is useful for leisure.

> And since we reject professional education in the instruments and in performance (and we count performance in competitions as professional, for the performer does not take part in it for his own improvement, but for his hearers' pleasure, and that a vulgar pleasure … and indeed performers do become vulgar, since the object at which they aim is a low one, as vulgarity in the audience usually influences the music, so that it imparts to the artists who practice it with a view to suit the audience a special kind of personality, and also of bodily frame because of the movements required) …
>
> ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὀργάνων καὶ τῆς ἐργασίας ἀποδοκιμάζομεν τὴν τεχνικὴν παιδείαν (τεχνικὴν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ὁ πράττων οὐ τῆς αὑτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορτικῆς … καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος· ὁ γὰρ θεατὴς φορτικὸς ὢν μεταβάλλειν εἴωθε τὴν μουσικήν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετῶντας αὐτούς τε ποιούς τινας ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις) …

Those musically educated are able to judge and feel pleasure correctly when acting as listeners, but the lower classes who have not gone through this process of ethical education are not able to judge the moral correctness of music. Rather, the uneducated listeners take pleasure in music regardless of its moral worth. Moreover, it seems that they particularly enjoy music which corresponds to their own base and banausic *êthê*. This performance of ignoble music is particularly dangerous to the performer. We know from Aristotle's previous comments that performing music has the powerful quality of assimilating the performer's character to what is represented and that performing achieves this much more easily than mere listening. Because the goal of the professional performer is not the cultivation of his own virtue, but the pleasure of the audience, the professional performer crafts his musical composition so as to appeal to those audience members with base characters. They are pleased, but in a sort of anti-moral habituation, the performer assimilates to their vulgarity.[37]

Aristotle's disparagement of the *banausos* or *phortikos* man and his 'vulgar pleasure' might lead one at first to think that different classes experience different pleasures in response to music. This is only true insofar as the different classes reflect differing levels of education. The aristocratic, educated man has developed the ability to 'enjoy correctly', a moral response to music gained through hands-on performance, which allows him to recognize, and subsequently enjoy, the moral dimension of musical representations.

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[37] Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1103b7 f.: ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη.

Because only the educated are trained to perform music, only this class is able to experience the pleasures gained from performance and the moral pleasure that accompanies it. Since the uneducated, lower-class man has no training in singing or playing an instrument nor experience in performance, he is unable to recognize, understand, or feel moral pleasure in music. Without any musical training to inform his reaction to a performance, his response and subsequent pleasure reflects the purely auditorial, the non-cognitive 'natural pleasure' which music provides. In this way, Aristotle's discussion permits access to the moral pleasure of the man with performance training to a select minority, the educated upper class. Aristotle does not simply propose a system of education that privileges the upper class and disparages the lower, but he introduces a sociology of pleasure in which the population is segregated by the primary pleasure they take in music.[38] It is not surprising that Aristotle introduces a class distinction based on virtue and education, but it is surprising, or at least interesting, that this social distinction is doubled in the aesthetic realm. The elite possess greater virtue and better pleasure. They get more practical value out of the practice of *mousikê,* and, in a system in which aesthetic value is assessed according to the successful representation of moral content, they have access to the highest level of aesthetic perception.

5. pathos *and* hêdonê

Aristotle describes music as a representation of an *êthos* (μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν, *Pol.* 1340a39), and he accepts as proof of this the observation that different types of music produce different emotional effects in the listener (Arist. *Pol.* 1340a39–1340b4):

> Pieces of music on the contrary do actually contain in themselves imitations of character; and this is manifest, for even in the nature of the mere melodies there are differences, so that people when hearing them are affected differently and have not the same feelings in regard to each of them, but listen

[38] I might briefly add that this class segregation is also apparent in the way each class uses music. The lower class uses musical pleasure for amusement (*paidia*), a way to relax and refresh after strenuous work. The upper class uses music for *diagôgê,* aristocratic leisure time, in which musical pleasure is not the goal, but a byproduct. See the discussions at *Pol.* 1337b34–1338a7 and 1339b15–44. I speak of 'primary pleasure', because while the educated man is able to feel both moral pleasure and natural pleasure, in Aristotle's estimation, the former trumps the latter and is a much more prestigious and valuable sort of pleasure.

> to some in a more mournful and restrained state … and to others in a softer state of mind … but in a midway state and with the greatest composure in another.[39]
>
> ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἔστι μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν (καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ φανερόν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις, ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον … πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν … μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μάλιστα πρὸς ἑτέραν …).

The relationship between *êthos* and *pathos* is complex, but generally, Aristotle describes ethical attributes in terms of propensities towards certain emotions, or more specifically, feeling the correct emotion 'at the right times, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way',[40] and as maintaining a intermediate orientation between emotional extremes. For example, mildness (πραότης) is the ethical designation of one who correctly feels anger (ὀργή),[41] and so when experiencing the emotional state of mildness, one is practicing an orientation toward *pathos* which corresponds to a specific *êthos*. Consequently, the sympathetic response evoked by music in the listener is a sign that he or she is indeed engaging with and practicing the represented *êthos*. I am remarking on the relationship between *pathos* and *êthos* in order to emphasize that listening to music, although it expressly involves *êthos*, is primarily an emotional experience.[42] This means that music produces two emotional responses. The first is the sympathetic emotional response which reproduces the object of representation in the listener, e.g. anger, enthusiasm, courage, or temperance. The second is natural pleasure as well as perhaps moral pleasure for the educated. The multiple responses introduced by Aristotle raise the question: what is the relationship between *pathos* and

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39 I have omitted the passage's mention of specific so-called 'modes': Mixolydian makes one mournful and restrained, Dorian instills the 'greatest composure', Phrygian makes people enthusiastic. Aristotle is specifically talking about *melos* here, but at *Pol.* 1340b8 he discusses the emotional character (*tropos*) of rhythms. At *Pol.* 1342b3 he speaks of Phrygian as a *harmonia*. Therefore he does not use these terms with the greatest accuracy. It is clear that all three components of music convey some sort of ethical information, and so for simplicity's sake, I am talking about 'music' in general as conveyer of emotional and ethical content.

40 Arist. Eth. Nic. 1106b21, tr. Irwin 1985 (τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ). See esp. the discussion in *Eth. Nic.* 2 through 4 for Aristotle's views on virtue, *êthos*, and *pathos*.

41 Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1126a26 f. Aristotle mentions both mildness and anger at *Pol.* 1340a20 as possible objects of musical representation.

42 See esp. 1340a8–18 (quoted above on p. 166) where the sympathetic quality of music is described.

hêdonê? And, while Aristotle tells us how moral pleasure is evoked, how is natural pleasure evoked?[43]

One might think at first that natural pleasure is a response to experiencing *pathos* itself and that human beings find pleasure in exercising the emotive faculty which is so centrally involved in the reception of *mousikê*. In other works, Aristotle does specifically connect *pathos* and pleasure, noting that pleasure and pain accompany emotions. In *Rhetoric* 2, for example, he defines the emotions in reference to pleasure and pain: 'the emotions are all those (feelings) on account of which men so change as to differ in judgment, and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure: for example, anger, pity, fear, and all other such emotions and their opposites'.[44] Aristotle implies that specific emotions are accompanied by either pleasure or pain, but generally not both.[45] For example, fear is categorized as a 'certain pain', and does not yield pleasure.[46]

In the case of *mousikê*, however, if music is naturally pleasurable to everyone as Aristotle asserts, it follows that pleasure is produced in the listener even when music simultaneously evokes painful emotions such as fear, anger, sadness, or enthusiasm. It is unclear how pleasure could be evoked in response to a necessarily painful emotion. One way to avoid this problem is to understand natural pleasure to be a response not to the emotional content represented by music but to the mimetic nature of music itself. In this sense, the stimulus toward emotion in each case is differentiated, with *pathos* arising sympathetically in response to the ethical object of representation (e.g. anger, courage), and *hêdonê* arising in response to recognition of a song's status as representation. Each emotional response then occurs in parallel instead of existing in a causal relationship with one *pathos* prompting the other. For the concept of mimetic pleasure, I refer to Aristotle's com-

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43 I focus only on natural pleasure in music here, because Aristotle makes it clear that moral pleasure, the pleasure of the trained performer, must be a response to the *êthos* and corresponding *pathos* evoked. So a musically educated person finds pleasure in the emotion of courage or mildness or *sôphrosunê*. Natural pleasure is taken for granted and left unexplained. I attempt here to make a few suggestions of how we might understand it.

44 Rh. 1378a20–23: ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία, tr. Fortenbaugh 2002. See also *Eth. Nic.* 1105b23, where Aristotle notes that pleasure or pain follows on specific emotions.

45 And, notably, some emotions such as hatred and kindness are specifically said to be accompanied by neither pleasure nor pain (e.g. *Rh.* 1382a12–13, 1385a20–b10).

46 See *Rh.* 1382a21. Fortenbaugh 2002, 103–114 further discusses the relationship between emotions, pleasure, and pain.

ments on *mimêsis* in the *Poetics*. In chapter 4, Aristotle states as a general fact that human beings take pleasure in mimetic objects.[47] As proof of this he asserts that a person takes pleasure in viewing an image of an object which in reality would be painful (e.g. a corpse).[48] This mimetic pleasure is a result of recognizing the correspondence between the represented object and its real-life counterpart.[49] Music similarly presents a situation in which pleasure is derived from an object which could ordinarily cause pain. Its status as *mimêsis* might explain the dual emotional responses by assigning each emotion to medium and content: pleasure is evoked *qua mimêsis* and *pathos qua* represented *êthos*. Furthermore, just as the natural pleasure of music is described as a universal human experience, so is mimetic pleasure a universal pleasure, one available to 'all men', 'not just philosophers'. One problem with identifying natural pleasure with mimetic pleasure is that Aristotle seems to describe the latter in cognitive terms: it is based on recognition (ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος).[50] Considering that music operates on the emotional and non-rational level, however, I would assert that this musical recognition and subsequent pleasure can take a non-cognitive form.

Furthermore, Aristotle implies that the listener enjoys music only when it corresponds to his own *êthos*. And so, at *Pol.* 1341b9–14, the professional singer is at risk of becoming corrupted because he aims to please the audience, who enjoy music that reflects their uneducated, banausic characters. This passage implies that audiences do not find the same levels of enjoyment in all music, but primarily in that which represents what they can recognize, namely their own dispositions. He makes a similar comment a little later, when he argues that, in competitions of theatrical music

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[47] *Poet.* 1448b8–9: καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. Although Aristotle makes these comments in the context of the origin of poetry, these specific remarks are presented as applicable to *mimêsis* in general.

[48] *Poet.* 1448b10–19: ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος· ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχῃ προεωρακώς, οὐχ ᾗ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ τὴν χροιὰν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν.

[49] Halliwell 2002, 151–206 talks at length about *mimêsis* and mimetic pleasure in the *Poetics*. While discussing *mimêsis* in the *Politics*, he does not mention musical pleasure.

[50] The involvement that the cognitive dimension plays in this pleasure described in *Poetics* ch. 4 is somewhat unclear and disputed by scholars. Engaging with *mimêsis* involves learning (μανθάνειν) and reasoning out (συλλογίζεσθαι), which suggests that higher-level cognition is involved, but it is also something which is done by children, who have not yet developed the kind of cognition and rational thinking skills possessed by adults.

containing both upper and lower classes in their audiences, different melodies must be played for each class.[51] The uneducated populace enjoys forms of music that the educated class does not (Arist. *Pol.* 1342a23–26):

> Just as their souls are warped from the natural state, so those harmonies and melodies that are highly strung and irregular in coloration are deviations, but people of each sort receive pleasure from what is naturally suited to them.
>
> εἰσὶ δὲ ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως—οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἑκάστοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖον.

The uneducated have never been morally habituated to feel pleasure and pain correctly, and so they enjoy music that corresponds to their uneducated characters and to ethical states developed apart from moral education. Because their souls have been perverted, they will feel pleasure at recognizing those same warped *êthê* represented in music. The ἡδονὴ φυσικὴ of music is considered natural because one will feel pleasure at expressions of one's own φύσις. This passage highlights the element of recognition involved in natural musical pleasure. We feel pleasure because we recognize that what we are hearing is a *mimêma*, an aesthetically crafted representation of something familiar, namely one's own ethical traits. Because it is familiar, it is recognizable as a representation instead of just pretty sounds. I reemphasize here that this recognition operates on the emotional and sub-cognitive level; this is a sort of emotional recognition in which the sympathetic response to a musical piece testifies to a successful recognition. The evocation of emotion is a sign one is recognizing the represented *êthos*, but this act of recognition is not equivalent to understanding the *êthos*. Aristotle stresses that only the educated performer can understand and evaluate an *êthos*.

6. *Conclusion*

I have argued that Aristotle makes a distinction between the musical pleasure experienced by the mere listener and by the man educated in performance. While the former is a natural pleasure experienced by and available to everyone, the latter is a form of moral pleasure restricted to those who have had training in performance. Aristotle focuses intently on this per-

[51] The passage assigns ethical melodies to the educated, and kathartic melodies to the lower class. Lord 1982, 138 f. provides further discussion.

formative pleasure and grants the reader some insight into its aims and objects, but he leaves the natural pleasure available to all listeners a little more obscure. I have attempted to tease out some possible implications by suggesting that it is related to mimetic pleasure, but my discussion has just scratched the surface, and I hope my comments will lead to further discourse and exploration. Furthermore, I have asserted that Aristotle attributes different values to each form of pleasure. Plato makes no such distinction and describes the pleasure of *mousikê* as one that is performative and beneficial for its educative properties. Because Aristotle's *polis* admits of class hierarchy, he not only makes a distinction between performative and auditorial pleasure, which conform to and follow class lines, but he also prioritizes these pleasures. Although he says 'it is proper ... to participate in the common pleasure' of music, the use of music for educational purposes and the moral pleasure which arises is classified as being more honorable (τιμιωτέρα, *Pol.* 1340a1) than any other use. The value Aristotle places in music correlates with its utility, and moral concerns certainly trump purely aesthetic concerns. That being said, unlike Plato, whose concern with art is purely ethical, Aristotle is concerned not merely with music's ability to confer virtuous habits. Aristotle's youth learn to perform music to become good, but just as importantly, they become good judges of musical performances and take pleasure in performances. In this way, the *Politics* attributes value to *mousikê* beyond simple utility and appreciates its status as an art form which is both performed and culturally embedded. Aristotle creates and conforms to a musical aesthetic which values moral and ethical traits as they are represented through the medium of *mousikê*, thus defining aesthetic value in such a way that he creates a hierarchy of pleasure and aesthetic experience. Aristotle's aristocratic youth do not simply become the most virtuous men, but they become the ideal arbiters of a culturally pervasive art form, which is a valuable component of Greek society. If they are to be the best men, they will also be the best practitioners of culture, with the best resulting pleasure.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

AUDIENCE, POETIC JUSTICE, AND AESTHETIC VALUE IN ARISTOTLE'S *POETICS*[*]

Elsa Bouchard

1. *Introduction*

Ancient popular taste, in the field of culture as elsewhere, is especially arduous to assess as a historical reality. Apart from the rather elusive nature of 'popular taste' as an object of inquiry, one must also cope with sources that largely consist of the writings of great thinkers holding very distinctive views on these matters—that is to say, views that are by no means representative of their contemporaries. This constraint hinders almost all accounts of ancient values. It calls for K.J. Dover's careful methodology in *Greek Popular Morality* (1974), where sources belonging to the philosophical genre are systematically excluded while attention is concentrated on types of speech that are directly intended for the demos: oratory and (with some additional precaution) comedy and tragedy. But in the specific case of poetic popular taste, to which I shall turn my attention here, it is even harder to escape the pitfalls of the 'intellectualist bias', because the field of ancient literary criticism is, more than any other, the province of the highbrow: the grammarian, the philosopher, or the pedantic poet. In order to obtain information on this matter it is thus inevitable to use the critical reactions of these anti-popular spirits, who regularly denounce the 'popularity', the 'vulgarity', or the 'insensitivity' of their time.[1]

[*] I wish to thank the anonymous referee for Brill for helpful suggestions on this chapter, as well as the members of the audience of the sixth Penn-Leiden Colloquium on Ancient Values for pertinent remarks on the occasion of its oral delivery.

[1] One apparently straightforward example of this is Eupolis' deploring the fact that Pindar's poems were condemned to silence 'by the crowd's indifference to beauty' (ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἀφιλοκαλίας) (fr. 398 KA = *Ath.* 1.3a). However, in addition to the fragmentary nature of the citation, the very thorny question of the attitude of poets of Old Comedy toward their audience, which alternates between flattery and insult, makes it difficult to take such assertions at face value.

Another precautionary comment should be made about a variety of testimonies on ancient poetic reception. One of our most striking pieces of evidence relating to this subject is Herodotus' account (Hdt. 6.21) of the reaction of the Athenians during the performance of Phrynichus' *Capture of Miletus* in 494 BCE: the audience burst into such distressed weeping that the dramatist was fined and the play forbidden further performances. Yet this anecdote is hardly helpful for determining the poetic preferences of ancient Greeks, because Phrynichus' play was so much bound to the recent historical events that had personally affected the people of Athens. In this case, the subject matter of the play prevents it from being an impartial witness of the Athenians' general appreciation of drama, but Herodotus' testimony at least shows that there were limits to their willful immersion into, as Plato puts it, tragedy's 'mixture of grief and pleasure' (Pl. *Phlb.* 48a): in the case of Phrynichus' play, grief apparently led to anger, not pleasure.

Something similar can be said about the reception of Aristophanes' *Frogs*. According to Dicaearchus, not only did the play win first prize but it was also so much admired that it was produced again. The main object of admiration was apparently the *parabasis*, 'through which Aristophanes reconciled the enfranchised to the disenfranchised and the citizens to the exiles'.[2] Once again, the play's (here favorable) reception is presented as first and foremost the result of its topical political message, and not of its poetic features. As we shall see, Dicaearchus nevertheless points to a dramatic element that Aristotle believes to be universally successful: the *reconciliation*, which he considers typical of comedy and indeed to which he ascribes the power of turning a tragedy into a comedy. To Aristotle's eyes, reconciliation obviously fulfills a latent desire of any audience.

This chapter will be concerned precisely with Aristotle, whose analysis of drama ignores both the historical and the patriotic brands of tragedy and stresses its more universal aspects (plot-arrangement, *êthos* of characters,

[2] Fr. 104 Mirhady (his translation) = 84 Wehrli: οὕτω δὲ ἐθαυμάσθη διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ παράβασιν, καθ' ἣν διαλλάττει τοὺς ἐντίμους τοῖς ἀτίμοις καὶ τοὺς πολίτας τοῖς φυγάσιν, ὥστε καὶ ἀνεδιδάχθη, ὥς φησι Δικαίαρχος. Wehrli 1944, 69 believes that the second production of *Frogs* was a documented fact, whereas the additional details on the reasons for the second production are no more than 'a typically arbitrary ornamentation in Dicaearchus' style' ('für D. charakteristische willkürliche Ausschmückung'). According to the argument presented in this chapter, Dicaearchus' comments should rather be considered in the light of a recurring post-Aristotelian critical attitude that imparts a particular taste for mild and morally edulcorated drama to the general public.

etc.).[3] I intend to show that Aristotle can be credited with a seminal distinction between 'beautiful' and 'good' tragedies that amounts to establishing a separate category of the 'aesthetic' in contradistinction to the 'successful' or the 'popular'. In the course of this demonstration, a number of conclusions will be reached about popular taste along the lines of Aristotle's account of the intellectual and emotional components of poetic experience. However, the purpose of this study is not so much to establish a historically accurate description of ancient popular taste as to identify some features of popular taste *as it is represented in ancient critical discourse*. In other words, I am more interested in popular taste as a construction of ancient critics than as an object *per se*—and luckily so, since our sources are hopelessly biased on this matter, as I have already mentioned.

2. *Critical Standards and Audience Standards*

In his treatise on *Rhetoric* Aristotle makes a fundamental distinction between three types of rhetorical speech. This division reflects the existence in the contemporary *polis* of three classes of audience destined to hear the speeches, as is made clear at the opening of 1.3 (Arist. *Rh.* 1358a35–b8):

> The kinds of rhetoric are three in number, corresponding to the three kinds of hearers. For every speech is composed of three parts: the speaker, the subject of which he treats, and the person to whom it is addressed, I mean the hearer, to whom the end or object of the speech refers. Now the hearer must necessarily be either a mere spectator or a judge, and a judge either of things past or of things to come. For instance, a member of the general assembly is a judge of things to come; the dicast, of things past; the mere spectator, of the ability of the speaker. Therefore there are necessarily three kinds of rhetorical speeches, deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. (tr. Freese)[4]
>
> ἔστιν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἴδη τρία τὸν ἀριθμόν· τοσοῦτοι γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν λόγων ὑπάρχουσιν ὄντες. σύγκειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ περὶ οὗ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὅν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρὸς τοῦτόν ἐστιν, λέγω δὲ τὸν ἀκροατήν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν εἶναι ἢ κριτήν, κριτὴν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ τῶν μελλόντων. ἔστιν δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων ὁ ἐκκλησιαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων [οἷον] ὁ δικαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τρία γένη τῶν λόγων τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβουλευτικόν, δικανικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν.

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[3] On Aristotle's 'excision' of the civic and Athenian features of tragedy in the *Poetics* see Hall 1996.

[4] Translations, unless otherwise stated, are my own.

This passage makes the important point that rhetoric revolves around the notion of *audience*, which is not only the source of the basic threefold division of rhetoric as a *tekhnê*, but is also closely connected with the very end (τέλος) of the speeches that this discipline teaches one to produce.

As it happens, Aristotle's definition of the audience as *spectators* and *judges* is certainly as true in the context of ancient drama as it is in the case of rhetorical speeches. However, by contrast with the *Rhetoric*, little scholarly interest is imparted to the 'audience' factor in Aristotle's treatise of poetics. The general tendency[5] is rather to overlook this admittedly contingent factor and to make Aristotle the exponent of a self-standing 'idea' of tragedy that would be blind to the actual *conditions* of the reception of tragedy.

Yet in the *Poetics* he does take into account certain aspects of the material context of dramatic performances. In the middle of chapter 4 we find the following remark, whose importance is seldom emphasized (Arist. *Poet.* 1449a6–8):[6]

> To consider whether or not tragedy is even now sufficiently developed in its types—judging it intrinsically and in relation to its audiences—is a separate matter. (tr. Halliwell)
>
> τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰ ἄρα ἔχει ἤδη ἡ τραγῳδία τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἱκανῶς ἢ οὔ, αὐτό τε καθ' αὑτὸ κρῖναι καὶ πρὸς τὰ θέατρα, ἄλλος λόγος.

This presents a straightforward disjunction between two criteria for judging the level of development in the art of tragedy: on the one hand art itself, and on the other the people who enjoy the product of this art. Presumably, in the first case a judgment could be made by reference to a self-contained and purely theoretical model, but in the second case, one would surely have to consider audience reception. Moreover, the distinction between art in itself and its reception is linked with an allusion to the types (εἴδη) of tragedy, which suggests that this distinction could be relevant to the typology of tragedies found later in the treatise.

In fact, the *Poetics* notoriously contains more than one such typology. The first to occur in the treatise (*Poet.* 1453a12–23) is based on the general direction of the play and on the quality of the protagonist: the latter is either a base or a decent man, and the events depicted show him either improving or worsening his initial state. Within these options, Aristotle

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[5] See e.g. Halliwell 1986, 103, 169 and *passim*. Halliwell is representative of a 'philosophical' approach to the treatise, i.e. one which strives to integrate its content as far as possible into the general context of Aristotelian philosophy.

[6] Exceptional in this respect is Ford 2002, 284.

isolates a single case, that of the decent man falling into misfortune through some sort of 'error' (ἁμαρτία), as the typical plot of what he assertively calls 'the most beautiful tragedy according to art' (ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγῳδία). The prescription concerning the general movement of the play is also repeated in an emphatic fashion: 'with a change not to prosperity from adversity, but on the contrary from prosperity to adversity' (Arist. *Poet.* 1453a13–14).

In the rest of chapter 13 Aristotle dwells with some insistence upon the quality of the protagonist and of the plot-structure of the 'finest' tragedy. In an ambience of polemic, he directly opposes those who blame Euripides for driving his characters into misfortune at the end of his plays, and confirms that this is indeed the 'right' way (ὀρθόν) to proceed. In support of this position, he adduces the following 'clue' (Arist. *Poet.* 1453a26–30):

> And the greatest indication of this is that in theatrical contests such plays are found the most tragic, if successfully managed; and Euripides, even if he does not arrange other details well, is at least found the most tragic of the poets.
> (tr. Halliwell)
>
> σημεῖον δὲ μέγιστον· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων τραγικώταται αἱ τοιαῦται φαίνονται, ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν, καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης, εἰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ εὖ οἰκονομεῖ, ἀλλὰ τραγικώτατός γε τῶν ποιητῶν φαίνεται.

The actual staging of the play thus seems to act as some sort of practical test to verify the quality of Aristotle's favorite plot-pattern.[7] However, one should take notice that he is in no way saying that the plays ending in misfortune are the most *successful* when performed, but only that they are the most *tragic*.

The distinction has some importance given that Aristotle's crowning of Euripides as the 'most tragic' playwright is certainly at odds with the latter's history of bad performances in contests. His censuring of 'the accusers of Euripides', although it probably makes reference to contemporary debates in Aristotle's time, may simultaneously be understood as a late rebuke to the historical judges of the competitions in which the tragedian had participated during his lifetime,[8] only to be repeatedly defeated. This is partly

[7] At first sight this seems to contradict some of Aristotle's other assertions on the subsidiary role of staging. But we must understand that the real criterion is conformity (ὀρθότης) to the rules of the art, whereas the actual performance is only a 'clue', albeit an important one (μέγιστον); cf. Frazier 1998. On the distinction between 'clue' (σημεῖον) and 'proof' (τεκμήριον) see *Rh.* 1357b1–5.

[8] According to Lucas (1968, 147), 'the critics of Euripides are a different set of people from those mentioned above' [sc. at 53a13, where mention is made of the advocates of the 'double

suggested by the allusion to 'staging and contest' (τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων), which hints at the agonistic context of theatrical performances. But whether Aristotle is thinking of the original performances or of contemporary re-performances of Euripides' plays, the apologetic tone of this passage at least indicates that he is striving to repair an injustice of some sort. His comments on the qualities of Euripides as a playwright might thus appear like posterity's restoration of an historical misjudgment: even if he is far from perfection,[9] Euripides' exemplary use of a particular plot-structure wins him the compliment of being the superlative representative of a genre in which, paradoxically, his successes were very meager.

The relevance of the playwright's performance records here is all the more likely considering that a few lines after his dismissal of 'the accusers of Euripides', Aristotle claims that it is usually the plays with a happy ending that achieve popular success, even though they are (absolutely speaking) inferior to the plays that conform to the pattern of the 'finest' tragedy (Arist. *Poet.* 1453a30–36):

> Second-best is the structure held the best by some people: the kind with a double structure like the *Odyssey* and with opposite outcomes for good and bad characters. It is thought to be best because of the weakness of audiences: the poets follow, and pander to the taste of, the spectators. Yet this is not the pleasure to expect from tragedy, but is more appropriate to comedy, where those who are deadliest enemies in the plot, such as Orestes and Aegisthus, exit at the end as new friends, and no one dies at anyone's hands.
>
> (tr. Halliwell)
>
> δευτέρα δ' ἡ πρώτη λεγομένη ὑπὸ τινῶν ἐστιν σύστασις, ἡ διπλῆν τε τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα καθάπερ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια καὶ τελευτῶσα ἐξ ἐναντίας τοῖς βελτίοσι καὶ χείροσιν. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι πρώτη διὰ τὴν τῶν θεάτρων ἀσθένειαν· ἀκολουθοῦσι γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ κατ' εὐχὴν ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεαταῖς. ἔστιν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς κωμῳδίας οἰκεία· ἐκεῖ γὰρ οἳ ἂν ἔχθιστοι ὦσιν ἐν τῷ μύθῳ, οἷον Ὀρέστης καὶ Αἴγισθος, φίλοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἐξέρχονται, καὶ ἀποθνῄσκει οὐδεὶς ὑπ' οὐδενός.

This passage illustrates better than any other the distinction made earlier between on the one hand the standards of art, of which Aristotle makes himself the exponent by authoritatively asserting the inferior status of the

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structure', no doubt some contemporaries of Aristotle]. *Contra* Gudeman 1931, 85 and 1934, 246.

[9] Aristotle criticizes Euripides on a number of points throughout the *Poetics*: illegitimate use of the *mêkhanê* (1454b1), of a recognition device (1454b31) and of 'illogicalities' (1461b20); character flaws (1454a28, 1454a32, 1461b21); unsatisfactory role of the chorus (1456a27).

double structure, and on the other hand the standards of the audience (and of those critics who base their judgment on the audience): according to the former standards the 'double-ending' play is second best, but it is first according to the latter. Here Aristotle firmly takes on the role of a connoisseur and snobbishly rejects the preference of the audience as a worthy criterion for establishing the structure of the 'finest' tragedy.[10] His condescending attitude goes as far as equating the harsh but morally satisfying outcome of the *Odyssey*, with its brutal and unmerciful bloodshed, with the innocuous and lighthearted tone of comedy—notwithstanding the fact that in the latter 'no one dies at anyone's hands'. The double structure is thus made the equivalent of the simple happy-ending structure, doubtless on account of its emotionally comforting conclusion.[11] This equivalence is confirmed by Aristotle's remark to the effect that those who accuse Euripides on account of his unhappy denouements 'make the same mistake' (τὸ αὐτὸ ἁμαρτάνουσιν) as the advocates of the double structure (Arist. *Poet.* 1453a24).

Interestingly, Aristotle's principled objection against 'comic' tragedies seems to have been picked up by the author of a hypothesis to Euripides' *Orestes* (presumably Aristophanes of Byzantium) (Sec. hyp. to *Or.* 11–25 Chapouthier):

> The play ends in a rather comic fashion. [Then follows a parenthetical explanation on the staging of the initial scene.] The play is one among those popular on stage, but it was terrible on account of the characters; indeed, all were base, except for Pylades.
>
> τὸ δρᾶμα κωμικωτέραν ἔχει τὴν καταστροφήν. [...] τὸ δρᾶμα τῶν ἐπὶ σκηνῆς εὐδοκιμούντων, χείριστον δὲ τοῖς ἤθεσι. πλὴν γὰρ Πυλάδου πάντες φαῦλοι ἦσαν.

Although the remark on the 'comic' ending is not developed, it obviously points to the double fact that 1) the play ends peacefully without any of the expected bloodshed; and 2) the protagonist's initially unfortunate situation is followed by a happy conclusion. This is confirmed by two bits of evidence; the first is a scholion to the last verse of the play (schol. Eur. *Or.* 1691):

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[10] In other contexts Aristotle is even harsher in blaming the audience and the judges for having a corrupting effect on artistic productions; cf. *Poet.* 1451b35–37 (on episodic plots), *Pol.* 1341b14–18 (on music).

[11] The passage's ascription to the general public of a preference for comedy-like tragedies is perhaps to be compared with Aristotle's report that the Megarians claimed to have invented comedy, 'contending it arose when their democracy was established' (*Poet.* 1448a30–32; I take γενομένης as expressing a specific occurrence and not, as does Halliwell, a state of affairs, cf. Gudeman 1934 ad loc.): the Megarians' recently acquired freedom would have been celebrated with the foundation of a new and particularly 'democratic' form of entertainment.

> The finale of a tragedy breaks up with a lament or a great suffering, that of comedy with a truce or a reconciliation; whence this play is considered to make use of a comic finale. Indeed, there is a reconciliation between Menelaus and Orestes. But in *Alcestis* also, the play moves from adversity to cheerfulness and resurrection.
>
> ἡ κατάληξις τῆς τραγῳδίας ἢ εἰς θρῆνον ἢ εἰς πάθος καταλύει, ἡ δὲ τῆς κωμῳδίας εἰς σπονδὰς καὶ διαλλαγάς. ὅθεν ὁρᾶται τόδε τὸ δρᾶμα κωμικῇ καταλήξει χρησάμενον· διαλλαγαὶ γὰρ πρὸς Μενέλαον καὶ Ὀρέστην. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀλκήστιδι ἐκ συμφορῶν εἰς εὐφροσύνην καὶ ἀναβιοτήν.

The second is the Aristophanic hypothesis to *Alcestis*, which likewise makes a connection between the two plays (Sec. hyp. to *Alc.* 27–31 Méridier):

> The play is more like a satyric drama, because it ends in joy and pleasure, against the tragic fashion. *Orestes* and *Alcestis* are excluded from tragic poetry on account of their foreignness to the genre, since they begin in adversity and conclude in happiness and joy, which belongs rather to comedy.[12]
>
> τὸ δὲ δρᾶμά ἐστι σατυρικώτερον, ὅτι εἰς χαρὰν καὶ ἡδονὴν καταστρέφει παρὰ τὸ τραγικόν. ἐκβάλλεται ὡς ἀνοίκεια τῆς τραγικῆς ποιήσεως ὅ τε Ὀρέστης καὶ ἡ Ἄλκηστις, ὡς ἐκ συμφορᾶς μὲν ἀρχόμενα, εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ καὶ χαρὰν λήξαντα, ἅ ἐστι μᾶλλον κωμῳδίας ἐχόμενα.

The mention of the 'base' characters in the hypothesis to *Orestes* also evokes the Aristotelian generic distinction between comedy and tragedy (*Poet.* 1448a16–18), and it makes an interesting point in contrasting the play's favorable reception with its poor quality with respect to a specific formal criterion: that of character. An additional censure is certainly to be felt in the mention of the comic denouement, since that is obviously an offense to the genre, as is made clear in the hypothesis to *Alcestis*.

3. Iphigenia in Tauris *vs* Oedipus Tyrannus

The clear-cut character of Aristotle's position in chapter 13 of the *Poetics* as regards the desirable outcome of a tragic play makes it all the more surprising that in the following chapter he apparently renounces it. In a new list of plot-patterns for tragedies, he now defends the superiority of a type of play which can only be termed a 'happy-ending' play. This time, he uses as his distinctive criteria two specific details about the content of the

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[12] The text betrays some confusion between the criteria by which a play is qualified as a comedy or as a satyric drama. For a thorough examination of this and related texts see Meijering 1987, 214–219.

play, namely: 1) whether an expected dreadful action actually takes place or not; and 2) whether the author of this action is aware or not of the identity of his/her victim, to whom the character is in fact closely related. Within these four new possibilities, Aristotle now declares that the best (κράτιστον) is the pattern in which the main character, who is about to do great harm to his/her kin unknowingly, recognizes his/her projected victim before it is too late and stops short of executing the irreparable action, as is illustrated by the plots of Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris* and *Cresphontes* (Arist. *Poet.* 1454a5–9).

For most commentators on the *Poetics*, the two expositions of the best type of tragic plot found successively in chapters 13 and 14 together make up a flat contradiction, and it has been repeatedly suggested that there is no other choice but to think that Aristotle has changed his mind in the midst of the redaction of these chapters.[13] And yet, one must admit that these chapters otherwise present a very cohesive content, which gives the impression that they were composed with all the care and rigor possible. Scholars who reject the likeliness of an unconscious contradiction on Aristotle's part are thus at pains to identify the precise form of his so-called 'favorite tragedy': does it correspond to the '*Oedipus Tyrannus* type' (ending unhappily), or to the '*Iphigenia in Tauris* type' (ending happily)?

Among the numerous solutions that have been attempted to remove the contradiction, one can identify two main strategies. The first consists in showing that chapters 13 and 14 in fact rely on different criteria, i.e. that they address different issues.[14] These attempts are generally unsatisfactory, as the idea of distinguishing between 'plot-structure' (the alleged subject-matter of chapter 13) and 'actions of the plot' (chapter 14) amounts to useless hair-splitting. As Halliwell points out (1986, 223 n. 30), 'Aristotle's focus in *Poet.* 14 continues to be on the plot-structure [...], that is, in particular, on the *metabasis* which constitutes the setting of the *pathos*'. Moreover, such attempts must face the puzzling conclusion that Aristotle's 'best' tragedy is not the same as that which contains the 'best' scenes.[15]

The second type of strategy is to show the progressive nature of Aristotle's account by a minute examination of the subtleties of his argumentation. This is illustrated, for instance, by Halliwell (1986, 223–228), who treats chapter 14 as Aristotle's final word (contrary to what he denounces

13 Cf. Moles 1979, 82–83, with bibliography.

14 This kind of solution can be traced back as early as Vahlen 1914 [1865–1867], 53–54. For other references see Halliwell 1986, 223 n. 30; Heath 2008, 3 n. 6.

15 Cf. Lucas 1968, 155: 'a fact on which Aristotle might have been expected to comment'.

as a widespread tendency, namely to take chapter 13 as the authoritative account and chapter 14 as secondary). Halliwell's main argument lies in what he believes to be the ethical framework of Aristotle's *Poetics*, which accords well with the rejection in chapter 14 of the 'extreme tragedy' (the *OT* type) found in chapter 13. Halliwell also mentions, albeit briefly, that the two chapters are not in strict conflict, considering that the movement from prosperity to adversity that is commended in chapter 13 is also present in the *Iphigenia* kind of tragedy, in which 'the final turn from adverse to favorable fortune is in effect an inversion of a preceding and contrary turn' (1986, 226).

This last statement of Halliwell's makes the implicit distinction between the general movement of the play and its actual ending—a distinction which is the bulk of Heath's similar solution, offered in a recent paper.[16] According to Heath, the prescriptions of chapter 13 are to be understood as essentially preliminary and polemic: they are above all intended to refute the partisans of the double plot. As regards the development of the play, this chapter focuses on the *general process* of change from prosperity to adversity, as is revealed by Aristotle's use of the present tense (1452b34: μεταβάλλοντας; 1453a9: μεταβάλλων; 1453a13: μεταβάλλειν). In chapter 14, by contrast, Aristotle further specifies what he really believes to be 'the best of the best' tragedies: the latter will ultimately avoid the completion of the process towards irreparable misfortune that makes up the preceding sections of the play. The reason Heath gives to explain this preference rests on the idea of technical purity: plays like *Iphigenia in Tauris* are devoid of acts of violence (*pathos*) and thus of the kind of sensational spectacle that Aristotle condemns at the beginning of chapter 14: 'Reliance on visual effect therefore becomes impossible in a plot of averted violence: the poet *has* to rely on the structure of the plot to achieve tragic effect' (2008, 14–15). But this argument betrays a confusion between *pathos* and *opsis*: even in a play where the violent act is completed, such as in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, there is no need for this deed to be shown on stage. Indeed, Oedipus' murder of Laius—arguably the main violent act resulting from an *hamartia* in this story—is not even part of the events of the plot.[17] Moreover, lessening the importance of the conclusion of the play seems to be at odds with Aristotle's own emphasis on endings in his defense of Euripides in chapter 13.[18]

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[16] Heath 2008. Cf. Janko 1987, 108.

[17] Cf. Else 1957, 451–452.

[18] The text is clear: *εἰς δυστυχίαν τελευτῶσιν* (1453a25). As a further objection to Heath one could add that the examples given in ch. 13 (Alcmeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Thyestes, etc.) are

According to critics like Halliwell and Heath, the two successive chapters of the *Poetics* are thus parts of a single account of what Aristotle believed to be *the* ideal tragedy. But is it not possible that instead of establishing an absolute hierarchy between the plot types, he is rather presenting these various rankings with regard to the value that different persons—the rigorous critic on the one hand, the member of the general public on the other—give to these stories?

In support of this idea, I call attention to the exact words by which Aristotle refers to the ranking of these plays: whereas the *Oedipus Tyrannus* type is emphatically termed 'the most beautiful tragedy according to art' (ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγῳδία), the *Iphigenia in Tauris* type is referred to as 'the best'; or, perhaps more accurately, 'the most powerful', the 'strongest' (the word used being κράτιστον). This difference is usually overlooked, since the superlative forms καλλίστη and κράτιστον bear meanings close enough to be considered virtual synonyms in many contexts. Here however I believe that the difference is in fact significant and shows an incompatibility of standpoints between aesthetic or formal standards on the one hand, and practical standards on the other. If that is the case, *kratiston* should here be given the more precise meaning 'strongest'.[19] This would square well with Aristotle's bitter remark, cited earlier, about the 'weakness' (ἀσθένεια) of spectators, which is revealed in their preference for happy, that is, morally satisfying, endings. This 'weakness' appears to be, at least on the lexical level, a natural counterpart of the 'power' that is presumably exerted on the audience by this type of tragedy.[20]

This slight terminological difference between the words of commendation used by Aristotle (*kallistê* on the one hand, *kratiston* on the other) has in fact already been stressed in an essay by Stephen White (1992), who similarly

all cases of completed deeds—in Aristotle's words, people who have *actually* 'suffered or perpetrated terrible things' (παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ ποιῆσαι).

[19] A quick survey of Aristotelian usage brings me to the conclusion that κράτιστος is used with connotations of 'might' at least as often as without (i.e. with the plain meaning 'best'). The following are examples of the former use: *Eth. Nic.* 1116a12, 1117a13, 1117b17 (predicated of soldiers); *Eth. Nic.* 1174b15 (intensity of perception); *Hist. An.* 618b, 620a ('strongest' races among some species of birds).

[20] Needless to say, from the earliest moments of Greek poetics there is a tendency to relate poetry to a special 'power' that exerts itself upon its audience; this is present no less in the accounts of the poets themselves (e.g. in Homer the listeners are regularly enthralled by a skillful narrator, be it Demodocus, Odysseus, or the Sirens) as in that of the theoreticians, such as in Gorgias' famous description of the power of logos (*Hel.* 8–14) and in his definition of tragedy as deception (82 B23 DK).

translates *kratiston* as 'most powerful'. Although he also links this powerful effect with the moral satisfaction provided by this type of tragedy, White does not go as far as I do in contrasting the formal and the popular value attached to these terms. In fact, White's general interpretation of Aristotle as exalting a category of tragedies that illustrates the overcoming of moral luck by 'moral fortune' is simply unconvincing: how could this 'moral nobility', this 'fine response to bad luck', express itself in a character who did not suffer or cause any harm after all? White's proposal that the two main plot-patterns described in chapters 13 and 14 are simply variant instances of Aristotle's 'finest' tragedy overlooks the fact that these patterns are, to put it simply, hugely irreconcilable.[21] As will be made clear presently (see section 7), these prototypical tragedies do not possess an identical value, insofar as they are valued by different audiences.

A parallel for the coupling that I have pointed out between the notions of a weak audience and an unrefined but powerful means of appeal can be found at the beginning of the third book of the *Rhetoric* (1403b6–1404a13). Aristotle there justifies his addressing the issue of *lexis* (which here includes delivery, *hupokrisis*) by stating that this element is most effective for persuasion (δύναμιν ἔχει μεγίστην) and that it also provides victory in poetic contests. He adds that such an object of study is certainly vulgar (φορτικόν), but that one cannot in practice do without it because the mediocrity of the audience (τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν) makes *lexis* such a potent element in speeches.

In a similar vein, Aristotle's analysis in chapter 14 of the *Poetics* could be understood as an attempt to temper the strictly formal requirements of the preceding chapter in that he now considers a contextual restriction, namely the emotional reaction of a concrete audience. I am not suggesting of course that the 'formal' treatment of chapter 13 ignores the effect on the spectator made by tragedy, quite the contrary: Aristotle's definition of the 'tragic' is inseparable from the emotions that it must evoke in the spectator, namely pity and fear. My point is rather that in chapter 13 this requirement is taken to its extreme consequences, without regard for the psychological comfort of the spectator or for the 'popularity' of this tragic pattern, whereas

21 Cf. Halliwell 1986, 227: 'Aristotle's averted catastrophe simply is not, in the end, a catastrophe at all; and if the requisite emotions of pity and fear are to be aroused by undeserved misfortune, then while the prospect of such misfortune may successfully elicit them, as Aristotle's argument presupposes, it cannot do so in quite the same way as the actuality'.

in chapter 14 we find a milder version of the same requirement: pity and fear are aroused up to the point where they are replaced by relief and consolation.

4. philanthrôpia *in the* Poetics

Another element can be brought to light in order to demonstrate the significant part played by the audience factor in Aristotle's generally theoretical model of tragedy. I have suggested that one of the main characteristics of the happy-ending plays is that they satisfy poetic justice by avoiding that a rather good character be undeservedly mistreated by fortune (or, alternatively, worsted by an enemy). Some of these plays, according to Aristotle, also feature a 'double' structure, that is, not only a favorable outcome for good characters, but also an unfavorable one for bad characters. It is remarkable that the latter element, punishment or misfortune for the wicked, is twice associated with an element called the *philanthrôpon* (*Poet.* 1453a2, 1456a20), while the picture of depraved characters moving from adversity to prosperity is specifically said *not* to arouse *philanthrôpon* (1452b36–38).

'*Philanthrôpon*' is one among a number of vexed terms in the treatise. Most translators render it with some periphrastic formula such as 'expressive of human sympathy' or 'satisfying a sense of justice',[22] but none of these interpretations is at all credible.[23] I believe that the right answer to this specific problem has been given in a largely ignored paper by D. de Montmollin,[24] who argued that the word *philanthrôpon* in the *Poetics* should be understood in a passive sense: it does not mean 'expressing human love' but rather 'loved by humans', 'popular' (a usage paralleled in contemporary rhetorical speeches). While admitting that almost all other φιλο- compounds have an active meaning in ancient Greek, De Montmollin adduced many convincing examples of a passive use of *philanthrôpon*, both in classical and post-classical literature. One of these examples comes from Aristotle himself (*Politics* 1263b15). After considering Plato's proposal of a system of communal property among the members of the *polis*, Aristotle makes the following remark: 'Such legislation therefore has an attractive appearance,

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22 Cf. Lamberton 1983; Moles 1984.

23 The first is unfit to the discussion in the *Poetics*, while the second has no parallel either in Aristotle or in contemporary literature. See the criticism in Carey 1988.

24 De Montmollin 1965. There is no reference to De Montmollin in the two articles mentioned above n. 23 and published in the same journal.

and might be thought to be *philanthrôpos* (εὐπρόσωπος μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν); for he who is told about it welcomes it with gladness (ἄσμενος) …'. As De Montmollin points out, the juxtaposition of εὐπρόσωπος and φιλάνθρωπος in this passage strongly suggests the passive meaning of the latter epithet.[25]

According to this understanding of *philanthrôpon*, Aristotle's mention (*Poet.* 1453a1–4) that some plot-structures, such as the one which shows a wicked individual falling from prosperity to adversity, lack the properly tragic elements of pity and fear but still contain the *philanthrôpon*, is in effect a reassessment of the distinction between the standards of art and those of the public: although not genuinely 'tragic', and thus unsatisfying in the eyes of a specialist preoccupied with the requirements of the genre, such plays are popular nevertheless, simply because they conform to the taste of the audience. As to the role of 'poetic justice' in this discussion, the examples provided by Aristotle suggest that even if the essential meaning of *philanthrôpon* is indeed 'gratifying' or 'popular', the word 'would of course subsume the "moral sense" interpretation',[26] given that the audience, in Aristotle's model, happens to have a preference for morally satisfying tragedies.

Aristotle's contrast between 'tragic' and '*philanthrôpon*' can be compared with the opinion of his pupil Aristoxenus on the potential conflict between the rules of musical art and popular musical taste; in such cases, the former must prevail in the eyes of a specialist (Themistius *Or.* 33.364c):

> [E]ven though Aristoxenus was engaged in a pursuit that has broad appeal, he regarded the disdain of the people and of the theater's throng as a matter of no significance. If he could not remain faithful to the principles of his art and simultaneously sing in a way that delighted the masses, he would opt for art over popularity. (tr. Penella)
>
> Ἀριστόξενος μὲν οὖν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐπιτήδευσιν μετιὼν δημοτικήν, παρ' οὐδὲν ἐποιεῖτο δήμου καὶ ὄχλου ὑπεροψίαν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὑπάρχοι ἅμα τοῖς τε νόμοις τῆς τέχνης ἐμμένειν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ᾄδειν κεχαρισμένα, τὴν τέχνην εἵλετο ἀντὶ τῆς φιλανθρωπίας.

This instance of the word *philanthrôpia*, although post-classical, is of course in full agreement with the interpretation of the corresponding adjective as 'popular,' 'agreeable.'

Since there appears to be a close association between poetic justice and the element of *philanthrôpon*, and if this word indeed points to a general

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25 This example from the *Politics* is also adduced by Apicella Ricciardelli 1971–1972, 392, who independently reaches the same conclusion as De Montmollin.

26 Carey 1988, 138 (who also ends up with a solution similar to De Montmollin's).

preference of the public, it is quite possible that Aristotle's crowning of such 'moral' tragedies as *kratiston* conveys some even more precise connotations, such as 'the dominant plays in competitions', 'the most award-winning'. Considering that there is strong evidence that the Athenian judges' decisions complied with the will of the crowd, which brashly expressed itself in the theater,[27] it is only natural to suppose that those plays exhibiting the features that the audiences liked most would have been the most successful in competitions—although this does not signify that Aristotle believed that they were the 'best' *auto kath' auto*, that is, artistically speaking. Quite the contrary: Aristotle should rather be considered an early promoter of an 'anti-prize mentality'[28] which would bear fruit in the later critical tradition.

5. *Literary Excellence and Contest Performance in Ancient Criticism*

On the question of the historical reality of this alleged popular preference for moral tragedies we are partly compelled to trust Aristotle, given the scant evidence available about the actual ranking of tragic trilogies. But at least in the case of the two extant plays that are identified as representatives of the 'unhappy ending' and of the 'happy ending', that is Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* and Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*, some pieces of evidence are available. In particular, we know that the trilogy of which the former was part was not victorious (Dicaearch. fr. 101 Mirhady = 80 Wehrli = sec. hyp. to *OT*):

> The *Oedipus Tyrannus* has been given this title [*Tyrannus*] in order to distinguish it from the other.[29] All graciously give it the additional title *Tyrannus* as standing out above all Sophocles' work, although it was beaten by Philocles, as Dicaearchus says.
>
> ὁ τύραννος Οἰδίπους ἐπὶ διακρίσει θατέρου ἐπιγέγραπται. χαριέντως δὲ Τύραννον ἅπαντες αὐτὸν ἐπιγράφουσιν ὡς ἐξέχοντα πάσης τῆς Σοφοκλέους ποιήσεως, καίπερ ἡττηθέντα ὑπὸ Φιλοκλέους, ὥς φησι Δικαίαρχος.

We should probably ascribe to Dicaearchus the content of the first part of the last sentence (about the play's exceptional quality and its fitting title) as well as the second part,[30] which is a mere piece of didascalic information. In

[27] Cf. Csapo and Slater 1995, 160.
[28] Cf. Wright 2009, who tracks this mentality in Greek and Latin writers.
[29] Sophocles' other Oedipus play, *Oedipus at Colonus*.
[30] Cf. Montanari 2009, 429 (in Montanari's reply to Avezzù during the Entretiens Hardt); also Wehrli 1944, I, 68.

fact, the juxtaposition of these two parts makes a telling contrast between the 'gracious' critical[31] recognition of the play's superiority and its historical defeat. A similarly clever association[32] between an epithet referring to a character in the play and some quality ascribed to that play is perhaps to be understood also in the following comment on the title of Euripides' *Hippolytus*, which comes from the Aristophanic hypothesis to the play (Sec. hyp. to *Hipp.* 28–32 Méridier):

> [In this competition] Euripides was ranked first, Iophon second, and Ion third. This one is the second *Hippolytus*, which is also nicknamed *Hippolytus with a crown*. It is obvious that it was written after the other, for what was inappropriate and liable to bad-mouthing has been corrected in this drama. The play is first rate.
>
> πρῶτος Εὐριπίδης, δεύτερος Ἰοφῶν, τρίτος Ἴων. ἔστι δὲ οὗτος Ἱππόλυτος δεύτερος, καὶ στεφανίας προσαγορευόμενος. ἐμφαίνεται δὲ ὕστερος γεγραμμένος· τὸ γὰρ ἀπρεπὲς καὶ κατηγορίας ἄξιον ἐν τούτῳ διώρθωται τῷ δράματι. τὸ δὲ δρᾶμα τῶν πρώτων.

Although the alternative title given to the play obviously points to the scene where the eponymous character is offering a crown to Artemis (73 ff.),[33] it could also have been coined as an allusion to the victory that Euripides obtained with the play. Just as Dicaearchus perceived an ambiguous 'meta-attribution' in the title 'Oedipus King [of tragedies]', here we are perhaps meant to understand 'Hippolytus [the] crowned [play]'. That would be all the more meaningful considering that the earlier *Hippolytus* clearly met with a devastating reception, with which its first-prized successor made a sharp contrast, and that this victory is by itself exceptional in Euripides' career: on only four other occasions did he receive this supreme recognition.[34] The last sentence of the text, with its equivocal reference both to the quality of the play and to its ranking,[35] expresses a rare agreement between

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31 χαριέντως has connotations of refined taste and elegance. In Plato, where much stress is laid on the critical incompetence of the mob, '[t]he presence of beauty or fineness is not signaled by pleasure but by a separate emotion called "charm" (*kharis*, see *Laws* 667b–d); this subtle feeling is concomitant upon a competent critic's perception of a work's "correctness" and "utility"' (Ford 2002, 286). Cf. Dem. Phal. fr. 137 SOD, where Demetrius is identified as one of the χαρίεντες who was displeased with Demosthenes' style of delivery, by contrast with οἱ πολλοί, who admired it.

32 *Pace* Avezzù (in Montanari 2009, 428) who deems 'stravagante' the remark on the title of the play.

33 This scene attracted considerable scholarly interest in antiquity: see Hunter 2009.

34 Cf. the anonymous *Vita Euripidis* 135 (ed. Méridier).

35 According to Wright (2009, 147), within the tradition of the 'pro-prize' mentality at Athens the literary prizes themselves 'could become a *metaphor* for excellence in litera-

Euripides' historical judges and the critical judgment of posterity on the value of the play (by contrast with the implied disapproval of Philocles' victory in the hypothesis to *Oedipus Tyrannus*). But whether or not Hippolytus' 'crown' is really an allusion to the success of the play, the contention that Euripides had to remove what was morally provoking in the earlier play in order to win the competition with the second version certainly constitutes another piece of evidence for the phenomenon that I have been pointing out, namely the ascription of moral preoccupations to the audience by ancient critics.[36]

To return to our *agôn* between *Oedipus Tyrannus* and *Iphigenia in Tauris*: in the case of the latter, we have no information about its original ranking, but its popularity in ancient times is assumed on account of the numerous vase-paintings featuring scenes from the play.[37] Its success at the occasion of its first performance appears at least plausible in the face of Euripides' composition of *Helen*, a very similar play, a few years later: the striking resemblances between *Iphigenia in Tauris* and *Helen* have sometimes[38] been explained by Euripides' conscious reproduction of a popular formula, one which had previously won him success. Finally, *Iphigenia in Tauris* is in all likelihood the play that was allowed a (prize-winning, albeit for acting) re-performance at the Great Dionysia of 341 BCE.[39] So even if the trilogy of which it was part did not originally win Euripides the first place, the later popularity of the play may have inspired Aristotle's choice of it as the paradigmatic *kratiston* tragedy.

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ture'. Here the 'metaphor' (τῶν πρώτων) has a literal significance as well, since the play did in fact come first. But it is true that the 'critical judgments' which typically conclude Aristophanes of Byzantium's *Hypotheses* do not in principle depend on the play's ranking (cf. Gibert 1997, 87).

36 It seems to me that Gibert 1997 is overly skeptical in his treatment of the content of this hypothesis, but even if he is right—that is, if the author of the hypothesis is merely guessing the reasons for Euripides' composition of two different plays on the same subject—that does not affect my argument, since I am concerned with the relation between morality, popular success, and aesthetic value *in ancient critical discourse*. Euripides' earlier *Hippolytus* may not really have been rejected by the Athenians for moral reasons, but that is nonetheless what our critic believes. For an analysis of Euripides' simultaneous self-censorship and self-assertion toward his public in the second version of *Hippolytus*, see Masaracchia 1998.

37 See Cropp 2000, 64.

38 See the introduction to *Iphigenia in Tauris* in Parmentier's and Grégoire's Budé edition (Paris 1959, 100–103).

39 Cf. Cropp 2000, 62–63. The *Didascaliae* (*TrGF* 1 p. 13) inform us that the famous actor Neoptolemus won the prize as protagonist of 'Euripides' *Iphigenia*' (without further precision). As Cropp points out, 'The title role of *IT* is much more attractive for a star actor than that of *IA*'.

As regards Euripides' fragmentary *Cresphontes*, which along with *Iphigenia in Tauris*[40] is given as an example of the 'strongest' kind of tragedy, we know that this drama exhibited the same pattern of averted murder between kin as *Iphigenia in Tauris*, but with an additional element of poetic justice, since the play also featured a revenge taken by the protagonist on the criminal usurper of his throne (thus it belongs to the 'double-structure' class of tragedy).[41] Plutarch (*Mor.* 998E) also informs us that the play could make a terrific impression on the audience, especially during the recognition scene, although we are ignorant of its actual ranking at the time of its original performance.

Of course, the (presumptive) success of *Cresphontes* and *Iphigenia in Tauris*, along with the (relative) failure of *Oedipus Tyrannus*, do not form a statistical sample large enough to validate Aristotle's general assertion about popular taste. But what we know or can legitimately speculate about the reception of these plays at least does not contradict this assertion. Aristotle's well-known work entitled *Didascaliae* (lists of victories in dramatic contests) confirms that he might very well have taken this sort of information into account in the *Poetics*:[42] the numerous allusions in the treatise to 'success' or 'failure' show that considerations of this sort were on his mind, although he is unlikely to have made serious emendations to his theoretical frame on account of the history of dramatic victories. The later generations of scholars in Alexandria and Byzantium likewise demonstrated a strong preoccupation with records of performances and prizes, even if their own relation to these plays was that of *readers* facing *texts*.[43]

More seriously, it could be objected that it would be unbearably naive on Aristotle's part to make any sort of judgment about popular plot types based on historical prizes, because these prizes were awarded not to single plays but rather to the trilogies and tetralogies of which they were part. But there appears to be a widespread tendency among ancient critics, including Aristotle, to discuss tragedies individually and to ignore the trilogic context of their actual mode of production.[44] For instance, the author of the hypothesis to *Oedipus Tyrannus*, cited above, speaks of this play as if the

40 Aristotle's third example, a play entitled *Helle*, is unknown.

41 See the reconstructed summary of the plot in Collard and Cropp 2008, 493–494.

42 The anteriority of the *Didascaliae* over the *Poetics* is generally accepted: Lucas 1968, xiii. It is also in line with Aristotle's 'empirical' methodology in his various fields of study.

43 Cf. Wright 2009, 147.

44 This tendency takes a concrete form in the taxonomic practice of the writers of literary catalogues from the time of Callimachus' *Pinakes*, in which plays were individually listed in alphabetic order: cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 129.

whole of Sophocles' hopes in the contest rested on it: it is *this particular play* that was 'beaten by Philocles'.[45] This tendency may be due to the fact that from an early period, tragic performances were composed of a series of four disconnected plays. In fact, the words 'trilogy' and 'tetralogy', apart from exceptional and dubious cases, seem to have been reserved for productions with a truly unified thematic frame, such as the *Oresteia*.[46] This state of affairs might be seen to justify the ancient critics' general focus on individual plays, especially since some of them must have been considered the 'highlight' of the production. It is by no means unreasonable to think that some exceptionally fine or successful plays may have accounted for the victory of whole productions, the more so if we recall the great complexity of the task of the voters, who were asked to rank three sets of performances composed of three or four plays each. Granting or explaining victory on the basis of a single play appears as a simplification reflex that is excusable both on the audience's and on the critic's part.

After Aristotle, the distinction between general audience taste and critical taste becomes a *locus communis* in critical literature,[47] where it is considered a flaw to pay excessive attention to the former to the detriment of the latter.[48] Moreover, the comments on audience reception sometimes allude

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45 Cf. the similar formulation in Aelius Aristides *In Defence of the Four* p. 256 Jebb: Σοφοκλῆς Φιλοκλέους ἡττᾶτο ἐν Ἀθηναίοις τὸν Οἰδίπουν. One wonders whether 'Philocles' is itself a reference to the author's trilogy (or tetralogy) or to a part only of this trilogy. The idea of a 'duel' between single plays is perhaps present in a curious statement of the *Suda*'s entry on Sophocles (σ 815, Adler IV 420): 'He himself began competing with a play against a play, but in not conducting the levy' (αὐτὸς ἦρξε τοῦ δρᾶμα πρὸς δρᾶμα ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ στρατολογεῖσθαι, tr. Tyrrell); on the reference to Sophocles' generalship and on the possible emendation of στρατολογεῖσθαι to τετραλογίαν see Tyrrell 2006, 165–166. The expression δρᾶμα πρὸς δρᾶμα ἀγωνίζεσθαι seems to imply that the tragedians presented one play each on each day of the festival, contrary to what is usually believed. But this interpretation is rejected by Pickard-Cambridge (1968, 81 n. 3), who thinks that this 'confused' remark means that 'what was characteristic of him [Sophocles] was the development of the independent single play', i.e. the composition of disconnected trilogies or tetralogies.

46 Cf. Pickard-Cambridge 1968, 80–81. Haigh (1896, 123) links Aristotle's surprising omission of any reference to the trilogic mode of composition to his relative disinterest in Aeschylus.

47 Apart from the texts examined below, see e.g. schol. Eur. *Med.* 922 (denouncing Euripides' enticing of the audience and his neglect of the 'carping' critics (ἐφελκυστικὸς γάρ ἐστιν ἀεὶ μᾶλλον τῶν θεατῶν ὁ ποιητής, οὐ φροντίζων τῶν ἀκριβολογούντων); Lucian *Hist. conscr.* 10–11; Plut. *Comp. Ar. et Men. Mor.* 854A. For a list of ancient denunciations of 'unfair' dramatic victories see Rossi 1972, 290; I am inclined to attribute these censures to the highbrow character of their authors rather than to 'mutations in audience taste', *contra* Rossi.

48 Euripides is most often accused of having written some particular verse 'for the sake of audience': see Lord 1908, 13–14 for examples.

to the emotional frailty of the general public, such as in the following (schol. Soph. *Aj.* 762):

> Take notice here again of the qualification made by the poet: he gave wordiness to Ajax and he is somewhat sparing the spectator, lest he should be vexed by the misfortune of Ajax. For being already attached to his virtue, there is a risk that the spectators even get angry at the poet.
>
> παρατήρει κἀνθάδε τὴν προσθήκην τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὅτι προσῆψε τῷ Αἴαντι γλωσσαλγίαν, μονονουχὶ θεραπεύων τὸν θεατὴν μὴ ἄχθεσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ συμφορᾷ τοῦ Αἴαντος. προσῳκειωμένοι γὰρ ἤδη τῇ ἀρετῇ αὐτοῦ σχεδὸν καὶ τῷ ποιητῇ ὀργίζονται.

This scholion is appended to a section of a messenger speech in which Ajax's somewhat hubristic words to his father are reported. The speech only just precedes Ajax's suicide and is thus meant, according to the scholiast, to temper the potentially outraged reaction of the audience by pointing out the protagonist's moral shortcomings. The scholiast here ascribes to the audience a taste for poetic justice and a repulsion towards the representation of undeserved misfortune that is comparable to Aristotle's account.

A very similar assumption can be perceived in the following (exegetical) scholion on *Iliad* 6.58–59, which comments on Agamemnon's enraged words to Menelaus, whom he encourages to kill every single Trojan he meets, including babies inside their mothers' wombs (schol. Hom. *Il.* 6.58–59 ex. bT):

> These words are hateful and unfitting to a royal character. For they reveal a beast-like temper, and the listener, since he is human, hates what is excessively harsh and inhuman. That is why in tragedies also they do not show those who commit such deeds on stage, and they suggest what is happening with sounds that are heard from a distance, or else by using messengers who arrive later to tell what happened. That is because the tragedians simply fear to be hated along with the actions.
>
> But one must say that if ⟨Agamemnon's⟩ words had been said before the breaking of the oath, then there would be grounds for criticism. But since they came after the oaths and their transgression, Agamemnon is not offensive. For the listener also nearly wishes for the race of oath-breakers to disappear.
>
> μισητὰ καὶ οὐχ ἁρμόζοντα βασιλικῷ ἤθει τὰ ῥήματα· τρόπου γὰρ ἐνδείκνυσι θηριότητα, ὁ δὲ ἀκροατὴς ἄνθρωπος ὢν μισεῖ τὸ ἄγαν πικρὸν καὶ ἀπάνθρωπον. ὅθεν κἀν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις κρύπτουσι τοὺς δρῶντας τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν ταῖς σκηναῖς καὶ ἢ φωναῖς τισιν ἐξακουομέναις ἢ δι' ἀγγέλων ὕστερον σημαίνουσι τὰ πραχθέντα, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ φοβούμενοι, μὴ αὐτοὶ συμμισηθῶσι τοῖς δρωμένοις.
>
> λεκτέον δὲ ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ἐλέγετο ταῦτα πρὸ τῆς ἐπιορκίας, ἔγκλημα ἂν ἦν· ἐπεὶ δὲ μετὰ τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὴν παράβασιν, οὐκ ἐπαχθὴς Ἀγαμέμνων· σχεδὸν γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἀκροατὴς τοῦτο βούλεται, τὸ μηδὲ γένος ἐπιλιμπάνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιόρκων.

Just as in Ajax's case, the scholiast expresses the belief that the poet has intentionally lowered the moral status of the Trojans *before* suggesting their forthcoming massacre. This is done in order to avoid the 'hatred' of the audience[49]—a very suggestive word in the light of my preceding discussion on the meaning of *philanthrôpia*.[50]

6. *Euripides: A Critical Battlefield*

In this section I will sum up my argument about Aristotle's appraisal of Euripides and add some comments on the reception of this controversial poet.

It is clear that ancient critical discourse on Euripides is neither uniform nor wholly consistent. Within Aristotle's sole account, Euripides is both a representative of the severe type of tragedian who composes exceptionally painful plays (as implied at *Poet.* 1453a24–26) and the author of one particularly 'strong' play, *Iphigenia in Tauris*, which is singled out for its happy outcome. Since Euripides does not appear to have composed a larger proportion of 'unhappy' tragedies than, say, Sophocles,[51] we should perhaps assume that the critics of Euripides with whom Aristotle takes issue had objected to a number of Euripidean plays in which the contrast between a protagonist's good nature and his final misfortune was especially sharp.

In the first portrait that he gives of Euripides in chapter 13 of the *Poetics*, that of the 'specialist' of unhappy tragedies, Aristotle adopts an apologetic attitude towards the tragedian and simultaneously expresses contempt for popular taste. This indirect account of Euripides' 'unpopularity' is supported by the statistics of his few victories, even though he was granted a chorus every or nearly every time he asked for one. P.T. Stevens[52] attempted to deny Euripides' unpopularity with the Athenians by stressing the latter fact: he was, after all, almost always admitted to take part in the competition. But this state of affairs only reveals the existence of a group of high-class admirers with enough influence on the archon to secure Euripides' participation, even if it was only to see him later rebuffed by a people-oriented

[49] On this expression see Hunter 2005, 180, 183.

[50] Cf. Heliod. *Aeth.* 1.14.4–7: Theagenes complains of the torture that Cnemon inflicts on him by interrupting his story at a point where the wicked mother-in-law is still left unpunished (τὴν κακίστην ἀτιμώρητον ἐάσεις ἐν τῷ λόγῳ Δημαινέτην), so Cnemon agrees to pursue his narration 'since that is agreeable' to his audience (ἐπειδήπερ ὑμῖν οὕτω φίλον).

[51] Cf. Gudeman 1934, 247.

[52] Stevens 1957.

jury.[53] The surprising contrast between Euripides' numerous participations and his few victories is in fact well explicable (although not *solely* explicable)[54] by such an opposition between two classes of audience. In this reconstruction, Euripides appears as 'friend of the elite, enemy of the people'; this squares well with the various ancient testimonies concerning his philosophical studies, his alliances with kings or tyrants,[55] and his allegedly tense relations with the masses.[56] Regardless of the historical value of these anecdotes, they demonstrate that Euripides was generally perceived as an unpopular poet, if not a court writer. Some of these anecdotes might conceivably have been forged precisely in order to account for the discrepancy between the quality and the reception of his plays. In its most extreme manifestation, the desire to explain such a discrepancy results in attributing to Euripides a total indifference to prizes, thus suggesting his 'artistic independence' (*Vit. Eurip.* 118–121 Méridier):

> For this reason presumably [*sc.* having formerly studied with philosophers] he was also somewhat arrogant and kept away from ordinary people and had no interest in appealing to his audiences. This practice hurt him as much as it helped Sophocles.[57] (tr. Lefkowitz)
>
> ὅθεν καὶ πλέον τι φρονήσας εἰκότως περιίστατο τῶν πολλῶν, οὐδεμίαν φιλοτιμίαν περὶ τὰ θέατρα ποιούμενος. διὸ τοσοῦτον αὐτὸν ἔβλαπτε τοῦτο ὅσον ὠφέλει τὸν Σοφοκλέα.

Not surprisingly (considering the confused and controversial portrait of Euripides offered by ancient sources), this account is contradicted by two anecdotes that report Euripides' desire to *defend* his productions in the face of the angry mob. Moreover, these anecdotes directly involve the moral message of his plays. According to the first one, found in Seneca (*Ep.* 115.14–15), the audience jumped to its feet and tried to expel 'both the actor and the play' (*et actorem et carmen*) from the stage upon hearing Bellerophon's

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53 Cf. Martin 1960, 252–253.

54 Another important explanation is of course the contemporaneity of no less an opponent than Sophocles.

55 On Euripides' being in favor with Archelaus, for whom he allegedly wrote a play: *Vit. Eurip.* 24–25 Méridier (cf. Dicaearch. fr. 102 Mirhady); with Dionysius of Syracuse: *Vit. Eurip.* 80–85 Méridier.

56 Satyrus *Life of Euripides* fr. 39 col. X. A further contrast appears in biographies between the Athenians' hostility toward Euripides and his popularity abroad: 'he was considered a great friend of foreigners [ξενοφιλώτατον, a hapax and 'witty inversion of the conventional virtue embodied in the more common *philoxeinos*', as noticed by Bing 2011, 201] since foreigners particularly liked him, while he was hated by the Athenians' (*Vit. Eurip.* 86–87).

57 This last statement is opaque as far as Sophocles is concerned (cf. Delcourt 1933, 272).

shameless encomium of money—until Euripides himself intervened and begged the audience to wait and see the unenviable fate that he had prepared for this character consumed by greed. The second anecdote is very similar, although it is not as dramatically staged in the theater: to those who were criticizing his Ixion on account of his 'impious and revolting conduct' (ὡς ἀσεβῆ καὶ μιαρόν),[58] Euripides allegedly answered that he had not driven him off the stage 'before nailing him to the wheel' (Plut. *Quomodo adul. Mor.* 19E).[59]

On the other hand, Euripides is also the author of at least one apparently successful play, *Iphigenia in Tauris*. Moreover, the dramatic pattern used in that play, which presents a significant improvement of the protagonist's situation, is denounced as untragic, even comic, in a number of post-Aristotelian critical notes on other Euripidean compositions. The combination of these two accounts of Euripides' dramaturgy is puzzling enough, resulting as it does in the image of a man who was rejected by the public during his lifetime because of some excessively painful dramas, and then posthumously disparaged by a group of critics because of some excessively mild dramas. Nevertheless, in the long run these 'mild' plays did not affect the opinion expressed in Aristotle's statement on Euripides as 'the most tragic' writer, since he achieved the status of a classic early after his death and never lost it. His bad performance records did not impede this reputation, quite the contrary: it might even be that they contributed to create the image of the misunderstood genius in the imagination of the highbrow critics.

7. *Customized Pleasures*

Although up to now I have stressed the contrast between specialized and public taste in critical discourse, Aristotle's double treatment of the 'best' and the 'finest' tragedy is certainly indicative of his generally open attitude

[58] μιαρόν is used by Aristotle in *Poetics* 13 and 14 to refer to an unwanted feature of some plot types, and it is clear that what he means with this word is 'morally repulsive'. μιαρόν is generally interpreted by scholars as the 'opposite' of *philanthrôpon*, even by those who do not subscribe to the rendering of this word as 'popular'.

[59] Two further anecdotes (whose content is compared by Audano 2008) give a contradictory account of Euripides' willingness to alter the text of his plays to bring it in line with popular demand: Plut. *Amat. Mor.* 756B–C (where Euripides modifies an ostensibly blasphemous verse for a re-performance) and Val. Max. 3.7 *ext.* 1 (where he refuses such a compromise on the grounds that he composes his plays to teach the people, not the converse).

towards the variety of individual preferences in the field of culture. Such an attitude is visible in the following comment, found in the last book of the *Politics*, on the composition of audiences for artistic productions (Arist. *Pol.* 1342a18–28):

> [S]ince the audience is of two classes, one freemen and educated people, and the other the vulgar class composed of mechanics and labourers and other such persons, the latter sort also must be assigned competitions and shows for relaxation; and just as theirs souls are warped from the natural state, so those harmonies and melodies that are highly strung and irregular in coloration are deviations, but people of each sort receive pleasure from what is naturally suited to them, owing to which the competitors before an audience of this sort must be allowed to employ some such kind of music as this.
>
> (tr. Rackham)

> ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ θεατὴς διττός, ὁ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ὁ δὲ φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγκείμενος, ἀποδοτέον ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως—οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἑκάστοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖον, διόπερ ἀποδοτέον ἐξουσίαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις πρὸς τὸν θεατὴν τὸν τοιοῦτον τοιούτῳ τινὶ χρῆσθαι τῷ γένει τῆς μουσικῆς.

This presents an account of musical pleasure based on a distinction between different classes of public, which might be applied to some extent to another branch of *mousikê*, that of poetry.[60] The fundamental notion of this model is homogeneity: deviant music appeals to deviant souls on account of the deviation[61] shared by both the object and the subject of musical experience. Pleasure is elicited within 'the similar' by 'the similar.' Presumably, such a theory of pleasure implies some sort of *recognition* by one's sensory faculty of what is akin to oneself.

As a matter of fact, in the field of poetry Aristotle explicitly states the importance of recognition for the production of pleasure. However this recognition does not occur at the superficial level of sensory stimuli, but

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[60] A similar distinction between 'superior/decent' (βελτίους, ἐπιεικεῖς) and 'crude' (φαύλους) spectators of poetry is implied in the argument presented at *Poet.* 1461b25–1462a4. But in the *Poetics* Aristotle generally assumes a minimally educated public and does not pay much attention to the vulgar one (although a taste for 'special effects' plays, which by their visual excess may be considered the dramatic equivalent of 'highly strung' music, might reasonably be attributed to this public; cf. *Poet.* 1453b8–11). On the quality of the presumptive public that Aristotle has in mind in the *Poetics* see Golden 1976; Micalella 1986.

[61] One should not overlook the moral connotations of the term 'deviation' here: in the *Politics* this word and its cognates are regularly employed to refer to progressively corrupted forms of political regime.

rather somewhere on the large spectrum of intellectual experience, as is made clear in a famous text (Arist. *Poet.* 4.1448b5–19):

> [I]t is an instinct of human beings, from childhood, to engage in mimesis. [...] We enjoy contemplating the most precise images of things whose actual sight is painful to us [...]. The explanation of this too is that understanding gives great pleasure not only to philosophers but likewise to others too, though the latter have a smaller share in it. This is why people enjoy looking at images, because through contemplating them it comes about that they understand and infer what each element means, for instance that 'this person is so-and-so'.[62] (tr. Halliwell)

> τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ [...] ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες [...]. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος.

The problem with this passage is that the example Aristotle uses—the simple identification of a portrait to its model—is so trivial and minimalist that it hardly gives any clue as to the object of recognition and understanding in tragic representations.[63] Yet this is a crucial element to determine in order to assess the nature of the aesthetic experience of tragedy.

Taking into account my preceding review of the various tragic plots considered in the *Poetics*, it can reasonably be inferred that in Aristotle's eyes, what the audience generally enjoys when attending a tragedy is the mimetic fulfillment of its moral expectations and the ensuing recognition of a moral order in the movement of the play towards the rewarding of virtue and/or the chastising of vice. These two features of poetic justice are presented as essential values of popular morality in the second book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.[64] A moral tragedy is thus attuned to the moral premises of the general public. It is only natural that the recognition of this harmonious relationship between real-life expectations and fictional enactment should

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[62] Cf. the similar statement at *Rh.* 1371b4–11.

[63] Cf. Halliwell 1986, 73. The simple recognition of mythological characters or stories is excluded, since apparently the traditional and mythological matters of tragedy in fact are 'familiar only to a minority, yet nonetheless please everyone' (*Poet.* 1451b26).

[64] When these requirements are not met in real-life situations, they give way to the emotions of pity and indignation, emotions which are 'characteristic of a decent man' but are far from pleasurable (cf. *Rh.* 1386b9–15). By contrast, no such man should suffer in the face of deserved misfortune, on the contrary: he should rejoice at it, in the same way as when he watches deserved prosperity (1389b26–32).

provide the pleasure to which this type of tragedy ultimately owes its popular success. In other words, Aristotle's model suggests that popular 'aesthetic' value, at least in the field of poetry, would have been a direct reflection of popular moral value, that which is shared by the bulk of the citizen audience.[65]

By contrast, the type of tragedy praised in *Poetics* 13—that in which a decent man is seen plunging into undeserved misfortune—verges on the morally repulsive (μιαρόν), and the pleasure that it elicits must then be explained otherwise. As we just saw, in his famous statement on the paradoxical pleasure taken in the observation of images of unpleasant things, Aristotle implies that the intellectual component of an aesthetic experience can compensate for the repulsive nature of the object represented. Consequently, in the case of tragedies like *Oedipus Tyrannus*, which obviously frustrate the audience's natural desire for justice, we must wonder what sort of intellectual satisfaction is provided to counterbalance the moral outrage inherent in such a plot.

Here one must remember that in the compact formula with which Aristotle summarizes his ideas on the structure of this type of tragedy, it is underlined that the misfortune should occur as a result of an 'error' (ἁμαρτία). This requisite is at least as much emphasized as the change from prosperity to adversity, of which *hamartia* is expressly said to be the cause.[66] Although necessity and plausibility are essential features of any cohesive narrative, this particular formula gives a major importance to a specific cause-and-effect relationship inside the sequence of events, one that acts as a causal milestone within the play. Such a pattern, it could be argued, insofar as it elicits a startling recognition of the work of causality in human affairs, and even though it is accompanied by strong and painful emotions, possesses a somewhat more intellectual flavor than the emotional comfort provided by moral tragedies. This, I contend, is the meaning of the word καλλίστη

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[65] On audience reaction in the face of poetic utterances that either conformed or conflicted with their moral values see Pickard-Cambridge 1968, 274–278; Stanford 1983, 7–8. Most testimonies describe reactions to single passages rather than to whole plays or plots.

[66] By contrast, tragic *hamartia* does not figure in the list of plot-patterns of ch. 14, although one can plausibly argue that Aristotle's mention of the agent's ignorance is equivalent to *hamartia* (cf. Halliwell 1986, 222, 226 n. 35). At any rate, *hamartia* can certainly not be identified as the *cause* of the change of fortune towards prosperity that is commended in ch. 14. The cause of such a reversal is rather an early recognition, itself entailed by dramatic circumstances of variable likeliness: compare Aristotle's admiration of Iphigenia's recognition by Orestes (*Poet.* 1455a16–22) with his censure of the artificiality of Orestes' recognition by Iphigenia (*Poet.* 1454b30–35).

('finest') as Aristotle applies it to such tragedies. This highly technical point of view makes the aesthetic value of tragedy independent of moral contentment, but not of the rational expectations of a philosophical mind.

Naturally, it is to be expected that this intellectual quality in tragedies should be more appealing to some individuals than to others. Its full appreciation would ideally require an audience composed of philosophers,[67] since they are singled out by their fondness of learning, which is only partially shared by other people. Consequently, a playwright working in the context of fourth-century BCE Athens and aiming at victory will do well to try as far as possible to reach the different classes of individuals composing the audience.[68] At some point Aristotle even suggests a certain plot-pattern capable of achieving this 'universal' pleasure (Arist. *Poet.* 1456a18–25):

> In reversals and simple structures of events, poets aim for what they want[69] by means of the awesome: this is tragic and *philanthrôpon*. This occurs when an adroit but wicked person is deceived (like Sisyphus), or a brave but unjust person is worsted. These things are even probable, as Agathon puts it, since it is probable that many things should infringe probability. (tr. Halliwell)
>
> ἐν δὲ ταῖς περιπετείαις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς πράγμασι στοχάζονται ὧν βούλονται τῷ θαυμαστῷ· τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν ὁ σοφὸς μὲν μετὰ πονηρίας δ' ἐξαπατηθῇ, ὥσπερ Σίσυφος, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος μὲν ἄδικος δὲ ἡττηθῇ. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ εἰκὸς ὥσπερ Ἀγάθων λέγει, εἰκὸς γὰρ γίνεσθαι πολλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός.

Apparently then, it is possible to stay faithful to the standards of art (to be 'tragic') while being pleasing to the majority (to be '*philanthrôpos*'). This is achieved by combining a moral satisfaction (here brought about by the

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67 At first sight, this might sound like an unlikely, if not simply ridiculous, idea. But Aristotle does allude to such an audience at some point in the *Rhetoric*: 'We ought also to consider in whose presence we praise, for, as Socrates said, it is not difficult to praise Athenians among Athenians. We ought also to speak of what is esteemed among the particular audience, Scythians, Lacedaemonians, or philosophers, as actually existing there' (*Rh.* 1367b8–11).

68 Cf. Stanford 1983, 17. This is all the more true considering that human beings have this peculiarity, by contrast with other animal species, of presenting great individual differences as regards what counts as pleasurable (cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1176a9–15). Presumably these 'individual' differences are rather 'class' differences, that is differences between the tastes of the 'noble' class and those of the 'vulgar' class (cf. Too 1998, 104–106)—to which we should probably add the tastes of the 'philosophical class,' at least in the case of such an intellectual art form as tragedy.

69 The phrase is obscure, but presumably what playwrights 'want' and 'aim for' is victory; this is also suggested by the immediately preceding sentence, which points out some poetic flaws responsible for bad performance in competitions (κακῶς ἀγωνίζονται). Else (1957, 550) accepts that the passage 'reflects something about the aim of tragedy as the poets themselves actually conceived it in Aristotle's day' rather than a purely Aristotelian stance.

punishment of an individual of dubious morality) with an apprehension of some unexpected, yet causally consistent consequences following a reversal of events.[70] On the basis of the reference to Sisyphus, some scholars[71] have made the plausible suggestion that this passage refers to satyr-play. This form of drama apparently combined features from both tragedy and comedy, but its inclusion in tragic tetralogies associated it generically with tragedy rather than comedy.[72] Satyr-play would indeed be an adequate candidate for representing this type of 'tragedy' in which a reversal of events brings about—even if in a playful mood—the misfortune of a rascal, at the hands of a more deserving adversary (such as in Euripides' *Cyclops*). It is not the place here to address the thorny question of the function of satyr-play in Dionysiac contests; but it has recently been argued[73] that this function precisely consists in offering morally simple patterns and successful outcomes contrasting with the transgressive and complex nature of tragedy, thus producing a cohesive effect on the Athenian audience.[74] Following this interpretation, Aristotle could be alluding to the 'soothing' effect of satyr-play, a sure-fire formula by which tragedians used to round off their performance.

8. *Conclusion*

It appears that both in the fields of music and poetics Aristotle's 'democratic' aesthetics implies a stratified composition of elements responsible for eliciting pleasure in different parts of the audience.[75] In fact, this multi-

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70 It is easy to imagine that a character like Sisyphus must have committed some sort of *hamartia* in order to be defeated on his own ground.

71 Else 1957, 551; Lucas 1968, 192–193. Lucas assumes the existence of a lacuna concealing a transition in the type of play discussed by Aristotle. Else unnecessarily regards the passage as 'ironical': there is no reason to think that Aristotle did not consider satyr-play a 'genuinely tragic' form (see next note).

72 Aristotle did not contest the generic affiliation of satyr-play with tragedy. As a matter of fact, he went as far as attributing the origins of the latter to the former (admittedly a puzzling statement): *Poet.* 1449a19–20. The Alexandrians might have pushed further the generic distinction between them: cf. Aristophanes of Byzantium's rejection of the 'satyric' *Alcestis* from tragic poetry (above end of section 2) and the testimony in schol. Ar. *Ran.* 1124 to the effect that Aristarchus called the *Oresteia* a 'trilogy', 'without the satyr-plays' (χωρὶς τῶν σατυρικῶν), whereas in the *Didascaliae* it is referred to as a tetralogy. Cf. Demetr. *Eloc.* 169.

73 Voelke 2001, 403–408. On the straightforward 'moral message' in Euripides' *Cyclops* see Goins 1991.

74 This account is not very remote from the traditional theory of satyr-play as providing 'comic relief', on which see (*inter alia*) Rossi 1972.

75 Revermann 2006 describes the dramatic exploitation of this state of affairs by the playwrights of Old Comedy.

layer conception of popular taste provides an explanation for a very peculiar assertion found in the *Politics*. In the context of an examination of some arguments in favor of democracy, he notoriously expresses the view that 'the general public is a better judge of the works of music and those of the poets, because different men can judge a different part of the performance, and all of them all of it' (*Pol.* 1281b3–10). Most commentators on the *Politics* take this assertion at face-value[76] and believe that Aristotle recognizes a critical superiority to the many in these two fields. But his argument rests on accumulation rather than exclusion: the 'many' in question do not refer to the vulgar public—this of course would make no sense—but rather to the inclusive totality of citizens, aristocratic and plebeian.

Nevertheless, this open-minded attitude towards popular taste, as opposed to critical or philosophical taste, does not prevent Aristotle from making a genuine distinction between them, as we have seen. Although the possibility of ascribing to him the invention of a genuine doctrine of 'aesthetics' is generally denied, he certainly never gets as close to it as in the contrast he makes between judgments *auto kath' auto* and *pros ta theatra*.

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[76] Cf. Barker 1958, 127–128: 'Aristotle here applies the same "democratic" argument [...] both to politics and aesthetics'.

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CHAPTER NINE

AUTHENTICITY AS AN AESTHETIC VALUE: ANCIENT AND MODERN REFLECTIONS

Irene Peirano

1. *Introduction*

Inquiries into the authenticity of literary texts and parts thereof have traditionally occupied a central role in the discipline of classics.[1] *Echtheitskritik*—German for 'authenticity criticism'—was a vital part of the work of the first philologists, the Hellenistic scholars both in their role as editors, selecting and imposing textual variants deemed authentic, and as librarians, deciding what does and what does not belong to the canon of a given author.[2] The denunciation of the Donation of Constantine as a forgery by the Humanist scholar Lorenzo Valla (*On the Donation of Constantine*, 1440) is often seen as standing at the beginning of the tradition of the modern philological method. In the eighteenth century, Richard Bentley's demonstration of the inauthentic nature of the *Epistles* attributed to the fifth-century Sicilian tyrant Phalaris made him a pioneer and model for nineteenth-century scholars.[3] Indeed, some of the most influential figures in classical scholarship well into the twentieth century made their mark through editions and commentaries of texts.[4] It seems that Dionysius Thrax revealed himself as a prophetic critic when he defined 'authenticity criticism', or *krisis* (Lt. *iudicium*), as 'the most beautiful part of the *tekhnê*' of philology (1.1), or as a scholiast to his text wrote 'the consummation and crown' of the entire art.[5]

[1] On the modern development of *Echtheitskritik* as a sub-discipline see Speyer 1971, 99–105; Vretska 1957; Büchner and Hofmann 1951, 216–222.

[2] Blum 1991. On ancient *Echtheitskritik* see Speyer 1971, esp. 112–128.

[3] Brink 1985, 61–98.

[4] Luck 1981.

[5] Dion. Thrax 1.1: ἕκτον κρίσις ποιημάτων, ὃ δὴ κάλλιστόν ἐστι πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ; Schol. Dion. Thrax 170.7–9 Hilgard: συμπέρασμά ἐστι τῆς πάσης τέχνης τὸ κριτικὸν καὶ τρόπον τινὰ στέφανος. *Krisis* is one of the parts of *grammatikê tekhnê*, a term which encompassed literary study and thus had a much wider range than our 'grammar'.

Within this tradition, authenticity is often conceptualized as an intrinsic property that a literary text (or indeed any work of art) either has or has not and that a critic is charged with discovering. Thus the ideal text which the critic seeks to reconstruct—the author's copy—has traditionally offered little room for shades and degrees of ambiguity: a text either is the genuine product of a given author or it is not, a variant is either to be rejected as an intrusion or embraced as a valid reading. It turns out, however, that authenticity is hardly an unproblematic concept: what is the 'genuine' text in cases where multiple versions by the same author exist?[6] And if a writer dies before putting the final touches to his work, is the unfinished product an 'original' or 'authentic', if we suspect that the author would have finished it differently?[7] Is a perfect copy of a work of art, if such a thing can exist, less 'authentic' than an original?[8] What should count as an authentic text in the case of an oral tradition where multiple variants simultaneously coexist?[9]

Moreover, the difficulties in grasping where the authenticity of a given text resides are not always due to the peculiarities and accidents of transmission but to more serious conceptual obstacles.[10] In particular, the postmodern dismissal of authorial intention as a legitimate subject of inquiry has had a severe impact on authenticity criticism in its various forms.[11] As the original thought of the author retreats more and more away from the horizon of scholarly inquiry, the project of reconstructing a reliable Ur-text becomes increasingly fraught with difficulties, not least among them an increasing awareness that the editor's choice of one variant over the other is deeply implicated in his own understanding of the author and of his own task. The crisis of confidence in the ability of scholars to access the authorial source directly in the way that philology would seem to require of them has led to calls for a 'New Philology', one that sees the contributions of subsequent readers as inextricably linked and thus inseparable from the putative 'original'.[12]

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[6] McGann 1992, esp. 37–80, on the ideology of authorial final intentions.

[7] Jocelyn 1990 on the ancient tales surrounding the posthumous publication and editing of the unfinished *Aeneid*.

[8] Gazda 2002 on the concept of the copy in Roman art.

[9] Zumthor 1991; Nagy 2004.

[10] Thus the problematic nature of authenticity has been exposed from the perspective of numerous disciplinary standpoints: e.g. semiotics (Eco 1990), aesthetics (Dutton 1983) and textual criticism (Zetzel 2005).

[11] Such a critique has been powerfully articulated in relation to textual criticism by McGann 1992; Bornstein and Williams 1993; Greetham 1998.

[12] Zetzel 2005, 161: 'The history that is embodied in the manuscripts that we use (or indeed in the editions that we create) is not inseparable from the 'original' but a part of it'. On New

While the methods and aims of *Echtheitskritik* continue to come under critical scrutiny, the focus of scholarly work is now shifting to the cultural function performed by this pursuit of the authentic: with basic critical operations no longer taken as given, editorial and critical strategies, both ancient and modern, are now beginning to be studied as part of a text's reception and a culture's approach to its literary heritage.[13] In this chapter, I am similarly concerned not with offering a critique of the viability of authenticity as a theoretical concept but with delineating a cultural history of *Echtheitskritik* and exploring the reasons for its enduring centrality. From a diachronic point of view, authenticity, I argue, is better thought of as a value rather than a property. The value of authenticity is here understood in two distinct and yet closely related senses. First, as the analysis of ancient and modern *Echtheitskritik* reveals, authenticity has typically functioned as an aesthetic quality which, when associated with a text or parts thereof, confers value on it. Thus parts of text that are deemed aesthetically superior are more easily believed to be authentic, while parts that are not considered altogether successful are more likely to be dismissed as spurious. While it is not inconceivable that a spurious item may be aesthetically pleasing, historically speaking judgments of authenticity have been inextricably tied to aesthetic considerations. Thus the close relationship between authenticity and aesthetics is not an inescapable necessity but rather the result of the particular position that the search for the authentic has occupied within the field. For, as I argue, the project of *Echtheitskritik* has been intimately involved from its earliest beginnings with the process of creating and defending a canon of works deemed superior. Moreover, a brief look at the history of authenticity criticism of works deemed second class reveals how the assumed aesthetic failure of such texts threatens to incapacitate the critic's effort to distinguish the authentic from the spurious and thus short-circuit the very project of the discipline.

Secondly, not only does authorial genuineness function as an aesthetic value when it is assigned or denied to a text, but the very process of aesthetic evaluation that is at the heart of *Echtheitskritik* is in itself of value as the

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Philology see Cerquiglini 1999; Nichols 1990, an introduction to a volume on New Philology. On New Philology in the Classics, besides Zetzel 2005, see Ziolkowski 1990; Nagy 2004; Gurd 2005.

13 Nünlist 2009, on Homeric scholia; Graziosi 2002, 201–234, on the transmission of Homer; Kaster 1988, esp. 169–197, on Servius; Grafton 1991, on Renaissance scholarship. For a more specific case see Farrell 2004 and Barchiesi 2001, 159–161, on Ovid's second edition of the *Amores*.

animating force of a system of intellectual and institutional exchanges within a given community of readers.[14] For the act of assigning or denying aesthetic value to a text which is at the center of *Echtheitskritik* sets in motion a virtuous circle of evaluation in which the aesthetic value of the text deemed authentic 'translates into' a positive appreciation of the critic who is capable of discerning such a value. From the vantage point of the history of *Echtheitskritik*, I suggest that *krisis* is just as concerned with judging the text and the latter's putative relation to its authorial source as it is with the definition of what counts as value in a given community of readers and with the act of evaluation *per se*.

2. *Authenticity as a Value*

Historically speaking, the refutation of the authenticity of texts or parts thereof has often gone hand in hand with aesthetic condemnation: spurious texts are often labeled as artistically and technically inferior, and conversely texts or parts thereof that are considered aesthetically inferior are more easily believed to be spurious.[15] It is doubtless true that theoretically speaking, genuineness of authorship need not coincide with aesthetic merit.[16] Thus it is not impossible that a text or a work of art which is not genuine—an interpolated verse or a copy of a painting—may be aesthetically pleasing and indeed even more pleasing than the original or the authentic model. In practice, however, judgments of authenticity have been couched in a tone of 'aesthetic condemnation' from the earliest beginning of the discipline. Take, for example, Quintilian's summary of the role and nature of authenticity criticism as practiced by the Alexandrians (Quint. *Inst.* 1.4.3):

> Indeed, the grammarians of old employed their judgment in such a severe manner that they not only allowed themselves to mark verses with a sign of disapproval and take out of the family as if they were supposititious children any books which appeared to be wrongly attributed, but also included some authors in the canon, and excluded others altogether from the list.[17]

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[14] Here I am particularly indebted to Barbara Herrnstein Smith's discussion of the relation between value and evaluation: Herrnstein Smith 1988, esp. 47–53.

[15] Barchiesi 1996 with reference to Ovidian *Echtheitskritik* explores the phenomenon whereby a text or parts thereof is defended as authentic on the grounds of its aesthetic value. For a further example of how aesthetic categories influence the appreciation of a text as authentic see the case of the Helen episode in Verg. *Aen.* 2.567–588 with Horsfall 2006.

[16] A position forcefully articulated by Goodman 1968, 99–123.

[17] All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are my own.

> quo [sc. iudicium] quidem ita severe sunt usi veteres grammatici ut non versus modo censoria quadam virgula notare et libros qui falso viderentur inscripti tamquam subditos summovere familia permiserint sibi, sed auctores alios in ordinem redegerint, alios omnino exemerint numero.

Quintilian is here translating the Greek technical vocabulary of *Echtheitskritik*: *falso inscripti* renders the Greek *pseudepigraphos*, 'wrongly entitled'. The parallel between spurious books and supposititious children is borrowed from Greek technical vocabulary, since Greek referred to fakes as 'bastards' (*nothoi*)—illegitimate children—and to the process of condemning a line as spurious as 'bastardizing' (*notheuein*). Conversely, a work considered genuine is defined as *gnêsios*—'legitimate', 'born in wedlock'—or in Latin as *genuinus*.[18] Like the illegitimate children to which they were compared, spuria were berated as inferior and had a low standing within the canon as second-class citizens.

The reasons why authenticity and aesthetic value have historically converged lie deep in the history of the discipline of philology. The first textual critics, the ancient editors of Homer, relied heavily on the assumption that, Homer being the best poet, his usage could be assumed to be consistently optimal. Thus, perceived redundancies were common grounds for *athetêsis*:[19] anything that seemed 'unnecessary' (οὐκ ἀναγκαῖος), 'superfluous' (περισσός) or 'not to the purpose' (οὐ πρός ὠφέλειαν) could be condemned as spurious. For example, a group of lines describing a *peplos* is found repeated in three different arming scenes in the *Iliad*, two of which involve Athena (Hom. *Il.* 5.734–736; 8.385–387) and one involving Agamemnon (Hom. *Il.* 11.17–46). Aristarchus athetized the lines in *Iliad* 8 on the grounds that, whereas in *Iliad* 5 the arming scene results in battle, in *Iliad* 8 Athena's plan to join the battle is foiled by Zeus's intervention and therefore, the panoply in *Iliad* 8 serves no purpose (πρὸς οὐδέν).[20]

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[18] This metaphorical usage of the lexicon of paternity in the Greek exploits the commonly found notion that an author is in a sense the father of his own writings, a notion famously explored in Plato's mythical account of the invention of writing in the *Phaedrus* (esp. 275.5).

[19] Meijering 1987, 171–181; Nünlist 2009, index: *athetesis*. Nickau 1977 on Zenodotus; Lührs 1992 on Aristarchus.

[20] Schol. Hom. *Il.* 8.385–387a Arist. A: 'these three lines are athetized [by Aristarchus] because in the *aristeia* of Diomedes [*Iliad* 5] they are well integrated; for they accomplish something. Here, however, she takes up the panoply for no purpose' (ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι τρεῖς, ὅτι ἐν τῇ τοῦ Διομήδους ἀριστείᾳ καλῶς ἐπεξείργασται· πράττεται γάρ τινα. ἐνταῦθα δὲ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀναλαμβάνει τὴν πανταυχίαν). Aristarchus' decision seems to be a reaction to Zenodotus who instead kept the lines in question but deleted those in *Iliad* 5: Schol. Hom. *Il.* 5.734–736 Arist. A.

Such arguments based on excellence focus on a perceived deviation from the reader's construction of the personality and style of the author. While critics may disagree in what they identify as the best practice, they are driven by a similar impulse of restoring the text to the aesthetic consistency with which it was supposedly imbued by its creator. As Cicero jokingly says to a friend, 'just as Aristarchus denies that a line is by Homer if he does not approve of it, in the same way—since I'm in the mood to make a joke—if something is not witty, do not believe it was said by me'[21] (*ut enim Aristarchus Homeri versum negat, quem non probat, sic tu—libet enim mihi iocari—, quod disertum non erit, ne putaris meum*, Cic. *Fam.* 3.11.59).

The ancient Vergilian editors followed such a method in making redundant or inconsistent passages the target of their *Echtheitskritik*. According to Servius, critics marked with a critical sign (Lt. *nota*) the last line of *Aeneid* 8 (*attollens umero famamque et facta nepotum*, 8.731) because it was deemed superfluous and therefore likely to be a later addition (Serv. *ad Aen.* 8.731):[22]

> The critics mark this line with a critical sign on the grounds that it is a superfluous and unambitious addition unbefitting of the poet's gravity; for it is rather neoteric.
>
> hunc versum notant critici quasi superfluo et humiliter additum nec convenientem gravitati eius; namque est magis neotericus.

The adjective *neotericus* is a rough translation of Gr. *neôteros*, a word employed by Alexandrian grammarians of usages which postdated (and were therefore 'more recent') Homer, and were thus deemed interpolations.[23]

Like *neoteros*, the terms *kuklikos* and *kuklikôs* are used by the Alexandrians of any feature of language deemed inferior to Homeric standard and therefore likely to be spurious. To start with, however, the *kuklikoi* are the representatives of a literary tradition known as the epic Cycle, a collection of heroic sagas extending from the beginning to the end of the heroic age, which survive in fragments and later summaries.[24] Already Aristotle distinguishes two of the poems of the epic Cycle from Homer on the basis of aesthetic criteria: the *Cypria* and *Little Iliad*, he says, focusing as they do on a

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21 Tr. Shackleton Bailey 2001, adapted.

22 Zetzel 1981, 49–50 speculates that the first-century grammarian Marcus Valerius Probus may be behind the enigmatic *critici*.

23 In their imitation of the standards and practices of Homer's editors, the *critici* thus seem to mirror Vergil's emulation of the Greek poet: Farrell 2008.

24 In the Homeric Scholia, *neôteroi* is often used as an equivalent to *kuklikoi*: Davies 1989, 4; Severyns 1928, 29–61.

single figure or period fall short of the narrative sophistication of the Homeric poems (Arist. *Poet.* 1459a30–b2).[25]

The Homeric scholia bring to the extreme Aristotle's negative evaluation of the Cyclic poets in using the terms *kuklikos* and *kuklikôs* to refer to poetry deemed substandard and therefore likely to be un-Homeric. Thus Aristarchus athetized five lines in *Il.* 15.610–614 which contain the prediction of Hector's death on the grounds that they give away the story and furthermore that they are tautological since the name Hector has already been given in the previous line (15.603) (Schol. Hom. *Il.* 15.610–614a Arist. A):

> Five lines are athetized. For we know that the subject is Hector. These interpolated lines take away from the force of Hector's divinely inspired attack. The genuine lines, at least if we keep them conjoined, safeguard its impressiveness. Moreover, it is a tautology in the cyclic manner: for before he had said 'with this in mind, he was rousing against the hollow ships,/Hector, son of Priam' [603–604]. So to what purpose does it mention again 'of Hector; / for he himself was his defender from heaven' [610]?
>
> ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι πέντε· ἐπιστάμεθα γὰρ ὅτι περὶ Ἕκτορός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος. καὶ τὴν ἔνθουν ὁρμὴν τοῦ Ἕκτορος ταῦτα παρενειρμένα ἐκλύει· συναπτόμενα γοῦν τὰ γνήσια τὴν δεινότητα σώζει. καὶ *κυκλικῶς* ταυτολογεῖται· προείρηται γὰρ 'τὰ φρονέων νήεσσιν ἔπι γλαφυρῇσιν ἔγειρεν/Ἕκτορα Πριαμίδην'. πρὸς τί οὖν παλλιλογεῖται 'Ἕκτορος· αὐτὸς γάρ οἱ ἀπ' αἰθέρος ἦεν ἀμύντωρ'.

Here the cyclic nature of the tautology, a charge which echoes the criticism of the epic Cycle as repetitive from Aristotle's *Poetics*, is given as justification for the *athetêsis* with the genuine lines being pointed at as the most conducive to safeguard the impressiveness of the scene.

Other times, *kuklikos* and *kuklikôs* seem to be used to criticize any number of unsuccessful or incompetent turns of phrase even in Homer. In *Iliad* 9, for example, Aristarchus attacks the phrase αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος ἐξ ἔρον ἕντο ('after they satisfied desire for drink and food') as 'cyclic' on the grounds that the heroes had just eaten and therefore could not have desired food, arguing that 'he [i.e. Homer] has misused this line in a rather cyclic manner (κυκλικώτερον κατακέχρηται τῷ στίχῳ) since the heroes had eaten a little while before; therefore they could not be desiring food' (Schol. Hom. *Il.* 9.222a Arist. A). Aristarchus did not go so far as to expunge them,

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[25] The first attestation of the expression 'epic cycle' is in Aristotle (*An. post.* 77b32 = Bernabé, *PEG* Test., 1, 1) but it seems to refer to Homer, and not to the epic cycle. It is likely that the idea of epic cycle dates to the Hellenistic period: Davies 1989, 1–2.

limiting himself to suggesting that 'it would have been better if the text read "partook again" [of food] or "partook forthwith"' (ἄμεινον οὖν εἶχεν ἄν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος, εἰ ἐγέγραπτο 'ἂψ ἐπάσαντο' ἢ 'αἶψ' ἐπάσαντο', Schol. Hom. *Il.* 9.222b1 Did. A). Although the word 'cyclic' is here used by Aristarchus with reference to an aesthetically unsuccessful turn of phrase in Homer, the suggestion of inauthenticity is always lurking in the background: thus Didymus imputed Aristarchus' choice to stick to the vulgate and not to alter the text to 'excessive caution', which presumably implies a belief on his part that the substandard expression was too uncharacteristic of Homer to be considered genuine.[26]

It is typically argued that *kuklikos* came to be synonymous with 'bad' or 'incompetent' simply because the poetry of the epic Cycle was bad poetry.[27] It is certainly true that the poets of the epic Cycle continue to be criticized specifically on the grounds of their repetitive and tautological manner: in the first century BCE, Horace still echoes Aristotle's criticism of the *kuklikoi*'s lack of understanding of poetic structure when he criticizes as inept the choice of subject matter and narrative start-point typical of a *scriptor cyclicus* (Hor. *Ars P.* 136–142).

However, criticism of the cyclic manner on aesthetic grounds is inextricably tied to its perceived epigonal status and lack of originality in relation to Homer.[28] Thus the scorn directed towards the poets of the Cycle is fueled by what readers constructed as their unoriginal and slavish derivativeness. For it is crucial to note that though some of the poems of the Cycle may actually have been older than Homer, as some modern scholars have argued, Aristarchus and his contemporaries thought of them as continuators of Homer.[29] Aristarchus' opinion of the relative chronology of the Cycle

[26] Schol. Hom. *Il.* 9.222b1 Did. A: 'but nevertheless due to his excessive caution, he did not change anything [sc. in the text], since he had found the reading to be transmitted as such in many manuscripts' (ἀλλ' ὅμως ὑπὸ περιττῆς εὐλαβείας οὐδὲν μετέθηκεν, ἐν πολλαῖς οὕτως εὑρὼν φερομένην τὴν γραφήν).

[27] Thus the latest editor Bernabé *PEG*, Test., p. 8: '*quamquam cyclicos poetas parvi aestimant Scholiastae, apud eos* κυκλικῶς *non 'vulgariter', 'inepte' vel sim., sed 'cyclicorum poetarum modo' tantum significat'*.

[28] Already hinted at in some of the ancient testimonia: Ps. Acro *ad Hor. Ars P.* 132 = Bernabé *PEG* Test., 6, 26: *moraberis orbem: id est si non in eisdem verbis sensibusque verseris, quae ab aliis dicta sunt, ne magis interpres fias quam verus dictor. 'orbem'* kuklon *dicit; namque* kuklikoi *dicunt Graeci.* The very notion of 'cycle' may hint at the idea of completing Homer as if to form a circle which embraces all events of the heroic age.

[29] Schol. Clem. Al. *Protr.* 2, 30, 5; Porphyr. *ad Hor. Ars P.* 132 = Bernabé, *PEG*, Test., 3, 11 and 12. On the relation between Homer and the epic cycle see Davies 1989, 3–5; Burgess 2001, 132–171.

to Homer is evident for example in instances where he notes how a Homeric passage was the source of the treatment of a *neôteros*.[30] For example, at *Il.* 17.719, Aristarchus noted that the *neôteroi* derived the idea of having Ajax and Odysseus transport the dead body of Achilles from this Iliadic scene (17.717–724) in which Menelaus and Meriones, protected by the Ajaxes, carried the body of Patroclus (Schol. Hom. *Il.* 17.719 Arist. A):

> From here came the idea to the *neôteroi* of portraying Achilles being carried by Ajax, while Odysseus covers him with a shield. But if Homer had written about the death of Achilles, he would not have portrayed the body being carried by Ajax as the *neôteroi* did.
>
> ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν τοῖς νεωτέροις ὁ βασταζόμενος Ἀχιλλεὺς ὑπ’ Αἴαντος, ὑπερασπίζων δὲ Ὀδυσσεὺς παρῆκται. εἰ δὲ Ὅμηρος ἔγραφε τὸν Ἀχιλλέως θάνατον, οὐκ ἂν ἐποίησε τὸν νεκρὸν ὑπ’ Αἴαντος βασταζόμενον. ὡς οἱ νεώτεροι.

Now, the rescue of Achilles’ body by Ajax and Odysseus was narrated in one of the poems of the Cycle, the *Aethiopis*, which dealt with the events surrounding the death of Achilles, as is known to us from Proclus’ summary.[31] The implication is that not only did Aristarchus identify the tale of the *Aethiopis* as derivative of the Homeric model, but he also specifically disapproved of the treatment since he makes a point of saying that had Homer written the episode of Achilles’ death, he would have handled it differently.

The idea of the epic Cycle as derivative underlines Callimachus’ famous poetic manifesto (Callim. *Epigr.* 28 Pf.):

> I loathe the Cyclic poem, and I do not rejoice
> in the path that carries many this way and that.
> I also hate the much frequented lover, nor do I drink from
> the public fountain. In fact, I detest everything vulgar.
> Lysanies, you are so, so beautiful—but before I say
> it clearly, some echo says: ‘someone else has him’.
>
> ἐχθαίρω τὸ ποίημα τὸ κυκλικόν, οὐδὲ κελεύθῳ
> χαίρω, τίς πολλοὺς ὧδε καὶ ὧδε φέρει·
> μισέω καὶ περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον, οὐδ’ ἀπὸ κρήνης
> πίνω· σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια.
> Λυσανίη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλὸς καλός—ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰπεῖν
> τοῦτο σαφῶς, ἠχώ φησί τις· ‘ἄλλος ἔχει.’

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[30] Nünlist 2009, 258–259.

[31] Procl. *Chrestomathy* 193–195: καὶ περὶ τοῦ πτώματος γενομένης ἰσχυρᾶς μάχης Αἴας ἀνελόμενος ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς κομίζει, Ὀδυσσέως ἀπομαχομένου τοῖς Τρωσίν. On the episode see Huxley 1969, 150.

Alan Cameron rightly rejected the idea that cyclic poetry should be seen as equivalent to all post-Homeric epic, and that therefore Callimachus' poem signifies a rejection of all epic, including that of his contemporaries Apollonius of Rhodes and Antimachus of Colophon: 'Cyclic poetry'—Cameron insisted—'simply meant cyclic poetry, not epic poetry in general'.[32] But what then is the connection between the busy road, the promiscuous lover, and the public fountain, and finally Lysanies who is already taken? All these are in effect communal property: the cyclic poem lacks exclusiveness because it borrows from Homer in an unoriginal way, turning the great poet into a whore or a fountain from which anyone can drink without acknowledgment. It is for this reason that in the second century the epigrammatist Pollianus refers to the poets of the Cycle as 'thieves of other people's verses' (I hate these cyclic poets, who say 'but then', thieves of other people's words, τοὺς κυκλίους τούτους τοὺς "αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα"λέγοντας/μισῶ, λωποδύτας ἀλλοτρίων ἐπέων, *Anth. Pal.* 11.130.1–2); a few lines down he defines the cyclic poets as people who 'strip Homer so shamelessly that they now write "sing, goddess, the wrath"' (οἱ δ' οὕτως τὸν Ὅμηρον ἀναιδῶς λωποδυτοῦσιν,/ὥστε γράφειν ἤδη 'μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά', *Anth. Pal.* 11.130.7–8).

A second Callimachean epigram expresses a similarly ambivalent stance towards another poem of the Cycle, the *Oekhalias Halôsis* ('Capture of Oechalia'), a work concerning Heracles' conquest of the town of Oechalia. Callimachus is seeking to counter an anecdote known also from other sources according to which the poem was a gift of Homer to one Creophylus in return for the hospitality he received.[33] Instead, he argues that the author of the poem is not Homer but Creophylus himself (Callim. *Epigr.* 6 Pf.):

I am the toil of the Samian who once welcomed the divine bard
    in his house. I celebrate the suffering of Eurythus
and fair-haired Iole. I am called a 'Homeric'
    book. By Zeus, this is really quite a compliment for Creophylus.

τοῦ Σαμίου πόνος εἰμὶ δόμῳ ποτὲ θεῖον ἀοιδόν
    δεξαμένου, κλείω δ' Εὔρυτον ὅσσ' ἔπαθεν,
καὶ ξανθὴν Ἰόλειαν, Ὁμήρειον δὲ καλεῦμαι
    γράμμα· Κρεωφύλῳ, Ζεῦ φίλε, τοῦτο μέγα.

Just as we expect, Creophylus is depicted as an imitator who managed to reproduce the manner of the Homeric poet. The positive evaluation of

[32] Cameron 1995, 399.

[33] The main source is Strabo 14.1.18 where Callimachus' epigram is quoted, but see also Proclus, *Life of Homer* 5 and *Suda s.v. Kreophulos* κ 2376 Adler. Graziosi 2002, 189–193.

Creophylus' reproduction of the style of Homer (Ὁμήρειον ... γράμμα, 3–4) brings to mind Callimachus' praise of Aratus' imitation of 'Hesiod's song and style' in the preface of *Epigram* 27 (Ἡσιόδου τό τ' ἄεισμα καὶ ὁ τρόπος, Callim. *Epigr*. 27.1) in the *Phaenomena*. However, Callimachus' epigram is just as ambiguous in its assessment of Creophylus' project as Callimachus is in his evaluation of the epic genre. The last line in particular can be read as an ironic criticism of Creophylus' lack of originality: what is a measure of praise for Creophylus (Κρεωφύλῳ ... τοῦτο μέγα, Callim. *Epigr*. 27.4)—the fact that his work should pass off as Homer's—is not necessarily impressive for Callimachus, whose poetic credo includes a call to originality as exemplified by Apollo's advice in the *Aitia* prologue to pursue untrodden paths. The praise of Creophylus is further undermined by another possible reading of the last line which could be taken to mean not only 'this (*touto*) is a great thing (*mega*) for Creophylus' but also 'this great thing (*touto mega*) is by Creophylus'. The latter's interpretation is not just sarcastic but downright negative since in Callimachus' words a *mega biblion* is equivalent to a *mega kakon* (Callim. fr. 465 Pf.).

Whether the aesthetic category of *kuklikos* is really reflective of the style of the so-called epic Cycle and what the latter's historical relation to 'Homer' is, remain open questions. For the purposes of the present argument, however, it is important to note that the ancient evaluation of the epic Cycle, whatever we may think of its accuracy, is characterized by an unmistakable nexus of circular aesthetic judgments: the word *kuklikos* came to be interchangeably used both of a specific literary tradition supposedly characterized by lack of originality and incompetence, *and* of aesthetically inferior, redundant or inconsistent features of style which are thus seen to convict the portion of the text in which they are found of being an interpolation, representative of that later derivative tradition. As we have seen, anything that does not match the standard of perfection which one associates with the authentic is easily condemned by ancient critics as spurious. But the reverse is also true: consistently, anything that is perceived to be inauthentic, derivative, or spurious is labeled as an aesthetic failure.

3. *Authenticity and Canon*

This theoretical model, which locates the essence of authenticity in the artistic excellence of the author, is strictly bound up with the project of creating and then defending a canon. The creation of lists of authors—such as the *ordo* to which Quintilian refers at 1.4.3, or the nine *lyrici* amid

whom Horace hopes to be included (*Carm.* 1.1.35–36)—who are considered most worthy of being read, stirs up a fierce crusade to fence off this kernel of excellence against a periphery of spurious material.[34] It is because the project of authenticity criticism is directed from its first beginnings towards defining and defending a body of works deemed superior that verdicts in problems of authenticity are not merely 'objective' textual choices but value judgments.

The relation between authenticity criticism and canonicity is evident from the earliest beginning of *Echtheitskritik*. Thus it is no coincidence that the earliest specimens of authenticity criticism are found in the context of the many and sometimes contradictory stories about the formation of the Homeric canon, the stabilization or written transposition of the Homeric text. An influential version of this tradition is the story according to which the Homeric texts were brought to Athens, and subsequently gathered and published for the first time by Pisistratus, or in some versions by Solon.[35] The context in which the story of the Pisistratean recension of Homer is repeatedly found is actually in denunciations of Pisistratus' forgery. Thus the Athenian ruler is said to have inserted a line in the Homeric catalogue of ships to support the Athenian contention that Salamis had belonged to them and not to Megara. This is, for example, Strabo's account (Str. 9.1.10.1–8):

> Nowadays, the Athenians have possession of the island, but in ancient times a quarrel developed between them and the Megarians over it. And they say that it was Pisistratus, others say Solon, who inserted in the Catalogue of the Ships immediately after the line [i.e. Hom. *Il.* 2.556]: 'And Aias brought twelve ships from Salamis', the verse 'and bringing them, he positioned them where the ranks of the Athenians stood', and used the poet as a witness that the island belonged to the Athenians from the beginning.

It is crucial to consider briefly the context in which authenticity thus defined is invoked and contested. As Strabo says, the Athenians were using Homer as a witness (μάρτυρι χρήσασθαι τῷ ποιητῇ) to lend support and credibility to the version of the events that they endorsed. The practice of using poetry as a witness (*martus*) is explicitly theorized by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* where he writes that witnesses in a legal or political dispute can be either ancient or modern and cites the appeal of the Athenians to Homer as a witness in their dispute over Salamis as an example of the former (Arist. *Rh.* 1375b).

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34 Harvey 1955; Pfeiffer 1968: 205–208; Zetzel 1983.
35 Cic. *De or.* 3.137. *Anth. Pal.* 11.442; Paus. 7.26.13; Ael. *VH* 13.14.

The Homeric texts can lend authority to espoused truths. Conversely, versions of events that are perceived as less than truthful can be disputed by attacking the authenticity of the text. The mechanism is well summarized by Seneca the Younger: Posidonius held that the potter's wheel was invented by Anacharsis, a legendary sixth-century Scythian prince who was considered one of the Seven Sages. When he realizes that the wheel is mentioned by Homer in the 'Shield of Achilles' (Hom *Il.* 18.600–601), and is therefore attested several centuries before Anacharsis was even born, Seneca says, 'Posidonius prefers to regard these verses as spurious rather than questioning the account' (*Deinde quia apud Homerum invenitur figuli rota, maluit videri versus falsos esse quam fabulam*, Sen. *Ep.* 90.31= fr. 284 Edelstein–Kidd). Since Homer is a source that cannot be bypassed or ignored, the only way to defend his authority in the face of a blatant discrepancy between his text and what the reader believes to be the true account of events is to attack the authenticity of the incongruous passage. To put it differently, a text can be deemed unauthentic to the extent that it is perceived to be mendacious. Because Homer was thought to have moral and educational value and thus in a sense to contain truth, he was treated in the same fashion as guarantors of historical accuracy.[36] Contestations of authorship are in essence challenges to the faithfulness of the text.

Thus starting from the fifth century, debates over authorship are often found in the context of discussions of the reliability of the suspected text. A primary example of this approach is represented by Herodotus' skeptical pronouncements on two poems of the epic Cycle. In *Histories* 4, the historian cites the *Epigonoi* not without adding his skepticism about their authenticity. The Hyperboreans, he says, are not talked about by the native sources but are mentioned by Hesiod and by Homer in the *Epigonoi*, 'if Homer really wrote this poem' (εἰ δὴ τῷ ἐόντι γε Ὅμηρος ταῦτα τὰ ἔπεα ἐποίησε, Hdt. 4.32). Interestingly, the contestation of Homeric authorship of the poem that he is quoting as a witness is accompanied by a general skepticism about the very validity of the claim—the existence of the Hyperboreans—that the poem is said to endorse. I would not go as far as to say that the source is suspected of being un-Homeric because it is unreliable but I think we can say that the suspicion of false ascription helps to undermine further the validity of the claim. Similarly, the *Cypria* cannot be by Homer because it gives an account of events—the journey of Paris from Sparta to Troy—that

36 Verdenius 1970.

is at odds with that presented in the *Iliad*. Herodotus is here at pains to show that during the Trojan war Helen was not in Troy but in Egypt where Paris left her after being confronted by the local king Proteus. Homer, Herodotus argues, was aware of this story as is evident from a passage in the *Iliad* (Hom. *Il.* 6.289–292) which comments on Paris' journey from Sparta to Troy. This passage, which Herodotus goes on to quote, reveals that, while he left the story out as unsuitable to the epic genre, he nevertheless knew of Paris' journey. By contrast, the *Cypria* relates how Paris reached Troy after three days of navigation: 'therefore these verses and this passage prove most clearly that the *Cypria* is not by Homer but by someone else' (κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἔπεα καὶ τόδε οὐκ ἥκιστα ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δηλοῖ ὅτι οὐκ Ὁμήρου τὰ Κύπρια ἔπεά ἐστι ἀλλ' ἄλλου τινός, Hdt. 2.117).

The refutation of Homeric authorship in Herodotus is framed in the context of an attack against the reliability of the text in question: using a method later employed by the Alexandrian scholars, Herodotus focuses on an inconsistency with the Iliadic account which, he argues, promptly reveals the version found in the *Cypria* as unHomeric and *therefore* as unreliable.[37] The rudimentary authenticity criticism which we see at work here is based on a strong presumption of what we might call 'authorial consistency': first, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are assumed *a priori* and uncontroversially to be by Homer. Second, if a text which bears a claim to Homeric authorship is inconsistent with the authorially guaranteed narrative of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, it is judged spurious. The assumption that an author, Homer in this case, could not offer two different accounts of the same event is based on an unspoken premise which dominates much of ancient literary criticism: an account of events, even those deemed fictional or mythical from a modern standpoint, is deemed realistic insofar as it corroborated by direct experience or *autopsia*. On a rhetorical level, the importance of eyewitnessing as an authenticating device of narrative implies a strong call on the author to narrate the events of a story in the words of Odysseus 'as if he had been there, or heard it from one who was' (ὥς τέ που ἢ αὐτὸς παρεὼν ἢ ἄλλου ἀκούσας, Hom.

[37] Herodotus' use of Homer as a source is actually more complex and nuanced: in the course of the same passage, the historian challenges Homer's contention that Helen did go to Troy and accepts the Egyptian account which he claims he himself has heard from the Egyptian priests (ἔλεγον δέ μοι οἱ ἱρέες ἱστορέοντι τὰ περὶ Ἑλένην γενέσθαι ὧδε, Hdt. 2.113.1), according to whom she was in Egypt, as inherently more plausible (Hdt. 2.118 and 220), though perhaps less suitable for epic (Hdt. 2.116.1). Homer is both a model against which to assert the historian's generically different concern for 'truth' and plausibility, and a source which, if carefully and scientifically inspected, is inherently more truthful than any other.

Od. 8.491).[38] The authenticating force of direct experience has an important consequence at the level of authorial representation: precisely because an author is expected to report faithfully on what he experiences or at least convey the impression that he is doing so, he is not likely to give two contrasting accounts. If he is found to be doing this, the inconsistency has to be explained away by invoking the notion of poetic license, by rationalizing or denying the very inconsistency, or in the last resort by calling into question the authenticity of the text in question (whether the whole poem or a single line). The hermeneutical figure of the self-consistent author both vouches for the authenticity of his own narrative and protects against other unauthorized accounts. A further corollary of this approach is that a challenge to authenticity implies *de facto* a strong attack against a text's reliability and vice versa: because only one version of events can be witnessed and therefore authorized, one of the two accounts has to be mendacious, usually the un-Homeric one. Therefore, a narrative, such as, in this case, the *Cypria*, which is deemed to be inconsistent and therefore spurious, is also simultaneously suspected of forging the version it endorses.

The non-authentic text is viewed as an interpolation, something that does not belong but has been 'added' or 'thrown in' to manipulate the authoritative narrative according to the interpolator's wishes and objectives. The interpolation is discarded as forged not because it is stylistically discordant—a criterion which will become pivotal in Hellenistic *Echtheitskritik*—but because it is in essence anachronistic and untrue. Put in another way, the authentic is synonym with ancient, impartial, and truthful, the spurious with new, tendentious, and false. What distinguishes the authentic from the spurious is not the superiority of formal command of language and style but the reliability of its author's wisdom. Yet, the Hellenistic emphasis on formal markers of authenticity flows naturally from this early emphasis on the authorial text as a container of truth (and in fact both continue to exist side by side):[39] in both cases the authenticity of a text is made to reside in a value, a well-identifiable x which the authentic text is thought to possess in the highest degree. This ideal of perfection, which is identified now with formal criteria, now with moral worth, is the aesthetic value of authenticity.

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38 This is particularly but not exclusively true of ancient historiography: Marincola 1997, 63–86. On eyewitnessing (real or fictional) as an authenticating device in poetry, see Nünlist 2009, 185–193.

39 And thus undignified treatment of gods, for example, continue to be used as grounds for *athetêsis*: e.g. Schol. Hom. *Il.* 3.423a Arist. A on different interpretations by Zenodotus and Aristarchus of Aphrodite carrying a seat for Helen.

4. *Aesthetics without Authenticity*

Not all the grounds for *athetêsis* are of course based on aesthetic consideration as Cicero jokingly suggests: for example, Aristarchus developed sophisticated arguments based on Homeric usage which do not imply condemnation of the linguistic or metrical feature which he regards as spurious as in the case of Hom. *Il.* 1.5 where an unnamed critic, in all likelihood Aristarchus, rejected the reading οἰωνοῖσί τε δαῖτα ('and he gave it as prey to dogs, and as *food for the birds*') on the grounds that there was no parallel in Homer for δαίς meaning food for animals. Instead, he read οἰωνοῖσί τε πᾶσι (and he gave it as prey to dogs, and *to all the birds*), a conjecture which prevailed in the vulgate.[40] Modern *Echtheitskritik* has made the stylistic variable arguably even more 'quantifiable' by studying closely metrics and diction and compiling lists of features which are characteristic of a given author, and distinguishing between the early and late phases of their production. But as Richard Hunter has warned in his study of the reception of the pseudo-Theocritean corpus, all arguments based on style are subject, to varying degrees, to the danger of circularity since to establish what counts as a characteristic feature of an author's style one has to have already decided what legitimately belongs to that author's canon.[41] Thus disquisitions about the attribution of such 'minor' works as the poems of the so-called *Appendix Vergiliana*, the *Eclogues* of Calpurnius Siculus or the pseudo(?)-Ovidian Sappho Epistle have hinged on fiercely contested definitions of what counts as Vergilian style, subject matter and chronology, or Neronian or Ovidian poetic and metrical technique, with aesthetic considerations often functioning as decisive factors.[42] Pronouncements on the periphery of the canon are thus always tied in important ways to the process of defining its center and the values one associates with it.

Moreover, even the seemingly objective notion of internal (in)consistency, here primarily understood as linguistic and stylistic uniformity, is not altogether devoid of aesthetic implications.[43] On the contrary, the feature(s) that are isolated as being consistently repeated are often positive qualities.

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[40] Eust. *Il.* 1.32.21–26 van der Valk and Ath. 1.21.26–38 Kaibel: Pfeiffer 1968, 111. See also Pfeiffer 1968, 111–113 and 227–233 on the famous principle of textual criticism attributed to Aristarchus: 'to explain Homer from Homer'.

[41] Hunter 2002.

[42] Amid the vast bibliography I single out Tarrant 1981 and Rosati 1996 on Ovid *Her.* 15; Mayer 1980 and Horsfall 1997 on Calpurnius Siculus.

[43] As explored by Greetham 1994, 297–299 and 323–324.

In Latin studies, the name of Bertil Axelson is associated with a widely influential method in deciding on questions of authenticity and literary history. This method of 'Priority Criticism' (*Prioritätskritik*) developed by Axelson in a study of the poet Lygdamus' relationship to Ovid and aimed at sorting out which of two similarly worded texts is the source and which the imitation relied heavily on similar notions of internal consistency: 'if two passages are verbally similar, in a way that precludes coincidental resemblance, and one is organically related to its context while the other is not, the former is the original and the latter the imitation'.[44] The idea that parts of text that are found to be inconsistent or redundant should in principle be considered derivative seems to rest on the premise that an original text can be counted on to be always free from redundancies and other such faults. This often unexamined equation of original and uncorrupted surfaces in other areas.[45] A.E. Housman famously defined textual criticism as 'the science of discovering error in the text and the art of removing it'.[46] Implicit in this definition is the idea that the original text and the ideal target of authenticity criticism is one which is as much as possible consistently free from mistakes.

But what happens if an authentic text does fall short of this ideal of perfection? I have argued that historically speaking, aesthetically inferior texts are more readily believed to be spurious, while the authorial text is often times constructed as consistently optimal. This is of course far from being a hard and fast rule. According to the scholiast to the pseudo-Hesiodean *Aspis*, Megaclides of Athens considered the poem to be genuine in spite of the fact that Hesiod was found to have committed several mistakes: 'Megaklides of Athens considered the poem to be genuine but censured Hesiod: for he said that it was illogical that Hephaestus should make weapons for his mother's enemies' (Μεγακλείδης ὁ Ἀθηναῖος γνήσιον μὲν οἶδε τὸ ποίημα, ἄλλως δὲ ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ Ἡσιόδῳ· ἄλογον γάρ φησι ποιεῖν ὅπλα Ἥφαιστον τοῖς τῆς μητρὸς ἐχθροῖς, *Hypothesis*, Merkelbach–West pp. 86–87 = Most, *Hesiod* Loeb, vol.I, Test. 52).

Vergil reportedly had his critics already in his lifetime.[47] The Vergilian scholia report some interventions of Vergil's posthumous editors, his friends Varius and Tucca. They were supposedly given the task of editing the poem by the dying poet and later by Augustus who prevented Vergil from burning

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44 Axelson 1960, as summarized by Tarrant 1981, 143–144.
45 Tarrant 1995, 98.
46 Housman 1922, 68.
47 Courtney 2003, 284–286.

the unfinished manuscript.[48] As the story goes, Varius published the text after correcting it lightly (*summatim emendata*, Donat. *Vit. Verg.* 41). One such improvement is recorded by Servius *ad Aen.* 5.871. According to the scholiast, Vergil concluded *Aeneid* 5 with the lines which now stand at the beginning of *Aeneid* 6 (*sic fatur lacrimans* 6.1–2) and we owe their placement today to the initiative of Varius and Tucca (Servius *ad Aen.* 5.871):

> It must be noted that Tucca and Varius wanted the fifth book to conclude with this line: for the two verses that follow were directly joined to this verse by Vergil, so that in some ancient manuscripts the beginning of the sixth book reads '*obvertunt pelago proras, tum dente tenaci*' [Verg. *Aen.* 6.3].
>
> sane Tuccam et Varium hunc finem quinti esse voluisse: nam a Virgilio duo versus sequentes huic iuncti fuerunt: unde in non nullis antiquis codicibus sexti initium est 'obvertunt pelago proras, tum dente tenaci'.

R.G. Austin, in his commentary to *Aeneid* 6, displays an ambivalent response to the anecdote reported by Servius. On the one hand, he agrees with Servius that the verses are more effective at the beginning of *Aeneid* 6. On the other, precisely because they are more effective, he is driven to discount Servius' anecdote and instead attribute the placement of the lines to Vergil himself: '… it is an unsatisfactory story [Servius']: why suppose that Vergil himself did not see at once that *Aeneid* 5 ends perfectly and beautifully without the two added lines, and that *Aeneid* 6 begins smoothly and naturally with them (as Servius realized)?'.[49] If Austin is more inclined to attribute the perfect and beautiful text to the work of Vergil, the first-century CE Vergilian critic, Marcus Valerius Probus, if we are to trust Servius, preferred the least appealing but supposedly 'authentic' variant. Thus, in the next note, Servius explains that the grammarian left the verses at the close of *Aeneid* 5, thus preserving the 'authentic' Vergilian reading (Servius *ad Aen.* 6.pr):

> It must be noted that though Probus and others left the first two lines at the close of book 5, it is wise to transpose them to the beginning of book 6: for, it makes for a better transition and Homer himself began in this way 'so he spoke, with tears pouring down'.
>
> sane sciendum, licet primos duos versus Probus et alii in quinti reliquerint fine, prudenter ad initium sexti esse translatos; nam et coniunctio poematis melior est, et Homerus etiam sic inchoavit Ὣς φάτο δάκρυ χέων.

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[48] Donat. *Vit. Verg.* 40–41. The veracity of this story is severely in doubt—Jocelyn 1990—and yet the anecdote provides essential background to understand Servius' own stance in the matter of book divisions.

[49] Austin 1977, 30.

Interestingly, Servius does not claim that the beginning which he so admires is Vergil's 'original' text. Nevertheless, in his view, the verses fit better at the beginning of *Aeneid* 6 and this reading therefore should be accepted regardless of whether or not it goes back to Vergil's 'original' version.

What we witness in this specimen of Vergilian *Echtheitskritik* is a curious phenomenon whereby the critic *qua* editor takes the side of that which is perceived to be more aesthetically pleasing regardless of its reputed genuineness. Even Probus, who in the previous case championed the less satisfying but genuine 'original' ending, is not immune to this thinking. Thus, at Verg. *Aen.* 4.418, for example, a line repeated from *G.*1.304, Servius Danielis quotes a note in which the grammarian's scorn can still be felt: 'Probus appended the following statement to this line: "if he [i.e. Vergil] had omitted this line, he would have done a better job"' (*Probus sane sic adnotavit: si hunc versum omitteret, melius fecisset*, Serv. Dan. *ad Aen.* 4.418). Although *adnotare* signals the critic's disapproval, it should not be assumed that Probus necessarily meant to expunge the line from the text.[50] In any case his reading did not affect the manuscript tradition. Whether or not he intended to expunge the unsatisfactory line despite regarding it Vergil's work, it is clear that Probus saw aesthetic judgment as an essential part of his work as editor and dispensed it accordingly.

Rather than viewing Probus and Servius as rogue philologists because of their privileging of the aesthetic over the authentic, it is more helpful to consider the historical and intellectual roots of their activity. After all, it is worth remembering that 'emendation' (Lt. *emendatio*), one of the activities by which editing is defined, literally means the removal of 'errors' (Lt. *menda*). In fact, in the Roman world, *emendatio* was an activity ambiguously poised between restoring the text to its original state and improving it.[51] Thus, after introducing it in the context of the grammarian's tasks in *Institutio Oratoria* 1, Quintilian discusses *emendatio* again in *Institutio Oratoria* 10 (Quint. *Inst.* 10.4) where it does not seem to mean anything more than correction of mistakes or faults in writing.[52] Horace *Sat.* 1.10 is prefaced

[50] The exact meaning of the expression *adnotare* and the extent to which the ancient terminology of editing generally maps onto modern practices are uncertain: Jocelyn 1984, 469–471. On the meaning of *adnotare* in the passage above from Servius Danielis see Timpanaro 1986, 114–116, and cf. Serv. Dan. *ad Aen.* 1.21–22; Suet. *Gram.* 24.3, in which Probus is said to be the first one to *emendare ac distinguere et adnotare*.

[51] Delvigo 1990.

[52] Cf. Varro fr. 236 Funaioli, *Gramm. Rom. Frag.*: *emendatio est recorrectio errorum qui per scripturam dictionemue fiunt*.

by a short passage, clearly spurious, which acts as a kind of introduction to the poet's final demonstration of Lucilius' faults as a poet. The poem, as these lines say, will show once and for all Lucilius' limitations with the help of Valerius Cato, one of the most prominent Roman grammarians of the first century BCE and editor of Lucilius ([Hor.] *Sat.* 1.10.1–3):

> Lucilius, how full of faults you are I will prove clearly
> by the testimony of Cato, your own advocate, who is setting out to work
> to remove faults from your own badly composed verses.
>
> Lucili, quam sis mendosus, teste Catone,
> defensore tuo, pervincam, qui male factos
> emendare parat versus.

The passage seems to be implying that Valerius' impulse to 'emend' (*emendare*), and thus to improve, Lucilius' poorly executed verses paradoxically confirms the faulty (*mendosus*) character of his poetry. Here the critic's *emendatio* is so aligned with aesthetic principles that it backfires, revealing the critical object as in need of improvement. Further evidence of the *grammaticus*' role as a judge of the aesthetic worthiness of poets, if not of the authenticity of their texts, comes from Horace *Ars Poetica*, where Aristarchus appears in the guise of the unbiased critic of literature who will mark and chastise whatever faults he finds in what he reads.[53] Aristarchus is both the Homeric expert, who can distinguish Homer's authentic verses from interpolations, and the tireless critic who notes down that which is poorly written and must therefore be changed (*mutanda notabis*). It is no wonder that ancient readers, like modern ones, were suspicious of the grammarians' 'corrections': according to an anecdote preserved by Diogenes Laertius, when Aratus asked Timon where he could find a reliable text of Homer, the philosopher replied that he would get one if he laid hold of an old copy and not one of those that had already been corrected (*diôrthômena*) (εἰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ἀντιγράφοις ἐντυγχάνοι καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἤδη διωρθωμένοις, Diog. Laert. 9.113). There are still many open questions about the nature of the work practiced by Hellenistic grammarians and their Roman counterparts especially concerning the end product of the scholars' work. It should be clear, however, that grammarians were judges of aesthetic worth as much as they were textual critics, never taking off their mantle of aesthetic connoisseurs when it came to deciding between authentic and spurious. If the

[53] Hor. *Ars P.* 445–450: *vir bonus et prudens uersus reprehendet inertis,/culpabit duros, incomptis adlinet atrum/transuorso calamo signum, ambitiosa recidet/ornamenta, parum claris lucem dare coget,/arguet ambigue dictum, mutanda notabit,/fiet Aristarchus.*

two foci of their work—aesthetic value and authenticity—were already deeply intertwined in antiquity, it is no surprise that they have continued to be closely connected throughout the history of textual criticism.

5. *Anti-Values: The Bad and the Unoriginal*

To some extent, however, since both Homer and Vergil were widely (though not unanimously) reputed to be the best poets, the evidence presented thus far is by necessity skewed. What happens if the text that is being reconstructed is actually perceived to be second class? Unsurprisingly, texts that have a lower ranking within the canon are an uneasy target of authenticity criticism, threatening to short-circuit the very project of the discipline. Nothing makes this clearer than Housman's pungent summary of the problems of editing Vergilian spuria (Housman 1902, 339):

> Just as it is hard to tell, in Statius or Valerius Flaccus, whether this or that absurd expression is due to miscopying or to the divine afflatus of the bard, so in the Culex and Ciris and Aetna it is for ever to be borne in mind that they are the work of poetasters. Many a time it is impossible to say for certain where the badness of the author ends and the badness of the scribe begins.

The work of the critic consists precisely in separating the 'badness' caused by corruption from the idealized 'goodness' of the original. If the latter is absent, the work of reconstructing the authentic text is fundamentally threatened.

The essay on the orator Dinarchus by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, part of a longer work on Attic orators, is not only one of the most complete specimens of ancient *Echtheitskritik* but also an interesting example of the challenge posed by aesthetically inferior works to the project of authenticity criticism. Though Dionysius often uses chronology as a deciding factor, style is also invoked as a criterion. However, Dinarchus poses a special problem. Each writer in the canon of Attic orators is characterized by a set of distinctive positive qualities which he is judged to possess in the highest degree. Dinarchus, however, is not regarded as the creator of a specific style (*kharaktêr*) but as a clever imitator. The trick then, as Dionysius goes on to explain, is to keep in mind the virtues of whichever author Dinarchus is imitating, and if these are not found or are found in a deficient level in a given speech, then the critic should assign the work to Dinarchus (Dion. Hal. *Din.* 7):

> Now let it be assumed that certain speeches are attributed to Dinarchus, and have a close similarity to Lysias' speeches. He who wishes to make a

> determination must first contemplate the individual style of that famous man (τὴν ἰδιότητα τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐκείνου); then if he sees that the speeches have the flower of excellence and charm, and contain his well chosen diction and that there is nothing flat in what is being said, let him confidently say that these are by Lysias. But if he finds no such charm or persuasiveness or precision of words or close adherence to reality, let him leave them among the speeches of Dinarchus ... what is there that one could say except that an inborn charm and freshness attaches to all original models, whereas in adapted copies, even if they reach the height of imitative skill, there is also present nevertheless a certain amount of contrivance and unnaturalness? It is by this principle that not only orators distinguish (διακρίνουσιν) other orators, but painters the works of Apelles from those of his imitators, molders the works of Polycleitus, and sculptors the works of Pheidias.[54]

Two related understandings of authenticity are at work here: authenticity as genuineness, that is as a function of authorship, and authenticity as originality, that is as a literary quality. The two are clearly related: since Dinarchus is 'unoriginal', it is difficult to assess the genuineness of his work except by relying on the borrowed yardstick of his model's originality. The mediocre, unoriginal text exists as an authentic text only to the extent that it possesses albeit to a smaller degree a positive quality, an original belonging to a different author.

The confusion of pre-assigned stylistic identities brought about by mediocre texts is fundamentally disruptive of the critic's work. For the critic's ability to differentiate and separate the good from the bad and the 'authentic' from the 'corrupt' is a fundamental aspect of *Echtheitskritik*, and unsurprisingly so, since the Greek word *krinô*, from which 'critic' and *krisis* are derived, originally means 'separating' or 'dividing one thing from another', and hence judging. That which cannot be distinguished cannot be so easily judged.

6. *Conclusion: The 'Value' of Authenticity*

I have argued that judgments of authenticity are far from being simple objective choices but are rather deeply reflective of the critic's view of the authorial source and of what constitutes its aesthetic value whether that is made to reside in its moral truth, its originality or its aesthetic uniqueness. Questions about authorial provenance are never independent from a criti-

[54] Tr. Usher, adapted.

cal agenda towards the source itself. And precisely for this reason, questions of authorial provenance are not always part of the system of transactions between audiences and texts. In other words, the emergence of an interest in tracing authorial sources is a cultural phenomenon worth commenting on in itself, but one which deserves more space than I can give here.[55]

Insofar as the project of *Echtheitskritik* has been closely tied from its earliest beginnings to that of defining a canon, authenticity criticism is by definition a value-oriented critical activity and judgments of authenticity are part of the complex mechanism through which a reading community defines what counts as value in literature and art. The aesthetic value of authenticity is therefore not an accident but an essential consequence of its role within the history of the discipline.

However, highlighting the cultural and aesthetic relativity of judgments of authenticity should not be tantamount to discounting their importance for the discipline. For, to use the partial failure of *Echtheitskritik* to settle authorial questions to undermine its value for the field would be to miss the point of authenticity criticism as an intellectual activity: what is really at stake in *Echtheitskritik* is not just decisions on the authenticity of individual lines or works but the critic's sense of judgment and his taste. Authenticity criticism is an arena in which the critic can display his discernment, affirm himself as a knowledgeable individual and with luck be included in a community of likeminded people with refined taste.

The ancient representations of Alexandrian grammarians provide ample testimony of this performative aspect of *krisis*. In a letter addressed to his friend Paetus and written in 46 BCE, Cicero compares Caesar to a discerning critic who is so familiar with an author's work that he is (or thinks he is) absolutely capable of telling at a glance a genuine item from a spurious one. The issue at hand is potentially very serious: Paetus is warning Cicero that he is being accused of making offensive remarks against Caesar, something that Cicero denies. He also adds, however, that Caesar himself has fine judgment (*peracre iudicium*) when it comes to Cicero's statements (Cic. *Fam.* 9.16.3–4/Shackleton Bailey 190):

> But Caesar himself clearly has a keen sense of judgment and, as your brother Servius, whom *I judge* to be a man of outstanding literary culture, could easily pronounce that Plautus did not write one line or did write another, because

[55] See Wood 2008, on authenticity in German Renaissance art, and Peirano 2012, 36–73 on the disconnect between ancient and modern conceptions of authenticity in discussions of Vergilian authorship.

> his taste has been refined by observation of the styles of poets and by constant reading of their work, in the same way I hear that, having in his day compiled a volume of my sayings, Caesar will reject any specimen offered him as mine which is not authentic.

> sed tamen ipse Caesar habet peracre *iudicium*, et, ut Servius, frater tuus, quem litteratissimum fuisse *iudico*, facile diceret: 'hic versus Plauti non est, hic est', quod tritas aures haberet notandis generibus poetarum et consuetudine legendi, sic audio Caesarem, cum volumina iam confecerit apophthegmatorum, si quod afferatur ad eum pro meo, quod meum non sit, reiicere solere.

While Cicero's main aim seems to be complimenting Caesar on his keen sense of judgment, on closer inspection, the comparison between the politician and the man of letters fulfills several other purposes. For one, by praising the addressee's brother as *litteratissimus*, Cicero indirectly compliments the addressee himself, and returns the kindness Paetus had shown by expressing concern over his safety. Secondly, the comparison between Caesar and the connoisseur of literature implicitly presents Cicero as a classic—the equivalent of a Plautus—an author who is read, reread, and commented upon. Last but not least, the compliment to Caesar's *peracre iudicium* is conditional on the reader's acceptance of Cicero's own superior judgment, since the comparison is introduced by Cicero's assertion of his own ability to judge (*quem litteratissimum ... iudico*) the eminence of Paetus' brother as a philologist. Drawing attention to his own standing as a discerning critic, Cicero makes sure to emphatically ascribe to himself the very quality for which he compliments his opponent.

Housman similarly insists on the pre-eminence of judgment in textual criticism. Mocking Lachmann's followers and their brand of 'scientific criticism' or 'critical method' geared towards identifying reliable manuscript witnesses at the exclusion of other branches of the tradition, Housman writes (Housman 1932, xxxi):

> An editor of no judgment, perpetually confronted with a couple of MSS to choose from, cannot but feel in every fibre of his being that he is a donkey between two bundles of hay. What shall he do now? Leave criticism to critics, you may say, and betake himself to any honest trade for which he is less unfit. But he prefers a more flattering solution: he confusedly imagines that if one bundle of hay is removed he will cease to be a donkey.

Textual criticism for Housman is in essence an act of judgment which manifests itself in a series of discerning choices between textual variants and manuscripts of varying trustworthiness. An editor of no judgment in Housman's opinion is no editor at all. Housman returns to the subject of judgment in the preface to his 1926 edition of Lucan. There, in introducing

the subject of emendation, he argues that the more daring the critic is in his use of judgment the stronger the case he needs to build. Thus, according to Housman, what distinguishes the conservative scholar from the emendator is the high standard to which he is held by the audience of judicious few (Housman 1926, xxvii):

> It would not be true to say that all conservative scholars are stupid, but it is very near the truth to say that all stupid scholars are conservative. Defenders of corruptions are therefore assured beforehand of wide approval; and this is demoralising. They need not seriously consider what they say, because they are addressing an audience whose intelligence is despicable and whose hearts are won already; and they use pretexts which nobody would venture to put forward in any other cause. Emendators should thank their stars that they have the multitude against them and must address the judicious few, and the moral integrity and intellectual vigilance are for them not merely duties but necessities.

In Housman's opinion, the authentic text is the product not just of the discernment of the individual critic but of the judicial soundness of the community by which each individual is held accountable. It is by engaging in the process of judgment that the community is able to identify the critic from the 'donkey', the 'judicious' from the man of 'despicable intelligence'. In many respects, *Echtheitskritik* appears to be geared as much towards judging the judge and creating a community based on shared aesthetic values as it is towards judging the work and its disputed attribution. Not only is authenticity a value of texts, but the cultural work that the category of authenticity performs when it is invoked and contested is in itself *of value* to the community of critics as a means to create and ensure the survival of that same community.

In an important essay on fakes and forgeries, Umberto Eco came to the conclusion that 'a semiotic approach to fakes shows how theoretically weak are our criteria for deciding about authenticity'.[56] It is a testament to the enduring cultural value of authenticity that despite being such a theoretically problematic concept, it never ceases to be invoked and contested by readers across different time periods and contexts.[57]

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[56] Eco 1990, 200.

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CHAPTER TEN

HERACLIDES CRITICUS AND THE PROBLEM OF TASTE

Jeremy McInerney

1. *Introduction: Aesthetics and Taste*

Ancient investigations of aesthetic theory in Greek and Roman society tended to stay on familiar ground; beauty as an absolute, the relationship of beauty to goodness, the nature of sublimity are perennial issues from Aristotle to [Longinus].[1] Some of the trajectories of these discussions were also reliably consistent: what was the role of poetry in society? Was Homer a good influence? Recent scholarship, reflecting the 'cultural turn' of the 1980's, has been suspicious of traditional aesthetic theory and has emphasized the political and ideological dimensions of this discourse.[2] Yet both the ancient and modern debates, while necessary, overlook a number of issues that relate to aesthetics but at a tangent. One such question is the matter of taste and judgment, resulting in actions which arise in the setting of aesthetics but frequently have immediate social application. Consider, for example, the following: the assertion that roses are beautiful is one kind of claim that clearly falls within the field of aesthetics. The claim that the Apricot Princess rose growing in my garden is beautiful is different, but still recognizably aesthetic. But the assertion that white roses are more appropriate for weddings than red roses is an altogether different kind of claim. It may overlap with the aesthetic to a certain degree, but also operates in a new terrain as well. Far from abstraction, such a dictate is a statement about fashion and taste, and though it is as ephemeral as a ban on wearing white shoes after Labor Day, it

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[1] Tatarkiewicz 1970.

[2] Too 2004, 1–12. For the explicit contrasting of politics and aesthetics see Habinek 1998. For an important discussion see Martindale 2001, who remarks on the tendency of recent scholars to treat 'aesthetic judgements [as] occluded judgements of other kinds' (2001, 121).

also constitutes a kind of applied aesthetics, in which taste functions as a mark of social standing and helps create subtle and opaque social distinctions.[3]

Perhaps it was ever so, but there are signs in the fourth century BCE that such judgmental thinking was finding wider literary expression. Earlier, in the fifth century BCE Athenian culture was broadly bifurcated. At one end were disquisitions on Homer and the full panoply of philosophical inquiry—ethics, natural science, and the questions explored by the sophists—but to those at the other end of the spectrum this was highbrow stuff, the preserve of professional critics, of university professors, of sophists sitting in baskets, mixing their *nous* with the ether as they deconstruct reality in the ivy-clad refuge of the *phrontistêrion*.[4] In the century, however, after Athens' traumatic defeat new voices began to speak. Menander and Theophrastus reflect this: the former employs language closer to the spoken word while the latter offers sketches of recognizable persons. Even if he is a 'type', is there anyone who does not recognize the *alazôn*, or snob, who pontificates about the superiority of Asian workmanship compared to European (Theophr. *Char*. 23.2)?

It is possible that Menander, Theophrastus, and other writers of the early Hellenistic period represent the emergence of a middle-brow of aesthetic judgment. This is a category that has not been widely explored, although Emilio Gabba pointed to paradoxography as evidence for the existence of a middle-brow culture in the Hellenistic and Roman periods.[5] More recently Mark Griffith has teased out the ideological associations of the various equids employed by the Greeks, and has identified the mule as a symbol of the middle order in Greek society.[6] It is with these somewhat slippery categories in mind that I suggest investigating a work characterized by a range of styles and concerns not previously prominent in Athenian literature: a dilettantish concern for good taste, a casual snobbishness that is amusing but is not based on any kind of coherent or developed aesthetic theory or philosophy, an inclination to pass judgment on the manners and mores of others,

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[3] On the complex relationship between high aesthetics and mass culture see Rubin 1992; Berglund 2006, 133; Aubry 2008, 86; much of the modern discussion goes back to Macdonald 1960, and see Horowitz 1992. For a definition of middle-brow aesthetics see Bourdieu 1990.

[4] The literature on Aristophanes' caricature of intellectuals in *Clouds* is extensive. See, e.g. Vickers 1993, 603–618 and Whitehorne 2002, 33–34.

[5] Gabba 1981, 53.

[6] Griffith 2006a and 2006b, 354: 'They never managed to develop a consistently egalitarian, middle-of-the-road set of values to which all members of their society would aspire'.

based on the author's clear superiority, and a marked preference for contemporary comic literature rather than anything by Homer, the tragedians, or in fact anything philosophical or historical. The work to which I refer is the early periegetic text of Heraclides Criticus, entitled Περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι πόλεων (*On the Cities of Greece*). Whether it can be properly characterized as middle brow, or is simply to be dismissed as 'foppish' is largely a matter of labels. My concern is less with finding the right label for the work and more with understanding what it says about the little known literary culture of its time, the mid-third century BCE, a moment of profound change, not to say dislocation in Greek society.

2. *The First Blog*

In relation to the literature that comes before it, Heraclides' work is entirely fresh, but coming to his text after reading canonical works is like picking up *Vanity Fair*, the magazine, after finishing Thackeray. Snodgrass expressed it well, saying, 'It is instantly clear that we are in the presence of an individualist and a humorist: quotations, off-the-cuff evaluative judgments (often derogatory), and downright gibes alternate with extremely observant description'.[7] What perhaps Snodgrass and others have failed to do is to recognize the originality of the work. It avoids the high cultural stance of the philosopher and his penchant for theory, yet it is equally dismissive of the philistine and the rustic bore.[8] In place of argument it offers observation and opinion built on a foundation of untested assumptions and snap judgments. In other words, Heraclides Criticus wrote the first blog.

What makes this significant in terms of the trajectory of Greek cultural production is that the work was composed in the third century BCE, as the political independence of the city-states fell victim to the emergence of regional powers such as Macedon. The broad changes in the Greek world are on a remarkable scale: the spread of Greek populations far abroad in the wake of Alexander's armies, the establishment of Graeco-Macedonian dynasties in areas formerly foreign to the Greeks, from Egypt to Anatolia and beyond, not to mention the stylistic changes that mark Hellenistic art as distinctly different from its classical antecedents. An especially important

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7 Snodgrass 1987, 89–90. Pretzler 2009, 358 describes Heraclides as 'humorous and somewhat flippant'. Eisner 1993, 32 dismisses him as 'often trivial in his judgments'.

8 For a more general approach based on the simple idea that a third style may emerge between the old high culture/broad culture distinction, see Griswold 1993, 455–467.

development in the early Hellenistic period was the shaping of a distinctive memory of classical culture. Communities' identities are imagined, to be sure, and a component of that imagining resides in its manipulation of the past. The notion of a packaging of Greece as a cultural landscape literally worth visiting and seeing is, of course, a phenomenon familiar to us from the Second Sophistic, but Heraclides' work proves that this process actually begins much earlier than the Roman period. The emergence of this middle-brow literature points to the beginning of a significant shift in cultural production, as Greece itself becomes a repository of places and people worth seeing and describing. The ethnographic gaze turns inward.

Some background: the manuscripts containing this work were collated by Stephanus in 1589 but for three hundred years the three lengthy fragments were incorrectly ascribed to the fourth-century peripatetic philosopher, Dicaearchus of Messene, in the manuscript of whose work the fragments of Heraclides had been accidently inserted.[9] Along with the three prose fragments of Heraclides, 150 lines of iambic verse by a certain Dionysius, son of Calliphon were also inserted into the text of Dicaearchus. How the fragments of Heraclides and Dionysius came to be identified with Dicaearchus is unknown, but Keyser speculates that Heraclides may have referred to Dicaearchus in his preface.[10] Another possibility is that a bookseller incorrectly assigned the fragments of Heraclides to Dicaearchus due to the latter's interest in the height of mountains, which led him to measure the height of Pelion (Plin. *HN* 2.162). Pelion is the subject of Heraclides' third fragment. (An amusing feature of Heraclides' *Nachleben* is that Stephanus, or Henri Estienne, to give him his own name, appears to have been inspired by the satiric tone of Heraclides' work to produce his own travelogue, an amusing portrait of Paris written by a man who spent much of his life in exile in Geneva.)[11]

It was in 1831 that German scholar F. Osann recognized that a reference in the paradoxographer Apollonius clearly identified the author of the three prose fragments found in Dicaearchus' work, which were separate and distinct from the surrounding chapters. Apollonius' citation reads as follows (*FGrH* 369a T1):

[9] For full discussion of the manuscript tradition see Pfister 1951.

[10] Keyser 2001, 371.

[11] Boudou 2007, 18: 'La vie d' Estienne et son attachement à la cité qui l' a vu naître révèlent donc une situation d' exil qui le conduit à parler de Paris comme un voyageur qui en revient, ou qui y retourne'.

> Heraclides Criticus in his work *On the Cities of Greece* says that on Mt Pelion there grows a fruit-bearing prickly plant and that if one grinds the berries up with oil and water and anoints one's own body or anyone else's, then, even in winter, one will not feel the cold.[12]
>
> Ἡρακλείδης δὲ ὁ κριτικὸς ἐν τῶι περὶ τῶν ἐν τῆι Ἑλλάδι πόλεων κατὰ τὸ Πήλιον ὄρος φύεσθαί φησιν ἄκανθαν καρποφόρον, ἧς τὸν καρπὸν ἐάν τις τρίψας μετ' ἐλαίου καὶ ὕδατος χρίσηι τὸ αὑτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου σῶμα χειμῶνος ὄντος, οὐκ ἐπαισθήσεται τοῦ ψύχους.

The corresponding passage in Heraclides reads as follows (*FGrH* 369a F2.5):

> Also growing on the mountain is the berry of a prickly plant that resembles white myrtle. When this is ground smooth and the body anointed with it, one becomes impervious to the coldest weather entirely, or almost so. Nor in the summer does the body suffer the heat, because the salve, by blocking the pores, prevents the external air from penetrating deep into the body.
>
> φύεται δ' ἐν τῶι ὄρει καὶ καρπὸς ἀκάνθης τοῖς λευκοῖς παραπλήσιος μύρτοις· ὃν ὅταν τις τρίψας λεῖον [... ίσῃ] τὸ σῶμα, τοῦ μεγίστου χειμῶνος οὐ λαμβάνει τὴν ἐπαίσθησιν ἢ πάνυ βραχεῖαν· οὐδὲ ἐν τῶι θέρει τοῦ καύματος, κωλύοντος τοῦ φαρμάκου τῆι αὐτοῦ πυκνώσει τὸν ἔξωθεν ἀέρα κατὰ βάθους διικνεῖσθαι τοῦ σώματος.

Because of the clear correspondence between the anomalous passages inserted into the manuscript of Dicaearchus and the explicit citation in Apollonius, the identification of Heraclides as the author of the three lengthy fragments has generally been accepted, although in subsequent literature one still finds an occasional reference to 'Pseudo-Dicaearchus'.[13]

3. *Visions of Athens*

The work as it comes down to us begins in Athens, although the report begins *in medias res* and there is really no way of telling where the journey began (*FGrH* 369a F1.1):[14]

> From here [one proceeds] to the city of Athens. It is a fine road, passing through land all under cultivation, quite pleasant to behold. The city however is entirely dry. It suffers from a poor water-supply, and, because of its antiquity, the lay-out of the streets is chaotic. Most of the houses are shabby, few are better quality. At first sight, a foreigner would find it hard to believe

12 All translations are my own.

13 See, for example, Elsner 2004 and Orrieux and Schmitt-Pantel 1999.

14 Pfister 1951, 20 and Perrin 1994, 197 assume that the missing earlier chapters dealt with the Peloponnese.

> that this was the famous city of Athens. At second glance, however, he would believe it. It is truly the loveliest place in the inhabited world.
>
> ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὸ Ἀθηναίων … ἄστυ. ὁδὸς δὲ ἡδεῖα, γεωργουμένη πᾶσα, ἔχουσά τι τῆι ὄψει φιλάνθρωπον. ἡ δὲ πόλις ξηρὰ πᾶσα, οὐκ εὔυδρος, κακῶς ἐρρυμοτομημένη διὰ τὴν ἀρχαιότητα. αἱ μὲν πολλαὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν εὐτελεῖς, ὀλίγαι δὲ χρήσιμαι, ἀπιστηθείη δ' ἂν ἐξαίφνης ὑπὸ τῶν ξένων θεωρουμένη, εἰ αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ προσαγορευομένη τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις· μετ' οὐ πολὺ δὲ πιστεύσειεν ἄν τις. ὧδε ἦν τῶν ἐν τῆι οἰκουμένηι κάλλιστον·

One notices immediately that the author is striving to give the account a vivid, eye-witness quality, not only by attention to detail of climate and local conditions, but also by playing off the contrast between the city's reputation—the imagined city—and the stark reality, which in turn gives way to a deeper, more nuanced appreciation of the city's visual pleasures. In some respects Heraclides resembles his contemporary, Hegesias of Magnesia, part of whose encomium to Athens is preserved in Strabo (Str. 9.1.16):[15]

> I see the Acropolis, and there the mark of the mighty trident! I see Eleusis and have been initiated into its mysteries. There the Leocorium! Here the Theseum. But I cannot point out each one. For Attica is sacred to the gods, who took it for themselves and as a possession of the heroic dead!
>
> ὁρῶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τὸ περιττῆς τριαίνης ἐκεῖθι σημεῖον, ὁρῶ τὴν Ἐλευσῖνα, καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν γέγονα μύστης. ἐκεῖνο Λεωκόριον, τοῦτο Θησεῖον· οὐ δύναμαι δηλῶσαι καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον· ἡ γὰρ Ἀττικὴ θεῶν αὐτοῖς … καταλαβόντων καὶ τῶν προγόνων ἡρώων.

In the very next lines Strabo goes on to criticize the fact that Hegesias passed over many of the notable offerings on the Acropolis, and had little to say about the demes other than Eleusis. The same could be said of Heraclides, but where Hegesias feigns an inability to capture the grandeur of Athens, in part because of its overwhelmingly sacred character, Heraclides suggests that its charms reveal themselves to the attentive visitor. In fact, a comparison of the two authors show their approaches are quite different. Where Hegesias wants only to see the magnificent monuments of Athens' glorious past, the *signa priscae artis* to borrow Livy's phrase, Heraclides is interested in the contrast between those monuments and the charmless backdrop provided by the city's current dry and shabby conditions. In this way the glories of the past are made all the more evocative. Which monuments (*FGrH* 369a F1.1)?

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[15] On Hegesias see Norden 1915, 133–138. Comparing Heraclides with Hegesias was suggested to me by Robert Parker and I thank him for this.

> It possesses a noteworthy theater, large and astonishing, as well as an expensive temple of Athena, which is conspicuous and worth seeing, the so-called Parthenon, perched above the theater. It makes quite an impression on those who see it. The Olympieion is also impressive even though it is only half-finished, since the plan of the building is clear. It would be the finest building of its type, were it ever finished. There are three gymnasia: the Academy, the Lyceum, and Cynosarges. All three are well wooded, and have grassy grounds.
>
> θέατρον ἀξιόλογον, μέγα καὶ θαυμαστόν, Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερὸν πολυτελὲς, ἀπόψιον, ἄξιον θέας, ὁ καλούμενος Παρθενών, ὑπερκείμενον τοῦ θεάτρου, μεγάλην κατάπληξιν ποιεῖ τοῖς θεωροῦσιν. Ὀλύμπιον ἡμιτελὲς μὲν κατάπληξιν δ᾽ ἔχον τὴν τῆς οἰκοδομίας ὑπογραφήν, γενόμενον δ᾽ ἂν βέλτιστον εἴπερ συνετελέσθη. γυμνάσια τρία, Ἀκαδημία, Λύκειον, Κυνόσαργες· πάντα κατάδενδρά τε καὶ τοῖς ἐδάφεσι ποώδη.

The matching tricola represent perhaps a rudimentary stab at style, and the extreme economy of vocabulary gives the prose a sharp, clipped quality that may point once again towards Hegesias, the orator whose Asiatic style infuriated Cicero.[16] What is certainly interesting is the merging of the visually real with the evocation of cultural memory. Heraclides, in fact, shows us an Athens which is being transformed into a *lieu de mémoire*, a place where the physical monuments become signifiers of past glory. What is signified is a claim about Athenian status based in aesthetics. The theater of Dionysus, the Parthenon above, and the unfinished Olympieion, all share this role. The theater, with its associations with the defeat of the Persians, the power of Pericles, and the cultural flowering of fifth century-drama, evokes Athenian cultural supremacy; the Parthenon, that glorification of Athenian imperial might, also instantiates a particular claim of the Athenians to a greater piety than any other people, celebrated in festivals and sacrifices, ephemera whose existence is affirmed now architecturally and spatially. And the Olympieion, by its very unfinished quality points to the possibility of connecting with that past glory by continuing the work long postponed, a message which later would be fully grasped by Hadrian.

Less visually arresting yet just as evocative are the three gymnasia, the Academy, where Plato was buried, Cynosarges, which gave its name to the cynics, and the Lyceum a favorite haunt of Socrates. Now Athenian topography had long had rich mythological associations. Cleidemus for example could point to the exact locations where Theseus had defeated the

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[16] Cic. *Orat.* 230: *sunt etiam qui illo vitio, quod ab Hegesia maxime fluxit, infringendis concidendisque numeris in quoddam genus abiectum incidant versiculorum simillimum.* See Staab 2004.

Amazons, but in the Hellenistic age, the fifth and fourth century topographical associations would come to function as the new mythology of Athens.[17] The city would exist out of phase in a curious warp between a recent, magnificent past and an inglorious present. As a corollary, then, to these magnificent buildings and impressive locations from the past, the present becomes even more squalid. The Athenians' houses are shabby, and the people are increasingly faced with deprivation (*FGrH* 369a F1.2):

> It is a city, thanks to its sights and diversions, unaware of the hunger of its citizens, causing them to forget to lay in provisions.
>
> ἔστι δὲ ταῖς μὲν θέαις ἡ πόλις καὶ σχολαῖς τοῖς δημοτικοῖς ἀνεπαίσθητος λιμοῦ, λήθην ἐμποιοῦσα τῆς τῶν σίτων προσφορᾶς.

This explanation for the poverty of Athens is quite remarkable. It manifests itself as hunger, but even something as concrete as hunger connotes something of the people's character (*FGrH* 369a F1.2):

> The produce of the soil is priceless and first rate when it comes to flavor, but it is increasingly scarce. The way of life, however, so well suited to the appetites, which the Athenians share with each of the foreigners in their midst, by diverting their attention to the pleasure it brings makes them forget their servitude.
>
> τὰ γινόμενα ἐκ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἀτίμητα καὶ πρῶτα τῆι γεύσει, μικρῶι δὲ σπανιώτερα. ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν ξένων ἑκάστοις συνοικ(ει)ουμένη ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις εὐάρμοστος διατριβὴ περισπῶσα τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρέσκον λήθην τῆς δουλείας ἐργάζεται.

So they produce less than one might expect, but what they do produce is of extremely high quality. But in addition to the physical scarcity of food is the problem of their lack of independence, an accurate description of Athens in much of the third century BCE when the city was under the control of Macedonian kings and governors.[18] Yet rather than lament this powerful combination of woes: scarcity, hunger, and political enslavement, the author sees a population of remarkable resilience whose cultural life and addiction to festivals and other leisure activities compensates for physical hardship. They enjoy (*FGrH* 369a F1.1 and 2):

> Festivals of every kind, rest and recreation for the spirit thanks to every kind of philosophical school, a thousand diversions, an endless succession of spectacles … But for those who have the means there is no place its equal for enjoyment. The city has a great many other attractions.

[17] Plut. *Vit. Thes.* 27. See McInerney 1994, 29.
[18] See Habicht 1997.

> ἑορταὶ παντοθαλεῖς· φιλοσόφων παντοδαπῶν ψυχῆς ἀπάται καὶ ἀνάπαυσις, σχολαὶ πολλαὶ, θέαι συνεχεῖς ... ἐφόδια δὲ ἔχουσιν οὐδεμία τοιαύτη πρὸς ἡδονήν. καὶ ἕτερα δὲ ἡ πόλις ἡδέα ἔχει καὶ πολλά·

In other respects the looming presence of Athens' aesthetic glory continues to shape the community. It produces a kind of schizophrenia in which two Athenian types emerge (*FGrH* 369a F1.4):

> Of the inhabitants of the city, some are Attic, others Athenian. Those who are Attic are busybodies and chatter-boxes, liars, cheats, and obsessed with foreign ways of living.
>
> τῶν δ' ἐνοικούντων οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν Ἀττικοὶ οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι. οἱ μὲν Ἀττικοὶ περίεργοι ταῖς λαλιαῖς, ὕπουλοι, συκοφαντώδεις παρατηρηταὶ τῶν ξενικῶν βίων.

These are the folks who shower accolades on every artist to visit the city, a kind of sycophancy that Heraclides calls 'a stunning lesson in human gullibility'.[19] He identifies a type, whom he calls Attic, as opposed to Athenian, which represents the current city at its worst, pandering to anyone who will visit the city, the ancient progenitor of the tourist tout, groveling, obsequious yet also contemptuous of the tourist. The terms Athenian and Attic had been used to distinguish city-dwellers and rustics from as early as the fifth and fourth centuries, but Heraclides appears to be using these terms in a quite novel fashion.[20] For him the *Attikoi* are garrulous and obsessed with foreign fads. The Athenians, on the other hand, are men of gravity, simple in their ways, true guardians of friendship. They are also harsh critics, and here Heraclides reveals his professional background, since he characterizes these Athenians as 'unceasing in their theater attendance'. Since both groups are plainly found in the city the old urban/rustic distinction is not at work. Instead, Heraclides' usage illustrates a version of these terms identified by Cynthia Patterson, who has demonstrated that *Athênaios* was usually applied to a full citizen in his capacity as a member of 'the politically sovereign body', while *Attikos*, on the other hand, was a less-formal label, applied to a member of 'the traditional Athenian community of Athenian families'.[21] His *Athênaioi*, then, would correspond to those members of the political class who continued to hold office during the Macedonian

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19 *FGrH* 369a F1.3: θαυμαστὸν πλινθίνων ζώων ἀνθρώπων διδασκάλιον. The exact meaning of the line is unclear. Hesychius and the *Suda* both gloss the verb *plintheuetai* ('is molded like a brick') as synonymous with *exapatatai* ('is utterly deceived'). Heraclides may be quoting a tag equivalent to 'there's a sucker born every minute'.

20 See Pl. *Leg.* 626d.

21 Patterson 1986, 53.

domination of Athens, while his *Attikoi* are the many inhabitants of the city who could not be bothered participating in a political life that lacked genuine independence. This corresponds nicely to the picture of Athens in the mid third century offered by Christian Habicht, who remarks that 'it has become clear that other normal democratic practices were interrupted or suspended in this period'.[22]

So we have in Heraclides competing versions of Athens. One is a down at heel city of grubby alley ways, full of sycophants, ambulance chasers, vexatious litigants ready at the drop of a hat to 'blackmail those foreigners who are residents and wealthy', as he says at F1.4, and an Athens of Athenians still trying to live up to the oppressive reminders of past glory right in their midst. But he is not a philosopher, nor an analyst of any sort. Rather his merits are as an observer with a flair for the well-turned phrase (*FGrH* 369a F1.5):

> To summarize: as much as other cities differ from the countryside when it comes to leisure and the comforts of life, to that degree does Athens surpass those other cities. It is especially important to be on guard against the courtesans, lest one die of pleasure without even noticing.
>
> τὸ καθόλου δ' ὅσον αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις πρός τε ἡδονὴν καὶ βίου διόρθωσιν τῶν ἀγρῶν διαφέρουσι, τοσοῦτο τῶν λοιπῶν πόλεων ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παραλλάττει. φυλακτέον δ' ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα τὰς ἑταίρας, μὴ λάθηι τις ἡδέως ἀπολόμενος.

And as a literary man himself, he understands that the best way to finish a section of his essay is not to bring it to a logical conclusion, but to end with an apt quotation, this one from the comic poet Lysippus (*FGrH* 369a F1.5):

> If you haven't seen Athens you're a fool.
> If you've seen it but resisted, you're a mule.
> If you liked it and then left it, you're a tool.
>
> εἰ μὴ τεθέασαι τὰς Ἀθήνας, στέλεχος εἶ·
> εἰ δὲ τεθέασαι μὴ τεθήρευσαι δ', ὄνος·
> εἰ δ' εὐαρεστῶν ἀποτρέχεις, κανθήλιος.

4. *To Boeotia*

Heraclides now quits the city, and begins a tour of Boeotia, offering a travelogue that reflects even more of this middle-brow inclination, opinionated and scurrilous but without deep reflection. Unlike the Hippocratic *On Airs, Waters, Places*, with its pseudo-scientific disquisition on climate and ethnic

22 Habicht 1997, 159.

character, Heraclides relies on the amusing observations of a man from the big city condemned to spend time *chez les sauvages*. Among the highlights is his description of Oropus (*FGrH* 369a F1.7):

> The commercial activity of traders [here] has flourished over the years, and with it the unspeakable greed of the city's tax-collectors, hand in hand with a vileness of character that is second to none. For they even tax the goods that they are about to import. Most of them are uncouth when it comes to social relations, since they have managed to get rid of anyone with any intelligence.
>
> μεταβολῶν ἐργασία, τελωνῶν ἀνυπέρβλητος πλεονεξία ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων ἀνεπιθέτωι τῆι πονηρίαι συντεθραμμένη· τελωνοῦσι γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς αὐτοὺς εἰσάγεσθαι. οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τραχεῖς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις, τοὺς συνετοὺς ἐπανελόμενοι·

This is followed by an apposite quote (*FGrH* 369a F1.7):

> They're all tax collectors and thieves,
> Every one of them ravenous;
> May they get a tax bill from the Ferryman,
> Those bastards from Oropus.
>
> πάντες τελῶναι, πάντες εἰσὶν ἅρπαγες·
> κακὸν τέλος γένοιτο τοῖς Ὠρωπίοις.

It is not until he reaches Tanagra that our guide encounters a locale worth his attention (*FGrH* 369a F1.8):

> The city is perched up high, in a difficult location, and its appearance gives the impression of gleaming white potter's clay. The houses of the city's inhabitants have beautifully adorned entrance-halls and encaustic paintings. The grain produced by the land hereabouts is not particularly bountiful, but the city holds first place in Boeotia when it comes to wine.
>
> ἡ δὲ πόλις τραχεῖα μὲν καὶ μετέωρος, λευκὴ δὲ τῆι ἐπιφανείαι καὶ ἀργιλλώδης, τοῖς δὲ τῶν οἰκιῶν προθύροις καὶ ἐγκαύμασιν ἀναθεματικοῖς κάλλιστα κατεσκευασμένη. καρποῖς δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς χώρας σιτικοῖς οὐ λίαν ἄφθονος, οἴνωι δὲ τῶι γινομένωι κατὰ τὴν Βοιωτίαν πρωτεύουσα.

The aesthetic simplicity here connotes a corresponding character (*FGrH* 369a F1.9):

> The inhabitants are wealthy but frugal; all are farmers, none are workers. They show a decent regard for justice, honesty and hospitality. They set aside their first fruits and freely share what they have with those of their fellow citizens who are in need, as well as with wanderers in their travels, for they are strangers to improper excess in any form. For foreigners staying there it is the safest city in Boeotia. This is because the inhabitants have a fundamental hatred of wickedness, pure and simple, arising from their self-sufficiency and their love of hard work.

οἱ δ᾽ ἐνοικοῦντες ταῖς μὲν οὐσίαις λαμπροὶ τοῖς δὲ βίοις λιτοί· πάντες γεωργοί, οὐκ ἐργάται. δικαιοσύνην, πίστιν, ξενίαν ἀγαθοὶ διαφυλάξαι. τοῖς δεομένοις τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τοῖς στιχοπλανήταις τῶν ἀποδημητικῶν ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἔχουσιν ἀπαρχόμενοί τε καὶ ἐλευθέρως μεταδιδόντες, ἀλλότριοι πάσης ἀδίκου πλεονεξίας. καὶ ἐνδιατρῖψαι δὲ ξένοις ἀσφαλεστάτη ἡ πόλις τῶν κατὰ τὴν Βοιωτίαν. ὕπεστι γὰρ αὐθέκαστός τε καὶ παραυστηρὸς μισοπονηρία διὰ τὴν τῶν κατοικούντων αὐτάρκειάν τε καὶ φιλεργίαν.

On to Plataea and finally Thebes, where a brief description of the locale leads to a disquisition on Theban character. Given the reputation of Thebes and Boeotia in general among Athenians, we perhaps need not be surprised by what follows (*FGrH* 369a F1.14):[23]

> As for the inhabitants, they are men of gravity who are remarkable for their sanguine outlook on life. They are quick to anger, insolent and arrogant. They'll fight anybody, making no distinction between stranger or local, and they have nothing but contempt for the law.

οἱ δ᾽ ἐνοικοῦντες μεγαλόψυχοι καὶ θαυμαστοὶ ταῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον εὐελπιστίαις· θρασεῖς δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι· πλῆκταί τε καὶ ἀδιάφοροι πρὸς πάντα ξένον καὶ δημότην καὶ κατανωτισταὶ παντὸς δικαίου.

Legal matters, in fact, become the focus for Heraclides' extremely vivid account of life in Thebes (*FGrH* 369a F1.15–16):

> When it comes to business disputes, they settle them not by debate, but by resorting angrily to physical force, so that their court-room appearances end up resembling the kind of wrestling moves that athletes employ in their matches with each other. As a result, legal cases among the Thebans last for a minimum of thirty years. For the man who makes reference publicly to this sort of thing, and does not quit Boeotia immediately, but stays in the city for even the shortest period, will soon find himself ambushed during the night by those who refuse to accept that the case is over, and is gruesomely put to death. The Thebans use any excuse to kill each other.

πρὸς τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα τῶν συναλλαγμάτων οὐ λόγωι συνιστάμενοι, τὴν δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ θράσους καὶ τῶν χειρῶν προσάγοντες βίαν, τὰ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γινόμενα πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖς ἀθληταῖς βίαια εἰς τὴν δικαιολογίαν μεταφέροντες. διὸ καὶ αἱ δίκαι παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς δι᾽ ἐτῶν τοὐλάχιστον εἰσάγονται τριάκοντα. ὁ γὰρ μνησθεὶς ἐν τῶι πλήθει περί τινος τοιούτου καὶ μὴ εὐθέως ἀπάρας ἐκ τῆς Βοιωτίας, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐλάχιστον μείνας ἐν τῆι πόλει χρόνον, μετ᾽ οὐ πολὺ παρατηρηθεὶς νυκτὸς ὑπὸ τῶν οὐ βουλομένων τὰς δίκας συντελεῖσθαι, θανάτωι βιαίωι ζημιοῦται. φόνοι δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς διὰ τὰς τυχούσας γίγνονται αἰτίας.

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[23] Here, as on the Athenian stage, Thebes serves as the exact opposite of Athens. See Zeitlin 1990.

This tendency to rely on broad stereotypes, such a reassuring substitute for critical thinking, is most fully shown in his summary of Boeotia (*FGrH* 369a F1.25):

> Greed dwells at Oropus, envy at Tanagra, quarrelsomeness at Thespiae, insolence at Thebes, arrogance at Anthedon, officiousness at Coronea, pretentiousness at Plataea, fever at Onchestus, stupor at Haliartus. The shortcomings of all Greece flowed down into the cities of Boeotia. There is a line in Pherecrates: 'If you're smart, get out of Boeotia'. That's what Boeotia is like.
>
> τὴν μὲν αἰσχροκερδίαν κατοικεῖν ἐν Ὠρωπῶι, τὸν δὲ φθόνον ἐν Τανάγραι, τὴν φιλονεικίαν ἐν Θεσπιαῖς, τὴν ὕβριν ἐν Θήβαις, τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἐν Ἀνθηδόνι, τὴν περιεργίαν ἐν Κορωνίαι, ἐν Πλαταιαῖς τὴν ἀλαζονίαν, τὸν πυρετὸν ἐν Ὀγχηστῶι, τὴν ἀναισθησίαν ἐν Ἁλιάρτωι. τὰ δ' ἐκ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀκληρήματα εἰς τὰς τῆς Βοιωτίας πόλεις κατερρύη. ὁ στίχος Φερεκράτους· 'ἥνπερ φρονῇς εὖ, φεῦγε τὴν Βοιωτίαν'. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν Βοιωτῶν χώρα τοιαύτη.

And so we are advised to quit Boeotia. The inevitable complement of this habit of dismissing entire populations in devastating character sketches is a tendency to treat women also as objects to be described and evaluated, and here the middle-brow aesthetic of Heraclides is on display at its best and worst (*FGrH* 369a F1.17–18):

> As for their women, they are the most elegant and beautiful of all the woman in Greece when it comes height, bearing and grace. As Sophocles says,
>
> You speak to me of Thebes, its gates of seven mouths,
> Where the women bear only gods!
>
> The veil on their heads formed by their *himatia* is such that the entire face seems to be covered as if by a small mask. For the eyes alone are visible, while all other portions of the face are covered by the *himation*. All the women wear *himatia* that are white.
>
> αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες αὐτῶν τοῖς μεγέθεσι, πορείαις, ῥυθμοῖς εὐσχημονέσταταί τε καὶ εὐπρεπέσταται τῶν ἐν τῆι Ἑλλάδι γυναικῶν. μαρτυρεῖ Σοφοκλῆς·
>
> Θήβας λέγεις μοί, τὰς πύλας ἑπταστόμους,
> οὗ δὴ μόνον τίκτουσιν αἱ θνηταὶ θεούς.
>
> τὸ τῶν ἱματίων ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς κάλυμμα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὥστε ὥσπερ προσωπιδίωι δοκεῖν πᾶν τὸ πρόσωπον κατειλῆφθαι. οἱ γὰρ ὀφθαλμοὶ διαφαίνονται μόνον, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μέρη τοῦ προσώπου πάντα κατέχεται τοῖς ἱματίοις· φοροῦσι δ' αὐτὰ πᾶσαι λευκά.

Perhaps it was his investigations of this particular local color that got him into trouble with the men of Thebes (*FGrH* 369a F1.19–20):

> They have blonde hair and wear it bound up on the crown of the head. The locals call this a 'bandage'. Their footwear is simple, and is not cut high;

> rather it is dark reddish in color, and cut low and with straps so that the feet seem almost naked. In their social behavior they are scarcely Boeotian, but rather Sicyonian. Their speech is delightful, while their men's is harsh and overbearing.
>
> τὸ δὲ τρίχωμα ξανθὸν, ἀναδεδεμένον μέχρι τῆς κορυφῆς· ὃ δὴ καλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγχωρίων λαμπάδιον. ὑπόδημα λιτὸν, οὐ βαθὺ, φοινικοῦν δὲ τῆι χροιᾶι καὶ ταπεινὸν, ὑσκλωτὸν δ' ὥστε γυμνοὺς σχεδὸν ἐκφαίνεσθαι τοὺς πόδας. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις οὐ λίαν Βοιώτιαι, μᾶλλον δὲ Σικυώνιαι. καὶ ἡ φωνὴ δ' αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἐπίχαρις, τῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν ἀτερπὴς καὶ βαρεῖα.

This thumbnail style of description is familiar from modern handbooks like Baedeker's and the *Rough Guide*, but its value is often overlooked as a guide to the criteria used by ordinary people in evaluating the world around them. Notice the way that 'aesthetics lite' combine a thumbnail description of a site with an instant evaluation: this, for example, is what a smart Athenian sees when he walks into Chalcis (*FGrH* 369a F1.27–28):

> The perimeter of the city of Chalcis is more than 70 stades, which is greater than the length of the road leading to it from Anthedon. The city lies entirely on hilly ground and is shady, with mineral springs but most of them salty, although there is one spot where the water is only mildly brackish but wholesome and cold. It flows from the so-called Spring of Arethusa, which is capable of providing a sufficient flow of spring-water to supply all the inhabitants of the city. In terms of public works, the city is very well supplied: gymnasia, stoas, temples, theatres, paintings, statues and an agora superbly placed with regard to the needs of business.
>
> ἡ δὲ τῶν Χαλκιδέων πόλις ἐστὶ μὲν σταδίων ο′ μείζων τῆς ἐξ Ἀνθηδόνος εἰς αὐτὴν φερούσης ὁδοῦ. γεώλοφος δὲ πᾶσα καὶ σύσκιος, ὕδατα ἔχουσα τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἁλυκά, ἓν δ' ἡσυχῆι μὲν ὑπόπλατυ τῆι δὲ χρείαι ὑγιεινὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς κρήνης τῆς καλουμένης Ἀρεθούσης ῥέον, ἱκανὸν ὡς δυναμένης παρέχειν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς πηγῆς νᾶμα πᾶσι τοῖς τὴν πόλιν κατοικοῦσιν. καὶ τοῖς κοινοῖς δὲ ἡ πόλις διαφόρως κατεσκεύασται, γυμνασίοις, στοαῖς, ἱεροῖς, θεάτροις, γραφαῖς, ἀνδριάσι, τῆι ἀγορᾷ κειμένηι πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐργασιῶν χρείας ἀνυπερβλήτως.

This is followed by a description of the farming activities hereabouts: olives are their special glory, but soon we will be leaving the cultivated territories of Attica, Boeotia, and Euboea for the wilder regions of Mt. Pelion. Because this is not civilized territory (though it has rich plough land), the commentator falls back on descriptions of *thaumata* (*FGrH* 369a F2.3):

> There is also to be found here a plant in the most barren parts, the root of arum, which is used to treat snake-bite and seems to be pernicious to snakes. It drives out some of the snakes from the territory in which it grows by virtue of its smell, while others it disables when they approach by making them fall into a stupor, and those that touch it it kills by its noxious smell.

> γίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτῶι καὶ βοτάνη ἐν τοῖς χερσώδεσι μάλιστα χωρίοις καὶ ῥίζα δὲ ἡ ἄρου, ἥτις τῶν ὄφεων δήγματα ἰᾶται καὶ δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἐπικίνδυνα· τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς χώρας, ἐν ᾗ πέφυκε, τῆι ὀσμῆι μακρὰν ἀπελαύνει, τοὺς δ' ἐγγίσαντας ἀχρειοῖ κάρον καταχέουσα, τοὺς δ' ἁψαμένους αὐτῆς ἀναιρεῖ τῆι ὀσμῆι.

There are no evocative theaters or temples here, only a wild landscape occasionally visited by people shedding their quotidian civic identity (*FGrH* 369a F2.8):

> On the high peak of the mountain there is the so-called cave of Chiron, and a temple of Actaean Zeus. At the time of the rising of Sirius, when the heat of the day is at its height, the leading citizens and those in the prime of life make their way here. They are selected in the presence of the priest and dressed in thick, new fleeces. For the cold on the mountain can be extreme.
>
> ἐπ' ἄκρας δὲ τῆς τοῦ ὄρους κορυφῆς σπηλαιόν ἐστι τὸ καλούμενον Χειρώνιον καὶ Διὸς Ἀκταίου ἱερὸν, ἐφ' ὃ κατὰ κυνὸς ἀνατολὴν κατὰ τὸ ἀκμαιότατον καῦμα ἀναβαίνουσι τῶν πολιτῶν οἱ ἐπιφανέστατοι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀκμάζοντες, ἐπιλεχθέντες ἐπὶ τοῦ ἱερέως, ἐνεζωσμένοι κώδια τρίποκα καινά· τοιοῦτον συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄρους τὸ ψῦχος εἶναι.

Richard Buxton has suggested reading the procession to the sanctuary of Zeus Actaeus as a ritual of inversion: 'Once a year the citizen-group turns, through its representatives, into a community of shepherds, which practises what may be described as a one-day ritual transhumance'.[24] Burkert instead emphasizes instead the expiatory character of the event, assuming that the skins worn by the Magnesian elite are those of animals they have themselves just sacrificed: 'The sacrificer identifies with his victim to the point of wearing its skin, tries in effect to undo his own deed'.[25] In either case, we have passed from the civilized world of theater to the wilderness, with its description of killer plants and curious local customs.

5. *What is Hellas?*

Just as quickly this is followed by another abrupt shift in Heraclides' text, a strenuous argument about exactly what constitutes Greece and Greekness. He begins by recounting the founding of Hellas (*FGrH* 369a F3.2):

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24 Buxton 1994, 93–94.
25 Burkert 1983, 113–114.

> For Greece (Hellas) was once just a town in olden days, named for Hellen, the son of Zeus, and founded by him, being part of the territory of Thessaly, lying between Pharsalus and the city of the Melitaeans. So Hellenes are those who are descended from Hellen and speak the Hellenic language inherited from Hellen.
>
> ἡ γὰρ Ἑλλάς, τὸ παλαιὸν οὖσά ποτε πόλις, ἀφ' Ἕλληνος τοῦ Διὸς ἐκλήθη τε καὶ ἐκτίσθη, τῆς τῶν Θετταλῶν οὖσα χώρας, ἀνὰ μέσον Φαρσάλου τε κειμένη καὶ τῆς τῶν Μελιταιέων πόλεως. Ἕλληνες μὲν γάρ εἰσιν τῶι γένει καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς ἑλληνίζουσιν ἀφ' Ἕλληνος·

The attempt to fix Hellenic identity according to a blend of genealogy, locality, and language was, however, a difficult exercise, especially since there were different accents and different versions of Greek—Attic, Doric, Aeolic, and Ionic were all distinct, in Heraclides' eyes, and could not be traced back to Hellen or Thessaly. So, having cited a few Homeric episodes and the Hellenic genealogy of Euripides, Heraclides simply brushes the problem aside (*FGrH* 369a F3.5):

> What is presently called Greece is a word, but not a reality, for I maintain that 'to hellenize' or 'speak Greek' is not a matter of correct pronunciation but concerns the origin of the word. The word derives from Hellen. Hellas lies in Thessaly. Accordingly we shall say that those men inhabit Hellas, and 'hellenize' in their speech. Even if Hellas is a part of Thessaly with respect to its specific origins, it is appropriate in a general sense to take Thessaly as a part of Hellas, given the way the term 'Hellenes' is now used.
>
> ἡ δὲ καλουμένη νῦν Ἑλλὰς λέγεται μέν, οὐ μέντοι ἐστί. τὸ γὰρ ἑλληνίζειν ἐγὼ εἶναί φημι οὐκ ἐν τῶι διαλέγεσθαι ὀρθῶς ἀλλ' ἐν τῶι γένει τῆς φωνῆς. αὕτη (δ') ἐστὶν ἀφ' Ἕλληνος. ἡ δὲ Ἑλλὰς ἐν Θετταλίαι κεῖται. ἐκείνους οὖν ἐροῦμεν τὴν Ἑλλάδα κατοικεῖν καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς ἑλληνίζειν. εἰ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ γένους τῆς Θετταλίας ἡ Ἑλλάς ἐστι, δίκαιον καὶ κατὰ τὸ κοινόν, ὡς νῦν ὀνομάζονται Ἕλληνες, τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτὴν εἶναι.

The logic here does not bear close scrutiny, since the argument really has two separate strands. The first seems to be that labels such as Greece (Hellas) and Greeks (Hellenes) are legitimate simply because they derive from the name Hellen. The second is that since Hellas was in Thessaly, then Thessaly can now be considered part of Hellas. Although Heraclides champions the idea that *hellênizein* should not be equated with 'speaking proper Greek', he cannot really offer any alternative definition of being Greek (Hellenes) other than the implied proposition that all who call themselves Hellene are descended from Hellen. But this assertion is lost in the more polemical conclusion, that Thessaly should be considered part of Greece. The notion that Hellas was originally a part of Thessaly goes back at least to Thucydides,

but it is clear both from Heraclides' tone and from his reference to contemporary poets that the issue was a contested one in his day.[26] He continues (*FGrH* 369a F3.7):

> That everything which we have included in our account constitutes Hellas finds confirmation in the work of the comic poet Posidippus, when he reproaches the Athenians for claiming that theirs is the language and the city of Hellas, saying as follows:
>
> One Hellas there is, though of cities there's a throng.
> Now, here in Athens, you employ an Attic tongue.
> But we Hellenes speak Greek too.
> Why obsess over syllables and letters?
> Why beat every joke and burden it with fetters?
>
> ὅτι δὲ πᾶσα ἣν κατηριθμήμεθα Ἑλλάς ἐστι, μαρτυρεῖ ἡμῖν ὁ τῶν κωμωιδιῶν ποιητὴς Ποσείδιππος, μεμφόμενος Ἀθηναίοις, ὅτι τὴν αὑτῶν φωνὴν καὶ τὴν πόλιν φασὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος εἶναι, λέγων οὕτως:
>
> Ἑλλὰς μέν ἐστι μία, πόλεις δὲ πλείονες.
> σὺ μὲν ἀττικίζεις, ἡνίκ' ἂν φωνὴν λέγῃς
> αὑτοῦ τιν'· οἱ δ' Ἕλληνες ἑλληνίζομεν.
> τί προσδιατρίβων συλλαβαῖς καὶ γράμμασιν
> τὴν εὐτραπελίαν εἰς ἀηδίαν ἄγεις;

Despite Heraclides', or Posidippus', generous view that all Greek speakers counted as Greeks, the geographical question of what to include in Greece was also open to contestation. Macedonia, one notes reading Heraclides, is not included. Pausanias' *periêgêsis* of Greece also excludes Macedon and Aetolia, and in fact his Greece looks suspiciously like the Roman province of Achaea. But we are at an earlier point here, probably in the mid 200's when Macedon and Aetolia but not Rome, are the two major powers. Neither is given a place here. Heraclides anticipates Strabo, in whose account (Str. 9.5.1), the borders of Thessaly also serve as the borders of Greece, beyond which lie the Macedonians to the northeast and Epirots to the northwest.

Aside from tid-bits of information about colorful local habits, Heraclides is immensely valuable as an example of the middle-brow thinker during a time of acute anxiety. He and his society are aware of the glory of Greece's past and perhaps uncertain of its future. There is as yet no suggestion that Greece will become a Roman province. Right now the pressing question is surely what to make of Macedonian power, the threat of the Aetolians

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[26] Prontera 1991 and Rutherford 2001. For the notion that Hellas was originally a part of Thessaly see Thuc. 1.3 and Hornblower 1991, 15–16.

and jockeying for position in relation to the newly established Hellenistic kingdoms. Then as now, the question of where Greece was going and what was Greece was expressed as a quite literal exploration of the different ways the term Greece could be used (*FGrH* 369a F3.8):

> Let this suffice as an answer to those who do not believe that Thessaly is part of Hellas, nor that the Thessalians, though they are the descendents of Hellen, speak Greek. Having set the boundary of Hellas at the outlet of Thessaly and by Homolium in Magnesia, we have completed our treatise and conclude our account.
>
> πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνοντας εἶναι τὴν Θετταλίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐδὲ τοὺς Θετταλοὺς Ἕλληνος ἀπογόνους ὄντας ἑλληνίζειν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω. τὴν δὲ Ἑλλάδα ἀφορίσαντες ἕως τῶν Θετταλῶν στομίου καὶ τοῦ Μαγνήτων Ὁμολίου, τὴν διήγησιν πεποιημένοι, καταπαύομεν τὸν λόγον.

Is Greece defined by its culture, language, history, geography or some Protean combination of all these?

6. *A Travelling Actor*

We seem then to have a sophisticated view of the world of the Greeks from a somewhat Athenocentric focal point, written at a time when Athens was in poor straights and probably subject to the hegemony of an outside power. Almost certainly this is Macedon and for a variety of reasons it is probable that Heraclides' work dates to the third quarter of the third century.[27] It may also be possible to identify him, and such an exercise may prove valuable by shedding light on the genesis of the text. Let us begin with Heraclides' milieu.

The text alludes to passages in very well-known prose authors such as Thucydides, Isocrates, and Aristotle and reflects the sentiments of a well-educated man with rhetorical training. At the same time there are features of the work that sit less well with the traditional profile of an upper-class author. He quotes only twice from the great tragedians, once from Sophocles and once from Euripides, but draws on a variety of comic sources: Lysippus, Xenon, Posidippus (twice), Laon, Pherecydes, and Philiscus. These range from the fifth century (Lysippus and Pherecydes) to Heraclides' own time, the third century (Laon). Many of the comic quotations suit Heraclides' style: acerbic, judgmental, and deliciously unfair.

[27] Arenz 2005, 51–84.

We can go further. In the Hellenistic period Athenian playwrights and actors were honored throughout Boeotia, specifically at Oropus, Thebes, Thespiae, Tanagra, and Orchomenus.[28] The didascalic texts testifying to this coincide with the rise of the *technitae* of Dionysus who brought productions of both classic and new plays to a veritable circuit of new festivals such as the Sarapeia at Tanagra and the Mouseia at Thespiae. It is noteworthy that Heraclides describes many of the same small towns as were visited by the *technitae* and that he describes them with the same mixture of affection and contempt we might expect from a cosmopolitan comic poet. In fact, a Heraclides is listed as a dramatic winner at the Delphic festival, the Soteria, in 263 BCE, (*FD* 3.1.478 l. 32) as a *kômôidos*, and a Heraclides is listed eight years later as the second place comic *hupokritês* at the Lenaea in Athens, in 255 BCE (*IG* 2^2 2345). If the manuscript's designation of Heraclides as 'Crêticus' is a mistake for 'Criticus', as most commentators believe (since there is nothing Cretan about Heraclides' name, dialect, or interests) it may be that the epithet recalls his profession, not as a *grammateus*, as Pfister thought, taking *criticus* as a synonym for *grammaticus*, but rather as a *hupokritês*, an actor.[29] It is only a conjecture but an attractive one: it conjures up an image of Heraclides taking notes as he traveled from Athens to direct and participate in performances in the back-blocks of central Greece.[30] To get an idea of this, one might imagine going to Stratford, Ontario, home of the Ontario Pork Congress and since the early 50's, also home of the Stratford Shakespeare festival, the first lines of the first production of which were delivered by none other than Sir Alec Guinness. If Heraclides was in fact a thespian who went on tour to the boondocks, he may even have been part of a family tradition. In 330 BCE, a Heraclides took third place in the comedy section at the Dionysia, while in the first century BCE an Athenian *tragôidos* was honored at Oropus. His name was Heraclides, son of Heraclides (*IG* 7. 416: 21–22).[31]

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[28] Jones 1993, 39–54; Habicht 1997, 104; evidence collected in Mette 1977, 53–63.

[29] Pfister may have been misled by the mention of a Heraclides Grammaticus in Plutarch's *Non Posse* 2.

[30] Pfister 1951.

[31] Perrin-Saminadayar 2007, 333. E 507–511 lists five Athenian *ephebes* named Heraclides.

7. *Conclusion*

But if we can end on a slightly more serious note, Joan Shelley Rubin has suggested that in twentieth-century America, 'the history of middle-brow culture provides a powerful illustration of the shift from producer to consumer values in America', and it may be that Heraclides' odd and amusing work signals a similar shift underway as early as the third century BCE in Greece. Of course, this was a not a turn in capitalist culture, but great changes were afoot, as Greek society began to adapt to a new status in which the distinction between consuming culture and being consumed as culture were blurred.[32] As power and independence in Athens in particular gave way to subordination and political powerlessness, the balance also shifted from the production of culture for Athenians by Athenians into a production of both Athenianness and Greekness for a wider audience. This is what pushed cultural production towards new genres, such as the guidebook. Heraclides offers evidence of an inner *periêgêsis*, not the exotic world of the foreigners seen by the Greek, but an anthropology of Greece for consumption by others. His aesthetics were not very Platonic, but then the middle-brow aesthetic rarely is.

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[32] Rubin 1992, 33.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

'POPULAR' AESTHETICS AND PERSONAL ART APPRECIATION IN THE HELLENISTIC AGE

Craig Hardiman

1. *Introduction*

The study of ancient aesthetics and aesthetic theory has recently undergone a renaissance. Varied studies and scholarly offerings have investigated this traditional field in new ways and have illustrated how diverse the application of ancient aesthetics can be.[1] The main thrust of these studies, understandably, has been the analysis of those few ancient authors who explicitly deal with aesthetic issues, chiefly Plato and Aristotle. These 'professional critics', for want of a better term, were primarily interested in aesthetic criticism as it related to the interpretation of text. This is most clearly seen in Aristotle's *Poetics*, but parallels can be found in such diverse authors as Callimachus and Quintillian. This is not to say that Aristotle or others had no interest in non-textual matters—far from it—but more often than not discussions of paintings, sculpture, and other artwork were limited as *exempla* to illustrate the broad aesthetic ideas being presented.

Still, the work of such philosophers was to lead to the creation of aesthetic valuations of art, 'art history' if you will, during the Hellenistic period. These Hellenistic professional critics, such as Xenocrates and Antigonus, were to create a series of writings whose aesthetics were primarily concerned with objective issues such as form and technique. These works, now lost but seemingly transmitted via later Roman sources, were in the tradition of earlier technical treatises such as Polycleitus' *Kanôn*, which looked for τὸ κάλλος (the beautiful) through the idea of συμμετρία (symmetry). Various philosophical and literary critics also added to this corpus of material

[1] As examples: Fowler 1989; Halliwell 2002; Tanner 2006; Elsner 2007; Netz 2009; Bychkov and Sheppard 2010. One could add the growing number of 'art and text' monographs that often deal with aesthetic issues.

that looked at concepts such as τέχνη (skill), μίμησις (imitation), φαντασία (invention), and even the debate between the aesthetics of Asian versus Attic oratory illustrated the 'parallel worlds of art and text'.[2] This then is the ancient background that would ultimately lead to the rather formalist aesthetic philosophies of such scholars as Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Heinrich Wölfflin.[3] Yet this view of the history of aesthetics belies the origins of even contemporary aesthetic philosophy in a far more popular or personal view of ancient art.

The origins of modern classical art history find their beginning primarily in two authors: Giorgio Vasari and Johann Joachim Winckelmann. These two authors, both seen as working within an interpretive tradition dating back to classical philosophers, also had an important contribution to make in the field of aesthetics from a personal standpoint. Vasari was a secondary painter of the Italian Renaissance who worked throughout Italy, but mostly in his home town of Arezzo, in Rome, and in Florence, in the early to mid *cinquecento*. While in Rome in 1546, Vasari was having dinner at the court of Cardinal Alessandro Farnese when a conversation arose about biography and art which ultimately led to Vasari's decision to write his most famous work: *The Lives of the Most Excellent Italian Architects, Painters and Sculptors from Cimabue to our Times*. *The Lives* was a culmination of Vasari's lifelong interest in and affection for artists and over the next four years he organized his own notes while also examining a host of other sources and models. This included the only surviving classical model for an account of artists and their work, Pliny's *Natural History*, but also such works as Plutarch's *Lives*, the *Lives of the Philosophers* of Diogenes Laertius and other more contemporary material. Vasari viewed his own *Lives* as a work of 'history' and so divided Renaissance art into three phases, or ages, which corresponded to the fourteenth century, where classical art was 'reborn', the fifteenth century, when the highest goal of art, the imitation of nature, is almost achieved, and the sixteenth century, when artists bring all these technical discoveries to their fruition. It is in this last age when artists have the ability to fully triumph over nature (a variation of mimetic theory) and finally

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[2] See Pollitt 1974, 12–63; Pollitt 1995; Tanner 2000; Tanner 2006, 117–122, 161–170, 215–219.

[3] 'Formalist' is used here adjectively and not in the sense of the more modern theories of aesthetic formalism (though Wölfflin was instrumental in its origins). These critics have also been discussed within a neo-classic tradition that looked back to the Platonic ideas of εἶδος and μίμησις, whereby 'form' was the dominant aesthetic evaluative characteristic even when constructing historical periodization schemes. For general overviews, see Davies et al. 2009, s.v. 'aesthetics in antiquity' and 'eighteenth-century aesthetics'.

outstrip their classical predecessors. Thus Vasari focuses on individuals within the history of art—unique creative personalities who litter the artistic landscape like heroes in a novel. The greatest of all these heroes was, for Vasari, Michelangelo. Here was an artist in whom a seeming divine talent had found a foothold and made him the culmination of this history of art. So Vasari followed Pliny with certain periodization concepts and interpretive opinions, all while framing his work in a personal evaluation of art that championed contemporary artists and their work over the classical.[4]

If many consider Vasari the first art historian, Winckelmann was one of the fathers of art history (and *the* father of classical art history) as a discipline. After spending several years in Dresden among its large classical collections, he wrote his first work *Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture* in 1755. This monograph made Winckelmann famous and ultimately led to his appointment in 1763 as Prefect of Antiquities at the Vatican, a post once held by Raphael. There he could study the Vatican's vast collection of antiquities, utilize the papal libraries, and meet and discuss his ideas with the leading artists and scholars of the day. This finally led to the publication of his masterwork *A History of Ancient Art* in 1764. Therein, Winckelmann set out many of the ideas about classical art with which we are still living—the separation of 'The Antique' into Greek and Roman, the periodization of art based on aesthetic interests and a progressive state for these aesthetics beginning with what he termed the old style (archaic), the grand style (classical), the beautiful style (fourth century) and the imitative style (degenerate Hellenistic/Roman). Like Vasari, much of this will seem familiar and scholars have long noted the ancient and contemporary literary models used by Winckelmann in his formulations. Nonetheless, Winckelmann himself stressed a scholarship based on observations of the ancient material and his influence has been far ranging—we are still, in many ways, living with(in) a Winckelmann understanding of ancient art.[5] What is interesting is the source for many of these ideas. As a student at university in Halle, he heard lectures by the philosopher Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten who was one of the early proponents of a new interest in aesthetic philosophy. Baumgarten's work *Aesthetica* (1758) was to form the basis of a new vision of aesthetics that redefined the term emphasizing a kind of

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[4] For Vasari in general, see Rubin 1995. For his relationship to Pliny, see Rubin 1995, 147–151; Isager 2003, 48–63.

[5] In general, see Potts 1994. For the relationship to contemporary Classical art history, see Donohue 1995.

objective 'taste' based on the senses. Directly opposing this view was Kant who in 1781 criticized the notion that aesthetic judgment could only be subjective, though he and later commentators came to adopt Baumgarten's reframing of aesthetics with regard to taste. This heavily influenced Winckelmann, but part of this new emphasis on taste was a reaction to currents in Europe at the time. The late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were great ages of mercantilism and saw the emergence of an expanded wealthy middle class. The nouveaux riches of Europe now had money to spend, and they wanted to spend it on antiquities in order to illustrate their taste and culture. Increasingly, the market for classical antiquities switched from the elite royal or religious circles to the individual collector. These collectors were taken from the aristocracy or this new wealthy class and the writing of Winckelmann and others had to speak to a personal ideal of 'taste' and not merely to larger political or religious ideologies.[6] This then became part of the 'personal' view of art appreciation that helped form the foundation of contemporary art aesthetic theory. This was not, however, solely a modern phenomenon.

2. *Personal Art Appreciation*

Associated with the idea of professional art criticism in antiquity is an associated and underlying notion of what J.J. Pollitt has termed 'popular criticism'.[7] This particular version of aesthetic analysis seems to come from the non-specialist critic, whether educated or not. For Pollitt, this type of art criticism champions three primary virtues: 1) realism; 2) miraculous qualities; and 3) costliness. The virtue of 'realism' is easily understandable and is far and away the most remarked upon value. This is clearly a common version of μίμησις, the highly technical term found among the professional critics, but here the thought is simply the more real a piece of art looked, the better it was.[8] This type of criticism is often reflected in the many stories

[6] Tanner 2006, 7–8. Potts 1994, 4 also notes the highly personal nature of Winckelmann's aesthetics, influenced as it was by a homoerotic relationship to nude male imagery.

[7] Pollitt 1974, 63–66. While this popular strain of criticism is to be found in the texts of 'elite' authors, it is primarily found in those authors that can be considered compilers of traditions, Pliny the Elder and to a lesser extent Cicero and Quintillian, rather than the professional critics found among the philosophers.

[8] On *mimêsis* in general Webster 1952; Sörbom 1966; DeAngelo 1988; Halliwell 2002. As it relates to early art criticism, see Pollitt 1974, s.v. 'mimesis'; Hardiman 2005b, 256–257; Tanner 2006, 191–201.

in authors such as Pliny, who discuss the tricks or curious results that are the by-product of a piece's realism. *HN* 35.65 discusses a painting by Zeuxis that had such realistic grapes that birds would attempt to eat them. This then prompted his rival Parrhasius to paint a curtain over the scene that fooled even Zeuxis. The second virtue of 'miraculous qualities' deals with whatever technical effects, often seen or described as 'magical', which are derived from an artist's skill. More often than not these effects are associated with moving statues, and the makers of such wonder works can then either be seen as actual magicians, such as Daedalus, or as technical virtuosi, like Lysippus.[9] The last virtue of 'costliness' is the easiest to understand as it simply refers to remarking on the expense of a piece of art: the more expensive the piece the more remarkable. While there are some terms among the professional critics like πολυτέλεια and *dignus* that are comparable, this is an easily understandable comment for the non-technical critic to make.[10]

What is clearly missing in this type of criticism is any attempt at discussing the artistic merit of any piece from a formal perspective. No real discussions of form or composition occur, except occasionally in Pausanias who uses the term σχῆμα to sometimes mean 'form', 'shape', or 'bearing'.[11] In fact, it is with Pausanias, or more accurately the guides he sometimes used, that one can see how this popular criticism manifested itself as an educated but non-professional critic commented on the art he saw and listened to the tall tales he was told.[12] These tales that the guides would tell are similar in nature to the anecdotes and tales told in biographical authors like Pliny. It is in compilers such as Pausanias, or more directly Pliny, where strains of this popular criticism can be found. Much of what Pliny presents in *Natural History* 34 to 36 seems to derive from the works of Duris of Samos, specifically his Περὶ ζωγραφίας.[13] This work seems to have been a reaction to Xenocrates' more methodical and 'professional' analysis of art history and in it Duris presents a view that is more personal and, in some sense, random.[14]

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9 Eur. *Hec.* 838; Pl. *Meno* 97; Diod. Sic. 4.76.1; Plu. *Vit. Dem.* 31. See Overbeck 1868, 119–142; Webster 1939, 176–177.

10 Pollitt 1974, 63–64.

11 These would seem to be popular versions of the technical terms *rhuthmos* and *diathesis*. See Pollitt 1974, 64–65.

12 See Habicht 1998, 145–146.

13 On which see Kalkmann 1898, 244; Pollitt 1974, 65–66. On Duris, see Schweitzer 1934, 290–291; Pollitt 1974, 77–78. On Pliny and his sources, see Isager 1991.

14 On Xenocrates, see Schweitzer 1932; Pollitt 1974, 74–77. On the two, see Linfert 1978; Tanner 2006, 212–214. Duris seems to have focused on 1) the importance of imitating nature;

Duris stresses the importance of an artist's ability to mimic nature and the role that chance (τύχη) plays in the creation of art. Indeed if one views the mimicry of nature as 'talent' and chance as 'inspiration', it may well be that this marks the first period of understanding the artist as an independent creator and not a mere craftsman.

This type of personal view in art discussion and appreciation is found throughout the ancient sources, and not just in elite writers or in compilers. Terrance Rusnak has collected a series of 557 ancient references from the seventh century BCE to the third century CE that clearly illustrate that sculpture was a medium that was discussed publicly by the average ancient viewer.[15] This is hardly surprising given the volume of material that would have been present in ancient society. Not only sanctuaries and temples, but public spaces like *agorai* and *fora* would have had a multitude of sculptures foresting the area for all to look at and ponder. To what end? Often these pieces would have been didactic to serve some social purpose or meaning or to convey a personal message that falls within broad societal mores. One need only think of the multitude of sculptural inscriptions or epigrams that directly address the viewer and that were likely meant to be read aloud. From these multiple sources, Rusnak sees four broad patterns of popular interaction: 1) Viewers share a broad knowledge—of myth, of history, or societal convention—all of which help to understand the work. 2) If the viewers do not recognize the work then they begin to question each other. 3) These works then become the catalyst for discussion on both the personal and societal levels. 4) The viewers usually empathize with the works, an idea that is roughly equivalent to the rhetorical notion of ἐνάργεια—to arouse the passions in an audience.[16] Thus the ancient viewer became an active participant in the creation of meaning and, in a very modern sense, the sources illustrate how non-specialists engaged in a process that was social, vocal, and inherently subjective. An example may help illustrate this.

and 2) the importance of luck in the creation of any piece. The most direct reference to Duris in Pliny is to be found at *HN* 35.103 with the story of Lysippus having no teacher but nature herself. Pollitt 1974, 65–66 analyzes this passage by saying 'In its emphasis on the unusual and its appreciation of imitative realism, the passage is a perfect expression of popular criticism'.

[15] Rusnak 2001. Rusnak, as well as other scholars, focus on sculpture as it is the best studied and understood of the ancient media, being the one art form for which we have sufficient material and textual remains. Other media survive with little trace in the ancient literary testimonia (mosaic) or there is ample ancient literary evidence, but no examples survive (panel painting).

[16] Rusnak 2001, 43–46. For ἐνάργεια as a critical issue, see Zanker 1981.

3. *A Literary Perspective?*

Perhaps the two most famous examples of this kind of public discourse and art appreciation come from Herodas' *Mime* 4 and Theocritus' *Idyll* 15. These two works illustrate how sculpture in general was viewed in the Hellenistic period and how this material may have been interpreted by 'ordinary people'. In both, two average women discuss sculpture (both freestanding and relief) that they see in a public setting. In Theocritus' poem the two women, Gorgo and Praxinoa, examine material that is on display on the palace grounds in Alexandria, when they go out into the city to take part in the festival to Adonis. In Herodas' poem, Cynno and Coccale discuss sculpture that they see on display in the sanctuary of Asclepius on Cos. Both poems are very complex and present several problems—do these characters represent the way of viewing art of the generic person on the Hellenistic street? Can we learn any more about the way they consume art? Are they rather representative of a specifically female view of art? And are their views held up as valid, as models, or as ignorant foils to their readers' more sophisticated views, in which case women may stand for the most unambiguous example of an uninformed group? While these issues are important, for the purposes of this chapter, what is most noteworthy is the manner in which both poems purport to represent 'popular aesthetics'.[17] The material in both poems is displayed publicly and the overall context is religious, yet both poets include in their work elements of domesticity and illustrate how, as Joan Burton puts it, 'ordinary life can influence an aesthetic experience'.[18] In addition, while the authors of these poems are creating fictive individuals viewing (perhaps) fictive works of art, the author is attempting to court an audience to respond favorably to his own art.[19] Whatever the aims of the authors, the characters are responding in ways that must be understood by the poem's audience in order for the fictive reality to hold. Thus it may be profitable to examine these poems in light of how a Hellenistic audience, whether real or poetic, would view statuary.[20]

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[17] What follows is a 'simplified' reading of these two texts; 'simplified' in the sense that these important questions are skirted and the fictions of these poems are analyzed as actual representations. A fuller treatment of these poems is beyond the parameters of this chapter. See Hutchinson 1988, 150–153, 246–248; Goldhill 1994; Burton 1995, 93–122; Skinner 2001; Tanner 2006, 231–233.

[18] Burton 1995, 120.

[19] Burton 1995, 97.

[20] In analyzing primarily Theocritus' *Idyll* 15, along with other, select ecphrastic epigrams, Goldhill 1994 stresses this point.

Though perhaps the more famous of the two poems, Theocritus' *Idyll* 15 is less applicable to notions of personal viewing than is Herodas' *Mime* 4. It may be that this owes something to difference in genre, but with the noted links between *Idyll* 15 and mime, the two may be reasonably compared. The primary difference lies in the language—more formal and loquacious in the former and more colloquial in the latter. *Idyll* 15 uses θεάομαι as its primary verb of viewing, a word that is normally reserved for ceremonial contexts.[21] This quality of the 'ceremonial' is reinforced by the manner in which Praxinoa reads the art of the festival: she reads the art in its context, emphasizing those elements appropriate to Adonis that heighten her religious experience.[22] In addition, the language of description would seem to play on allusions appropriate to the educated members of the poem's audience. In a famous line, Gorgo refers to the tapestries before her as λεπτὰ καὶ ὡς χαρίεντα ('light and graceful', Theoc. *Id.* 15.79, tr. Burton). This description not only provides a learned allusion to a similar description of Circe's woven material at *Odyssey* 10.223 but also makes reference to terminology that is specific to Hellenistic poetic aesthetics.[23] Such learned knowledge may have been beyond the norm for the everyday viewer, but presents an important artistic argument on behalf of Theocritus. In this poem, he seems to be refuting the suggestion, usually associated with Callimachus, that art should be private and stresses the notions of the anonymous and the communal.[24] While the poem ends on a domestic note when Gorgo decides to return home, the general tenor of the poem is one that stresses the public role of art through the viewing of two private citizens who discuss their objects through the critical language of Hellenistic aesthetic theory. This

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[21] Theoc. *Id.* 15.22–23,65, 84. Various cognates are also used by Theocritus, in this and other poems, in similar circumstances. See Rumpel 1879 on the various cognates (θαητός, θάημα, θαέομαι). See Burton 1995, 97, 216, n. 24 and n. 25.

[22] Burton 1995, 98–99.

[23] On the Homeric allusion, see Gow 1952, v. 2, 287, n. 79; Goldhill 1994, 217; Burton 1995, 102–103; 173–175. On the reference to Hellenistic poetic aesthetics, see Burton 1995, 103–104 and on the terminology in general, Pfeiffer 1968, 135–138; Pollitt 1974, s.v. λεπτός. Later, Praxinoa uses the colloquial ἔμψυχ', οὐκ ἐνύφαντα· σοφόν τι χρῆμ' ἄνθρωπος ('They have a life within them and are not woven in. Man is a creature of wisdom', Theoc. *Id.* 15.83, tr. Burton). This descent into the colloquial has more to do with the poem's juxtaposition between high and low language and the lives of the characters and that of the festival. See Hutchinson 1988, 151–152.

[24] 'Art' in this sense should be thought of as poetry, but the discourse is framed through the public display and analysis of sculpture. See Burton 1995, 106–107, 118–119. Skinner 2001 refers to the female viewer in *Idyll* 15 as 'a surrogate for the *trained* reader' (Theoc. *Id.* 15.214—her italics).

seeming dichotomy may be present simply to reinforce the opposition of the public and private realms.[25] A private citizen can use his or her private knowledge (e.g. Praxinoa's knowledge of textiles) to enhance the viewing experience, but this experience remains a public one.

Herodas' *Mime* 4, however, would seem to present a different possibility.[26] As opposed to *Idyll* 15, the characters in this poem use non-ceremonial language and everyday references to highlight their 'public' event. Cynno uses the verb παμφαλάω upon viewing a painting by Apelles and stresses that those who are not excited by the work should be hung out to dry in a laundry mat.[27] Thus artistic appreciation and analysis are linked to the domestic world through punishment, albeit in a humorous manner. In addition, upon entering the sanctuary Coccale sees a painting of a naked young man and wishes to scratch it in order to test its 'reality'.[28] Unlike Praxinoa and Gorgo, Coccale seems ignorant of her ceremonial context and is prepared to do violence to her object so captivated is she by its realism. She presents a libidinous attitude towards the naked boy, she covets the silver in the painting and she is scared by a representation of a bull. All are personal responses to the painting before her, but this response to the realism presented distances her from her cultic context and places her in direct opposition to the characters in *Idyll* 15.[29] This personal response to the real is reflected in the types of sculpture that the two women observe in the sanctuary. They pass over a statue of an old man and linger on statues of a girl reaching for an apple, a boy strangling a goose, and an evocative portrait statue of a girl named Battale. All of these statues are well within the norm of Hellenistic sculptural types and those that the women focus upon are those that elicit the most excitement from them.[30] Such a personal response is inappropriate for their ceremonial context, but appropriate for their

[25] This juxtaposition runs throughout most of the poem, whether the private is the world of the home contrasted with the world of the festival or the relationships of Gorgo and Praxinoa with their husbands as compared to that of Adonis and Aphrodite. See Hutchinson 1988, 150–153.

[26] On the aesthetic issues raised in this poem, in general see Luria 1963; Gelzer 1985.

[27] Herod. *Mime* 4.76–78.

[28] Herod. *Mime* 4.59–62.

[29] Burton 1995, 99–101. In general, see Zanker 1987, esp. 42–46; Hutchinson 1988, 246–248.

[30] The statue of the old man is barely mentioned, while the others excite comment, suggesting a higher interest. These sculptures are within the tradition of Hellenistic sculptural types, while the boy strangling the goose is attested in the material and literary record (Plin. *HN* 34.54; see Pollitt 1986, 128). For these types of statues and their relation to Hellenistic poetry, see Webster 1964, 158–160, 168–169; Fowler 1989.

specific context where they 'visit a sanctuary of Asclepius to make private offerings in private thanks for a private boon; there they admire private offerings and individualized works of art'.[31] Such an emphasis on the individual is mirrored in their interest in the inscription on the statue base that names the artists as the sons of Praxiteles and Euthies as the dedicator. This stands in stark contrast to *Idyll* 15, where no such interest in the artists or dedicators is present and its emphasis is on the anonymous and communal as opposed to the specific and private.[32] Thus, it may be that this emphasis on the personal that pervades *Mime* 4 will allow the readers to see themselves in the two women and have their own tastes and interpretations mirrored, or perhaps contrasted, with those of Coccale and Cynno.[33] The attitude and analyses of the characters, however, may reflect those of everyday viewers and suggest that scenes common in Hellenistic art, interest in the artist and personal, rather than 'theoretical', responses were all part of an amateur's view toward art and its impact upon the viewer.

4. *The Archaeological Evidence*

There are obviously numerous other examples of personal evaluations ranging from Aristotle's mention of those who sat on a board commissioning and supervising the execution of a work of art who were asked to learn 'how to judge properly' (Arist. *Pol* 1339b), to a series of Hellenistic epigrams that ask viewers to look, speak, weep, and such, to Lucian's quarrel among statues of gods as to their worth (*Zeus Tragoidos* 7–10). All of these sources illustrate that there was a strong public discourse among non-professionals when it came to aesthetic valuation, but they still concern statuary in the public realm—what about actual personal statuary and not merely personal responses to public sculpture? In this instance we can match up the literary evidence with solid archaeological remains to perhaps give a picture of personal art appreciation within the Hellenistic home. The sources on domestic

[31] Burton 1995, 105.

[32] Herod. *Mime* 4.23–25. Burton 1995, 106.

[33] Goldhill 1994, 222; Burton 1995, 106. She goes too far, however, in referring to Coccale and Cynno as ironic portraits, who 'willfully misunderstand works of art' (107). The characters may be ironic in that they are oblivious to their ceremonial context, but their interpretations fall within the personal realm as maintained by the fictive reality of their Asclepian worship. It is true that they 'do not see the universalizing dimension of art and they look for qualities in works of art other than the classic norm of beauty' (107), but in many respects neither does the art of the Hellenistic period.

decoration are all fairly consistent: early decoration among the kings and tyrants of the fourth to the first centuries BCE lead to wealthy Greeks and Romans copying this practice.[34] The elite followed this royal practice for the very same reasons as well: to display their wealth and taste. Previous scholarship on the nature of domestic statuary has suggested that these works served a primary religious role within the home as part of domestic cult, though this was likely not the case.[35] The vast majority of domestic statuary was located in the most public areas of the home, the *andrônes* and courtyards, where non-household individuals would be able to see the decoration and the homeowner would be best able to show off his material. In fact, often one can look at sight lines for such material when found *in situ* that clearly show an importance on 'display'. Martin Kreeb has shown that certain statue bases in homes from Delos were actually planned during construction or renovations to homes, suggesting that such material was consciously arranged for maximum display potential.[36] One of the best examples comes from the early Hellenistic home known as the House of the Mosaics from the Euboean site of Eretria. In this house, a statue of a nude youth was placed in the main courtyard in such a way that the sight lines for the statue offer maximum viewing potential for the several dining rooms in the house (fig. 1). In addition, the statue plays off the other decoration in the home to suggest a coherent theme of agonistic imagery that outside members of the household would have enjoyed during an event like a symposium.[37] So statues, and to an extent wall paintings and mosaics, were displayed in such a way that mimics the literary sources—an emphasis on public locations that would allow discussion among all those part of, or invited into, the home.

This is not to say that there was no religious component to these works. Most of the statues in a home were of gods and goddesses, but surprisingly none were of those deities normally associated with domestic cult: Zeus Patroos, Zeus Ctesius, Zeus Melichius, Apollo Patroos, and others.[38] By far the most prevalent deity in the sculptural record is Aphrodite. While

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34 For a collection of these sources, see Hardiman 2005a, 19–41.

35 See Hardiman 2005a. This is counter to the conclusions of Harward 1982, which have generally been followed in scholarship.

36 Kreeb 1988.

37 Hardiman 2011.

38 On domestic religion in general, see Burkert 1985, 255–256; Parker 1996, 133–159; Zaidman 2004; Mikalson 2005, 123–148; Faraone 2008; Boedeker 2008; Morgan 2010, 143–165. The majority of evidence, especially textual, and scholarship deals with Athens specifically and the classical period in general.



Figure 1: *Plan of the House of the Mosaics with sight lines toward the Statue of a Youth* (After P. Ducrey et al. 1993, fig 25, modified by author). © Swiss School of Archaeology in Greece.

her presence may have something to do with fertility, it is also likely her presence owes to her decorative possibilities. She is the one acceptable female deity that can be shown in the nude. Occasionally representations are copies of larger-scale works, such as the Aphrodite Anadyomene from Priene (fig. 2), something that too could have provoked discussion.[39]

[39] There may be a relation to the term ἀφροδίσια and activities that occurred at a symposium after some type of enterprise. See Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.4–7; Plut. *Mor.* 301F., 785C, 1097C. Pirenne-Delforge 2010, 315–319.

Figure 2: *Aphrodite Anadyomene from House 13, Priene*. Ist. Arch. Mus. No. 1053. Wiegand, T. and H. Schrader, *Priene: Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen in den Jahren 1895-1898, v. I: Text, v. II: Tafeln*. Berlin, 1904, 321–322, 372, Abb. 467. © Copyright Expired.

The other main category of deities represented is Dionysus and his *thiasos*—satyrs, silens, and maenads (fig. 3). Along with Aphrodite these figures represent those deities and figures associated with libidinous and ecstatic mythologies, appropriate for a symposium and capable of generating dialogue—just as with public sculpture. Indeed, the display of wealth and taste is just as important in the public realm as the private, as witnessed by the multiple inscriptions on *kouroi* and *korai* that exhort a witness to comment on the wealth, status, and piety of the dedicant. Given the paucity of the archaeological evidence, it is difficult to make general comments. Still, while there is an increase in and diversity of characters in domestic statuary over time, as witnessed in the late Hellenistic material from Delos, in general these light-hearted characters remain the largest group within the corpus. As for the style of these pieces, the vast majority of domestic statuary can only be described as 'pretty' (or perhaps 'beautiful' to use Winckelmann's terminology). The works are mostly in a generic post-Praxitelean style that emphasizes smooth surface transitions and a broadly classical framework (fig. 4).[40] While there are other styles present, pieces in Hellenistic baroque, rococo, and archaizing styles are nowhere near as prevalent in the record. So it is that this private material, because of its location, seems to engender discussion and display and, in its style, illustrates an aesthetic preference for the kind of material that Cicero so often discusses as the 'in demand' material to decorate the ancient home.[41]

5. *Conclusion: Public Viewing in the Hellenistic Period*

What this material suggests is that there was non-professional aesthetic criticism in antiquity and that this personal art appreciation can be gleaned from both the textual and material evidence. While the emphasis that has always been placed on professional criticism is understandable, like so many other fields of classical scholarship, perhaps even aesthetic valuation

[40] As noted by Bieber 1961, 104, with regard to the Dionysus from Priene. Interestingly, a statue base reconstructed with the signature of Praxiteles was found in the House of the Herm on Delos. While the signature is likely a forgery (there is no evidence for the artist working on the island and the fourth-century letter types are earlier than the Hellenistic date of the house), it does illustrate the appreciation for the artist as the homeowner wanted all to believe that he owned a state by the famed master. See Marcadé 1953, 567–568; Bruneau 1968, 640–641; Hardiman (2005a), 202–203. In her analysis of bases signed by the artist, Ajootian 1996, 95–97, does not include this one.

[41] Cic. *Att.* 1.1.5; 1.4.3; 1.6.2; 1.8.2; 1.9.2; 1.10.3; *Verr.* 2.1.50; 2.1.61; 2.2.84; 2.4.123.

Figure 3: *Dionysus from House 33, Priene*. Berlin, Sk. 1532.
© Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Antikensammlung,
photographer: Johannes Laurentius.

Figure 4: *Nymph from the House of the Herm, Delos*. Delos inv. A 4289. Zaphiropolou, Ph. (tr. D. Kapsambelis), *Delos: The Testimony of Museum Exhibits*. Athens, 1998, 263–264, cat. no. 108. © Hellenic Republic-Ministry of Culture and Tourism-Delos Archaeological Museum.

can begin to explore the lives of the everyday individual. Some scholars, like Jeremy Tanner, have even suggested that the focus on professional critical evaluations has led to an inappropriate emphasis on matters philosophical and technical, and encouraged the view that a statue such as the Doryphorus was not so much a sculpture, but a physical manifestation of an intellectual exercise.[42] Such a view can, in fact, lead to forgetting the primary materiality of the aesthetic experiences for most in antiquity, as witnessed by Coccale's reactions to the art she sees in *Mime* 4. Whatever evaluative terminology was used by the ancient viewer, however, s/he certainly managed to express an interest that may have gone beyond the merely corporeal. The collection of ancient sources has certainly shown how individuals did converse and discuss material. These sources show, further, that this discussion was a subjective experience and that meaning was constructed from social and personal knowledge—history, myth, or politics. This is mirrored in the actual sculptural decoration found in the Hellenistic home. Material is primarily there for display purposes in the public areas of the home to engender discussion and show off the wealth and taste of the homeowner. That many of the statues involve copies of public works, copies by famous artists (even if with forged signatures) or generic works to discuss associated mythologies would seem to reinforce these ideas. Perhaps the rather 'generic' style of these pieces was even meant to make them accessible to all. In many ways then the personal reaction becomes separate and independent from any question of sophistication and evaluative experience—the appreciation for a piece of art could be entirely personal and not necessarily bound by any particular 'aesthetic theory' that the professional critics espoused.

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42 Tanner 2006, 116–122, 161–170.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

ART, AESTHETICS, AND THE HERO IN VERGIL'S *AENEID*[*]

Joseph Farrell

1. *Introduction*

Among poetic meditations on art and aesthetics, the major episodes of ecphrasis in Vergil's *Aeneid,* which span the poem virtually from beginning to end, have hardly wanted for attention.[1] Indeed, they are extremely famous passages that have been studied by more scholars and critics almost than I could count, let alone cite. My purpose in revisiting such well-known passages is to make a simple argument, which I can summarize in advance as follows. Each of these ecphrases casts the hero Aeneas as the principal viewer of a work of art; and as we move through the series, the way in which Aeneas experiences works of art develops in an impressively linear fashion away from the 'aesthetic' towards experiencing objects as 'spurs to action': hence his earlier encounters read as 'aesthetic' experiences to a fuller extent than his later ones. The core of this argument is made in section 5. However, it obviously depends on how one defines 'aesthetics', and so, before turning to the series of ecphrases, I will say something about how I think it should be defined in contradistinction to the related idea of 'art' (section 2). I will also show, with reference to a Vergilian passage from the *Eclogues*, why I think the 'the aesthetic' as I define it is a category that is relevant to Vergil's poetry (section 3), and will offer a case study of Vergilian connoisseurship (section 4).

The ecphrases in question are as follows:

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[*] This chapter revisits a topic that I first discussed at Wellesley College, some years ago, and the discussion on that occasion began to reorient my thinking about how to approach the subject of aesthetics in the classical period. After the Penn-Leiden Colloquium I had the opportunity to develop my ideas a bit further in a lecture at Penn State. My thanks to the organizers and audiences of all three occasions for the opportunity to benefit from their stimulating discussion.

[1] I bypass the question of how many ecphrastic passages the poem contains and hope that my criteria for selecting these passages will be clear from my discussion.

- the scenes of the Trojan War depicted on Juno's temple at Carthage (*Aen.* 1.441–493);
- Daedalus' representation of his personal history on the doors of Apollo's temple (*Aen.* 6.14–41);
- the prophetic scenes of Roman history on Aeneas' shield (*Aen.* 8.608–731);
- the baldric of Pallas, which is embossed with the myth of the Danaids (*Aen.* 10.495–500 and 12.940–952)

Critics have generally considered these passages as a special form of extradiegetic communication between the poem's narrator and his addressee, the reader.[2] Instead I want to consider the reactions to these works represented within the poem as general meditations on how anyone might respond to any work of art and, more specifically, as markers of the successive stages traversed by Aeneas as his character develops from the beginning of the poem to the end.[3] All of them present themselves unexpectedly to Aeneas; and all elicit very specific, quite different reactions from him. Once my general way of approaching these passages has become clear from my analysis of the first (section 5.1), it will be possible to move more quickly through the remaining three.

2. *'Art' and 'Aesthetics': Some Definitions*

The words 'art' and 'aesthetics' tend to be used more or less interchangeably by modern classicists. But it is possible and useful to distinguish between the two. Etymology is helpful here: art, *ars,* and τέχνη all refer to the skills that one would employ to create something. The word aesthetics, from

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[2] This heuristic principle is stated with admirable clarity by Putnam 1998b, 2 ('It will be my presumption that all of Virgil's notional ecphrases are in consequential ways metaphors for the larger text which they embellish and that, individually and as a group, they have much to teach the reader about the poem as a whole'). On 'notional ekphrasis' see Hollander 1988, 209–219 and 1995, 4. It goes without saying that my purpose is not to question the validity of this powerful approach to ecphrasis, but rather to add something to the discussion by considering the phenomenon from a different point of view.

[3] This approach has been adumbrated in a few studies of Vergilian ecphrasis, among which see Barchiesi 1997, 275–276. Beck 2007, 536 observes that studies of the murals on Dido's Juno temple have focused especially on Aeneas' reaction to the images, but just two closely related aspects of Aeneas' reaction—his unwarranted hope that the scenes contain the promise of safety for his Trojans, and his extreme emotionalism—have dominated the discussion. Of particular interest is the instructive debate between Putnam (1995 (= 1998b, 55–74); 2003) and Hardie 2002 on readerly reception as thematized in the Ganymede ecphrasis of *Aeneid* 5.250–257.

αἰσθητικός and, ultimately, from the verb αἰσθάνομαι, 'to perceive', obviously has to do with perception, not creation. In addition, aesthetics concerns the experience not only of art but of anything that can be perceived through the senses. It is true that aesthetics is by convention concerned with the experience of art in particular, which is one reason why it is so easy to conflate the two words. But for present purposes it will be important to distinguish between them.[4]

Furthermore, to speak of 'ancient philosophical aesthetics' is to risk a confusion of categories. The philosophy of art, and especially the art of poetry, is prominent in the work of Plato and Aristotle, the most influential ancient philosophers. But both they and their followers are more obviously interested in matters of production than of perception—that is, in art rather than aesthetics.[5] When critics refer to Platonic or Aristotelian 'aesthetics', they borrow this word not from any ancient thinker but from a branch of philosophy that came into being only in the eighteenth century.[6] The founders of modern philosophical aesthetics, such as Baumgarten, Kant, Schiller, the Schlegels, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, were conscious that they were inventing a new area of philosophical speculation concerned with every stage of the aesthetic experience and with the relationships among them, from the most elemental aspects of bodily perception to the emotions and ideas activated thereby to the most elevated judgments of taste made on the basis of these perceptions, emotions, and ideas. In addition, they considered not just works of art, but anything to which we respond through

[4] Levinson 2003b, 3–4 gives a flexible and yet unmuddled definition of aesthetics that takes account of its different 'foci' and of the relationships among them. These include 'art … conceived as a practice in which persons aim to make objects that possess valuable aesthetic properties, or that are apt to give subjects valuable aesthetic experiences' and 'aesthetic experience … conceived as the sort of experience that figures centrally in the appreciation of works of art or the aesthetic properties of things, whether natural or man-made'. Throughout this chapter I take my bearings from this useful distinction.

[5] On Plato's theory of art and aesthetics see, variously, Sider 1977; White 1989; Naddaff 2002; Hyland 2008; and the essays in Moravcsik and Temko 1982. For Aristotle see (e.g.) Halliwell 1998; Ferrari 1999; Gallop 1999. This focus on production instead of perception only intensifies in later times. As Abrams 1989, 163, for instance, notes, 'Traditional critical theory, from Aristotle on, has assumed a construction paradigm. The Greek and Latin terms for "poem" [*poiema, poema*] signified a "made thing"—made, that is, by the poet ("maker") in accordance with an "art" (a craft, or skill) … And traditional treatises did not distinguish between their function as a guide to the poet in making a good, or successful, poem and as a guide to the reader in judging whether the made poem is good. This paradigm, which is assumed in Aristotle's *Poetics*, becomes blatantly explicit in Horace's *Ars Poetica*, which later critics applied to painting and other arts as well as poetry'.

[6] On the history of modern philosophical aesthetics see Guyer 2003.

the medium of the five senses.[7] The discourse that they made possible is therefore considerably more spacious, as well as more systematic, than was the ancient philosophy of art and poetry.[8] And yet scholars of ancient poetry and other art forms seldom acknowledge this historical fact or, what is more important, even distinguish between theories of artistic production on the one hand and theories of perception and judgment on the other.[9] But it is worth maintaining verbal distinctions if they help to focus our attention on distinct phenomena and if by collapsing them we confuse the phenomena as well. That is certainly the case with 'art' and 'aesthetics'.

3. *Connoisseurship in* Eclogue *3*

To illustrate Vergil's perspective on these issues, it will be worthwhile briefly to examine a passage in which the theme of connoisseurship is obviously on display. In *Eclogue* 3 we find that the herdsman Menalcas is very interested in aesthetic categories.[10] Here Menalcas describes a pair of cups that he is willing to stake in a singing contest (Verg. *Ecl.* 3.32–43):[11]

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[7] In his foundational essay on *The Critique of Judgment* Kant distinguishes between the 'free beauty' (*pulchritudo vaga*) of things that he assumes not to be useful (such as flowers) and the 'adherent beauty' (*pulchritudo adhaerens*; one might say, 'contingent beauty') of things that do have a useful purpose (his examples include human beings as well as horses and buildings of various sorts): see Kant 1790, V, 129; Guyer 2000, 114. For more recent accounts of aesthetics outside the realm of art see Budd 2003 on 'The Aesthetics of Nature' and Sartwell 2003 on 'The Aesthetics of the Everyday'.

[8] It is also sometimes considered to be tightly implicated with the essential features of modern consciousness itself (see, variously, Eagleton 1990; Ferry 1993; Schaeffer 2000), although this position can and perhaps should be challenged. For instance, Halliwell 2002, starting from the position that eighteenth-century aesthetics, particularly as formulated by Kant, makes a much less complete break with the classical philosophy of art than is conventionally thought (especially in its conception of *mimêsis*, Halliwell's own central concern), proceeds to argue on the basis of a close engagement with Plato and Aristotle what a more fully realized ancient aesthetics might have looked like. Another approach (exploited by Halliwell 2002, 249–264 but more closely identified with other scholars) looks to the issues debated by a number of Hellenistic philosophers whose ideas are just now being discovered (even if generally at second hand in the summaries of a hostile witness). There is as yet no single adequate overview of this new landscape, but important aspects of it are surveyed by Asmis 1991; 1992; 1995; 2004; Janko 2000, 2010; Porter 1995.

[9] A notable exception is Martindale 2005, who argues that certain elements of modern aesthetic criticism are peculiarly well suited to the explication of classical Latin poetry. For discussion see Fitzgerald 2005; Farrell 2006.

[10] I have earlier considered this passage from two related perspectives, that of economics on the one hand and that of Vergil's interest in different aspects of philosophy, including aesthetics, on the other, in Farrell 1992 and Farrell f.c., respectively.

[11] All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.

I wouldn't dare bet you anything from my flock.
For at home I have my father and a wicked stepmother,
and both count the sheep twice a day, and one the goats as well.
But, I'll bet something even you will say is a lot more,
crazy as you are: beech wood cups,
the embossed work of the divine Alcimedon,
on which a pliant vine in appliqué made by his skillful chisel
clothes grape-clusters wandering upon pale ivy.[12]
In their midst are two figures, Conon and—who was the other,
who with his compass diagrammed the entire globe for the
nations, including the seasons that the harvester and the curved plowman must observe?
I've never touched my lips to them, but keep them put away.

De grege non ausim quicquam deponere tecum.
est mihi namque domi pater, est iniusta noverca,
bisque die numerant ambo pecus, alter et haedos.
verum, id quod multo tute ipse fatebere maius,
insanire libet quoniam tibi, pocula ponam
fagina, caelatum divini opus Alcimedontos,
lenta quibus torno facili superaddita vitis
diffusos hedera vestit pallente corymbos.
in medio duo signa, Conon et—quis fuit alter,
descripsit radio totum qui gentibus orbem,
tempora quae messor, quae curvus arator haberet?
necdum illis labra admovi, sed condita servo.

The cups that Menalcas describes exemplify two different *artes:* they themselves are sculpted and they celebrate the art of astronomy. In describing the cups Menalcas uses evaluative terms (*divini* and *facili*) and other descriptive words (*lenta* and *pallente*) that implicitly praise the artist's skill and the convincing representational qualities of the work. But Menalcas' concern is exclusively to bring out the aesthetic qualities of his cups and to increase Damoetas' appreciation of them by informing him about them in detail.[13] Menalcas carefully specifies their material, the techniques used in making

[12] A vexed passage. Here I follow what seems to be the majority as represented by (e.g.) Conington 1898 and Clausen 1994 ad loc., who base their interpretations on the Theocritean passage (*Id.* 1.29–31) that Vergil here adapts, while admitting that *hedera pallente* looks very much like an instrumental ablative. For this reason, Coleman 1977 ad loc. renders 'clothes its scattered clusters with pale ivy'.

[13] The spirit in which Menalcas undertakes to educate Damoetas is hardly disinterested: he wishes to convince Damoetas that the cups are worth a lot, even if he admits they are worth less than any animal in his flock—and even if, as it turns out, Damoetas himself has a pair of cups just like them! See Farrell 1992.

them, and the name of the artist. Each of these details has point. It has been said, for instance, that 'the *fagus* is, beyond all others perhaps, the tree of the *Eclogues*'.[14] According to its symbolic importance, then, beech wood is to be understood in these poems as a prestigious material. Appreciation of workmanship, too, is obviously a hallmark of the connoisseur, and here Menalcas comments on the illusionistic skill of the carving, which makes a decorative vine look like something flexible that had been applied (*superaddita*) over the grape clusters rather than carved, like them, from the same block of material.[15] The device of naming the artist is one that poets since Homer had used to lend a sense of reality to their ecphrastic fantasies, and to this extent can be considered a topos.[16] But at the same time, this naming too overlaps with the rhetoric of the connoisseur and the collector, where it functions, again, as a sign of prestige and also of authenticity.[17] And a collector is what Menalcas is: even if his collection is not large, he treats his cups not as articles for use but as treasures to be put away in order to keep them unspoiled. Menalcas clearly appreciates these cups in aesthetic terms, beginning with a response to the material itself and progressing through a knowing assessment of their workmanship to an understanding of the exalted theme that they celebrate. In short, Menalcas is, or poses as, a connoisseur.[18]

4. Artes *in* Aeneid *6*

Most critics of the *Aeneid* have treated both 'art' and 'aesthetics' as denoting a single field of creative activity that is easily separable from and opposed to others such as 'warfare', 'law', and 'statecraft'. Many have even found at the very center of Vergil's poem a kind of charter for making this distinction in Anchises' famous declaration that other nations will excel as sculptors, orators, and so forth, but that the Romans will excel at the arts of war, government, and politics (Verg. *Aen.* 6.847–853):[19]

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14 Ross 1975, 72.

15 The point gains emphasis from the fact that word *superaddita* is probably a Vergilian coinage: see Clausen 1994 ad loc.

16 Clausen 1994 ad loc.

17 Artists' names are of course very prominent in works that describe important collections, such as that of Asinius Pollio (Plin. *HN* 36.4.33–37). On authenticity, see the chapter by Peirano in this volume.

18 I should mention that Menalcas is being made to echo the description of a cup in Theocritus' first *Idyll* (27–60) by a goatherd who is in some ways an even more pronounced aesthete than is Menalcas.

19 The effects of such an approach can be observed most recently in Bartsch 1998.

Others will hammer out bronze figures with greater delicacy so that they seem to breathe
(I am convinced of this) and will draw living portraits out of marble,
be better at pleading cases, plotting the movements of the sky
and telling the risings of the stars;
you, Roman, remember to govern the nations under your empire
(these shall be your arts), to impose a tradition of peace,
to spare the humbled and war down the arrogant.

Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera
(credo equidem), vivos ducent de marmore vultus,
orabunt causas melius, caelique meatus
describent radio et surgentia sidera dicent;
tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento
(hae tibi erunt artes), pacique imponere morem,
parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.

It is intriguing that two of the arts that Anchises names are also represented in Menalcas' cups. In other respects, though, Anchises' *sententia* seems to have very different concerns, at least on the surface. Everyone can agree that his speech draws a sharp distinction between 'other nations' and 'Romans' (while Menalcas at *Ecl.* 3.41 speaks in *gentibus* of all nations without distinction); and, further, that 'other nations' means, essentially, 'Greeks'. Of course, the Romans did learn a lot from the Greeks, but they liked to exaggerate both the primitive state of their own culture and the exclusivity of Greek influence.[20] Certainly by the Augustan period, when even the Romans themselves could hardly deny how far their culture had advanced, they were adept in appropriating and adapting to their own purposes different styles from different periods of Greek sculpture and in absorbing and redeploying the various artistic products of other cultures.[21] Yet the Romans typically represented themselves as artistically challenged, but adept at warfare and administration, in specific contrast above all to artistically

[20] Cf. Porcius Licinus' statement that during the Second Punic War the Greek Muse invaded Rome, a city of uncouth soldiers, and made it her own (fr. 1 Blänsdorf), or Horace's more epigrammatic version about *Graecia capta* taking her wild conqueror captive (Hor. *Epist.* 2.1.157–158). See Citroni 2003 and Citroni f.c.

[21] On archaic, classical, and Hellenistic styles in Greek sculpture as objects of Roman imitation see Zanker 1988, 239–264; in respect of non-Greek artistic models see Elsner 2006. While the Romans' proximate sources of information about astronomy and astrology were Greek, they repeatedly and emphatically characterize those sciences as Babylonian or Assyrian (Lucr. 5.727, 6.429; Cic. *D iv.* 1.2, 36, 93; Hor. *Carm.* 1.11.2 with Nisbet and Hubbard 1970 ad loc.; Prop. 4.1.77; *OLD* s.vv. Chaldaei 2, Chaldaeus 2, Chaldaeicus 2), as in fact they were.

accomplished but politically incompetent Hellenes. Modern readers have too often accepted such ideas practically at face value. What they have found mildly surprising is that Vergil, an artist himself, would be so self-effacing as to give these ideas so prominent a place in his masterpiece. But in fact this self-effacement is perfectly in keeping with what we find in other Roman intellectuals, and for that reason it is not surprising at all. This does not mean that aesthetics, even in a vernacular sense and still less when the term is strictly defined, is the same thing as whatever Anchises is talking about. But it is easy to understand why this confusion is so common.

From a different point of view, however, Anchises' division between fine and practical arts masks the fact that all the arts he names involve *making* things—statues, speeches, and star tables for the Greeks, war, peace, and empire for the Romans. He conceives of all *artes* as protocols of production. Others will make better statues, while the Romans will make a better empire. But if we shift our focus from making to judging, from the point of production to the point of reception—that is, from art to aesthetics—it immediately appears that he is saying something else as well. Central to Anchises' declaration are the evaluative concepts that belong to the connoisseur as well as the artist, just as much if not more so. The first of these—*spirantia*, *mollius*, and *vivos*, which are applied to sculpture—belong to a domain of judgment that is based upon informed sensory perception.[22] Anchises then continues to stress comparative judgments, naming rhetoric and astronomy as arts that others will practice 'better' than the Romans. His *melius,* however—unlike the *mollius* that it echoes—does not refer to a specifically physical or tactile category, and this represents a choice: the craft of rhetoric certainly can be tied to physical categories, even if metaphorically, as it constantly is in the treatise *On the Sublime* falsely ascribed to Longinus.[23] But it need not be: in rhetorical treatises it seldom is, and neither is it here. Astronomy, too, can be linked to physical response: either Vergil or Anchises might have had in mind here something like Lucretius' *divina voluptas … atque horror* (Lucr. 3.28–29) a response to the contemplation of the universe that is closely linked to the sublime and rooted in a bodily shudder as the beginning of a complete aesthetic

[22] In addition, these are terms that implicitly emphasize the mimetic element: Anchises judges the art of sculpture in terms of lifelike realism. Whether Anchises' conception of mimetic excellence agrees with that of Halliwell 2002 is an intriguing question but one that, unfortunately, I cannot address here.

[23] The most famous instance, [Longinus] *Subl.* 39.4, focuses on the phrase ὥσπερ νέφος at Dem. *De cor.* 188. On Longinus, see the chapter by Porter in this volume.

response.[24] But in the idea that other nations will be 'better' astronomers it is very far from clear that any physical frisson, as opposed to purely intellectual accomplishment, is at stake.[25]

On this basis one might infer that Anchises begins by alluding to specifically sensory aesthetic criteria only to move farther and farther away from them as he turns from the fine arts of Greece to the practical arts of Rome. But the more important point is that evaluative terminology used by Anchises in mentioning the other arts alludes, even if fleetingly, to the lexicon of connoisseurship and to the judgment of taste as exercised by a connoisseur: and the fact that Anchises refers to the art of rhetoric in a specifically judicial context effectively emphasizes the motif of judgment before we pass on to the more noetic art of astronomy. Upon reflection, then, one sees that the progression of evaluative terms (from the specifically sensory to the much more general), and of *artes* (from the material to the intellectual) describes the full range of components involved in a complete aesthetic response. And every stage of the process is informed, implicitly or explicitly, by judgment.

From astronomy we pass to war and statecraft—a fine juxtaposition that alludes to Rome's cosmic importance as a universal empire or world state—and continue to move away from the realm of the sensory. Here, tellingly, all evaluative and comparative terms disappear, as well. These are Rome's arts exclusively: there is no *melius*, because there is no second place, and certainly no *mollius*, because softness and all that it implies is a property of the ruled, not of the ruler. But the capacity for judgment remains; and crucially, it remains Roman. It may indeed be pertinent as well that those arts in which Anchises says the Romans will excel are not ones in which success depends upon the judgment of any audience. Here the only judgment that counts is that of the imperial artist himself, whose

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24 On astronomy as an inherently sublime topic, see Verg. *G.* 2.475–486 (and the song of Iopas at Verg. *Aen.* 1.741–746, a virtual 'realization' of the georgic poet's ambitions); Ovid's praise of astronomers at *Fast.* 1.295–310 (with the remarks of Green 2004, 135–137); Manilius 1.25–65.

25 One could perhaps argue that the verb *dicent* is an odd word to use of actual astronomers, but one that is commonly used of poetic composition (see Habinek 2005, 59–74). Could it then mean 'they will sing or write poetry about' this subject, as Aratus did, and even perform it, as the bard Iopas does in *Aeneid* 1? To me at least that seems forced; but even if it did not, I would point out that Anchises' reference tells us nothing about our response to astronomical poetry; and it is with readerly response that aesthetics is principally concerned. In any case the Latin *Dichtersprache* tends to eschew compound verbs in favor of the corresponding simplex forms, so that we should perhaps render *dicent* as if it were *praedicent,* 'predict', since predicting the times at which heavenly bodies will rise is an essential aspect of astronomy itself, and not of poetry. It is of course also a mathematical aspect, and so is not obviously linked to aesthetics.

task is not to evaluate his empire against any others, but to evaluate the character of those that it is his task to rule, to decide whether he is dealing with humbled or arrogant peoples, so that he will know whether to spare them or to war them down. The judgment of Roman arts on the part of these humbled or arrogant others hardly matters. Though the Romans may not become accomplished artists in some media, they will be unsurpassed in their own.

And note that everywhere in his pronouncement Anchises exercises this judgment himself. He recognizes the artistic accomplishment of the various others whom the Roman will rule, implying thereby that his Roman descendants, no matter whether they will be accomplished artists themselves, will also be in a position to recognize, and presumably to reward artistic excellence. That is another way of saying that they will be in a position to sponsor, and so even to determine success in these fields. Roman connoisseurship (the ability to discern the *mollius* and the *melius*) will involve informed aesthetic judgments upon the efforts of others; and related qualities of judgment (the ability to discern between *subiecti* and *superbi*) will inform their creation of an empire. The unifying point is that Roman discernment will be supreme in all arts of every sort and in whatever capacity Romans may choose to act, be it that of audience, patron, or creator.

5. *Aeneas, a Heroic Connoisseur*

5.1. *Aeneas and Emotional Response: The Temple of Juno*

A focus on aesthetics instead of art, then, has the power to alter one's understanding even of Anchises' weighty *sententia*, one of the most intensively studied passages of the *Aeneid.* We will now explore how this focus can help us understand four other famous episodes, in which Aeneas is confronted with works of art.

All four major ecphrases of the *Aeneid* appear to involve the art of sculpture. But, as is well known, while the scenes on Juno's temple might be relief sculptures, in fact we do not know that they are. They are the only artifacts in these ecphrases not explicitly *said* to be sculpted. This raises the important question of how much we may infer from one of these passages when we interpret another. I generally consider the differences between the passages more important than the similarities, so I want to be clear that the scenes on Juno's temple could just as easily be paintings of some sort. But the real point is not to decide this question one way or the other: instead, we should recognize that the passage by virtue of its reticence tells us that

the medium is not the message.[26] This means that either the narrator or else Aeneas is not interested in the medium. Our approach could be not to be interested either. But that would have consequences for our interpretation. Not to decide is different from not to be interested: it should strike us as strange, when Vergil is elsewhere quite clear about the medium involved in his ecphrases, that in this one case he is not.[27] To ignore this factor is not only inconsistent with Vergil's usual practice, but it is at odds with the most basic principle of aesthetic evaluation. Every material has its quality, and the handling of his chosen material is a crucial element of the artist's skill. Accordingly, appreciation of these factors is a crucial element of the connoisseur's skill. Why, then, is this element so glaringly absent from the Trojan War scenes in *Aeneid* 1?

A narrator who is uninterested in issues of connoisseurship would be a promising subject for another paper.[28] But in fact, the same narrator is much more attentive to materials and workmanship not only in other ecphrases in later books of the poem, but also the banqueting episode of this same book, as we shall see presently. So his interest in aesthetic criteria is flexible, and presumably varies with his purposes in different episodes. And in any case focalization of the narrative through the eyes of Aeneas is so powerful in the temple ecphrasis that the narrator's reticence about aesthetic matters must pertain to the characterization of his hero. What does it mean that Aeneas is less interested in material and formal categories than someone like Menalcas? That he is a warrior and not an aesthete? That he is a kind of

26 Lowenstam 1993, 37 n. 3 briefly reviews the history of efforts to determine what specific medium Vergil had in mind, and himself refers to the images as 'reliefs', but correctly notes that 'Vergil does not provide the evidence to resolve the question'. This, to my mind, is the point that invites interpretation.

27 By the same token, as Putnam (1998b, 216 n. 2) acutely observes, 'The very anonymity of the effort is striking, especially by contrast to the prominence of Daedalus and Vulcan as creators of the poem's other two ecphrases of some length, as is the plurality of artisans mutually involved (*inter se*). Both notions may underscore the roles of Dido as guiding spirit behind the artistic re-creation of Troy and of Aeneas as emphatic respondent to this endeavor'. On Dido as patron or impresario, see further below at n. 30. In regard to the ecphrastic episodes with which this chapter is mainly concerned, I would note that the artisan who fashioned Pallas' sword belt is also named: see further below, section 5.3.

28 It is normal for an artistic ecphrasis to place some emphasis on the materials that the artist used, on their qualities, and on his skill in exploiting them. As we will see, some of Vergil's later ecphrases do just this. By withholding this information, Vergil may be toying with the reader's expectations, and even anticipating a point made by Fowler (1998, 2000) about the relationship between the insubstantial products of verbal artistry and the more solid products of the material arts.

Platonist who sees through mere representations to underlying realities and ideas? That he has not yet acquired a Roman appreciation for the artistry of 'others', in this case Carthaginians instead of Greeks?

Elsewhere in the poem we are given abundant reason to think that Carthaginians are not only artists themselves, but also connoisseurs who have a well-developed interest in fine things.[29] As I just noted, in the banqueting episode of *Aeneid* 1, the narrator is very attentive to materials and workmanship. The banquet is richly appointed with a golden couch for Dido herself (*aurea ... sponda*, Verg. *Aen.* 1.698), purple coverlets for her guests (*ostro*, 1.700), embroidered couches for her courtiers (*toris ... pictis*, 1.708), golden coffered ceilings above them all (*laquearibus aureis*, 1.726), fine linens (*tonsis ... mantelia villis*, 1.702), a ritual goblet heavy with gold and jewels (*gravem gemmis auroque ... pateram*, 1.727–728; cf. 1.739), a virtuoso singer, taught by Atlas himself, playing a gilded harp (*cithara crinitus Iopas/personat aurata, docuit quem maximus Atlas*, 1.740–741). The wealth of sensuous cues in the banquet passage—light and color for the eyes, water for the hands (1.701), all manner of sound, punctuated by silence (1.730), for the ears; food, wine, comfortable couches, and warm embraces for the body (1.715, 1.718)—such details support the idea that the Carthaginians are the definitive aesthetes of the heroic age and that the banquet is an artistic performance of almost operatic proportions. Another argument for this is Dido's comportment as impresario: it is she who appears first, like the director of a dramatic production who also plays the leading role, 'placing herself in the center of her composition' (*se ... composuit ... mediamque locavit*, 1.697–698).[30] But in fact it is not just a matter of national character: the Trojans hold their own in this company.[31] Dido's courtiers respond to Aeneas' gifts with admiration (*mirantur dona Aeneae*, 1.709), and they admire the figure made by Iulus not only because he is in fact being impersonated by the god Cupid (1.710), but also because he is splendidly decked out in a cloak, embroidered once again, this time with brilliant yellow acanthus (1.711).

Parenthetically, we might ask whether the passage identifies the participants not as great aesthetes but rather as great vulgarians. It would be easy to find moralizing passages that condemn the very details by which

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29 Such a characterization would of course agree closely with the historical Carthaginians' reputation for luxury.

30 See n. 27 above.

31 As, once again, would be expected on the basis of their own reputation.

Vergil conveys the splendor of this banquet.[32] Further, remembering that the entire episode is modeled on the banquet of Alcinous in the *Odyssey,* we should also recall that Hellenistic critics tended to disparage the Phaeacians as a paradigm of indulgent living, rather than to praise their heightened sensibilities.[33] And we are of course dealing with people of great wealth: it was a quarrel over this wealth that sent Dido into exile, wealth and clever bargaining that allowed her to settle in Africa, wealth that would one day be the driving force behind a Carthaginian mercantile empire, wealth the measure of that empire's success, and wealth that would bring Carthage into conflict with Rome.[34] So it is not by any means clear that positive impressions of this people are what emerge either from the Homeric intertext or from the portrait of them that Vergil's narrator draws in describing their banquet.

At any rate, when Aeneas comes upon the temple of Juno, these impressions of the banquet are still in the future. We do know already that Dido is supervising an ambitious and no doubt costly building program. Among the buildings we see a theater rising (*hic alta theatris/fundamenta locant alii*, 1.427–428). Significantly, it is being equipped with a *scaenae frons* that will be decorated with massive stone columns (*immanisque columnas/rupibus excidunt scaenis decora alta futuris*, 1.428–429). More emphasis, then, on costly materials as well as on form, and evidence that the art of architecture is well advanced at Carthage.[35] Meanwhile, the mere fact that they are building a theater informs us that the Carthaginians appreciate yet another of the arts. And then of course there is the temple of Juno itself and those scenes of the Trojan War that Aeneas finds so fascinating. So let us admit that Dido is a patron of the arts on a substantial scale, and that her building projects afford every opportunity for Aeneas to respond in aesthetic terms. But in fact the hero in gazing upon these lavish creations focuses not on

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32 The description of the banquet corresponds to one disparaged on moral grounds by Lucretius (2.20–36) and Vergil's own contrast between urban luxury and rural virtue (Verg. *G.* 2.458–540); cf. Hor. *Carm.* 2.3.16–24 with Nisbet and Rudd 2004, 3–5. For 'city and countryside' as vehicles of moral evaluation, see Rosen and Sluiter 2006.

33 This attitude is clearly attested by Horace in *Epist.* 1.2, where the Phaeacians are equivalent to Penelope's suitors, allegorized along with them as the kind of hedonistic slackers that we must all aspire not to be. On the complexities involved in reading Vergil's Dido in the light of Homer's Phaeacians see Gordon 1998.

34 As a disguised Venus informs her son at Verg. *Aen.* 1.335–370.

35 As is well known, the description of the theater at Carthage conforms anachronistically to a great construction project underway in Augustan Rome, the theater of Marcellus, the design of which incorporated four spectacularly large columns that had been used in the theater of Scaurus and then subsequently in Scaurus' own house (Asc. *in Cic. Scaur.* 45), as well as to Vitruvius' instructions on the design of a *scaenae frons* (Vit. *De arch.* 5.6.9).

the materials, the expense involved, or even the beauty of the results, but on the sheer labor required to make them, which a famous simile likens to the work of diligent, thrifty bees (1.430–436). What kind of connoisseur does that make him?[36]

The simile that likens the Carthaginians to thrifty, diligent bees pretty clearly tells the reader that Aeneas' wanderings have taught him to see everything in terms of labor. In Vergil's oeuvre this is quite unusual. Actual work is scarce in the pastoral world of the *Eclogues.* The *Georgics* of course places great emphasis on work, but an important paper by Brendon Reay on labor in the *Georgics* (the poem from which this simile is borrowed)[37] teaches us that it is conventional for the language of the Roman elite to occlude the contributions of actual laborers.[38] Similarly here Aeneas seems to see the work that goes into the building of Carthage as the industrious activity of free citizens, when perhaps we should think of Dido as using the gold that she brought with her from Tyre to hire workers from neighboring territories. The extensive similarities to Augustus' own building projects in Rome will have encouraged Vergil's contemporary audience to draw some such inferences about the actual means of production that Dido employed. Thus the difficult and dangerous labor involved in raising the massive columns that will decorate her theater could argue not for citizen labor but for the use of slaves on a large scale.[39] Of course, we cannot claim to know this; but it seems possible, and if it is, then we may infer that Aeneas either idealizes or does not fully understand what he sees.

This is certainly the case when he comes to view the scenes on Juno's temple. Not as a matter of simple cognition: the scenes depict episodes of the Trojan War, and Aeneas has no difficulty in understanding what they are. But he concludes from them that he has arrived by chance at a place where he will find no danger. 'This fame will bring you some safety', he tells Achates (Verg. *Aen.* 1.463). As many have objected, this is an unwarranted, and even an illogical inference.[40] Juno was the implacable foe of the Trojans

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36 To put the question another way, does Aeneas' work-focused response anticipate the phenomena discussed by Bettina Reitz elsewhere in this volume?

37 Verg. *G.* 4.153–169; see Briggs 1980, 71–73.

38 Reay 2003; cf. Reay 2005.

39 This is, however, a difficult question. On the economics of Roman construction projects in the Republican period see Bernard 2012.

40 First remarked by Otis 1963, 238, who notes that 'the irony of course is that Aeneas can see only *salus*, pity, hospitality, the dissipation of his anxiety, in what is actually his greatest danger. It is his own heart, his own sense of the past and its bitter outcome, his own longing for recognition and safety, in short, his *nostalgia* that really betray him'. See also Stanley 1965,

throughout the war. She is the principal divinity of Carthage. Her temple is decorated with scenes that celebrate the humbling of her enemies, Aeneas' own people. Why should this suggest to Aeneas that Dido will welcome him? That she actually does so is due to nothing other than the agency of three gods, namely Mercury, whom Jupiter commissions to make sure that the Carthaginians forget their usual ferocity (1.297–304), and Venus and Cupid, who work behind the scenes on Aeneas' behalf (1.657–697). So the hero's wishfully wrongheaded interpretation of the panels does not, in the event, lead to his destruction. But that does not alter the fact that his interpretation of these scenes makes no sense.

Aeneas' reaction to what he sees is intellectually deficient probably because it is dominated by emotion.[41] But there are other issues, as well. It is instructive to linger a bit on this point and to chart the course of his reaction as he approaches the picture gallery with reference to the Odyssean model of this episode. The sentence that announces the temple presents itself in the voice of the narrator, but already we must be viewing the scene through Aeneas' eyes: he realizes as he gazes upon the temple that it is the work of Dido of Sidon, his counterpart as leader of her people, and he admires the opulence of the dedications that he finds there, seeing them as impressive evidence of the goddess's power. He notices the abundance of bronze used to make or perhaps to decorate its staircase and podium, its roof beams, and its doors (Verg. *Aen.* 1.446–459):

> Here Dido of Sidon was establishing a huge temple to Juno,
> rich in dedications and in the goddess's divine presence,
> its **bronze** doorsills rising upon its staircases, its beams joined tight
> with **bronze** fittings, its hinges squealing with **bronze** doors.
>
> hic templum Iunoni ingens Sidonia Dido
> condebat, donis opulentum et numine divae,
> **aerea** cui gradibus surgebant limina, nexaeque
> **aere** trabes, foribus cardo stridebat **aenis**.

The triple reference to bronze is a *Leitzitat* reminding us that this temple corresponds to Alcinous' palace in the *Odyssey*, where bronze, gold, and silver are each mentioned three times, as well (Hom. *Od.* 7.81–94).[42]

273–274; Horsfall 1973–1974, 138; Johnson 1976, 100–105; Segal 1981; Thomas 1983, 180–184; Clay 1988, 197; O' Hara 1990, 35–39; Fowler 1991, 31–33; Putnam 1998b, 23–54; Beck 2007, 538.

41 As has been rightly emphasized by virtually all students of this episode.

42 Hom. *Od.* 8.83–91: χάλκεον 83, χάλκεοι 86, χρύσειαι 88, ἀργύρεοι … χαλκέῳ 89; ἀργύρεον … χρυσέη 90; χρύσειοι … ἀργύρεοι 91. On *Leitzitate* see Knauer 1964, 145.

Quite apart from this reference to Homer, Vergil's triple repetition of bronze accords with the conventional language of ecphrasis by emphasizing the materiality of the artifact that it describes; and to this extent, Aeneas' initial viewing of the temple involves a familiar aesthetic category. But by eliminating Homer's triple repetition of gold and silver, Vergil accomplishes several things.[43] One is that he begins to de-emphasize the motif of ecphrastic materiality, which soon disappears entirely from view: after the bronze components of the temple no other material reference appears in the passage. So an insistent emphasis on material here creates a contrast with the Trojan War scenes that follow. Being told nothing about the material or form of these images, we could not say whether they are panels on the temple doors, or metopes or a continuous frieze or even pedimental sculptures, or perhaps wall paintings or panels installed in or on the temple or throughout the surrounding portico.[44] The narrator does not tell us about any of this, presumably because Aeneas does not register it, suddenly being in no condition to respond to these scenes as works of art.

In his current frame of mind, all Aeneas can respond to is the content of these scenes, and to this he is capable of responding, as many have noted, only emotionally. What he sees eases his fear (*timorem/leniit*, Verg. *Aen.* 1.450–451) and induces him to dare hope that he has found a safe haven (*sperare salutem/ausus*, 1.451–452) and to put better trust in his miserable fate (*adfllictis melius sperare salutem*, 1.452). These lines mark a sharp turn in the course of Aeneas' reaction. Up to this point he has evidently been making a close and detailed inspection of the temple precinct (*lustrat … singula*, 1.453) and admiring (*miratur*, 1.456) the workmanship (*artificumque manus*, 1.455), the amount of labor involved (*operumque laborem*, 1.455), the coordination of diverse contributions (*inter se*, 1.455) and the resources that made such a thing possible (*quae fortuna sit urbi*, 1.454). As he takes it all in, he tries to find the queen who is responsible for it (*reginam opperiens*, 1.454). This is, if you like, a virtually complete and total response involving wonder

43 No doubt the elimination of gold and silver—to say nothing of Alcinous' divine watchdogs (Hom. *Od.* 7.91–94), which are made out of these costly materials—is in keeping with a more realistic conception of Dido's temple. By the same token, the symbolism of gold, silver, and bronze, which is so familiar from renditions of the golden-age motif from Hesiod onwards, implicitly enacts a cultural movement thematized in complex ways elsewhere in the *Aeneid* and indeed throughout Vergil's oeuvre: see Wallace-Hadrill 1982; Kubusch 1986; Perkell 2002, with further references.

44 All of these possibilities have been raised, and some of them endorsed, by students of the episode.

and appreciation of the complex in terms of artistic workmanship, engineering, and administrative prowess, financial might, and visionary leadership. But suddenly Aeneas' ability to respond in such a multi-faceted way is interrupted by his realization of what the scenes in the temple precinct depict. Wonder (*miratur*, 1.456) gives way to new perception, which provokes both a flawed intellectual inference and an extravagant physical response. Aeneas catches sight of the battles fought at Ilium (*videt Iliacas ex ordine pugnas*, 1.456); he correctly infers that the presence of these pictures in Carthage means that the Trojan War has become famous throughout the world (*bellaque iam fama totum volgata per orbem*, 1.457); and this causes him to stop dead in his tracks and weep (*constitit et lacrimans*, 1.459). The ingredients of a complete response are, once again, still present, and the emphasis on both perception and physical reaction draw Aeneas' response farther into the realm of the aesthetic. But emotion quickly gets the better of judgment as his tears start to flow; and it is at this point that he begins to draw inferences, unwarranted in their optimism, about the meaning of these pictures. The language in which the narrator describes Aeneas' further contemplation of the pictures suggests a kind of wallowing rather than the informed, somewhat detached response that we observed before. The hero feeds his spirit on empty pictures, groaning repeatedly, dousing his face in an inundation of tears (*animum pictura pascit inani,/multa gemens, largoque umectat flumine voltum*, 1.465).

In regard to these tears, the corresponding episode of the *Odyssey* is once again instructive. There are no comparable scenes on Alcinous' palace, but during the banquet that follows Odysseus' arrival Trojan War narratives are among the evening's entertainments. Odysseus' reaction to the first and third songs of Demodocus is to weep (Hom. *Od.* 8.83–92, 521–530), as Aeneas weeps here to remember the Trojans' suffering. Aeneas and Odysseus both weep because the stories involve them personally. On the other hand, Odysseus laughs at Demodocus' second song about Ares and Aphrodite (Hom. *Od.* 8.367–369), even though its themes are no less relevant to his situation than are those of Demodocus' first and third songs. Possibly his laughter can be sufficiently explained by the fact that Hephaestus, the crafty cuckold, takes revenge on his adulterous wife and her lover, as Odysseus may fear he will have to do after he returns to Ithaca. But the detached perspective offered by a story about someone else's troubles may be a factor as well. Aeneas is permitted no such detachment when he views the scenes in Carthage. Once we get into the scenes themselves, Aeneas' own reactions at first recede from view, then come back to the fore, and then recede again. At the beginning we are told that he saw (*videbat*, Verg.

Aen. 1.466) how the Greeks and Trojans fought around the city, and how he recognized with tears (*adgnoscit lacrimans*, 1.470) the arrival of Rhesus with his horses. To this point perception, cognition, and emotion are still in evidence, although the materiality of the artifact, as I mentioned before, has entirely vanished. Then the viewer himself disappears, becoming totally absorbed in the spectacle, as a succession of simple, declarative sentences describe what happens in the pictures as if it were happening before our eyes: Troilus is borne off by his horses as he clings to the chariot, his head and hair are dragged through the dust, his spear traces his path over the ground (1.474–478); the Trojan women were taking offerings to Pallas, but the goddess kept her eyes fixed on the ground (1.479–482); Achilles had dragged Hector's body three times around the city walls, and was not selling it for gold (483–484). The change from present tenses to imperfects (*fertur ... haeret ... trahuntur ... inscribitur*, 1.476–478; *ibant ... ferebant ... tenebat ... vendebat*, 1.479–484) may track Aeneas' momentary forgetfulness and subsequent recovery of the fact that this is after all a picture and that the events are not happening now, but belong to the past. However this may be, the pity of Hector's ransom calls forth a flood of emotion as Aeneas gives a great groan from the depths of his chest (*tum uero ingentem gemitum dat pectore ab imo*, 1.485) as perception (*conspexit*, 1.487) and then recognition (*agnovit*, 1.488) return when the hero finds himself among the first men of the Greek host. Such a recognition is tantalizing, since this is one episode, among so many that are easily put in their proper place within the Trojan cycle, that we cannot confidently identify: does Aeneas find himself in parley or in battle with the Greek leaders?[45] In any case, he also *recognizes* Memnon and his troops (1.498), but then Penthesilea becomes a grammatical subject (*Penthesilea ... ardet*, 1.491) as Aeneas once more loses himself in contemplation. The narrator sums up the hero's reaction to these wonders as one of stupefaction and near paralysis (*dum stupet obtutuque haeret defixus in uno*, 1.495) until Dido appears (1.496), interrupting his reverie and bringing him forcibly back to the business at hand.

Aeneas' first encounter in the poem with a work of art is obviously a rich experience in many ways, but it is also a puzzling one. It is clear that his senses, his intellect, and his emotions are all stimulated by these scenes. It

[45] Servius (*in Aen.* 1.488; cf. 1.242) notes that Aeneas' recognition of himself in this company quietly alludes to the tradition that Aeneas betrayed Troy to the Greeks. Alternative accounts of Aeneas' allegiances and behavior *vis-à-vis* Priam and his family are conveniently summarized by Casali 2010, 42–43. The medieval *Nachleben* of this tradition is discussed by Spence 2010.

is not clear that all these faculties are working together in a harmonious way. In particular, the effect of these scenes *as a work of art* seems almost negligible. If the narrator's way of summarizing what Aeneas sees has any meaning at all, then the hero did not even notice whether he was gazing upon a painting or a sculpture, or what materials were used, or how fine the workmanship was. These basic elements of aesthetic response were totally lost to him. In cognitive terms, Aeneas does better by recognizing the particulars in each scene, but much less well in drawing lessons from them. Finally, it is notable that the narrator characterizes Aeneas as if he were mesmerized and immobilized by what he saw. In the event, this is not a wholly bad thing: it behooves Aeneas at this point to do nothing, remaining wrapped in *aer* until he has assessed the situation in which he unexpectedly finds himself. But one could hardly say that he was in control of the situation.

Once again, comparison with the Homeric Odysseus, who remains within the mist that Athena has poured around him (Hom. *Od.* 7.14–17) until he is in position to fall before Arete and grasp her knees in supplication (*Od.* 7.142–143), makes painfully clear the extent of Aeneas' passivity, which is almost complete. And Odysseus' isolation, relative to Aeneas, underlines this point. Even though the Greek hero too benefits from the supernatural assistance of his goddess patron in much the same way as does Aeneas, Odysseus is more deliberate in assessing the situation for himself, drawing his own conclusions, and timing his appearance before Alcinous and Arete accordingly. Aeneas is responsible for none of this. Lost in spectatorship, first of the scenes on the temple, then of Dido herself, he watches as Ilioneus pleads his case for him (Verg. *Aen.* 1.520–560), and acts only when Achates, hidden with him in the divine mist, observes that the time to reveal himself has arrived. And even then, Aeneas takes no action to reveal himself, as does Odysseus when he grasps the knees of the queen (Hom. *Od.* 7.142–143). Instead, his camouflage simply disappears as if dissolved by Achates' own words (*vix ea fatus erat, cum circumfusa repente/scindit se nubes*, *Aen.* 1.586–587), so that Aeneas simply stands revealed as a result (*restitit Aeneas claraque in luce refulsit*, 1.588).

Aeneas' comportment, then, remains basically the same both during the temple ecphrasis and after it. Throughout this entire episode, he is a passive recipient of external images. It is true that the different images work upon him in somewhat different ways; but they do not goad or inspire him to action. Instead they absorb his attention and rouse his emotions, but they also leave him paralyzed. When Aeneas and Achates turn their attention to Dido's court and see that the purpose of the elaborate ceremonial

underway is the reception of a Trojan delegation, they are struck dumb by contradictory emotions, joy and fear (*obstipuit simul ipse simul perculsus Achates/laetitiaque metuque*, Verg. *Aen.* 1.513–514). They 'burn eagerly' to join their friends, but the uncertainty of the situation confuses them (*avidi coniungere dextras/ardebant; sed res animos incognita turbat*, 1.514–515). So they hold back until they can learn more. But when (thanks to divine machinations behind the scenes) Aeneas' best hopes are confirmed as he watches Dido extend a friendly welcome to his Trojans, a different emotion takes hold of him: he, along with Achates, is encouraged (*his animum arrecti dictis et fortis Achates et pater Aeneas* … , 1.579–580) and, as before, they still 'burn' to burst from the cloud (*iamdudum erumpere nubem/ardebant*, 580–581). Tellingly, the first time we hear that Aeneas and Achates 'burned' in this way, Aeneas (though he is not named) is mentioned first: *obstipuit simul ipse simul perculsus Achates/laetitiaque metuque*, 1.513–514). But the second time Achates is named first; indeed, the narrator emphasizes the fact that Achates speaks first (*prior Aenean compellat Achates*, 1.514), thus highlighting Aeneas' continued inability to act in spite of the fact that he too 'had long been burning to break out of the mist' (*iamdudum*[46] *erumpere nubem/ardebant*, 1.580–581).

In sum, Aeneas' reaction contains many of the elements of an aesthetic response, some even perhaps to excess. One can infer that it is the emotionalism of his response that clouds his judgment and leaves him unable to act. Certainly his attention does not seem to be dominated by artistry as such, whether that means by the choice and treatment of materials and by the design of the temple pictures or the elaborately artistic ceremonies of self-display with which Dido appears before her Trojan visitors. In short, it is as if this episode presented a perspective on aesthetics that one could hardly characterize as wholly successful. Even if the episode ends well for Aeneas, one could hardly say that expert reading of the temple scenes had anything to do with that success.

5.2. *Heroic Progression in Responses to Art*

With this, turning to a more summary inspection of Aeneas' artistic encounters later in the poem, we find that these conform to a number of patterns. This formal symmetry with which the passages involved are distributed throughout the poem indicates a thematic symmetry as well: the

[46] Presumably, that is, since we were previously informed about their burning in lines 1.513–514.

two ecphrases that frame the first half of the poem are both associated with temples, while those found in the even-numbered books of the poem's second half are associated with implements of war. These two fields of religion and war are by no means opposed. In the first and last ecphrases, they are clearly intertwined: Juno, goddess of marriage in the Roman pantheon and in the *Aeneid,* is honored in *Aeneid* 1 as a Carthaginian war goddess; in *Aeneid* 10 and 12, scenes of an ill-fated marriage, that of the Danaids and the Aegyptids, appear on the baldric that is worn successively by Pallas and Turnus.[47]

In addition to participating in these symmetrical arrangements, Aeneas' experiences as a viewer trace a clear trajectory that we can follow in various ways. If we consider these experiences in terms of cognition, it is clear that Aeneas understands less and less as he goes along. We have seen that in the Trojan War scenes of Juno's temple he knows exactly what he is looking at. In the second ecphrasis, the doors on Daedalus' Apollo temple at Cumae, it is far less clear how much Aeneas understands.[48] The story it tells is of Daedalus' exile and journey to Italy, a tale that features, tragically, the theme of a father's love for his son. Does Aeneas register that Daedalus' experience as exile and father, not to mention images of the labyrinth, of wandering, of sacrifice to irrational and even bestial forces, are all in their different ways pointedly relevant to his own past and his future? We do not know. If the narrative focalization of the ecphrasis reliably represents Aeneas' perspective, then he understands a lot; but description of the final scene, where we are told that Daedalus tried twice to depict the fall of Icarus (*Aen.* 2.30–33), seems to go beyond what Aeneas or anyone could learn from gazing at a blank or perhaps unfinished panel.[49] So it is unclear how much of the total description represents Aeneas' own reading of the doors and how much is owed to the omniscient perspective of the epic narrator.

The issue of personal involvement is obviously important here, but probably not decisive. It helps to account for Aeneas' emotional reaction to the scenes in Carthage, which parallels Odysseus' weeping in response to

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47 Warfare is coupled with religion in a more general sense on the shield in *Aeneid* 8 as the Roman gods defeat those of Greece in the battle of Actium (698–706). Only on the doors of Daedalus' temple in *Aeneid* 6 is warfare not explicitly present.

48 The most illuminating account remains Putnam 1987; 1998b, 75–96; see also Miller 1995; Casali 1995; and Erdmann 1998.

49 It is not made clear whether Daedalus started this panel but left it incomplete or tried

the first and third songs of Demodocus. The scenes in Cumae might provoke sorrow as well, or at least foreboding: for Aeneas to reach Italy and then lose his son, as Daedalus had done, would be as great a disaster as had ever befallen him, or greater. But the parallel between Daedalus and Aeneas is more metaphorical than it is biological. No sooner has he arrived in Italy than 'Father Aeneas', as he is repeatedly called throughout *Aeneid* 5, starts losing people.[50] He has in fact already lost Palinurus en route from Sicily to Cumae (*Aen.* 5.827–871). He will lose Misenus during his interview with the Sibyl, immediately after seeing these doors (6.149–235), and his nurse Caieta upon his return from the world below (7.1–4). Indeed, his journey through the underworld confronts him with the reality of how many he had already lost; and of course in the war to come he will lose many more. But it is very far from clear that Aeneas understands how Daedalus' carvings are relevant to his own situation. Just as at Carthage, he is equally and more explicitly absorbed in the scenes at Cumae, which he would have kept studying (*quin protinus omnia/perlegerent oculis*, 6.33–34) if the Sibyl had not appeared to upbraid him for doing so. 'At a time like this those picture-shows are not what is called for', she says with some scorn (*non hoc ista sibi tempus spectacula poscit*, 6.37). Her attitude seems to recall the narrator's observation in *Aeneid* 1 that Aeneas in gazing upon the Trojan War scenes was 'feeding his soul on empty pictures' (*animam pictura pascit inani*, 1.464). But in emotional terms, we see a difference: in *Aeneid* 6, equal and equally misplaced absorption in empty pictures does not lead to tears and sorrow, but rather to apparently dispassionate contemplation.

Lengthy, dispassionate contemplation does not always bring understanding, however; and neither does delight in imagery and workmanship. The Trojan War scenes of *Aeneid* 1, as I have said, lack some elements of aesthetic connoisseurship, and the scenes in Cumae are even skimpier. Here we can at least say that we are looking at carven doors, and that they are of gold (1.32); but that is all we can say.[51]

but was prevented by grief even from starting it. In any case, it is difficult to believe that Aeneas or any viewer could understand that the artist had made two separate attempts to make the panel.

[50] On this theme see Farrell 1999, with further references.

[51] This, the only reference to materials in the ecphrasis of the doors, comes in at the end, almost as an afterthought, in connection with Daedalus' failed attempt to portray his son. Perhaps then Daedalus had reserved the use of gold as a special tribute; perhaps taking notice of the material only here connotes resistance, both the physical resistance of the medium and the psychological resistance of the subject, neither of which had troubled the master sculptor in any other portion of the work.

The doors then in every sense stand midway between the scenes on Juno's temple, about which Aeneas' knowledge presumably equals that of the narrator, and those on Vulcan's shield in *Aeneid* 8, a virtual *Annales* in comparison to the *Iliad* that the hero saw on Juno's temple. The reader sees the shield in two settings, first in Vulcan's workshop as he and his minions prepare to fashion it (8.416–453), and then in the ecphrasis itself (8.608–728), which emphasizes the physical impression that these weapons make not only in Aeneas' eyes but to all his senses as he handles them and fits them to his person (8.617–625). The materials that Vulcan used—bronze, gold, electrum, silver, and iron—are mentioned repeatedly, as are color effects that seem to go well beyond what any lesser craftsman might achieve with these materials.[52] The design of the object, as well, is clearer than in the earlier ecphrases, at least in some respects; certainly the central location of the Battle of Actium receives great emphasis (*in medio* 8.675), whereas it would be impossible to describe the specific position of any episode depicted on the temples at Carthage and Cumae.[53] For all that, however, the emphasis is still on the *content* of the shield, on the *events* that it depicts, about which both the narrator and the reader are fully informed; but Aeneas, though he rejoices in the artifact, famously has no idea what it all means (*Aen.* 8.729–731)

So, in addition to the other patterns that we have observed, it appears that as Aeneas moves from Carthage to Cumae to Caere, his emotional reaction to the works of art that he sees goes from grief to detachment to elation, while his cognitive reaction goes from painful recollection again to detachment and then to blissful ignorance. Moreover, the inferences that he draws when he sees the scenes that he knows well are very questionable, those that he may or may not have drawn at Cumae, where he may or may not have grasped the images' symbolic relevance to himself, are inscrutable, and his understanding of the shield is negligible—but the elation that Aeneas feels while viewing scenes that baffle him is absolutely justified: he *will* defeat Turnus and be victorious in the battles that lie before him. None of these trajectories is altogether encouraging to anyone who wants to believe that viewing works of art has some value for the hero, whether we define that value with reference to aesthetics, narrowly or broadly defined, or in strictly emotional or cognitive terms.

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52 Bronze: 8.621, 675; electrum: 8.624; gold: 8.624, 655, 659, 661, 672, 677; silver: 8.655, 673; iron: 8.701; blue: 8.672, 713; white: 8.672, 709, 720; red: 8.686, 695 (and perhaps 622, 703).

53 On centrality in ecphrasis see especially Thomas 1983.

5.3. *A Different Kind of Sign: Pallas' Baldric*

The last of the four ecphraseis is very different from the first three. I mentioned earlier that I would deal only with works of art that present themselves to the reader through the eyes of Aeneas, and that on that score the last one barely qualifies. But it is exceptional in a way that actually confirms the existence of the various patterns that we have been noticing. The belt of Pallas is described very briefly (Verg. *Aen.* 10.496–499), but even so it receives a full measure of attention in terms of details emphasizing that it is a beautiful visual and tactile work of art. We feel its weight (*immania pondera baltei*, 10.496), we see that it is embossed (*impressumque*, 10.497; *caelaverat*, 10.499) and rich with gold (*multo … auro*, 10.499), and we even know the name of the artist (*Clonus Eurytides* 10.499). In aesthetic terms it is almost a match for Menalcas' cups in *Eclogue* 3. But this description shows us the belt not through Aeneas' eyes, but through those of Turnus as he strips it from its wearer's lifeless body. For this reason the manner in which the narrator describes the myth that is depicted on it may be of great importance: he says that it shows a band of young men foully slaughtered on the eve of their wedding (*una sub nocte iugali/caesa manus iuvenum foede thalamique cruenti*, 10.497–498). The names Aegyptids and Danaids do not occur, which could be a comment on Turnus' inability to recall these names in the heat of battle, or perhaps at all, even if it is a myth that comes from his ancestral Argos.[54] If he does not fully recall the story, this must be significant: the complex mix of emotional, cognitive, and aesthetic responses that played out in Aeneas' prior encounters with images graven on temple and shield appears here in a new permutation.

Even more significant is that Turnus is only the first hero to view this artifact. It is when he sees it and strips it from his victim as a trophy that the reader too learns about it—what it depicts, of what it is made, who made it. But in its second appearance, things are very different. It reappears, as everyone knows, at the very end of the poem when Aeneas sees it, just as he is about to spare Turnus. And when Aeneas catches sight of the belt, he does not care about the myth that decorates it, or about its costly materials, or about the maestro who gave it form. For Aeneas, the only effect that the belt has is to remind him of Pallas and to spur him to revenge. The hero's reaction to the belt is not aesthetic in the least. For him, it has become a different sort of sign and has acquired a different meaning from the one

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[54] See Verg. *Aen.* 7.406–414, 789–796.

given it by the artist who made it. It no longer matters what the belt depicts; all that matters is that Pallas had worn it and died in it at Turnus' hands, so that it seems to Aeneas to cry out for vengeance.

6. *Conclusion*

If we revisit the trajectory of Aeneas' experiences of art from this point of view, we find that the hero has gone from being a viewer who is prone to a depth of absorption that tends towards inaction into being one who does not even see a work of art as such, but rather as only a spur to action. Direct personal involvement conditions the hero's response on both occasions, when he actually sees himself depicted in the scenes of the Trojan War, and when he does not even register what scene is depicted on Pallas' swordbelt. Emotion and a sense of loss are present when he views the scenes in Carthage and the belt of Pallas, but in the former case that emotion is a paralyzing grief, where in the latter it is impetuous anger. Complex possibilities for interpretation in *Aeneid* 1 give way in *Aeneid* 12 to a certainty that recognizes no alternative.

For all that we can trace clear lines of development through these scenes of ecphrasis, then, it is not clear that Vergil is making any single, prescriptive statement about the various ways of experiencing a work of art. There are many variables at work, and in particular it must be important that Vergil's primary viewer is a warrior and not an aesthete. Nor is it much of a surprise to find Aeneas flailing and indecisive when he guesses at the possible meanings of a major art complex in a foreign city but succeeding more and more as he gradually stops worrying about the intended meanings of subsequent masterpieces until, finally, he imposes his own meaning on an artifact and, in so doing, imposes himself and his people upon their enemies. This is a curious way for a poet to dramatize the varieties of aesthetic response; but in this as in other ways, it is almost as if Vergil had been aware that there would be at least two, quite opposite ways of reading his poem—one obsessed with teasing out its multiple possible meanings without ever deciding upon the right one, the other quite certain about the poem's meaning and ready to act on it. Such certainty itself comes in various forms: anyone happy with the label of 'optimist' or 'pessimist' probably belongs to this group, although Aeneas' final act tends to align unaestheticized decisiveness with a triumphalist reading of the poem. In this sense, perhaps the most compelling idea that can be drawn from this survey is to consider these episodes of artistic encounter a kind of mirror for the reader in which

we can see our own reactions to the poem reflected and refracted in Aeneas' reactions to the various works of art that we watch him read.

Beyond this, I can offer only more questions. Is this finally an aesthetic problem? Or is aesthetics in this poem too intricately entwined with other issues for us to treat it as a discrete and autonomous idea? Are the aesthetic problems that the poem poses more productively engaged through an ancient or a modern theoretical lens? Finally, is the position that Aeneas reaches at the poem's end similar to or different from the one that Anchises recommends when he concedes the other *artes* to other peoples and reserves the arts of war, governance, and judgment to his descendants, the people of Rome?

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

TANTAE MOLIS ERAT: ON VALUING ROMAN IMPERIAL ARCHITECTURE

Bettina Reitz

1. *Introduction*

How can we gain access to the aesthetic criteria that ancient viewers applied to architecture?[*] How can we know on what basis they divided the good from the bad, the beautiful from the ugly? One approach might be to use ancient literary sources which describe responses to architecture, and examine them for what they can reveal about actual appreciation of architecture in antiquity. Hardiman in this volume applies a comparable approach to Theocritus *Idylls* 15 and Herodas *Mime* 4 with regard to art appreciation when he investigates to what extent these poems about women who view sculptures and a tapestry can offer access to the 'popular' reception of art in antiquity.[1] My approach is related, but different in one important respect. I argue that we possess a range of evidence, consisting of inscriptions, images, and texts, which might not tell us how Romans actually viewed and valued architecture, but which were supposed to encourage Roman viewers to appreciate architecture in a particular way.

In this chapter, I will investigate a selection of inscriptions, images, and texts and discuss the way in which they influence the viewer's appreciation of a work of architecture, and what it is they encourage Roman viewers to value the most. It will emerge that our traditional understanding of

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[1] Hardiman, p. 271: 'These two works illustrate how sculpture in general was viewed in the Hellenistic period and how this material may have been interpreted by "ordinary people"', with important nuancing remarks.

'aesthetic value' as a category based solely on beauty has to be broadened considerably if we want to understand the ways in which ancient builders wished viewers to value what they had made.

The obvious starting point for anyone interested in Roman architectural aesthetics is Vitruvius' *De Architectura*. However, it is important to look beyond the opening of the treatise and the famous six aesthetic categories named in 1.2.1–9.[2] It is true that this passage has been extremely influential for the development of architectural theory from the Renaissance onwards, but it is by no means representative for the remainder of the treatise.[3] A closer reading of *De Architectura* soon reveals that for Vitruvius, the value of architecture resides in far more than what we might conventionally understand as 'aesthetic' value, architectural beauty achieved for example though symmetry or proportion. The following passage, which appears towards the end of *De Architectura* 6 illustrates this fact (Vitr. *De arch.* 6.8.9):

> Therefore the test of all building is considered in three parts: fine workmanship, magnificence, architectural composition. When a building is considered to have been magnificently executed, the expenditure will be praised, based on the power of the patron. When it has been executed carefully, the exactitude of the building supervisor will be approved. But when it has a graceful effect due to its proportions and symmetries, then the glory belongs to the architect.[4]
>
> itaque omnium operum probationes tripertito considerantur: id est fabrili subtilitate et magnificentia et dispositione. Cum magnificenter opus perfectum aspicietur, a domini potestate inpensae laudabuntur; cum subtiliter, officinatoris probabitur exactio; cum vero venuste proportionibus et symmetriis habuerit auctoritatem, tunc fuerit gloria architecti.

In this passage, Vitruvius suggests that one should assess a building on the basis of three criteria of which only the last one (*dispositio*) relates to actual 'aesthetic value': a pleasant effect of the building (*venuste*), achieved *proportionibus et symmetriis*. In order to evaluate a building on the two other

[2] *ordinatio, dispositio, eurythmia, symmetria, decor* and *distributio*. On these categories, and the problematic status of this passage within the remainder of the treatise, see e.g. Lefas 2000 with an overview of earlier bibliography.

[3] Payne 1999, 35 notes the selective and skewed reception of Vitruvius' treatise for the writers of Renaissance architectural treatises: 'Renaissance architects [read] their own questions into it [i.e. the treatise], and [turned] it into a collection of loci, a thesaurus of issues and recommendations, that set off a pattern of use still current today. Certain passages had greater appeal …'.

[4] Translations, unless otherwise stated, are my own.

counts (*fabrilis subtilitas, magnificentia*), the viewer, according to Vitruvius, needs to take into account the process of the creation of the building: in the one case, the amount of money invested by the patron, in the other, the supervision and coordination of the workers.[5]

In the remainder of this chapter, I hope to demonstrate that this passage from *De Architectura* is no exception. Evidence from a range of different kinds of sources shows that Roman viewers were not only here, but frequently encouraged to include awareness of the process of making a building into their assessment of its merit. I shall look at examples of three different media (inscriptions, images, and literary texts) to show how they can all encourage the viewer to imagine, while looking at a building, the process of its creation. In different ways, these texts and images create a (fictional) 'memory' of how the building might have been constructed.[6] This constructed version of the process of creation is stylized according to the particular medium, and according to the aspect of the process of construction on which the viewer was supposed to focus. We see that the more unpleasant aspects of the construction process (like the dirt or the inconvenience which accompanies construction) are filtered out, while those aspects of construction which bolster the positive connotations of the monument (such as technical sophistication, coordination, or hard work) are especially emphasized. In this way, viewers could be encouraged to include this awareness and the positive image of the 'making of' a building in their evaluation of the building as a whole.

2. *Framing the View: Building Inscriptions*

One way of influencing the way in which a building is viewed is to inscribe it. A building inscription functions as a kind of viewing instruction, which impacts on the way a building is evaluated, and encourages its reader to note especially and to appreciate certain aspects of the building it frames.[7]

[5] On costliness as a category in art criticism, see Hardiman pp. 268–269 in this volume.

[6] I use the word 'memory' to refer to an image of the past in the viewer's or reader's mind, an image that is created and/or manipulated from the outside.

[7] This framing function is for example noted by Elsner 1996b ('… inscriptions and texts as a crucial framing device', 35) and applied on the largest possible scale: he argues for an interpretation of the *Res Gestae* as framing its readers' view of the entire city of Rome: 'the *Res Gestae* framed the viewing of Augustan Rome. For it told Romans how their city should now be seen' (40). On the interaction of inscriptions with their environment, see generally Corbier 2006. Cf. also Horster 2001, 12–13 on the communicative aspect of building inscriptions.

The typical building inscription contains a minimum of two basic elements, namely the name of the builder in the nominative, and a verb such as *fecit* or, as the case may be, *reficit* or *restituit*.[8] In addition, it can contain different elements of extra information. Most commonly, such additional information consists of a specification of the building that has been built or restored (in the accusative), or of the individual or community for which the building was constructed (in the dative). However, many inscriptions expand further on this standard repertoire. They can also provide details such as the reason for building or restoration,[9] who bore the expense,[10] the time it took to build,[11] who was employed in construction,[12] what materials were used,[13] the thoroughness of the workmanship,[14] different stages of the building activity,[15] or other details of the construction.

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8 On the basic elements of a building inscription, see Horster 2001, 31–75. She systematically discusses all imperial building inscriptions outside Rome, but these 'unterscheiden sich in ihrem Aufbau, ihrem Aussehen und ihrer Funktion nicht grundsätzlich von Bauinschriften, die ein oder mehrere Individuen, eine Stadt oder eine Gemeinschaft an einem Gebäude anbringen ließen' (10). Cf. also Saastamoinen 2010 for a detailed investigation of the elements of North African building inscriptions. For more general overviews see Meyer 1973, 59–61; Almar 1990, 173–192.

9 See e.g. Horster 2001, 222–224. Cf. also 52–53, on the different possible elements of additional information with the verb *reficere*, which seems to require the specification of a reason for the renovation of the building (*vetustate, terrae motu, vi ignis, vi maris, vi torrentium, vi tempestatis, longa incuria ... conlapsum*). See also Saastamoinen 2010, e.g. 190–208 (on information about the previous state of a restored building), or 225–234 (on the intended use of a new building).

10 E.g. *pecunia sua, munificentia sua*. See Horster 2001, 67–75 for additional information about the financing of a building project in imperial building inscriptions, and Saastamoinen 2010, 304–358.

11 See e.g. *CIL* V 3329 (rebuilding the city walls of Verona within nine months), *CIL* VIII 2658 (cf. p. 954 and *AE* 1973, 645) (building a 39 km aqueduct within eight months), on which see Horster 2001, 244 n. 40; *CIL* V 6513 (restoring a bath building in Novara in only two years), with DeLaine and Johnston 1999, 72–73. See Saastamoinen 2010, 213 n. 1200 for the North African examples (including *CIL* VIII 2658).

12 Military forces are frequently cited as having been involved in building projects, especially those under imperial control (often improvements to the infrastructure, such as bridge building, road building or the renewal of milestones). See MacMullen 1959; Horster 2001, ch. 4 and 443–445; and Saastamoinen 2010, 285–288, who also cites some instances of civilian building projects.

13 For examples and a short discussion see Horster 2001, 214–218, with e.g. no. Ib 1 (*CIL* X 4574, *cum cubulterinis marmoribus*) from her own catalogue; and Saastamoinen 2010, 181–185. Cf. also *IRT 2009* 467 (Constantinian rebuilding of the *basilica vetus* with columns of Troad granite) with Ward-Perkins 1992, 68 and 72.

14 Saastamoinen 2010, 209–213. He distinguishes between the very common *a solo* and *a fundamentis* (for both new and restored buildings) and more specific descriptions such as *summa cum diligentia* (n. 1190) or *labore incredibili* (n. 1194).

15 Saastamoinen 2010, 214–225.

Figure 1: Inscription on the base of the Column of Trajan, Rome.
Photo: author.

Any building inscription to some extent demands from the viewer of a building that she considers not only the monument as it stands, but also the fact that it was made at all, the fact that it did not simply appear but had to be constructed in a process that required the initiative of a builder, money, manpower, material, time. The more details of the construction process an inscription provides, the more specific a memory of the construction process it creates for its viewer-reader.

Thomas and Witschel have demonstrated that such epigraphic claims (about the details of rebuilding) are often inaccurate or even patently untrue, and that these claims are determined less by the works that were actually executed than by more complex ideological motives.[16] This fits exactly with my point: these details (true or not) contribute to the creation of an increasingly specific image or memory of construction in the reader's mind.[17]

One of the best-known inscriptions of the ancient world is also an excellent example of an inscription that creates such a fictional memory of construction: the inscription on the base of the column of Trajan (fig. 1):[18]

> The Senate and the People of Rome
> to the Emperor Caesar Nerva Trajan Augustus,
> son of the deified Nerva, conqueror in Germania and Dacia, Pontifex Maximus,
> vested with the tribunician power for the seventeenth time,
> acclaimed as imperator six times, consul six times, Father of the Fatherland:
> to declare how high a mountain had been dug away,
> and the site for such great works.[19]

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16 Thomas and Witschel 1992. Fagan 1996 raises important objections, and justly stresses the formulaic character of building inscription, but the core argument about the dangers of using building inscriptions for the reconstruction of archaeological phases remains important.

17 Cf. Saastamoinen 2010, 23, who summarizes his findings: 'In a word, Roman building inscriptions are not … either comprehensive, or exact, or technical, or objective descriptions of building processes. The limited information they contain is selected to produce a positive but vague idea of the quality of the commemorated building activity'.

18 *CIL* VI 960 (cf. pp. 3070, 3777, 4310) = *ILS* 294. Technically, this inscription should not be classified as a building inscription, but as a dedicatory inscription. On the accepted classifications of Latin inscriptions, see e.g. the overview in Meyer 1973, ch. 4. On the definition of the building inscription and the differences between building and honorary inscriptions, see Saastamoinen 2010, 18–23.

19 The interpretation of the Latin of the inscription has been much debated. On the inscription, its meaning, and the different possible reconstructions, see e.g. Frere and Lepper 1988, 203–207, with an overview of earlier scholarship. I take the final two lines (with *tantis operibus* restored) to mean 'to declare how high a mountain has been dug away, and the site for such great works'.

> Senatus populusque Romanus / Imp(eratori) Caesari divi Nervae f(ilio) Nervae / Traiano Aug(usto) Germ(anico) Dacico pontif(ici) / maximo trib(unicia) pot(estate) XVII imp(eratori) VI co(n)s(uli) VI p(atri) p(atriae) / ad declarandum quantae altitudinis / mons et locus tant[is oper]ibus sit egestus

The inscription desired the viewer to admire that the site of the forum had been cleared and adapted to its purpose. It is not only the inscription which performs this function of commemorating construction: through the inscription, the column as a whole becomes a marker of the engineering feat accomplished in reshaping the landscape and building the forum. It has often been argued that the inscription's claim must be untruthful, that the mountain mentioned as dug away must have been smaller than the height of the column suggests, or even entirely non-existent.[20] That may indeed be the case—and it confirms my suggestion that inscriptions actively *create* memories of construction, which are determined by achieving maximum impact for the monument, rather than (only) by historical fact.

3. *Framing the View: Visual Depictions of Construction in Progress*

Inscribing a building is one way of reminding a viewer of the process of making it, but this can also be achieved by means of images of construction. Depictions of building in progress, displayed on monuments, could also encourage viewers to consider the process that had led to their construction.[21] My first example is the so-called Haterii relief (fig. 2), found in the context of a Roman tomb building on the Via Labicana.[22] It was discovered during an excavation in 1848, along with other sculptural decoration.[23] It shows a tomb building next to a large crane. The tomb is richly decorated in figural and ornamental relief. The tomb interior is depicted in a separate scene on top of the roof of the tomb. To the left stands a large crane, which rises taller than the building to the right. It is operated by five men in a treadmill and two more holding ropes. Two workmen have climbed up the arm of the crane, the top of which is decorated with a basket.

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[20] See e.g. Lancaster 1999, 421.

[21] Representations of technical processes in different artistic media were common both in Greece and Rome (for an overview with bibliography, see Ulrich 2008). However, significantly, depictions of the process of construction are limited to the Roman sphere (Ulrich 2008, 47–48).

[22] Museo Gregorio Profano, Rome, inv. no. 9998. Freyberger and Sinn 1996, no. 6 (51–59) and Tafel 11–16.

[23] For a catalogue of all items associated with the Tomb of the Haterii, see Freyberger and Sinn 1996, ch. 6.

Figure 2: Tomb-crane relief from the tomb of the Haterii. Vatican, Museo Gregoriano Profano. © 2012. Photo: Werner Forman Archive/Scala, Florence.

Such building scenes on tomb interiors are usually classified with other scenes of craftsmanship in tomb art, and interpreted as relating to the lives and achievements of the tombs' owners.[24] In this case, it seems likely that the *pater familias* of the family buried in this tomb actually worked in the building industry—we know that he was called Haterius, and an inscription has been found elsewhere which mentions a *redemptor* (a building contractor) by the name of Q. Haterius Tychicus.[25]

The relief might commemorate Haterius' profession, but it does more than that. Firstly, the crane in action represents and commemorates the effort involved in creating the tomb depicted next to it in its finished state.[26] The conflation of construction and constructed in one image represents the monumental achievement in its entirety. The depiction of the finished building emphasizes its perpetuity and lasting achievement, while the crane asks the viewer to remember and envisage the spectacular achievement of erecting this building in the first place.[27]

Secondly, the crane relief also impacts on the way in which a viewer considers the entire tomb complex. The tomb depicted on the relief is generally considered to be a representation or at least an idealized version of the tomb itself with its surrounding gardens.[28] Coarelli has argued that Haterius probably erected the tomb himself, with his own workforce, and

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24 On representations of the deceased's profession in tomb art, see the study of Zimmer 1982.

25 *CIL* VI 607, cf. 30801b. On the identification of the owner of the tomb with this Haterius, see Coarelli 1979, 259f. Further corroboration is provided by the parallel of a Capuan relief panel, likewise decorated with a crane employed to raise a column of a *proscaenium*, and bearing the following inscription (*CIL* X 3821 = *ILS* 3662): *Lucceius Peculiaris* ***redemptor*** *proscaeni/ex biso fecit*. On the Capuan relief, see De Nuccio and Ungaro 2002, 515–517 with select bibliography.

26 Cf. Thomas 2007, 184–185, who considers the relief in the context of his investigation of 'monumentality': 'Although apparently already complete, the building is also shown still under construction, with cranes operated by small putti, to emphasize the role of architecture in creating a monument'.

27 *Pace* Ulrich 2008, 37: 'Yet, despite the plethora of details, the image of the crane is incidental to the overall composition'.

28 Freyberger and Sinn 1993, 33; Wrede 1981, 90f. The original layout and architecture of the tomb are difficult to reconstruct on the basis of the excavations so far conducted. As far as we know, the tomb might have had a less symmetrical layout than the representation suggests, but it did correspond to the type of the two-storey tomb temple which inspired the relief carver: Freyberger and Sinn 1993, 33. Other tombs provide parallels for this sort of visual documentation of the building on or within the tomb, such as detailed descriptions of the tomb in inscriptions (cf. the tomb of Claudia Semne in Wrede 1981, 79ff.), or even maps of the tomb layout on marble slabs (see Toynbee 1971, 98–99; Gregori 1987/88, esp. 181–183; and Meneghini and Valenzani 2006, 30–34).

if Haterius was indeed a *redemptor*, this seems likely.[29] The relief therefore commemorates his achievement in constructing the tomb, and it prompts the viewer to imagine the process of construction that led to the existence of the tomb temple. This memory of the coordinated effort and technical sophistication employed in making the tomb is supposed to become part of a viewer's evaluation of the tomb as a whole.

In the case of the Haterii relief, the connection between the image of construction and the monument itself is beyond doubt. I now turn to an example where the relation between the construction scene and its built context is, at first sight, less clear cut: a scene from the Basilica Aemilia frieze. The so-called 'Basilica Aemilia' stood on the north side of the Forum Romanum, between the curia and the site later occupied by the temple of Antoninus Pius and Faustina.[30] During their excavations of the basilica, Boni and Bartoli discovered 280 fragments of a frieze, sculpted in Pentelic marble.[31] The surviving fragments together make up only 22 meters in length. It is possible that the frieze continued around the entire nave along a length of 184 meters, in which case our fragments only make up one eighth of the original length, but recently it has been suggested that the 'frieze' was in fact not continuous, but consisted of a number of separate relief panels.[32]

The frieze depicts scenes related to the early history of Rome,[33] among them the foundation of a city, possibly Rome or Lavinium (fig. 3).[34] The scene shows a half-built ashlar masonry wall, and three workmen who are engaged in constructing it. The figure of one of these, on the far left, is badly damaged, only his legs remain. Another one, to his right, is standing behind

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[29] Coarelli 1979, 268–269.

[30] The first results of the major project of the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut Rom on the Basilica Aemilia have been published in Ertel, Freyberger, Lipps, and Bitterer 2007; and Ertel and Freyberger 2007.

[31] On the excavation of the Basilica Aemilia and the discovery of the fragments, see Bartoli 1950, 289–294. Major works on the frieze with detailed descriptions are Carettoni 1961; Furuhagen 1961; Simon 1966; Kränzle 1991; and most recently Ertel and Freyberger 2007, 118–129. The frieze is now housed in the Museo Nazionale Romano.

[32] Ertel and Freyberger 2007, 118–121 with fig. 11.

[33] Simon 1966, 834–843, connects all scenes with the legendary foundation of the city of Rome and the reign of Romulus. Others have argued for a broader scope, connecting some of the scenes with the saga of Aeneas (Carettoni 1961; Furuhagen 1961). Albertson 1990 argues for a relation between each scene and an event of the Roman calendar commemorating the early history of Rome, making the frieze a sort of figured calendar.

[34] In the Museo Nazionale Romano, Rome, inv. no. 3171; Carettoni 1961, 16–21; Capelli 1993 fig. 1.

Figure 3: Basilica Aemilia Frieze (detail). Rome, Museo Nazionale Romano. Photo: author. Courtesy of the Ministero per I Beni e le Attività Culturali – Soprintendenza Speciale per I Beni Archeologici di Roma.

the wall, only visible from the arms upwards. He is turned towards the right and another workman, who is standing in front of the wall and facing left. The workman on the right is carrying a stone on his shoulders, which he appears to be passing to his colleague behind the wall, who is extending his right arm to receive it. On the far left, a female figure is supervising the building process—most likely a divinity who is favorably disposed towards the foundation process, or the personified city herself, as may be suggested by the mural crown she wears.

In terms of the general layout of the scene, the postures of the persons depicted, and their arrangement, the image closely resembles the depictions of two city foundations on the so-called Esquiline frieze (fig. 4), most likely the foundations of Lavinium and Alba Longa.[35] The scene therefore appears at first to stem from a conventional repertoire of mythological scenes. However, one interesting feature of the Basilica Aemilia scene should give us pause. The workman standing behind the wall and receiving a block of stone seems to have been given portrait features. It has been suggested that the features are those of a member of the Aemilian *gens*, inserted

[35] In the Museo Nazionale Romano, Rome; Capelli 1998.

Figure 4: Esquiline Frieze (detail). Rome, Museo Nazionale Romano. Photo: author. Courtesy of the Ministero per I Beni e le Attività Culturali – Soprintendenza Speciale per I Beni Archeologici di Roma.

into the frieze by the Aemilii, under whose name the Basilica was restored after it had been destroyed by a fire in 14 BCE.[36] If we accept this interpretation, then the insertion of the portrait into the scene of city building allows the builder of the basilica to insert himself into the early history of Rome, and to stress the ancient origins of the family of the Aemilii and their relation to Aeneas himself.[37]

However, in my view, the patron's involvement in the process of construction in the decoration also relates directly to his responsibility for the construction of the building which bears the frieze. The image shows the man responsible for the reconstruction of the basilica, personally engaged

36 In fact, Augustus appears to have financed the reconstruction. See Ertel, Freyberger, Lipps and Bitterer 2007, 493–524 on the dating and history of the basilica; and Ertel and Freyberger 2007, 121–129, in more detail on the dating of the frieze. On the question of the Aemilian portrait, see Capelli 1993, who however dates the frieze to a different phase of the building.

37 Capelli 1993.

in the act of construction, and thereby asks the viewer to consider his involvement in constructing the building bearing the frieze. This link between the depicted mythical construction and contemporary construction would, apart from the portrait features of the builder, in all likelihood also have been supported by other, now lost building scenes.[38] A fragment of one of the lost scenes shows a mechanical lifting device for heavy stone blocks.[39] Such devices were usually only depicted in representations of contemporary construction, and only very rarely in scenes depicting the mythical past.[40] This contemporary touch in one of the other construction scenes thus supports the connection between the depicted construction and the contemporary rebuilding of the Basilica.

Crucially, the image again manipulates the viewer's memory of construction in several ways. Most obviously, showing the noble donor himself engaged in hands-on construction work makes his involvement in the process of restoring the basilica seem much more active and direct than it would have been in practice. Secondly, inserting the construction scene into a narrative of the early history of Rome raises the status of the foundation and reconstruction of the basilica. The Aemilian act of (re-)foundation is to be ranked with the most important moments in Roman history, and becomes part of the foundation history of Rome.[41]

Finally, I would like to suggest that a similar interpretation can be applied to the famous spiral frieze of the column of Trajan, the inscription of which I discussed above. The frieze shows Trajan's two campaigns against Dacia, but any viewer looking at the column and its reliefs from any vantage point very soon comes across a depiction of construction in progress. Lehmann-Hartleben has calculated that one in ten figures on the column is engaged in construction (of camps, walls, boats etc),[42] and the frieze shows no fewer scenes of unfinished camps under construction than of completed camps in use.[43] Even considering the much-discussed problems of visibility, several

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[38] Kränzle 1991, 115, argues that the fragments of buildings scenes have to belong to at least four different city foundations.

[39] In the Museo Nazionale Romano, Rome, inv. no. 3174. Carettoni 1961, 19–20 with figs. 15–17; Kränzle 1991, 43.

[40] Kränzle 1991, 43.

[41] DeLaine 2002, 220 even argues that this scene, especially in a basilica which 'embodied the civilizing role of law in Roman society' symbolizes 'the foundation of a civilized, urban community; … the building of the walls, the symbolic barriers between the savage uncontrolled wilderness and the settled, orderly life of the citizen …'.

[42] Lehmann-Hartleben 1926, 39.

[43] Coulston 1990, 40–41.

scenes of building would have been visible to any viewer, no matter where she was standing at the time.[44]

The standard explanation for the frequency of scenes of building in progress is that they draw the viewer's attention to the engineering prowess and technical superiority of Roman soldiers, and are part of the column's representation of war as an ordered operation of efficiency.[45] I suggest that the reliefs also have another function. They visually evoke the process of the creation of the very monument the viewer is contemplating as well as of the architectural complex in its entirety. The prominence of construction in the scheme of the relief prompts the viewer to envisage the engineering achievement and the amount of manual labor that lies behind the carving of the relief, the erection of the column, and the entire Trajanic forum complex.

The reliefs do not, of course, afford the viewer an adequate record of what the construction of the forum really looked like. They are representations of camp-building, not forum- and column-building. However, they manage visually to link themselves to the construction of the forum, and thus also impact on the viewer's memory of the construction of the complex. This will become clear if we consider one of the many construction scenes in detail.

Scene XI–XII in the numbering of Cichorius (fig. 5) is particularly well suited to such a close analysis, since it is one of the scenes in the second spiral from the base, and can therefore easily be viewed in significant detail from the ground.[46] Furthermore, the discussion is relevant to most construction scenes, since despite variations in layout and details, they have many typical elements in common.[47]

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[44] I assume that a viewer of the column can make out what is happening in the scenes in the lowest spirals, while the continuation of similarly detailed relief all the way up the column mainly creates the impression of 'surplus': see Brilliant 1984, 96. Some sections of the frieze could also be viewed from the buildings flanking the column, perhaps libraries (Claridge 2007, 82–84 considers them 'auditoria-cum-honorary statue galleries'). On the difficulties of viewing see Veyne 1988; and Settis 1991. Huet 1996 discusses the problems of viewing the column with the help of photography or film.

[45] See e.g. Rossi 1978; Davies 2004, 132–133; and Wolfram Thill 2010, who further develops this interpretation.

[46] Coarelli 2000, 55, pl. 11; Frere and Lepper 1988, 60–63. The author had the opportunity to personally confirm the visibility of the details discussed here from a viewing point directly next to the column base.

[47] Lehmann-Hartleben 1926, 44–46 discusses the correspondence of all construction scenes to similar types, the use of stock figure poses and the limited number of activities depicted.



Figure 5: Scene 11, frieze of the Column of Trajan, Rome.
Photo: Anger. Neg. D-DAI-Rom 91.155.

A group of legionaries is represented in the process of building a fortification. In the foreground, one soldier is standing up to his waist in a trench which he is digging, while another is taking from him a basket filled with earth. The scene of digging is foregrounded in the representation, here and elsewhere, and we might connect this prominent representation of digging with the inscription of the column, and its emphasis on the clearing of the site for the erection of the forum.[48] Furthermore, Coulston argues that the type of basket used by the diggers on the column (fig. 6) is not inspired, as might be expected, by specialized military equipment, but rather by the baskets used by laborers on the Trajanic building sites in Rome.[49]

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[48] The importance of spectacular rock-cutting for imperial display is for example confirmed by the so-called 'Pisco Montano' at Terracina, where Trajanic engineers cut back a headland to clear a pass for the Via Appia. The process of digging down was marked with Roman numerals, carved into the rock every ten feet, down to the new ground level (*CIL* X 6849, cf. pp. 991, 1019). *RE* s.v. 'Tarracina', Coarelli 1996, fig. 219; Frere and Lepper 1988, 20. Cf. also DeLaine 2002, 210–211 on the importance of landscaping as a source of wonder in Roman construction.

[49] Coulston 1990, 42. What he does not point out is that the earth baskets are also

Figure 6: Detail of fig. 5.

Behind the diggers, a group of soldiers is engaged in carrying and piling up squared blocks of what might either represent stones or *caespites*, blocks

very similar to those employed on the Esquiline frieze (fig. 4) or in the tomb of Trebius Iustus, on which see Rea 2004 (esp. 133–148 on the decorative program). The allusion is thus both to building as it looked in Rome and to its appearance in familiar images of civilian construction. DeLaine 2002, 220, also points out that the depictions allude to mythological wall-building scenes.

of turf.[50] The fact that there is debate over this point is interesting in itself. It seems logical that *opus quadratum* buildings would have been highly impracticable in the Dacian forests, and that these blocks must therefore represent turf. But if that is so, why do the sculptors choose to represent blocks of turf in a way which corresponds exactly to representations of stone construction in comparable images?[51] On the Esquiline frieze (fig. 4) and on the Basilica Aemilia frieze (fig. 3), men are engaged in erecting city walls from blocks which look very similar, and which are most definitely supposed to represent stones.[52] From the ground, a viewer would only have been able to make out square blocks being put together. The visual similarity of an *opus quadratum* building and a turf-fortification is crucial. While the soldiers might be engaged in piling turf, the visual representation of this activity is deliberately similar to the construction of a Roman high quality building, and, incidentally, similar also to the high ashlar wall which separated the forum from the Markets of Trajan.[53]

Again, these scenes of construction do more than just *remind* the viewer of the construction of the building she is looking at: they also manipulate her image of the process of construction. All these different scenes of camp construction present the building process in a heavily stylized form. Legionaries work together in ordered small groups, their poses repeat themselves at regular intervals. The overwhelming impression of coordination, teamwork, and order carries over into the viewer's imagination of the building process.

The column of Trajan thus combines two different strategies for the representation and memorialization of construction: an inscription, and

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50 In favor of stone e.g. Lehmann-Hartleben 1926, 42 and Coulston 1990, esp. 43–46, and most extensively Wolfram Thill 2010, esp. 29–32. In favor of turf e.g. Richmond 1935, 18 ff.; Frere and Lepper 1988, 62.

51 Cf. Wolfram Thill 2010, 34. She, too, stresses the 'symbolic importance' (29) of representing fortifications as stone constructions, and argues that this presents 'technical skill, cultural sophistication and the permanence of the Roman army in Dacia' (35).

52 Cf. also the Terracina relief, showing an emperor or high magistrate supervising the construction of a harbor building with marble blocks. On the Terracina relief, see e.g. Coarelli 1996, figs. 210–211, with discussion and bibliography, 434–454.

53 Coulston 1990, 44, believes that the sculptors were unconsciously influenced by the construction work around them, especially of the forum perimeter wall with dry-laid *peperino* tufa blocks. However, while he argues that this similarity is accidental, I would see it as deliberate—the sculptors could have found a less ambiguous way of depicting turf construction without being confused by the construction work surrounding them, had they chosen to do so. See also Wolfram Thill 2010, 35: 'The choice probably had little to do with confusion and much more to do with a conscious desire to harness the evocative power of that method of construction'.

relief sculpture. The inscription desired the viewer to admire how the site of the forum had been cleared and adapted to its purpose. The reliefs, with the prevalence of scenes of construction in progress, further nuance the viewer's image of constructing, in asking her to visualize the process of construction, to reenact in her head the coordinated effort of thousands of workmen which so speedily produced the magnificent forum complex.[54]

4. *Framing the View: Statius' Architectural* Silvae

Literary texts, too, can encourage viewers in this particular sort of evaluation of architecture, by asking them to visualize and consider the process of construction as an integral part of the achievement of the monument as a whole. I would like to offer two examples from Statius' *Silvae*, a collection of short occasional poems written in the late first century CE under the emperor Domitian. My first example is *Silvae* 1.1, a poem about the Equus Domitiani, a large equestrian statue of the emperor Domitian, newly erected in the middle of the Forum Romanum.[55] The second example is *Silvae* 3.1, which deals with a temple of Hercules, built by the poet's friend and patron Pollius Felix in the grounds of his villa at Surrentum.

Both of these texts offer a model way of viewing and interpreting the monuments they praise. They are designed to be read in connection with these monuments, since they were written for the occasion of their dedication. *Silvae* 1.1 was presented to the emperor on the occasion of the dedication of the equestrian statue (see Stat. *Silv.* 1.pr.17–20),[56] while 3.1 was most likely performed for or presented to Pollius Felix in connection with the dedication of the temple of Hercules. Both these texts, I shall argue, in offering their readers an exemplary interpretation of the monument, stress the process of construction and create a specific memory of it, in order to add

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[54] The combined effect of the inscription and the scenes of engineering on the frieze is also noted in by Seelentag 2006, 411 in his analysis of the visual program of the column: 'Die Legionäre waren also im Felde bei ebenjenen Arbeiten zu beobachten, mit denen die zivilen Ingenieurleistungen und Baumaßnamen in der Hauptstadt korrespondierten. Hier wie dort war die feindselige Natur von Rom besiegt worden …'.

[55] I have included this poem in my discussion even though it deals with sculpture, and not architecture, since it offers a pertinent example of the creation of a memory of construction, and since it employs the same categories in doing so that are also applied to architecture in *Silv.* 3.1.

[56] See Nauta 2002, 422 with n. 141 for the dating of the poem, 361–362 on the unlikelihood of oral presentation, and 365–374 more generally on the practice of presenting poems in writing.

to the monument's impact. This is already apparent from the structure of *Silvae* 1.1. The poem begins with a series of questions about the provenance and possible makers of the horse (Stat. *Silv*. 1.1.1–7):

> What is this mass that stands embracing the Latian Forum,
> doubled by the colossus on its back? Did it glide from the sky,
> a finished work? Or did the effigy, molded in Sicilian
> furnaces, leave Steropes and Brontes weary?
> Or did the hands of Pallas fashion you for us,
> Germanicus, in such guise as the Rhine of late and the lofty
> home of the astounded Dacian saw you holding your reins?[57]

> quae superimposito moles geminata colosso
> stat Latium complexa forum? caelone peractum
> fluxit opus? Siculis an conformata caminis
> effigies lassum Steropen Brontenque reliquit?
> an te Palladiae talem, Germanice, nobis
> effinxere manus qualem modo frena tenentem
> Rhenus et attoniti vidit domus ardua Daci?

These opening lines immediately draw attention not only to the work of art itself, but also to the question of *what it took* to get the statue there. The list of possible mythical builders encourages reflection on the superhuman achievement of constructing the huge equestrian statue.

These lines are followed by a detailed description of the work of art. The author describes how the emperor on his horse surveys and controls the forum with his gaze, while being viewed himself,[58] and he admires how the representation is so lifelike that you might expect the statue to breathe, and the horse to gallop off.[59] At first, the poem is very static. For 60 lines, there is no action, while the speaker describes what the statue looks like. But in line 61, in a moment of 'flashback', the poem shifts from the description of the horse and rider as they stand in the forum, away also from the timeframe of the rest of the poem (Stat. *Silv*. 1.1.61–70):

> No long delays drew out the time. The god's present likeness itself
> makes labor sweet and the men intent upon their task

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[57] All translations from Statius' *Silvae* are from Shackleton Bailey 2003, slightly adapted.

[58] E.g. *discit et e vultu* (25), *tuentur* (29), *videt* (31), *prospectare videris* (32), *visum* (52), *aspiciens* (55), *viso* (73), *tueri* (77), *lumine fesso* (87), *despectus* (88), *videre* (89), *videas* (107).

[59] A theme often reflected on in connection with viewing or judging art (see Hardiman pp. 268–269, in this volume, and p. 273 on Herod. *Mime* 4). In 1.1, the statue seems to strain the boundaries of art, when the horse lifts its head and almost gallops off (46–47). In 57, this liveliness of the statue even communicates itself to the physical surroundings: the earth 'pants' under the great weight of the horse: *insessaque pondere tanto/subter anhelat humus* (56–57).

are surprised to find their hands more powerful. The lofty scaffolding
is loud with hammer strokes and an incessant din runs through
Mars' seven hills, drowning the vagrant noises of great Rome.
The guardian of the place in person, whose name the sacred chasm
and the famous pool preserve in memory,
hears the countless clashes of bronze and the Forum
resounding with harsh blows. He raises a visage stark in holy
squalor and a head sanctified by well-earned wreath of oak.

nec longae traxere morae. iuvat ipsa labores
forma dei praesens, operique intenta iuventus
miratur plus posse manus. strepit ardua pulsa
machina; continuus septem per culmina Martis
it fragor et magnae vincit vaga murmura Romae.
Ipse loci custos, cuius sacrata vorago
famosique lacus nomen memorabile servant,
innumeros aeris sonitus et verbere crudo
ut sensit mugire Forum, movet horrida sancto
ora situ meritaque caput venerabile quercu.

All at once, the statue is no longer finished, standing in the forum being admired and itself looking out over the space. We have gone back in time, and it is only in the process of being constructed.

The description of the erection of the statue picks up the questions asked at the very beginning of the poem about the supposedly divine origins of the statue. In effect, questions and answers about the construction of the horse frame the description of its visual impact. The connection between the first lines and lines 61ff. is emphasized by verbal echoes.[60] *Operi* (Stat. *Silv*. 1.1.62) recalls *opus* (1.1.3), the *manus* (1.1.63) of the workmen recall mention of Minerva's hands in 6 (*effinxere manus*, 1.1.6). The theme of divine involvement in the manufacturing of the statue (1.1.2–7) is taken up by *forma dei praesens* (1.1.62).

The poem offers its audience an exemplary way of viewing and interpreting the physical statue. By dwelling not only on its finished state but framing the contemplation of its appearance with passages about its production, the poem inscribes admiration of the achievement of the statue's manufacture into the canon of appropriate reactions to it. The memory of construction which the poem creates becomes part of the experience of viewing it.[61]

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60 Geyssen 1996, 103.

61 The same framing device can also be observed in *Silv*. 3.1. Depictions of the process of construction (10–21 and 117–138) frame the central part of poem, the description of the picnic and thunderstorm which led Pollius Felix to initiate construction: see also pp. 335–336.

In the case of both *Silvae* 1.1 and *Silvae* 3.1, two themes are of particular importance in their creation of a memory of construction: the speed at which construction proceeded, and the sound that accompanied it. The particular version of the construction process created in these texts is determined by achieving maximum impact for the monument, but also (just as we saw in the case of inscriptions and images) by the specific demands and characteristics of the medium.

Once a monument has been completed, nothing about the way it looks can still reveal whether it took 2, 20, or 200 years to build. Recording the achievement of fast construction augments the impact of a monument on the viewer and her appreciation of it.[62] In 1.1, the speed of construction is expressed in the phrase *nec longae traxere morae* (1.1.61) which introduces the description of the manufacturing. *fluxit opus* (1.1.3) and *plus posse manus* (1.1.63) also dwell on the same theme. The theme of the speed of construction also returns in 3.1, together with ideas about possible divine involvement in a superhuman task of construction. The theme of *Silvae* 3.1 is the celebration of the new temple of Hercules, but Statius chooses not to provide an ecphrastic description of the temple's splendors—in fact, the poem only gives an extremely vague idea of what the temple looks like.[63] Instead, the poem begins with a series of reflections on the differences between the old, humble shrine and the new splendid temple (3.1.1–9).[64] The poet then focuses on the impressively fast construction of the temple, which was erected in the space of only one year (Stat. *Silv.* 3.1.10–19):

> Where did rustic Alcides get this new mansion, this unlooked-for
> splendor? Gods have their destinies and places too.
> O rapid piety! A little while ago all we could see here
> was barren sand and sea-splashed mountainside and
> rocks shaggy with scrub and earth scarce willing to suffer
> print of foot. What fortune has suddenly enriched these
> stark cliffs? Did these walls arrive by Tyrian quill
> or Getic harp? The year itself is amazed at its
> labor, the twice six months, so narrowly bounded,
> marvel at a work built to last.

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62 See DeLaine 2002, 222–223 on speed of construction as a 'virtue in itself'. She quotes Josephus *BJ* 7.158–159 on the speed with which Templum Pacis was completed. See also n. 10 above.

63 We do not learn more than that it is a *tholos* (3), that it has shining doorposts (5), and marble columns (5–6).

64 Attributes associated with the old temple (and its patron deity) in 1–9: *pauper, vagis habitabile nautis, reclusum limen, parva ara, inglorius custos*. Associated with the new temple: *maior tholos, nitidi postes, Grais effulta metallis culmina.*

unde haec aula recens fulgorque inopinus agresti
Alcidae? sunt fata deum, sunt fata locorum.
o velox pietas! steriles hic nuper harenas
ad sparsum pelago montis latus hirtaque dumis
saxa nec ulla pati faciles vestigia terras
cernere erat. quaenam subito fortuna rigentes,
ditavit scopulos? Tyrione haec moenia plectro
an Getica venere lyra? stupet ipse labores
annus, et angusti bis seno limite menses
longaevum mirantur opus.

The passage opposes the previous, uncultivated state of nature to the domesticated landscape, enriched through the building of the temple. The focus lies on the speed with which the alteration has been achieved: *recens* (3.1.10) *velox, nuper* (3.1.12), *subito* (3.1.15), *annus, angusti bis seno limite menses* (3.1.18). Lines 19–22, which follow this passage, give the poet's explanation for the astonishingly fast execution of construction: the god himself must have participated in this 'Herculean labor' (*labores*, 3.1.17)[65] to make such a miracle possible (Stat. *Silv*. 3.1.19–22):[66]

It is the god that brought and erected
his towers, straining to dislodge reluctant boulders
and pushing back the mountain with his great
breast; one might suppose his harsh stepmother had given the order.

deus attulit arces
erexitque suas atque obluctantia saxa
summovit nitens et magno pectore montem
reppulit; immitem credas iussisse novercam.

In addition to the speed at which the transformation of landscape and temple have taken place, the stress is here on the heavy work which the god himself has had to carry out. Resistant nature (*obluctantia saxa*, 3.1.20) has had to be overcome by physical force (*magno pectore*, 3.1.21). Towards the end of the poem, a lot of the motives used in these first lines recur, in an even more extensive reflection on the process of construction (3.1.117–138). In 134–135, it is again Hercules' intervention that leads to astonishing progress being made overnight (*rosea sub luce reversi/artifices mirantur opus*). In 123–124, Statius returns to the motif of moving mountains against the will of nature. The short construction time of only a year and the speed of the works are picked up again in 135–138.

65 Cf. Laguna 1992 ad loc.

66 In 3.1.134–135, too, it is because of Hercules' intervention in construction that astonishing progress is made overnight: *rosea sub luce reversi/artifices mirantur opus*.

But there is another reason why speed is stressed in both poems, a reason which is specific to the medium of poetry. The focus on the process of *producing* the statue, and on the impressive achievement of its creation, is also a way of directing attention towards the achievement of *creating the poem*. The way in which the process of making the statue is figured shapes the reader's perception of the poetics of the *Silvae*.[67] I argue that the categories of speed and (further below) sound, are specifically appropriate to the special aesthetics of the *Silvae*, a collection of short occasional poetry containing often extravagant praise.

In *Silvae* 1.1, the speaker's emphasis on the speed with which the construction work progresses (1.1.61–63) reminds the reader of the poet's claim in the prose preface that he wrote the poem in only a couple of days: *nullum enim ex illis biduo longius tractum, quaedam et in singulis diebus effusa* (1.pr.13–14). The link between the fast poetic composition and the speed at which the statue was erected is made explicit by a further parallel between preface and poem: in the preface, Statius claims that the poems *mihi subito calore et quadam festinandi voluptate* ***fluxerunt*** (1.pr.3–4), while lines 2–3 of the poem run: *caelone peractum/* ***fluxit*** *opus?*

The theme of speedy construction as a source of praise for the builder as well as, on a metapoetic level, for the poet, is developed more extensively in 3.1. Again fast *ad hoc* composition is stressed in the *praefatio* to the book: *statim ut videram, his versibus adoravi* (*Silv*. 3.pr.9–10). The poem itself praises the speed of the temple-building enterprise, and the metapoetic significance of this rapid construction of the temple is made abundantly clear, for example by references to the programmatic opening of *Georgics* 3, where Vergil envisages a poem for Augustus as a metaphorical temple.[68]

The second theme that is stressed in the poems' accounts of construction is the sound that accompanies it. Noise might be a familiar realistic feature of a building site, but it does not seem like an obvious thematic choice

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67 Since both *Silv*. 1.1 and 3.1 are placed at the opening of their respective books, they are particularly suited to being used for establishing a poetic program for the *Silvae* and formulating their aesthetic categories. See e.g. Geyssen 1996 on 1.1, esp. 122. Newlands 1991 on 3.1; and Newlands 2002, esp. 49–50, 69–73. Cf. also Smolenaars 2006 on the metapoetics of *Silv*. 4.3, not included in this discussion.

68 Further ways in which this is achieved include casting Hercules (the builder of the temple) in the role of the Muse, and invoking the mythical exemplum of Amphion (115). Newlands 1991 explores the metapoetic layer of *Silv*. 3.1: see esp. 449–450 for the connection between speed of building and fast poetic production. On the connections between this poem, Verg. *G*. 3, and (possibly) the opening of *Aetia* 3, see Thomas 1983. Hercules is invoked as providing poetic inspiration in 23–28 and more explicitly in 49–51 (on which, see p. 339 below).

in a panegyric poem. It must surely have been one of the side effects of construction that annoyed and irritated people and that you would not want them to think about when viewing the finished product.[69] I argue that the answer again lies on a metaliterary level.

In *Silvae* 1.1, the silent splendor of the statue is interrupted by the noise of hammering, which pervades the entire city, drowns out its other noises and raises Curtius himself from his pool. In the ecphrastic description of the equestrian statue's position and appearance in the first 60 lines, the pertinent experience is the visual: gazing at the statue can reveal its meaning, and gazing is also the means by which the controlling power of the statue (and the depicted emperor) is exercised.[70] When the focus shifts to the statue's manufacture, a different sense experience takes over. While the statue is still in the process of being erected, viewing is a less reliable guide to the magnificence of the undertaking than listening. Scaffolding and a group of workmen might not *look* impressive (yet),[71] but while the completed statue visually controls only the forum on which it is placed, the sound of the work takes over the entire city: *continuus septem per culmina Martis/it fragor et magnae vincit vaga murmura Romae* (*Silv*. 1.1.64–65).[72]

On a metapoetic level, the reference to the loud sounds of construction also offers the poet a way of reflecting on the potential impact of his own poetry. The sound of the building site, which travels far and wide through

[69] You would, however, if you were trying to discredit the monument: cf. Pliny's criticism of the noise caused by Domitianic building activities (Plin. *Pan*. 51).

[70] The statue renders the monuments of the forum mere spectators of its own beauty (lines 29–31), and also exerts control over its surroundings by gazing out over the forum, the other monuments and up towards the Palatine (lines 32–36). For a broader consideration of Domitianic architecture in terms of 'surveillance', cf. Fredrick 2003, esp. 214–220 on *Silv*. 4.2 and *Silv*. 1.1. On the gaze and ecphrasis, see e.g. Bartsch 1989, 109–143 on spectacle in the ancient novel, or Elsner 2007 on the Ariadne myth in ecphrastic poetry and Roman wall painting.

[71] *Machina* (64) can also mean both 'crane' (*TLL* VIII.12.70–13.7) and scaffolding (*TLL* VIII.13.11–22). A scaffolding seems more likely (cf. Shackleton Bailey 2003, 36, n. 19), since the assembling of the elements of a bronze statue would have required the joining of different elements at great height, and therefore probably could not have been done without a scaffolding. The noise and the need for a scaffolding or crane in any case suggest that the statue was not completely finished, polished, and put on its pedestal in the workshop, but transported to the forum in parts, and only combined and finished there. This is a strong argument in favor of those who argue that the statue was a *colossus*, or at least significantly larger than a normal equestrian statue, since a normal-sized statue would have been completed in the workshop. On the question of the size of the statue, see Nauta 2002, 422 n. 142. On the technology of ancient large bronze statues, see Bol 1985, 118–172.

[72] Note the continuation of this motif in *Silv*. 4.3 (esp. 1–8). The themes of speed and sound are there also employed for the expression of poetic choices. Cf. Smolenaars 2006.

the city, suggests also the sound of Statius' own poetry. The sound of a building site would announce the presence of construction works long before it came into view. The impact of the monument is communicated far beyond its immediate surroundings, by the sound of the construction works, but also by its poetic recreation through Statius.[73]

One might object that the *quality* of the sound is important too: after all, I am arguing that words expressing loud and violent noises, such as *strepit* (*Silv*. 1.1.63), *fragor* (1.1.65), and *mugire* (1.1.69), should be suggestive of the sound of Statius' poetry. However, if we turn again to *Silvae* 3.1, it becomes clear that a metaphorical relation between the loud sound of construction works and the sounds of the poetry itself is not only very likely, but also expresses a particular literary aesthetic.

In *Silvae* 3.1.49–51, the following passage precedes the story of the foundation of the temple:[74]

> But come, say, revered Calliope, how this sudden shrine
> came into being. Alcides will be your loud accompanist,
> making mock music with his sonorous bowstring.
>
> sed quaenam subiti, veneranda, exordia templi
> dic age, Calliope. socius tibi grande sonabit
> Alcides tensoque modos imitabitur arcu.

Hercules, the (poetic) temple's most efficient builder, humorously intervenes in matters of poetic inspiration. Inverting the usual scheme of so-called *recusationes*, passages in which poets tend to excuse themselves from writing loud and thundering poetry (usually of a panegyric kind),[75] loudness is here not condemned, but defended. Hercules' plucking of his bowstring provides the justification for the resounding rhetoric of the resulting poetry.[76]

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73 This interpretation is supported by the fact that Curtius, raised by the sounds of construction, greets the statue like this (74–75): *salve, magnorum proles genitorque deorum, /**auditum longe** numen mihi. Auditum longe mihi* can be read as 'already long known to me' or, as Shackleton Bailey translates, 'known to me by distant report' (Shackleton Bailey 2003, 37), but following directly upon a passage which dwells quite literally on sensations of hearing, it might also be a play on the way in which the sounds of construction/the poem announce the fame of the ruler before one even lays eye on the statue.

74 This passage is understood as an epic *Binnenproöm* by Van Dam 2006, 203. See also Laguna 1992, 146.

75 The authoritative treatment is still Wimmel 1960 on the Augustan poets, although his brief discussion of Statius' use of *recusatio* (316–319) as 'biedere Gesten' (319) does not do justice to the complexities of Statian aesthetics. On Flavian *recusationes* see Nauta 2006.

76 The description of manufacturing the temple in the second half of the poem is also accompanied by a cluster of sound descriptions: *ditesque Caprae viridesque resultant/Tauru-*

In advocating fast poetic production and loud thundering sound, Statius violates two of the most accepted principles of Latin poetic aesthetics, both of which Latin poets ultimately (claim to) derive from the influential aesthetic pronouncements of the Hellenistic poet Callimachus.[77] Latin poets regularly pride themselves on slaving over their work for decades, working through the nights, and polishing every single word, instead of hastily producing sub-standard work.[78] Similarly, loud sound is a feature of 'bad' poetry in the Callimachean aesthetic scheme:[79] it often signifies bloated and bombastic poetry that poets reject in favor of the subtle and well crafted. But Statius has a reason for advocating speed and loud sound: the sort of poetry he is writing, occasional poetry often voicing extravagant praise, requires a reconsideration of poetic ideals. Configuring the standards by which his own poetry should be judged, he stresses that his *Silvae* are supposed to impress not by their polish achieved through long and laborious attention to detail, but through their fast and inspired production. Furthermore, for praise poetry such as the *Silvae*, the 'noise' of fulsome rhetoric and unrestrained hyperbole is an integral feature. Statius requires a new literary aesthetic, which allows speed and loudness where they are appropriate to poetic content and context, and he employs the description of fast, noisy construction to convey it.[80]

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bulae et terris ***ingens*** *redit aequoris* ***echo./non tam grande sonat*** *motis incudibus Aetne/cum* ***Brontes Steropesque*** *ferit, nec maior ab antris/Lemniacis* ***fragor*** *est ubi flammeus aegida caelat/Mulciber et castis exornat Pallada donis*, Stat. *Silv*. 3.1.128–134.

77 Nauta 2006, 35: 'We see in Statius not just a neutralization, but even an inversion of the Callimachean apologetic scheme'. For a recent treatment of Latin poets' engagement with Callimachus, and an overview of earlier literature, see Hunter 2006. Cf. also Fantuzzi and Hunter 2004, 444–485 on 'Callimacheanism' in the Greek world and in Rome.

78 Callimachus himself does not explicitly mention the fast production of poetry. He condemns poetry that is not carefully made, is too long, or not sufficiently original. In the *Aetia* prologue (Callim. fr. 1 Pf.), he rejects poems of many thousand lines (Callim. fr. 1.3–4), and recommends judging poetic merit by the standards of art, and not the Persian 'chain', a land-measure (Callim. fr. 1.17–18). However, Roman 'Callimachean' poets as a rule do condemn fast composition, and praise poetry that is the product of years of laborious execution. Cf. Catullus 95.1–3, Horace in *Sat*. 1.4.9–10. Statius himself makes the common poetic claim to careful polish achieved during long years of composition for the *Thebaid*, both in the poem itself (*Theb*. 12.810–812) and in the *Silvae* (*Silv*. 3.5.35–36; 4.7.26).

79 Callimachus uses noises such as thundering (βροντᾶν, Callim. *Aet*. fr. 1.20 Pf.) or the braying of asses (θόρυβον … ὄνων 30; ὀγκήσαιτο 31) to illustrate bad poetry. Cf. Statius' *mugire* (1.1.69).

80 I go further than Newlands 2002, 300, who argues that 'Statius plays with Callimachean poetic metaphors in an independent way', and sees this as part of Statius' negotiation of his private and public voice. Cf. also McNelis 2007, who applies the idea of an anti-Callimachean ('Telchinian') aesthetic, also found in the *Silvae* (see esp. 72–74), to the *Thebaid*. I hope to

The literary examples of the representations of construction are complicated by their own status as artworks. Their pronouncement on value and aesthetics are, as I have argued, at least partly determined by the literary concerns of the poet. However, like inscriptions and images, they aim to include awareness of the process of *making* an artwork (be it a statue, a temple, or a poem) in its assessment as a whole.

5. *Conclusion*

If we understand aesthetic value to pertain only to the beauty of an object, then this traditional definition cannot capture the ways in which Roman viewers were encouraged to evaluate architecture. I have argued from a diverse range of sources that Roman viewers were supposed to judge buildings not only on the basis of their beauty or pleasing effect upon the eye, but also by considering what it had taken to produce the monument that they were looking at. This idea of value deriving from the 'made-ness' of an object has to be incorporated into our understanding of Roman architectural value. Ultimately, the value that lies in the fact that something has been made, and in the ways in which this has been achieved, becomes an aesthetic category in itself.

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further explore Statius' aesthetic of construction in my doctoral dissertation, which deals with literary representations of the process of building.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

POETRY, POLITICS, AND PLEASURE IN QUINTILIAN

Curtis Dozier

1. *Introduction*

The role of the aesthetic in the evaluation of literature has generated considerable controversy over the past several decades. On the one hand, many critical theorists, especially those of a Marxist persuasion, have argued that the aesthetic cannot be understood separately from the political. Terry Eagleton's *Ideology of the Aesthetic* is a particularly well-known example of this point of view, which is, in broad outlines at least, also familiar to Latinists from Thomas Habinek's *Politics of Latin Literature*. Critics such as these argue that aesthetic judgments, which have traditionally been represented as disinterested, in fact have a political function. For such scholars the work of criticism is, as Habinek puts it, to 'politicize the aesthetic', that is, to expose the coercive hierarchies that literature creates and maintains.[1] Others, however, have attempted to reclaim for the aesthetic some of its traditional autonomy and to argue that aesthetic criticism may not necessarily require collusion with unappealing ideologies.[2] Charles Martindale has recently taken up this cause within Classics in his neo-Kantian manifesto *Latin Poetry and the Judgement of Taste*, in which he takes exception with politicizing critics—Habinek in particular—who, he feels, argue that

[1] See Eagleton 1990, 3: 'The construction of the modern notion of the aesthetic artefact is inseparable from the construction of the dominant ideological forms of modern class-society, and indeed from a whole new form of human subjectivity appropriate to that social order …'; and Habinek 1998, 5–6 where he proposes 'an unsentimentalized account of the political and social function of treasured classical texts'.

[2] Within the disciplines of English and Cultural Studies this debate was already underway before Habinek's book appeared: George Levine's introduction to Levine 1994 is a passionate discussion of the dilemma facing a scholar who loves literature but recognizes and abhors its oppressive function. While Levine advocates a rehabilitation of some form of aesthetic criticism, the essays in Berube 2005 suggest ways that the aesthetic has always been a part of political and ideological criticism.

'the aesthetic is merely an occlusion or mystification of the political'.[3] Martindale, who elsewhere shows himself capable of a much more nuanced approach to the relationship of politics and aesthetics,[4] is perhaps offering this characterization of Habinek's work as an intentionally reductive provocation; it is unlikely that very many politicizing critics would express their position in so extreme a form as that which Martindale attributes to them, least of all Habinek, who presents his book as complementary to traditional criticism.[5] Martindale's critique, however, seems to me nevertheless to call attention to the need to define more precisely the political function of the aesthetic, lest we appear guilty of implying, as Martindale accuses us of doing, that the aesthetic is nothing more than occluded ideology. The present chapter is intended neither as a rebuttal of Martindale nor a defense of Habinek but as an exploration of the role of aesthetic factors in the political function of poetry in ancient Rome that gives a partial answer to the problem Martindale raises and fills in some elements of Habinek's approach. I focus on Quintilian's approach to poetry in his *Institutio Oratoria*, which declares that poetry 'aims exclusively at pleasure' (*solam petit voluptatem*, Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.28), thereby making poetry an aestheticized form of speech. This pleasure has a political dimension, but, as Quintilian describes it, such pleasure does not straightforwardly contribute to the elite hegemony that critics such as Habinek say poetry establishes and maintains; in fact it has the potential to undermine this hegemony. The relationship between poetry's aesthetic pleasure and its political function in Rome is thus not one of occlusion but one of tension and negotiation.

2. *The Role of Pleasure in Poetry and Oratory*

I begin my investigation into how poetry was evaluated in ancient Rome with an anecdote from Cicero's *Brutus*, in which Cicero describes what happened when the Hellenistic poet Antimachus of Colophon was reciting one

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[3] Martindale 2005, 12; Eagleton himself (1990, 4) recognized that his approach might lead to such reductive claims.

[4] E.g., Martindale and Thomas 2006, 5: 'We need to avoid privileging history over … the present moment in which the text is experienced, received, partly aesthetically (though that moment too is always potentially subject to historicization). If we respect both elements …'.

[5] Habinek 1998, 9. Habinek himself has impeccable formalist credentials as the author of *The Colometry of Latin Prose*, and his later investigation into the embodied practices of ritualized speech in Roman culture (Habinek 2005) has much to say about the aesthetic experience of song.

of his works to a large group. Cicero tells us that when 'everyone except for Plato walked out', Antimachus said 'I will read nonetheless; as far as I'm concerned, Plato by himself is as good as one hundred thousand others' (Cic. *Brut.* 191).[6] Whether or not this encounter really happened, the story provides us with a moment of aesthetic judgment to consider. On the one hand the crowd, which Cicero goes on to call the *vulgus*, makes an unfavorable judgment about Antimachus' poetry while Plato, both an archetype for a mind unbounded by common opinion as well as a potent symbol of elite taste, makes the opposite judgment. Such an alignment of social class and aesthetics, where the *vulgus* dislikes what the elite Plato enjoys, is easily recognizable and traditional.[7] Cicero wanted to affirm this alignment in the case of poetry because he wanted to make a counter-intuitive claim about the relationship between class and aesthetics in the case of oratory. At this point in the dialogue, Atticus has just asked whether 'the crowd's judgment of an orator will always agree with that of the experts' (*intellegentes*). Cicero's somewhat surprising answer—he admits that not everyone will agree with him—is that in the case of oratory, the two judgments must coincide: 'whoever speaks in such a way that he wins approval from the crowd, this same man wins approval from the learned' (*doctis*), a claim that Cicero justifies with his theory that the orator's three *officia* are *docere*, *movere*, and *delectare*.[8] By this reasoning a speaker is a good orator only if he accomplishes these three things, and as a result experts have no choice but to praise an orator whose audience is instructed, moved, and delighted.[9] This is clearly a tendentious claim in the context of a society as socially stratified as Cicero's Rome, and indeed Cicero's theory should probably be regarded as a response to those who criticized him for pandering to the *vulgus*.[10] His account of how oratory should be evaluated allows him to maintain his status while defending the populism of his style. What is

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[6] For the anecdote see Matthews 1979, 45–48; for the fragments of Antimachus see Matthews 1996.

[7] See Habinek 1998, 45–59 and 125–127 (on Cicero's *Brutus*) for elitism in matters of literary taste.

[8] Cic. *Brut.* 183–185. For Cicero's various accounts of this theory, which in its earliest form seems to derive from Aristotle's three means of appeal, see Calboli Montefusco 1994.

[9] Pliny (*Ep.* 2.3.3) praises the sophist Isaeus because, 'in a word, he teaches, he gives pleasure, and he moves (*docet, delectat, afficit*); you would hesitate to say which he does best'.

[10] Habinek 1998, 125. Quint. *Inst.* 12.10.12 summarizes the ancient criticism of Cicero: 'bombastic, Asianic, redundant, repetitive, sometimes unsuccessful in his humor, and undisciplined, extravagant, and (heaven forbid) almost effeminate in his composition'. These charges seem to have been leveled by 'Atticist' orators like Licinius Calvus.

significant for my discussion is that Cicero's tendentious claim about oratory is predicated on an assumption about how poetry is evaluated, that is, in relation to one's social class. He assumes that elite audiences will enjoy poetry more than mass audiences, and that this is how it should be: Cicero expresses his approval of Antimachus' perseverance in reading to an audience of one, because 'an abstruse poem ought to evoke the approval of the few (*pauci*), but a speech to the people ought to evoke that of the crowd' (Cic. *Brut.* 191).

Two generations later, the professor of rhetoric Quintilian, who not only theorized about oratory but taught young Romans how to think about it, similarly constructs oratory and poetry in relation to one another (Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.28–29):[11]

> The orator should not follow the poet in everything, neither in his freedom of vocabulary nor in his license to develop figures: poetry is designed for display, and quite apart from the fact that it aims exclusively for pleasure and pursues this by inventing things that are not only untrue but also unbelievable, it also has a special defense for its license, namely that it is bound by metrical constraints and so cannot always use the literal expressions, but is driven by necessity off the straight path and into certain byways of language.[12]
>
> meminerimus tamen non per omnia poetas esse oratori sequendos, nec libertate verborum nec licentia figurarum: genus ostentationi comparatum, et, praeter id quod solam petit voluptatem eamque fingendo non falsa modo sed etiam quaedam incredibilia sectatur, patrocinio quoque aliquo iuvari: quod alligata ad certam pedum necessitatem non semper uti propriis possit, sed depulsa recta via necessario ad eloquendi quaedam deverticula confugiat.

Quintilian is not speaking as explicitly about evaluation as Cicero was in his anecdote about Antimachus, but he is more explicit about the relationship of poetry to oratory, and his analysis of the differences between the two clarifies the stakes in Cicero's account. For Quintilian, the primary difference between poetry and oratory is that poetry is an aesthetic discourse, one that aims 'exclusively at pleasure'. This pleasure derives from poetry's 'freedom' (its *libertas verborum* and *licentia figurarum*) and its 'showiness' (*ostentatio*), and is located in poetry's penchant for made-up stories (its *falsa et incredibilia*) and unusual language (its *eloquendi deverticula*). Oratory, in Cicero's

[11] This contrast goes back at least to Isoc. *Evagoras* 9. Aristotle (*Rh.* 1404a28–29) criticized Gorgias for mixing the two, a violation of propriety because 'the style of prose is not the same as that of poetry'. Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.17: 'The biggest mistake is made by those who believe that everything is appropriate in prose which is permitted to the poets'.

[12] Translations from Quintilian are taken from Russell's excellent Loeb edition (2001).

account, aims at pleasure as well, but not exclusively; *delectare* is only one of his three *officia*.[13] But Quintilian, who elsewhere speaks with approval of Cicero's tripartite scheme,[14] here makes *delectare* the sole *officium* of poetry. If oratory is to be evaluated by the degree to which it accomplishes its *officia*, poetry too can be evaluated in this way, by the degree to which it fulfills its sole *officium*, the creation of pleasure.

3. *Problematic Pleasures*

This alignment of poetry with pleasure found in both Cicero and Quintilian produces ambivalence toward poetry. Quintilian's ambivalence is explicit: he states openly that he does not want his orators to imitate the pleasures of poetry. The ambivalence toward poetry in Cicero's anecdote is less obvious, but more telling. Cicero's critics have accused him of pandering to the *vulgus*, and the great orator does not deny that he does this but rather argues that this charge is improperly applied: an orator is supposed to persuade as many people as he can, including the *vulgus*, so it makes no sense to criticize him for doing so. Cicero is particularly sensitive about this charge, and particularly eager to exculpate himself from it, because, as Eric Gunderson has shown, giving pleasure is a mark of femininity and servility, both of which are deeply at odds with the requirement that the orator represent himself as masculine, autonomous, and authoritative.[15] This threat to the speaker's status is present even if he only gives pleasure through his choice of style, for Rome was a society in which 'the style is the man'.[16] But this

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[13] For the present discussion I treat *delectatio* and *voluptas* as approximate synonyms, but with more study it might be possible to distinguish them. For example *voluptas* may refer more to the source of pleasure while *delectatio* may refer to its perception (cf. Varro *Rust.* 1.23.4: *voluptas* [*quaerit*] *delectationem*); also *voluptas* seems to me to have a more transgressive connotation than *delectatio*. But the two terms are difficult to distinguish at, for example, Cic. *Leg. Man.* 40, *Red. sen.* 14, *Sest.* 138, *Caecin.* 46; similarly *voluptas* is also often the subject or agent of *delectare*: Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.115, *De or.* 3.25, Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.19, Sen. *Dial.* 7.4.4, 7.9.2, 11.9.5, Tac. *Dial.* 14.3, SHA *Alex. Sev.* 41.6.

[14] Quint. *Inst.* 3.5.2, 8.pr.7, 12.2.11, 12.10.59. Calboli Montefusco 1994, 83 points out that Cicero's original formulation of *docere-movere-conciliare* corresponds better to his Aristotelian source than his later replacement of *conciliare* with *delectare*. The modified triad, first attested in the *Brutus*, better fits a comparison with poetry because it makes pleasure one of the orator's priorities.

[15] Gunderson 2000, 149–186, esp. 171–172; as reported by Quintilian, critics of Cicero's style (*Inst.* 12.10.12, quoted above), referred to it as 'effeminate', *mollior viro*.

[16] The *locus classicus* in Latin for this proverb is Sen. *Ep.* 114.1: *talis hominibus fuit oratio qualis vita*. Ferriss-Hill (in this volume) collects many other examples. Indeed many of the

is not to say that orators were supposed to give no pleasure whatsoever; *delectare* was, after all, one of the three *officia*, and only extremists such as the Atticists who had criticized Cicero attempted to exclude it from their speeches.[17] Rather pleasure had to be limited in oratory. Both Cicero and Quintilian, in attempting to define these limits, rely on comparisons between oratory and poetry, which is constructed as a discourse rife with problematic pleasures: Quintilian says that poetry aims solely at pleasure, and Cicero, by arguing that orators must be allowed to provide limited pleasure, deflects the criticisms aimed at him onto 'popular' poets who, he says, are supposed to write only for the few. Students learning what constituted oratory learned also what constituted poetry, namely pleasure. Any understanding of how this discourse of pleasure was evaluated in Rome must therefore take into account attitudes toward these pleasures.

In Quintilian's treatment of *sententiae* we can see how his students would have learned ambivalence toward providing pleasure in oratory. On the one hand, Quintilian recommends that his students make some use of these pointed maxims: 'Who can deny them usefulness', he asks, 'so long as they have substance, are not over-abundant, and contribute to winning the case? They strike the mind, they often knock it over by a single stroke, their very brevity makes them more memorable, and the pleasure they give (*delectatione*) makes them more persuasive' (Quint. *Inst.* 12.10.48). The pleasure of *sententiae* has an important usefulness for persuasion. On the other hand, Quintilian warns his students not to imitate the *indocti*, who, in their use of *sententiae*, 'seek only for effects which charm the ears of the audience, even if the pleasure is a perverse one' (*pravis voluptatibus*, Quint. *Inst.* 2.12.6). Used improperly, these same *sententiae* threaten to lead the orator to provide 'perverse' pleasures that compromise his status. It must have been difficult for the orator to know how to chart the delicate course between persuasion and perversity.

It is not surprising to find Quintilian expressing ambivalence about *sententiae*, which were traditionally regarded as a characteristic feature of the kinds of speeches encouraged by declamatory exercises that Quintilian and others blamed for the decline of oratory in Rome.[18] Ambivalence toward

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contributors to this volume (Halliwell, Bartels, Rocconi, Ferriss-Hill) treat this pervasive maxim, no doubt because it encapsulates the ancient conflation of the aesthetic and the moral.

17 See Dugan 2001, esp. 423–424 for the Atticist Calvus' attempts to limit the corrupting influence of pleasure on his life and work.

18 For example Quint. *Inst.* 1.8.9, Sen. *Controv.* 1.pr.10, 1.pr.22, Tac. *Dial.* 35.5, Petronius 3 (this last probably parodying such authorities).

the declaimers' emphasis on pleasure contributed in no small part to this identification of declamatory practices as decadent.[19] The problematic pleasures of declamation are, however, poetic pleasures. For example, Quintilian decries the practice of borrowing 'figures and metaphors from the most decadent (*corruptissimo*) of poets' (Quint. *Inst.* 8.pr.25); that Quintilian has the declaimers in mind is suggested by the echo in *corruptissimo* of the title of his lost treatise, *de Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae* (*Concerning the causes of the decline of eloquence*), in which he seems to have argued against the corrosive influence of declamatory exercises.[20] Elsewhere Quintilian accuses the declaimers of being 'frightened of words that are in daily use' (Quint. *Inst.* 2.10.9), a parallel to the *eloquendi deverticula* that he identified as one of the pleasures of poetry. A further and telling link is that declaimers, like poets, are said to aim solely at pleasure.[21] For Quintilian, the problem of the influence of the declaimer's techniques, and in particular the problematic pleasures they produce, is coextensive with the problem of the use of poetic devices in oratory.

Quintilian's treatment of the poetic devices that he identifies as sources of pleasure—*falsa et incredibilia* and *eloquendi deverticula*—is laden with the same ambivalences that we find in his treatment of *sententiae*, although not in the way that we might expect. A well-known strain of thought, of which Plato is the best-known exponent, held that poetry was immoral because it deceived,[22] but Quintilian does not regard this aspect of poetry as problematic. He does advise his students not to give the impression of having taken out a 'license to lie' (*licentia mentiendi*) by introducing 'fictions drawn entirely from circumstances outside the case' (*Inst.* 4.2.89), but this warning speaks more to the risks of self-contradiction in court than to the inherent immorality of deception. Elsewhere, he writes that 'speaking falsehoods (*mendacium dicere*) is not disgraceful when it is done for a good reason ... to tell a lie is something occasionally allowed even to the wise man' (*Inst.* 2.17.27). When it comes to elaborate language characteristic of poetry, however, Quintilian is far less tolerant (*Inst.* 12.10.73):

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19 Gunderson 2003, 124–128, 155–157; see also 236 on modern criticism of declamation deriving from a (unavoidable) misunderstanding of its pleasures.

20 Brink 1989, 473–477; Brink does not discuss the passage just quoted in his survey because it does not include the phrase *corrupta eloquentia*, but my view is that any passage in which the word *corruptus* appears may reflect the attitudes of that work. This would also be true of Quint. *Inst.* 12.10.73, discussed below.

21 Quint. *Inst.* 2.10.10, 5.12.17.

22 Halliwell 2002, 20 nn. 48–49 gives many references for this line of thought.

> People make a great mistake in thinking that popularity and applause are better earned by a faulty and decadent style, one which revels in verbal license, plays around with puerile conceits, swells with unrestrained bombast, raves with meaningless generalities, blossoms with flowers that will fall as soon as touched, confuses the hazardous with the sublime, and justifies its madness as freedom of speech.
>
> falluntur enim plurimum qui vitiosum et corruptum dicendi genus, quod aut verborum licentia exultat aut puerilibus sententiolis lascivit aut inmodico tumore turgescit aut inanibus locis bacchatur aut casuris si leviter excutiantur flosculis nitet aut praecipitia pro sublimibus habet aut specie libertatis insanit, magis existimant populare atque plausibile.

The metaphors that Quintilian uses to describe this style—*exultat, lascivit, immodicus, turgescit, inanis, bacchatur, insanit*—impute a whole range of moral failings to the man who speaks with a *licentia verborum* that echoes the 'freedom of vocabulary' and 'license to develop figures' which Quintilian cited as a difference between the poet and the orator. It is somewhat surprising to find that a moralizing critic like Quintilian is more concerned with the immorality of a poetic style than he is with the immorality of telling lies, especially because his perspective inverts the traditional battle-lines in debates among poetic theorists about form, content, and moral utility. Elizabeth Asmis has quite reasonably observed that the more emphasis a critic places on formal elements, the less concerned he tends to be with the morality of the poet's thoughts, but Quintilian seems to locate the morality of a text squarely in its formal and stylistic elements.[23] He sanctions poetic fiction but censures poetic style.

We can observe this differentiation of content from style in Quintilian's account of the relative utility for orators of poetic fiction and poetic style. He recommends that the orator use 'fictions' (*ficta*) because they 'often attract the mind, particularly that of uneducated rustics (*rusticorum et imperitorum*) who listen to them in a simpler spirit (*simplicius*) and, in their delight (*capti voluptate*), readily assent to things that they enjoy hearing (*ea quibus delectantur*)' (*Inst.* 5.11.19). In the case of a style that resembles the 'faulty and decadent' style censured above, he charges that 'Some find pleasure (*delectant*) in the wanton affectations of our own times (*recens haec lascivia deliciaeque*), when everything is designed to tickle the fancy of an uneducated general public (*ad voluptatem multitudinis imperitae composita*)' (*Inst.* 10.1.43). Just as with *sententiae,* fulfilling the *officium* of *delectare*

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[23] Asmis 1995, 149.

is not as simple as inducing pleasure in the audience; Quintilian indicates that the pleasures produced by fictitious narratives are unproblematic but that the pleasures of a poetic style reflect badly on the speaker. Both discussions refer to the relationship of pleasure to social class, but whereas appealing to the 'uneducated rustics' with pleasurable but fictitious stories can evidently be regarded as an appropriate persuasive strategy, the moralizing tone of his description of orators who use the pleasures of style, signaled for example by *lascivia deliciaeque*, indicates that appealing in this way to an uneducated audience makes one a member of it. Quintilian's approach to poetic pleasures thus creates ambivalence toward them: his students learn that they are sometimes problematic, sometimes beneficial.

Quintilian creates further ambivalence when, in the case of the problematic poetic style, he declines to recommend that his students avoid poeticisms altogether but in fact seems to regard them as essential to successful persuasion. For example metaphor, which Cicero says 'was invented because of a lack of vocabulary but which is used frequently because of the pleasure (*delectatio*) it gives' (Cic. *De or.* 3.155),[24] is particularly characteristic of poetry, and so might be expected to come in for censure. But Quintilian calls it 'by far the most beautiful trope' (*incipiamus igitur ab eo [tropo] qui cum frequentissimus est tum longe pulcherrimus, tralatione dico, quae* μεταφορά *Graece vocatur*, Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.4) and advises his orators that it can 'brighten a style' (*Inst.* 8.6.14) and 'place things before our eyes' (*Inst.* 8.6.19). 'If the subject is a grander one', Quintilian writes, 'I do not think any ornament (*ornatus*) should be denied to it' (*Inst.* 5.14.34), thus giving his students permission to make use of ornamentation that is characteristic of poetry and its problematic status.

This apparently self-contradictory stance toward poetic discourse—on the one hand the stylistic pleasures of poetry are very helpful for the orator, but on the other they threaten his claim to elite status—is a literary-aesthetic expression of Michel Foucault's model of 'the use of pleasure', by which a hierarchical society such as ancient Rome does not sanction or ban any particular pleasurable action, practice, or in this case, discourse, but rather emphasizes the proper use of that source of pleasure as a means of determining membership in elite society.[25] All uses of pleasure are thus

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[24] Cf. Cic. *De or.* 3.159: 'Everyone takes more pleasure in metaphorical and familiar words than in proper and home-grown ones'.

[25] Foucault 1990, 35–92 esp. 63–77, 89 ('an aesthetics of existence … a way of life whose

permitted but evaluated for their propriety, not systematically excluded or approved. Rhetorical training, which aims to produce autonomous elite males, is concerned in many ways with propriety as a standard for evaluation: Aristotle made 'appropriateness', *to prepon*, one of his virtues of style, and this idea was translated into Roman rhetorical practice by the term *decorum*.[26] The strictures of *decorum* govern all aspects of oratorical composition and performance, but fit Quintilian's account of the use of poetic pleasures in oratory particularly well. Thus we find Quintilian avoiding total censure of the poetic style, even going so far as to say that 'poets are so far forgiven (*ignoscitur*) that the faults themselves have other names when they occur in poetry; we call them metaplasms and schematisms or schemata' (*Inst.* 1.8.14). Instead we find Quintilian simultaneously urging his students to make appropriate use of poetic pleasures in their compositions while warning them of the dangers of doing so inappropriately. He thus establishes the use of poetic pleasures in oratory as a means for the display of the orator's proper mastery of pleasures, which is also a mastery of the self that, in Foucault's analysis, justifies his claim to mastery over others, just as the orator seeks mastery over his opponents, and indeed, the judge himself.[27] Romans were thus trained to evaluate poetry for the utility it offered for this display of power, a display paradoxically both possible and problematic because of poetry's status as a discourse of pleasure.

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moral value did not depend on one's being in conformity with a code of behavior … but on certain formal principles in the use of pleasures, in the way one distributed them, in the limits one observed, in the hierarchy one respected'.) See too Habinek 1998, 50 ff. on the 'assessment of aristocratic performance' as a 'standard ritual of Roman culture', and Habinek 1998, 63 on the implications for orators' identity of 'providing a self-conscious display of the resources of Hellenistic rhetoric'. Those who engage in an Asiatic style advertise not only their indebtedness to foreign ideas, as Habinek shows, but also, I would add, their attitude toward pleasure.

26 Cic. *Orat.* 70 is the earliest example of *decorum* as a technical translation of the Greek rhetorical virtue *prepon* (πρέπον *appellant hoc Graeci, nos dicamus sane 'decorum'*) and the *quasi decore* in the earlier Cic. *De or.* 1.144 may indicate that the translation had not yet been standardized at that time; see Leeman and Pinkster ad loc. Cic. *Off.* 1.93–151 is the fullest ancient discussion for Rome, including many examples from non-oratorical spheres.

27 See, e.g. Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.62: 'A speech does not adequately fulfill its purpose or attain the total domination (*plene dominatur*) it should have if it goes no further than the ears, and the judge feels that he is merely being told the story of the matters he has to decide without their being brought out and displayed to his mind's eye'. On the relationship between giving pleasure and enacting mastery, see Gunderson 2000, 161.

4. *Poetry and Luxury*

So far I have focused on the use of poetic pleasures in the forum, in what the Romans called *negotium*, where speakers might establish their authority by displaying their ability to use pleasures properly. While the forum was a primary site for the construction of elite identity, these identities were contested and scrutinized in all spheres of aristocratic life,[28] including the sphere most opposed to the public life of oratorical performance, namely the sphere of *otium*, 'leisure'. The proper use of pleasure in so-called private life was just as fraught with anxieties as it was in the forum; indeed, the anxieties were perhaps more keenly felt because *otium* was the portion of life dedicated to the enjoyment of pleasure.[29] In composing speeches, pleasure had to be introduced with moderation, but in the world of *otium*, pleasure was already omnipresent. Roman anxiety about the proper display and enjoyment of luxury products speaks to a fundamental similarity between the role of pleasure in public and private life: the pleasures of *otium* must be mastered along with those of *negotium*.[30] Indeed one's enjoyment of luxury products served as a basis for evaluating not only that individual's concept of self but also his attitude toward the Roman imperial project, for the same pleasures that were derived from the fruits of conquest and had to be enjoyed as an expression of one's participation in that conquest also threatened the very ideals—primarily masculine self-control—that made conquest possible in the first place. Just as orators could not avoid pleasure entirely even as they strove to limit it, elite Romans had to enjoy the pleasures of luxury in order to be recognizably elite, without indulging to a point that compromised their status. 'Proper use' of pleasure and *decorum* rule the day long after the forum has been vacated, and the pleasures of poetry are no less useful when at leisure than they were in court.[31]

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28 Habinek 1998, 54–55.

29 Cf., e.g. Cic. *Sest.* 23: *otiosa vita, plena et conferta voluptatibus*; Sen. *Ep.* 67.11: *ea quae per voluptatem et otium veniunt* …

30 Edwards 1993, 200: 'Pleasures which involve the display of knowledge and taste (as well as money), far from blurring the "proper" distinctions between and within social groups, could serve to reinforce them'. On the complex discourse of luxury see now Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 315–440.

31 Krostenko 2001, esp. 155, shows how the aesthetic complicates the boundaries between apparently discrete areas of Roman culture, with particular emphasis on the relationship of the 'socially valuable' (*negotium*) and the 'socially valueless' (*otium*). Krostenko's account of how these boundaries became blurred lays the groundwork for my discussion of the function of pleasure in both spheres of life.

One figure who seems to have embodied this mastery of luxurious pleasure is the Petronius described by Tacitus as Nero's *arbiter elegantiae*. Tacitus tells us that this man was known for his *eruditus luxus*, 'well-trained luxury', and also that he attracted the envy of Tigellinus because of his *scientia voluptatum*, his 'understanding of pleasures' (Tac. *Ann.* 16.18). I take both of these descriptions to refer to Petronius' ability to display and enjoy pleasures always in accordance with *decorum*; Tigellinus' envy for this specific quality makes clear the significance of this skill in the establishment of status. In the case of Nero's court we may wonder if the standards of *decorum* were somewhat warped but this Petronius was, apparently, *par negotiis*, 'equal to his responsibilities' as proconsul and consul, a further indication of his self-mastery in this area.[32] If this is the same man who composed the *Satyrica*, as many scholars assume, we may also say that one of his many attainments was to master the art of poetry, as the many poetic passages of the *Satyrica* attest.[33] Such mastery of poetry should be understood as one facet of the mastery of luxury: as a discourse of pleasure poetry is subject to the requirements of proper use, and in fact should probably be regarded as a luxury product in its own right. Like the statuary that adorned wealthy villas, poetry was imported from Greece and was originally produced by talented but conquered poets such as Livius Andronicus, Plautus, and Terence. In his *Ars Poetica* Horace makes explicit the similarity between poetry and other luxury items, and also emphasizes the importance of *decorum* in poetry's deployment: Horace compares poetry to various unnecessary but pleasing accoutrements of elite banquets including music, oil, and honey which, if improperly deployed—if the music is out of tune, the oil thick, the honey bitter—threaten to ruin the party.[34] Just as in the forum the proper use of poetry is essential to the display of the proper use of pleasure.

Quintilian himself makes a link between the calibration of pleasures required in oratorical composition and in leisure-time activities by casting

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[32] Griffin 1986, 39–40 discusses the Roman fascination with men who had mastered this balancing act. Griffin's example is Maecenas; Velleius Paterculus' description of him bears a striking similarity to Tactitus' of Petronius.

[33] Connors 1998 examines Petronius' artistry in his poems and argues that they are integral to his work.

[34] Hor. *Ars P.* 374–376. Encolpius' claim that 'all the words and deeds [of declamation] are, so to speak, sprinkled with pepper and sesame' evokes the *papaver* of Horace's comparison and serves as a further reminder that the pleasures of declamation are derived from its use of poetic devices.

his discussions of stylistic *decorum* in terms of the *decorum* of luxury. Quintilian's invocation of Horace's famous 'purple patch' makes perhaps the clearest connection between poetry and luxurious clothing: the orator should aim for 'a stripe or some purple in the right place' but should avoid 'a dress with a number of different marks in the weave' (*Inst.* 8.5.28). The unmistakable echo of Horace's metaphor for a poetic passage that, to quote Ben Jonson's translation, 'may o'ershine the rest'[35] brings Horace's luxurious metaphor into the world of oratorical composition. But even when poetry is not alluded to so explicitly it is implicitly present as a means by which speakers make their style pleasurable. Quintilian compares the proper use of *sententiae* to the 'elegance in dress and diet which escapes reproof' (*Inst.* 8.6.34); seeks a brilliance of oratory like that of steel, not silver and gold (*Inst.* 10.1.30); likens a speech whose style is mismatched to its subject matter to 'men disfigured by necklaces, pearls, and long dresses' (*Inst.* 11.1.3); and locates a decorous style between 'a hairy toga' and a silken one, a short haircut rather than one of 'tiers and ringlets' (*Inst.* 12.10.47). In each comparison students are invited to make an analogy between the *ornatus* of speech and the *ornatus* of luxury; attitudes toward poetry are essential to this negotiation because a speech's *ornatus* derives from the speaker's use of poetic devices. Poetry, luxury, and oratorical *decorum* stand always in relation to one another, as Seneca indicates when he paraphrases 'the style is the man' in terms of luxury: '*lascivia* in a speech is proof of public *luxuria*' (Sen. *Ep.* 114.2).

Yet despite this broad parallel poetry's position in the spheres of *negotium* and *otium* is different. In composing a speech, an absence of poetic devices would render the speech excessively austere but serviceable (as Cicero might have said of the Atticists), but an unrestrained use of poetry takes the speaker into the depths of decadence. In the sphere of luxury poetry still engages with austerity and decadence but its relationship to these terms is inverted; in leisure-time activities some amount of decadence might be acceptable but austerity must be avoided at all costs. Pliny's account of poetry at banquets shows poetry's role in negotiating this tension between excessive austerity and decadence: when he upbraids his friend Clarus for missing his party, he boasts that there was a *lector* and that, if Clarus had been there, they would have 'devoted themselves to study' (*studuissemus*, Plin. *Ep.* 1.15.3), making the presence of poetry an

[35] Hor. *Ars P.* 15–16: *purpureus, late qui splendeat, unus et alter adsuitur pannus.*

advertisement for the decorous classiness of the occasion.[36] By contrast when Julius Genitor complains to Pliny that he had endured a party that featured such anti-intellectual entertainment as 'jesters, buffoons, and male dancers' (*scurrae, moriones, cinaedi*), Pliny dismisses people who enjoy such parties as men who 'call for their shoes [so that they can leave] when a reader or a comic actor or lyre player is brought in' (Plin. *Ep.* 9.17.3). Genitor, it is implied, would have been much happier at one of Pliny's dinners featuring poetic entertainment. Pliny does admit, however, that 'the types of entertainment by which you and I are enthralled and moved offend many people, sometimes because they find these entertainments silly, sometimes because they find them extremely tiresome' (Plin. *Ep.* 9.17.2–3). Standards of elegance, as well as of decadence, are contingent on who is judging and who is being judged: Pliny and his friends might regard a party with jesters as a decadent gala, but others might see his civilized readings as tiresome study sessions. Whichever side one might take, poetry is implicated in the calibration of pleasure at banquets: men like Pliny use poetry to avoid the charge of decadence, while others prefer less-intellectual entertainment in order to avoid the charge of pedantry and boredom. Thus whereas orators use poetry as a source for much-needed pleasure, participants in luxury practices, as acutely aware as any orator of the need for a properly calibrated level of pleasure, use poetry to limit the amount of pleasure their gatherings provide.[37] There is perhaps no greater evidence of elite Romans' familiarity with poetry being used in this way than Trimalchio's misbegotten attempts to elevate the atmosphere of his *cena* with performances of poetry and references to mythological stories.[38]

[36] Similarly Pliny's friend Spurinna presented comic actors at his dinners 'so that pleasures may also be seasoned with *studia*' (Plin. *Ep.* 3.1.9). Gellius' accounts of hyper-learned conversations at banquets (e.g. Gell. *NA* 2.22.2, 3.19.3–5, 9.9.4, 19.7.2) may be taken as an extreme form of these *studia*.

[37] In the republican period we are told (Nep. *Att.* 14.1–2) that at Atticus' dinners 'no one heard any entertainment other than a reader … so that the diners could take pleasure as much with their minds as with their bellies'.

[38] Trimalchio's attempts at *studia*: Petron. 39.3, 48, 53, 55, 59, 68. Satire such as this depends on the practice of using *studia* at banquets being recognizable. The epigrammist Lucillius also refers to it (*Anth. Pal.* 11.10, 11.140) as does Juvenal (Juv. 6.448–454). His parody of the learned woman at a banquet turns on the question of whether it is decorous for a woman to pursue *studia* as a man does.

5. *Conclusion*

Just as in the forum, poetry in private life would have been evaluated on the basis of its capacity to convey decorous attitudes toward pleasure, but with the added ambiguity that poetry had a different, and opposing, role to play in *otium* and *negotium*. Poetry is subject to contradictory demands in different aspects of life, which in fact is another level of decorous restriction: one has to know not only how to use the pleasures of poetry but how to use them in a way appropriate to the demands of the ideological context in which they are being used. We begin to see how fraught the evaluation and enjoyment of poetry must have been for Romans, torn as they were between the desire to enjoy pleasures and the need to master them. The impossibility of defining the requirements of *decorum* only adds to the difficulty of this negotiation. Indeed, this impossibility increases the already considerable difficulty of saying with certainty what was valued in Latin poetry, because different contexts and different audiences with subtly different attitudes toward the proper role of pleasure would have valued different aspects of poetry. However, I would tentatively suggest that Quintilian's sources of poetic pleasure—*ficta et incredibilia* and *eloquendi deverticula*—may in fact represent the aspects of poetry that were thought to determine the suitability of a particular poetic style for use in a particular context. In the forum, where poetic devices were deployed for their persuasive powers and performative pleasures, the fictions of poetry provided enjoyable anecdotes and the poetic style conferred variety and vividness; in the sphere of leisure, where poetry was useful as a check on unrestrained decadence, mythological narratives provided opportunities for learned comparisons with alternate versions and the artificial style provided opportunities for the display of specialized linguistic knowledge and mastery of language. The approach of the grammarians to poetry, in fact, seems to have prepared young Romans specifically for these ways of engaging with poetry: the *enarratio poetarum*, which Quintilian says is the primary task of the *grammaticus*, involved the explication of *historiae*, 'historical allusions', which Quintilian makes clear includes mythological material, and the analysis of various aspects of poetic diction: 'anything contrary to the laws of speech', 'words not in common use', tropes, and figures of speech and thought.[39] This kind of knowledge is essential to becoming a proper Roman man, but not because a command

[39] *Enarratio poetarum* as task of the *grammaticus*: Quint. *Inst.* 1.4.2; *historiae*: 1.8.18, and for mythology in particular, 1.8.21; poetic diction: 1.8.15–16.

of certain facts was required for admission into elite society. Rather membership in that society depended on an ability to deploy this knowledge properly in various contexts, and so to display a mastery of the pleasures that knowledge produced.[40]

Quintilian trains his students to become members of elite society, in part, by training them to recognize the usefulness of poetry in that process. That is, he makes them aware of literature's political function as 'a symbolic as opposed to a practical means of reuniting a fragmented aristocracy and preserving the continuity of its control over the Roman world', as Habinek has it.[41] But insofar as this process depends on the proper use and display of the pleasures afforded by that literature it is as much an aesthetic process as a political one, and in fact the aesthetic dimension is at least potentially at odds with the political dimension because of pleasure's problematic status. If, as Habinek says, literature 'transmits the standards of behavior to which the individual aristocrat must aspire', the improper use of poetry's pleasures may in fact advertise an inability or refusal to conform to those standards;[42] if literature has 'the power to constrain human belief or conduct',[43] excessive indulgence in poetry's pleasures can also indicate a lack of regard for those constraints. Elites put great faith in literature's ability to 'reunite a fragmented aristocracy'[44] but that same aristocracy might splinter over contested standards of the proper use and display of pleasure, including that of poetry. Even as a knowledge of poetry helps to define the membership and boundaries of the elite class, the pleasure that accompanies that knowledge threatens to divide that membership and disrupt those boundaries. The aesthetic is an essential part of the construction of elite identity even as it simultaneously undermines it.[45]

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40 Habinek 1998, 54: 'The *mos maiorum* is something you know, but also something you do'.

41 Habinek 1998, 66; cf. Morgan 1998, 259: 'If in some sense the product of an education in a certain type of language is political power and virtue then the use of that language comes close in itself to guaranteeing the virtue and authority of the man who uses it'.

42 Habinek 1998, 45; poetry, for Habinek, transmits these standards through *exempla*, but not all poetry is exemplary in this way. For Quintilian, however, most, if not all, poetry provides pleasure.

43 Habinek 1998, 62.

44 Habinek 1998, 66.

45 Eagleton 1990, 3 recognizes this 'eminently contradictory' aspect of the aesthetic.

6. *Epilogue*

What about Plato and Antimachus? The easiest reading is that Cicero needed to think of the figure from ancient Greece whose tastes diverged most sharply from those of the multitude, and Plato was the obvious choice, so Cicero imagined an encounter between the philosopher and the poet whom Plato was traditionally held to have championed.[46] This tradition in turn may derive from *Republic* 398a where Socrates describes the kinds of poets proper for his state: such a poet will be 'austere' and, more significantly for this discussion, *aêdês*, 'unpleasurable'.[47] Quintilian's description of Antimachus does qualify him to perform in Plato's state: he says that the poet lacked, among other things, *iucunditas*, 'delightfulness'. Antimachus is praised, too, for his 'not at all vulgar (*minime vulgaris*, Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.53) style of speaking', which might plausibly lead to the departure of the *vulgus* in Cicero's anecdote. Indeed, if poetry in Rome is, as Quintilian says, a discourse that aims 'exclusively at pleasure', and if appealing to non-elite social classes was inherently problematic, and finally, if pleasures of all sorts had to be properly deployed to establish elite status, then we may regard Antimachus as Cicero represents him as having achieved the most perfect mastery of pleasure in his compositions: the pleasures of his poetry were (apparently) perceptible only to Plato, so complete was Antimachus' mastery of them and his decorous adherence to the standards of elite use.[48] Quintilian's lukewarm evaluation of Antimachus should perhaps be understood as a recognition of the undesirability of imitating an author whose pleasures are so completely mastered, since the orator must make at least some appeal to broad audiences. Correspondingly Quintilian's enigmatic judgment that Lucan 'should be imitated more by orators than by poets' may be intended to signal that Lucan's mastery of the pleasures of poetry strikes a balance that Quintilian regards as more workable for orators concerned not just with their status but with winning cases.[49]

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46 Matthews 1979.

47 Vessey 1971.

48 Something about Antimachus' style made him useful for critics thinking about limit cases of composition: Philodemus' critique of a certain Stoic, possibly Ariston of Chios, implies that Antimachus was a poet cited in discussions of whether stylistically accomplished but morally neutral poetry could be called 'good' or not. See Asmis 1995, 151.

49 Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.90; unfortunately no analysis of Lucan's style along these lines can be attempted here, but it would begin with his use of the pleasures Quintilian identifies: *falsa et incredibilia*, and *eloquendi deverticula*, both of which are prominent features of Lucan's poem.

If in Cicero's anecdote Antimachus is a master of using pleasures properly in composition, Plato is represented as a master of using pleasures properly in reception. Cicero's Plato here is not an unrecognizable figure: Stephen Halliwell has described Plato as a 'romantic puritan' whose deep fear of the effects of poetry was paradoxically derived from his own deep experience and enjoyment of the enchanting *psukhagôgia* of poems.[50] This is why Plato allows certain kinds of poets to continue to perform in his ideal state; his attitude is not one of total censorship but of careful control and, so to speak, proper use. Cicero shows no more interest in banning poetry outright than Plato did; indeed Cicero, an accomplished poet himself, must have perceived the usefulness of poetic discourse for the establishment and maintenance of aristocratic status.[51] Cicero's anecdote assimilates Plato to the Roman aristocracy for whom poetry was not something to be banned, but was something to be preserved both in spite of and because of its decadence and transgression, precisely because of the opportunities it provided to display the proper attitudes toward this transgression and the pleasures that came with it. That is, Cicero here welcomes Plato into his exclusive aesthetic club of men who were committed lovers of poetry and who took this most aristocratic of discourses, identified the poet whose use of pleasure most conformed to his standard of *decorum*, and retained those most elevated pleasures for themselves.

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[50] Halliwell 2002, 25–26 and in more detail, 72–97.
[51] Habinek 1998, 66 argues that Cicero's philosophical and rhetorical treatises accomplish this as well.

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

TALIS ORATIO QUALIS VITA: LITERARY JUDGMENTS AS PERSONAL CRITIQUES IN ROMAN SATIRE

Jennifer L. Ferriss-Hill

1. *Introduction*

That Roman Satire comments on genres quite unrelated to its own has long been recognized, but the sources and mechanisms of such literary critical moments have not been fully appreciated. I survey here the particular ways in which aesthetic judgments of literary value are presented as personal, particularly moral, attacks, and argue that Old Comedy contributed vital material to the literary critical idiom of Roman Satire. This chapter touches on a number of matters that I treat in greater detail in a book-length project,[1] in which I investigate the manifold contributions of Old Comedy to Roman Satire's unique voice, as I attempt to unravel what exactly Horace and Persius[2] might have meant by their respective claims for its formative influence on their writings. Literary criticism, the topic at hand, is only one of several key areas in which I see Roman Satire and Old Comedy displaying striking affinities.

2. *Roman Satire on Old Comedy*

Many of the points of contact between the two genres are, I argue, attributable to Roman Satire's declaration that it is in some way related to or dependent on Old Comedy, and at the core of these claims lies a shared belief in the special truth-telling powers of humor. Horace famously considers Lucilius' *sermo* (and, by extension, his own, for he is, as he repeatedly

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[1] Based on my Ph.D. Dissertation (Harvard University, 2008).
[2] And perhaps Lucilius: see n. 12 below.

tells us, Lucilius' successor)[3] to be indebted in some way to Old Comedy (*Sat.* 1.4.1–7), and Persius invites his ideal reader, one whose ear has been 'steamed clean' (*vaporata*; that is, made receptive) by Cratinus, Eupolis, and 'the grand old man', Aristophanes himself, to find something 'more boiled down' (*decoctius*)[4] than Old Comedy[5] in his own writings (Pers. 1.123–126).[6] Horace's exact meaning is, at this early point in his satirical project,[7] not yet fully clear, for it is only by reading all of his hexameter poetry that we can come to understand the depth of the connection he is trying to articulate, but he surely means to indicate something more substantive than that Lucilius and Old Comedy simply share an interest in attacking vice.[8] Persius, similarly, does far more than simply nod to Horace: like his predecessor, he, too, describes his poetry as existing in a direct relation to Old Comedy. Juvenal, by contrast, states that his satire has taken up the mantle of a quite different

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[3] Horace is, of course, pointedly silent as to his own place in this genealogy (cf. Rosen 2007, 6), though he consistently presents himself as Lucilius' successor, even inferior, throughout his *Satires* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.56–57, 1.10.48, 2.1.29, 2.1.75).

[4] On this evocative term, which activates the alimentary etymology of *satura*, see Gowers 1993, 120 and 180–188; and Gowers 1994.

[5] That Old Comedy, and not Horace, is the comparandum denoted by *decoctius* has escaped many, e.g., Gowers 1993, 140 and 180; Freudenburg 2001, 181; and Reckford 2009, 50–51 read Persius correctly.

[6] These programmatic claims of Horace and Persius have suffered from not being taken seriously. Such skeptical readers have included Nisbet 1963, 48; Van Rooy 1965, 149 and 193–194; Rudd 1982, 89, all of whom accuse Horace of exaggerating (for reasons not explained) the dependence of Lucilius on Old Comedy. Among those who have been willing to take Horace and Persius at their word, and consequently to investigate the import of their programmatic claims, are Cuchiarelli 2001; Freudenburg 2001; Keane 2006; Rosen 2007; and Hunter 2009, 99–100. Persius has been similarly maligned by, e.g., Van Rooy 1965, 149 and Relihan 1989, 155.

[7] Others have also considered Horace's *Epistles* and *Ars Poetica* to be part of this poet's satirical writings. Porphyrio already saw the fundamental sameness of the two (*Flacci Epistularum libri titulo tantum dissimiles a* (*libris*) *Sermonum sunt, ad* Hor. *Epist.* 1.1.1), a view in which he has been followed by such scholars as Fraenkel 1957, 310 (who describes Horace's *Epistles* as 'an organic continuation of his *Satires*'); Van Rooy 1965, 74 (who notes that Horace's *Epistles* and *Satires* often share 'thought or content'); Ramage, Sigsbee, and Fredericks 1974, 6 (who call the *Epistles* 'in essence the philosophic extension of the *Satires*'); and Rudd 1982, 154–158 ('the *Satires* and *Epistles* both belong to the same genus'; he also argues persuasively that ancient scholars, such as Suetonius, Quintilian, and the scholiasts, considered these works related, even interchangeable). The connection between *epistula* and *satura* in the ancient mind is also evidenced by Lucilius' inclusion of letters in the fifth book of his collection (Lucil. frr. 182–213 Krenkel) and by Persius' sixth poem, which likewise takes the form of an epistle.

[8] That this is all Horace means is claimed by, e.g., Van Rooy 1965, 147; Ramage, Sigsbee, and Fredericks 1974, 7; and Rudd 1982, 88–89.

dramatic genre—tragedy (*fingimus haec altum satura sumente coturnum*, Juv. 6.634)—and this departure from the preceding tradition is, as I see it, of no little consequence for his markedly distinct, un-Old-Comic satire.[9]

3. *Laughter Speaks the Truth*

The claims made for the truth-telling power of humor follow a similar pattern: both Horace and Persius, following in the footsteps of Old Comedy, assume this privileged role for their genre, while Juvenal is, once again, set apart. Aristophanes, via his protagonist in the *Acharnians*, Dicaeopolis,[10] declares 'for even/also[11] comedy knows what is just' (τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον οἶδε καὶ τρυγῳδία, Ar. *Ach.* 500). This idea is as integral to Roman Satire as it is to Old Comedy, and Horace articulates it on two occasions.[12] He wonders aloud in the opening satire of his collection, 'what prevents a laughing man from speaking the truth?' (*ridentem dicere verum/quid vetat?*, Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.24–25), and restates this tenet once more in the programmatic closing poem of the book (Hor. *Sat.* 1.10.14–17):[13]

> Generally humor gets to the point
> of big matters more effectively and better than seriousness.
> Those men by whom Old Comedy was written
> stood on this, and in this they are to be imitated.

> ridiculum acri
> fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res.
> illi scripta quibus comoedia prisca viris est
> hoc stabant, hoc sunt imitandi.

I see Aristophanes' phrase, τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον οἶδε καὶ τρυγῳδία, as the ultimate source of Horace's *quamquam ridentem dicere verum/quid vetat?* and *ridiculum acri/fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res*. Just as τρυγῳδία is

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9 On Juvenal's 'tragic' satire, see, e.g., Weber 1981. Keane 2003 and 2006, 13–41 discusses at length the role of drama, primarily tragedy, in Juvenal.

10 Dicaeopolis acts as a mouthpiece for the poet throughout this play, speaking as Aristophanes at Ar. *Ach.* 377–382 and 502–503. For a main character to adopt such a role in an Old Comic play outside the parabasis, the licensed venue for such speech, would appear to be unique (see Foley 1988 and Hubbard 1991, 41–59; though Bailey 1936, 234 and Olson 2007, 212 see Plato Com. fr. 115 KA, which also refers to a feud with Cleon and is in iambic trimeters and therefore not part of the parabasis itself, as similarly pseudo-parabatic in nature).

11 On the sense of καί, see Taplin 1983 and Silk 2000, 40–41.

12 Lucilius, too, may link his poetry to Old Comedy at fr. 1122: ⟨*nosce*⟩ *archaeotera* ⟨*illa*⟩ *unde haec sunt omnia nata* (Van Rooy 1965, 147 and Krenkel 1970, 601 note this possibility).

13 All translations (unless otherwise indicated) are my own.

the marked term with which Old Comedy refers metatheatrically to itself,[14] so *ridere* serves the same function in Horace, occurring in the form *ridiculum* at *Sat.* 1.10.14 and, strikingly, twice in as many lines at *Sat.* 1.1.23–24, like τρυγῳδία at *Ach.* 499–500. In the event that the Old Comic precedent for Horace's claim had, despite such textual links,[15] eluded the reader at its first appearance (*Sat.* 1.1.24–25), Horace makes his model known on the second occasion (*Sat.* 1.10.14–17) by naming the writers of *comoedia prisca*[16] as the originators of the poetic method he twice articulates. The claim that laughter may speak the truth is, arguably, a notion inherent to all satire, rather than a hallmark unique to Old Comedy and Roman Satire. Still, the phraseological similarities between Horace's and Aristophanes' formulation, along with the fact that Horace names Old Comedy as a model for satire at *Sat.* 1.10.14–17, suggest that Horace had Aristophanes foremost in his mind as he crafted these programmatic statements.

This Aristophano-Horatian idea appears in Persius, too, and Persius' collection is, like Horace's *Satires* 1, framed by oblique references to satirical truth-telling. In his first satire, the poet's interlocutor says to him (Pers. 1.107–110):

> But what need is there to scrape tender little ears
> with biting truth? Take care to be the sort of man
> that the thresholds of greater men not chance to give you the
> cold shoulder: for here in your satire you make a growling sound.
>
> sed quid opus teneras mordaci radere vero
> auriculas? vide sis ne maiorum tibi forte
> limina frigescant: sonat hic de nare canina
> littera.

The interlocutor's question, *sed quid opus teneras mordaci radere vero/auriculas?* contains clear aural and thematic resonances of Horace's *quamquam*

[14] Cf. Mastronarde 1999–2000 and Olson 2002, 200, who are right to note that the term is not confined to (nor therefore likely coined by) Aristophanes (it also appears at Eup. *Demoi* fr. 99.29 KA), as, e.g., Taplin 1983, 333 (who sees it as alluding to comedy's intimate relation with tragedy) and Foley 1988, 34 and 43 suggest.

[15] Both passages are also characterized by a curious overabundance of voices: in the *Acharnians*, the voice of Dicaeopolis, a character within a play, addressing the chorus of Acharnian farmers intermingles with that of Aristophanes, addressing the audience, and at moments it seems as it Comedy herself is even speaking (Silk 2000, 40 also notes this 'astonishing mixture of *personae*'); at Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.24–25, the poet's voice momentarily intrudes into the text, before retracting to allow the narrative, governed by his voice as a character rather than as poet, eventually to resume.

[16] That Horace's term is at least approximately equivalent to our 'Old Comedy' is con-

ridentem dicere verum/quid vetat?[17] The implication, imported from both Horace and Aristophanes, is that Persius' writings not only 'scrape tender little ears with biting truth', but that they do so by means of humor.[18] Persius' later intertext with Horace and Old Comedy encapsulates the *spoudaio-geloion* in full and is, again, delivered by his interlocutor, in this case his teacher, Cornutus (Pers. 5.14–16):[19]

> You follow the words of the toga, you who are clever at making a harsh join, being smooth, with a moderate mouth, and learned in scratching pallid customs and spearing blame with an ingenious play.
>
> verba togae sequeris iunctura callidus acri,
> ore teres modico, pallentis radere mores
> doctus et ingenuo culpam defigere ludo.

Ingenuo culpam defigere ludo[20] is Persius' second, more fully developed version of Aristophanes' and Horace's formulations of the same idea.[21] This governing programmatic idea is pointedly absent in Juvenal—the only Roman Satirist who does not connect his poetic program to Old Comedy. It seems that Juvenalian satire, characterized as it is by *indignatio* (Juv. 1.79),[22] has dispensed with the Old Comic idiom so fundamental to Lucilius (if we are to believe Horace), Horace, and Persius.

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firmed by Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.1–2, where *comoedia prisca* is defined as what Eupolis, Cratinus, and Aristophanes wrote.

17 Keane 2006, 123–124 and Tzounakas 2008, 105 n. 63 also connect these two passages. Note the presence of *vero/verum* and the dominant *r* and *d* sounds in each.

18 Even though humor is not explicitly mentioned here, the adjective *mordax*, 'biting', and the reference to the *canina littera*, 'the dog's letter', that is, a growling *r*, confirm that the medium in question is indeed satire. Satire's self-association with a dog's growl or bite seems to originate with Lucilius (cf. fr. 5, 367–370), and is also taken up by Horace (e.g., *Sat.* 2.1.85) and Persius; cf. Bramble 1974, 132–133, 151–152 and Wehrle 1992, 28.

19 There is some disagreement as to the speaker of these lines. Jahn 1843; Gildersleeve 1875; Harvey 1981; Clausen 1992; Kissel 1990 assign them, as I do, to Persius' interlocutor, who would appear to be Cornutus throughout the poem, but to Gowers 1993, 186, for example, 'such flattery would not … be consistent with Persius' obsession with self-criticism', and so she would read them rather as 'an admiring description [sc. by Persius] of his teacher Cornutus' style'.

20 To Persius the expertise of satiric humor lies not in justice (τὸ … δίκαιον) or truth (*verum*), but rather in identifying and attacking fault, *culpa*. In addition, just as Aristophanes and Horace had employed the terms τρυγῳδία and *ridere* to describe their morally didactic writings, Persius, adding to the metapoetic repertoire (or perhaps looking back to Lucilius, who also appears to use the term self-referentially, frr. 982–983: *ludo ac sermonibus nostris*), describes his satiric tool as *ludus*, 'playing'.

21 Morford 2001, 41 notes the Horatian precedent for Persius' *ingenuo culpam defigere ludo*.

22 For this angry satirist as a character carefully crafted by the poet, see Anderson 1982, 314, who calls it 'a masterpiece'.

What are the implications, then, of the fact that Aristophanes (*Ach.* 500), Horace (*Sat.* 1.1. 24–25, 1.10.14–15), and Persius (Pers. 1.107–108, 5.15–16) all claim that, as Bakhtin was to put it over two millennia later, 'certain essential aspects of the world are accessible only to laughter'?[23] The notion that one can best—even solely—voice certain ideas by humorous dissembling is a powerful one, and lies, I believe, at the core of the way both Old Comedy and pre-Juvenalian Roman Satire construct and present themselves. Horace himself draws attention to this capability of his satire in his opening poem: borrowing from Lucretius (*DRN* 4.11–22), he compares the use of humor to convey a serious message to teachers bribing their young charges to learn their lessons with little cookies (*ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi/doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima, Sat.* 1.1.25–26).[24] This methodology is applied by the satirist to many aspects of his program, including literary criticism and so, like the Old Comic poets and Persius, Horace adopts humorous characterization of an author's physical or personal qualities (especially failings) as not simply a way, but in fact the best way of communicating an aesthetic evaluation of literary style. The ability of Old Comedy and Roman Satire to approach the world through a spectrum of interrelated critical activities, allows them to shift almost imperceptibly between personal invective and literary criticism, and to formulate incisive aesthetic judgments as physical ones. It is precisely because the literary criticism of Roman Satire and Old Comedy disavows in this way its seriousness that it can aspire to make such serious and accurate observations. And it is this delicate balance of humor and proclaimed truth-telling that is, in my view, the hallmark of Old Comic and Roman Satirical literary criticism: it both joins them to one another, and sets them apart from the other ancient efforts in this area.[25]

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[23] Bakhtin 1984, 66. The quote, fitting as it seems to the present context, is perhaps misappropriated, since Bakhtin's interests lie in the popular-festive tradition, not in satire.

[24] The poet's self-representation as a teacher of the city is another pose shared by Old Comedy and Roman Satire. Aristophanes portrays himself as such in the parabasis of the *Acharnians*, and at, e.g., *Vesp.* 1029–1043, *Pax* 751–759, and *Ran.* 686–687 and 1054–1055 (see Silk 2000, 46). Horace takes up the mantle at *Ars P.* 99–100 and 343–344 and *Epist.* 2.1.118–138, and even Persius, so often viewed as divorced from society (as, e.g., Semple 1961–1962, 158; Anderson 1966; Ramage, Sigsbee, and Fredericks 1974, 5; and Hooley 1984, 84 would have it), alludes to his didactic role at 5.14–16, in addition to dispensing advice throughout his first satire (e.g., 1.5–7). Furthermore, as Rosen and Baines 2002, 107 point out, 'the very act of complaining, blaming, mocking, etc. implies a didactic posture, for why else complain unless you believe—however disingenuously or ironically—that your audience will be edified by what you say?' Thus the satirist, by the very act of writing, reveals his implicit hope that his writings will be read, and consequently can never truly be alienated from society.

[25] I consider Old Comic and Roman Satirical literary criticism to be qualitatively distinct

Some brief remarks on the seriousness[26] of satire's didactic pose are perhaps called for here, even though any word in this debate cannot be the last—and that is, of course, part of the point. The literary criticism of Old Comedy and Roman Satire is undermined by the very form it takes: by virtue of its being in verse, as well as humorous, any relation to reality to which it pretends is problematic.[27] The poet's ever-mobile meaning refuses to allow itself to be fixed in place, and therein lies the delightful frustration of reading Old Comedy and Roman Satire.[28] This continual fluidity, however, does not mean that Old Comic and Roman Satirical literary criticism has no meaning, for the humorous personal attacks on writers of disparate genres contain aesthetic evaluations of uncanny accuracy. Nevertheless, the point of Old Comedy and Roman Satire can never be simply the issuing of literary critical comments, nor of any moral lessons: the poetic trumps the didactic every time.[29]

from that found in (e.g.) Pindar, Callimachus, Terence's prologues, and Catullus, whose literary-critical moments are either limited to the poet's competitors within his own genre, or exist explicitly to contrast another genre with the poet's. They exist, that is, in the service of self-referential discussions of poetics. Old Comedy and Roman Satire, on the other hand, show a much broader interest in literary criticism than simply as a means of defining their own genres. These two genres are uniquely voracious, continually drawing matter from their surroundings into themselves and putting it to use as the substance of which they are composed (Keane 2002, 13 is right to speak of the 'contaminated nature of satire'). The very fact that Aristophanes and Horace *have* an identity as literary critics seems remarkable, and speaks once more to the essential kinship of Old Comedy and Roman Satire.

26 Silk 2000 (esp. 301–349), though even himself coming to few definite conclusions, puzzles at length over what 'seriousness' means and notes (310) 'the oddity of never discussing seriousness, but forever appealing to it'.

27 Cf. Rosen 2007, 23: the fact that poetry is 'a marked form of speech' 'instantly problematize[s] any relationship it may appear to have with reality'. Freudenburg 1993, 22 similarly sighs, 'the satirist, it seems, cannot be trusted'.

28 Silk 2000, 349 bemoans the 'elusiveness of Aristophanes' claims', while Rosen 2007, 218 is right to conclude that since it is 'virtually impossible to decide where the "meaning" of satirical poetry actually resides', insiders must 'revel in, rather than problematize, its comic ironies'. The poet's manipulation of his readers in this way is discussed by Hubbard 1991, 88–112: the reader naturally wishes to count himself among those few who are in-the-know, but satire makes us insecure, for we can never be completely certain that we are not still being laughed at.

29 Freudenburg 1993, 8, complaining that 'too often the *Satires* are regarded as entirely serious in their didactic intent', makes this same point: 'whatever we feel the final aim of the poet is, it is surely not simple-minded moral or literary judgments; it is, among other things, the creation of a complex and demanding poetic world.' See also Silk 2000, 342: '"the issues" in *Knights* never were, never could have been, "the point"'.

4. *The Literary Criticism of Roman Satire*

4.1. *Lucilius and Roman Satire's Old Comic Models*

Horace affirms that literary criticism has been an intrinsic component of Roman Satire since its inception when he recalls in *Satires* 1.10 certain disparaging comments he had earlier (*Sat.* 1.4.11) made about Lucilius (*Sat.* 1.10.50–54):

> And yes, I did say that he [Lucilius] flows along muddily, often carrying
> many more things that should be removed rather than left. Come, I ask you,
> do you, a learned man, find nothing objectionable in great Homer?
> Does affable Lucilius find nothing to emend in the tragedian Accius?
> Does he not laugh at those verses of Ennius that are inferior in dignity?
>
> at dixi fluere hunc lutulentum, saepe ferentem
> plura quidem tollenda relinquendis. age, quaeso,
> tu nihil in magno doctus reprehendis Homero?
> nil comis tragici mutat Lucilius Acci?
> non ridet versus Enni gravitate minores?

Horace here justifies his own criticisms of Lucilius by appealing to that poet's criticisms of Accius and Ennius—the literary giants of his predecessor's own tradition—and fragments of Lucilius' poems exist that contain precisely the activities Horace describes.[30] Accius' evidently portly build and innovations in spelling, for example, are attacked at fr. 474, *quare pro facie, pro statura Accius,*[31] but it is Pacuvius who is the target of much of Lucilius' critical vitriol. Thus at fr. 844 ('but a sad man from some tortured Pacuvian prologue', *verum tristis contorto aliquo ex Pacuviano exordio*), Lucilius characterizes a prologue of this tragedian as *contortus*, 'tortured', suggesting that it is 'affected', and he speaks elsewhere as well of this poet's excessively turgid style (cf. Lucil. frr. 605–606, 610, 611, 612, 613–614, 615, 616, 842, 843). Lucilius also described the senator Albucius' oratorical style as 'like all the little tiles, when the mosaic floor has been arranged with skillful inlay' (*ut tesserulae omnes arte pavimento atque emblemate vermiculato*, Lucil. frr. 74–75)[32]—an assessment in which Bramble sees a 'glimpse' of the idea that style and lifestyle are correlated.[33]

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[30] Cf. Porphyrio (*ad* Hor. *Sat.* 1.10.53): *facit autem haec Lucilius cum alias, tum vel maxime in tertio libro meminit et nono et decimo.*

[31] Cf. Krenkel 1970, 423, who translates *facie* as 'äusseren Erscheinung' and *statura* as 'Körpergrösse'. Barr 1965, 102 notes: 'it is notorious that Accius was a poet who frequently drew upon himself the strictures of Lucilius'.

[32] This description was beloved by Cicero and is preserved by him at, *inter alia*, *De or.* 3.171 and *Orat.* 149.

[33] Bramble 1974, 24–25. On Lucilian literary criticism more generally, see further Atkins

This correlation lies, of course, at the heart of Old Comic literary criticism, as illustrated most famously in the agon-scene of Aristophanes' *Frogs*. Here Euripides and Aeschylus find fault with one another personally as a way of critiquing each other's tragedies.[34] Euripides attacks Aeschylus' old-fashioned style, which Euripides regards as swollen and antiquated, by accusing Aeschylus-the-person of 'giving himself airs' (ἀποσεμνυνεῖται, Ar. *Ran.* 833) and 'talking marvels in his tragedies' (ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαισιν ἐτερατεύετο, Ar. *Ran.* 834), concluding that he is 'a man who is a poet of savagery, bold of speech, who has an unbridled, uncontrolled, ungated mouth, not to be outdone in talking, given to pompous word-bundles' (ἄνθρωπον ἀγριοποιὸν αὐθαδόστομον,/ἔχοντ' ἀχάλινον ἀκρατὲς ἀθύρωτον στόμα,/ἀπεριλάλητον, κομποφακελορρήμονα, Ar. *Ran.* 837–839).[35] Aeschylus' tragedies are thus in Euripides' view inferior because Aeschylus *himself* is bombastic and incontinent. In Aeschylus' view, in turn, Euripides' tragedies are defective because the man who wrote them is himself 'a gossip-monger, and maker of beggars and stitcher of rags' (ὦ στωμυλιοσυλλεκτάδη/καὶ πτωχοποιὲ καὶ ῥακιοσυρραπτάδη, Ar. *Ran.* 841–842) and a 'creator of cripples' (χωλοποιόν, Ar. *Ran.* 846).[36] Thus the attacks made throughout the agon shift fluidly across critical categories, from personal invective to literary criticism and back again. The contest for the best tragic poet is conducted entirely in terms of personalities: it is not so much that literary qualities take second place—on the contrary, they remain always at the fore—but rather that they are comically treated as indistinguishable from personality traits.

The inextricability of poet and poetry is taken to even more absurd lengths in the opening scene of *Thesmophoriazusae* as Agathon, looking for all the world like the famous courtesan Cyrene (Ar. *Thesm.* 98), explains why he is dressed in women's clothing (Ar. *Thesm.* 148–152, 154–156):

1934, II, 10–14; Schmidt 1977; Auhagen, Christes, Koster, and Manuwald in Manuwald's 2001 collection of essays on various aspects of Lucilius; Hass 2007. Möller 2004, 266–271 discusses Lucilius' literary criticism as focused on the person of the author.

34 Silk 2000 discusses at length the pre-eminence of tragedy in Aristophanic Old Comedy.

35 The prominent placement of ἄνθρωπον as the opening word of line 837 seems in particular to emphasize the *ad hominem* quality of these attacks.

36 On the critical vocabulary of the agon-scene, see O'Sullivan 1992; Rosen 2008; and Hunter 2009, 10–52. O'Sullivan is right to see Aristophanes' critical vocabulary and conceptual framework as being not of his own creation: the grand/slender polarity, in particular, is not only found elsewhere, but recurs in Aristophanes' own treatment of rhetorical styles, e.g., that of Cleon, *Ach.* 379–382 and *Eq.* 626–628, versus that of the young men at *Eq.* 1375–1380 (O'Sullivan 1992, 106–150).

I wear clothing to match my thinking.
For a poet-man must keep his customs
in accord with the sort of play he has to write.
For example, if one is writing women's plays,
his body must have a share of their customs …
If one is writing men's plays, the necessities are present
already in his body, but for those qualities that we do not possess,
imitation is helpful in seeking them out.

ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν ἐσθῆθ' ἅμα γνώμῃ φορῶ·
χρὴ γὰρ ποιητὴν ἄνδρα πρὸς τὰ δράματα,
ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν, πρὸς ταῦτα τοὺς τρόπους ἔχειν.
αὐτίκα γυναικεῖ' ἢν ποιῇ τις δράματα,
μετουσίαν δεῖ τῶν τρόπων τὸ σῶμ' ἔχειν …
ἀνδρεῖα δ' ἢν ποιῇ τις, ἐν τῷ σώματι
ἔνεσθ' ὑπάρχον τοῦθ. ἃ δ' οὐ κεκτήμεθα,
μίμησις ἤδη ταῦτα συνθηρεύεται.

'What is being parodied here', O'Sullivan comments, 'is not just a mere idiosyncrasy but something that is intimately bound up with the poet's style'.[37] Agathon's method-acting compositional process is further illustrated a few lines later, as he explains that the tragedian Phrynichus, too, wrote beautiful plays because he himself was beautiful and dressed beautifully (αὐτός τε καλὸς ἦν καὶ καλῶς ἠμπέσχετο·/διὰ τοῦτ' ἄρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ κάλ' ἦν τὰ δράματα, Ar. *Thesm.* 165–166), concluding, 'one necessarily composes things similar to one's own nature' (ὅμοια γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει, Ar. *Thesm.* 167). Euripides' kinsman, who has until now been occupied with interjecting obscene comments (Ar. *Thesm.* 153, 157–158), finally catches on, and continues, 'and similarly Philocles, who is harsh, writes harshly, and again Xenocles, being vile, writes vilely, and again Theognis, being frigid, writes frigidly' (ταῦτ' ἄρ' ὁ Φιλοκλέης αἰσχρὸς ὢν αἰσχρῶς ποιεῖ,/ὁ δ' αὖ Ξενοκλέης ὢν κακὸς κακῶς ποιεῖ,/ὁ δ' αὖ Θέογνις ψυχρὸς ὢν ψυχρῶς ποιεῖ, Ar. *Thesm.* 168–170).

Finally, the fragments of Old Comedy reveal that literary criticism of this type was an essential activity of this entire genre, not one confined simply to the plays of Aristophanes. A fragment of his contemporary Phrynichus, for example, preserves the sentiment on Sophocles that because this 'blessed' man 'lived a long life', 'died a fortunate and clever man', 'ended his life excellently', and 'endured no evil', he also wrote 'many excellent tragedies' (μάκαρ Σοφοκλέης, ὃς πολὺν χρόνον βιοὺς/ἀπέθανεν εὐδαίμων ἀνὴρ καὶ δεξιός·/πολλὰς

[37] O'Sullivan 1992, 146.

ποιήσας καὶ καλὰς τραγῳδίας/καλῶς ἐτελεύτησ', οὐδὲν ὑπομείνας κακόν, fr. 32 Kassel–Austin). As Olson[38] notes, the focus here is on Sophocles as a man, rather than as a poet, but the distinction between these two categories is blurred as Phrynichus alternates between them, first calling Sophocles the man blessed, then his tragedies excellent, and lastly his death excellent. The aesthetic qualities of Sophocles' literary output are thus indistinguishable from his personal ones, and both are praiseworthy.

It is clear, then, that literary criticism and personal invective, poet and poetry, are closely connected in Old Comedy and Lucilius.[39] Why, however, should the rendering of humorous yet incisive aesthetic judgments have come to be such an integral component of these two genres? The Old Comic poets and the inventor of Roman Satire were actively, even aggressively, engaged with the world around them, and their poetry consequently reveals a spectrum of interrelated critical activities, of which literary criticism is only one. Grube[40] has claimed that 'ancient literary theory hardly ever pays attention to the creator, only to the work', but this assessment seems quite untrue of Aristophanes and Lucilius, and, as we will see, of Horace and Persius, too. For Roman Satire and Old Comedy, the distinction between literary criticism and personal invective is an artificial one, and, to the extent that it is observed, they privilege the creator over the work. As 'low' genres, Old Comedy and Roman Satire are, on the surface, interested in people, rather than ideas. Upon closer reflection, however, it becomes apparent that people serve only as the most convenient and appealing vehicle for the true aim of these authors: the promulgation of ideas. Though we see only 'glimpses' of the Old Comic equation of poet and poetry in Lucilius, the kinship in this regard between Old Comedy and Roman Satire becomes clearer as we turn to Horace and Persius.

4.2. *Horace*

Though such elements surface in the fragments of Lucilius,[41] it is Horace himself who cements literary criticism as an integral component of Roman Satire and makes its Old Comic origins clear. Although the *locus classicus*

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38 Olson 2007, 177: 'the end of 2 introduces, at the last possible moment, the idea of Sophocles as a poet, and this is developed in 3 before the return to more conventional sentiments in 4'.

39 As Austin and Olson 2004, 105 note, 'the ideas Agathon puts forwards (or variants thereof) seem to have been widely disseminated in Ar.'s time'.

40 Grube 1965, 243.

41 Atkins 1934, II, 14 states that even the few remaining fragments 'are sufficient to prove

for Horatian literary criticism has traditionally been the *Ars Poetica*, *Epistles* 2.1 contains a greater number of stylistic judgments of actual authors,[42] and these moments exploit the same conflation of poet and poetry that had characterized such speech in Old Comedy. Horace describes Plautus, for example, as follows (Hor. *Epist.* 2.1.170–176):

> Look how [poorly] Plautus
> plays the parts of the young man in love,
> the over-involved father, the sneaky pimp;
> look what a buffoon he is among the greedy parasites,
> with what an undone sock he scampers across the stage.
> He is concerned only with slipping a coin into his pocket, after which
> he does not care whether the plot of his play comes crashing down or stands on a firm footing.

> aspice Plautus
> quo pacto partis tutetur amantis ephebi,
> ut patris attenti, lenonis ut insidiosi,
> quantus sit Dossenus edacibus in parasitis,
> quam non astricto percurrat pulpita socco.
> gestit enim nummum in loculos demittere, post hoc
> securus cadat an recto stet fabula talo.

Horace here, in typical satirist's fashion, exploitatively blurs critical categories. Plautus' entire oeuvre is treated as a single, monolithic entity consisting of nothing but a collection of stock characters, each of which is played on stage, badly, by the poet himself.[43] Horace manages all at once to criticize Plautus' portrayal of his characters, those characters themselves,

that Lucilius played no inconsiderable part as a critic', while Townend 1973, 148 is more cautious: 'it is difficult to ascertain whether Lucilius himself had made literary borrowing an essential element in the satirist's technique; but it must be accepted as such from Horace onwards'. Lucilius is even sometimes credited with bringing literary criticism to Rome—a distinction apparently first proposed by Pliny, who calls him *qui primus condidit stili nasum* (*HN* Pr.7), and repeated by several modern scholars, e.g., Sigsbee 1974, 71.

[42] The *Ars Poetica*, by contrast, is more broadly descriptive/prescriptive. Horace issues reminders about matters as specific as the fact that a play ought to consist of five acts (189–190), that certain events may not be depicted on stage (182–188), and that choral interludes must relate to the overall plot (193–195), and matters as general as those about, for example, the need for harmony and consistency (1–23) and conciseness (335–337).

[43] Hunter 2002, 192–193 suggests that Plautus is here portrayed as a *servus currens*. Compare Ar. *Pax* 803–805, where 'Melanthios is apparently imagined as performing his own tragedy' (Olson 1998, 229). Rutherford 2007, 255 also notes a similar 'merging of author and text' in Horace's description of Pollio at *Carm.* 2.1.17–18 in the fact that 'Pollio himself has played a part in the events he narrates'.

and the sloppy meter of the plays (*non astricto ... socco*), with a final dig at Plautus-the-poet for his materialism and lack of artistic principles thrown in at the end for good measure.[44] Throughout, poet and poetry are one and the same, and where they are not, Horace's easy transition from the one to the other elides any firm distinction between them. The aesthetic judgment that emerges is cutting: Plautus was prolific (a vice in Horace's world),[45] the meter of Roman comedy was rather free, and the subject matter of his plays can easily be condemned as rather repetitious.

Another Horatian target is one Furius, likely Furius Bibaculus, mentioned twice in the *Satires*, and described each time in terms that convey both poetic and personal shortcomings. Horace first introduces him incidentally,[46] as a foil to his own writing (Hor. *Sat.* 1.10.36–37):

> While the bloated Alpine man slaughters Memnon
> and while he splits the muddy head of the Rhine, I play at these things.
>
> turgidus Alpinus iugulat dum Memnona dumque
> diffindit Rheni luteum caput, haec ego ludo.

An explicit contrast is made here between epic—Furius Bibaculus had written an epic on the Gallic wars—and Horace's current genre of choice, satire, which he is characteristically faux-unwilling to name outright.[47] While the verbs *iugulat* and *diffindit* suggest, amusingly, both the literal murder of Memnon and destruction of the Rhine, as well as metaphorical manhandling of these poetic themes, the word of the greatest interest is *turgidus*, which conveys both physical corpulence, perhaps indigestion, and a bombastic style, likely also coupled with the accusation that the work has not been honed sufficiently.[48] Furius reappears at *Satires* 2.5.39–41:

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[44] See Jocelyn 1995, esp. 230–239 and 246–247, for more detailed interpretation of these lines. My inclination is nevertheless to read Horace's criticisms of Plautus rather more straightforwardly: the comic poet is guilty of simply throwing the expected characters onto the stage, without sufficient thought for how the plot in which they are involved will play out.

[45] 130 plays were attributed to him in antiquity (Gell. *NA* 3.3.11), though Varro set the number at 21. For Horace's contempt for prolific writers, cf. *Sat.* 1.4.9–10, 1.4.14–16, 1.9.23–24, 1.10.59–61.

[46] Though he is not named at Hor. *Sat.* 1.10.36–37, the similarities with the second description in which he is referred to as Furius are sufficient to equate the individuals mentioned in these two passages.

[47] Cf. Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.24 (*genus hoc*), 1.4.56–57 (*ego quae nunc,/olim quae scripsit Lucilius*), 1.4.65 (*genus hoc scribendi*), 2.1.28–29 (*me pedibus delectat claudere verba/Lucili ritu*), 2.1.62–63 (*in hunc operis componere carmina morem*).

[48] For this recurring theme in Horace, cf., e.g., *Sat.* 1.4.8–13 and *Sat.* 1.10.67–73.

Hold strong and endure, whether the ruddy Dog-star cuts open
unspeaking statues, or Furius, stuffed with fat tripe,
strews the wintry Alps with hoary snow.

persta atque obdura, seu rubra Canicula findet
infantis statuas seu pingui tentus omaso
Furius hibernas cana nive conspuet Alpis.

Horace again stresses Furius' bloated person and style: he is 'stuffed with fat tripe', an elaboration of the simple adjective *turgidus* by which he was described earlier.[49] The second and third lines of this passage are said by Porphyrio to be quotations from Furius' work ('Jupiter strewed the wintry Alps with hoary snow', *Iuppiter hibernas cana nive conspuit Alpes*, fr. 15 Courtney), and, if correct, this would mean that Horace has in the final line cleverly substituted the word *Furius* where Furius himself had written *Iuppiter*. Thus in place of the image of 'Jupiter strew[ing] the wintry Alps with hoary snow', Horace instead portrays Furius himself as doing what he had described as being done. In this new context the verb *conspuit*, as Bramble[50] notes, is now suggestive of vomiting, presumably a result of the over-eating of which Furius would appear to be so fond (Hor. *Sat.* 2.5.39–41). In these two passages Horace, while overtly focused on Furius' repellent physical qualities, nevertheless makes incisive aesthetic observations: Furius' poetry is, like the man himself, stuffed to bursting, bulky, and not fully under control (*conspuit* seems pregnant with the possibility that there may at any moment be an explosion).[51] Thus Furius, and not simply because he writes epic, stands in stark opposition to the Callimachean *tenuitas* for which Horace strives, not only in his *Satires*, but throughout his corpus.[52]

49 Bramble 1974, 64.

50 Bramble 1974, 65.

51 Bramble 1974, 64–66 emphasizes the commerce between the literary critical and alimentarily critical senses of Horace's description throughout, though in his view there is here 'only the merest insinuation of the possibility that there may be some flaw' in Furius' character. As I read it, however, Furius' poetry is flawed because of certain inherent flaws in the character of Furius himself and, naturally (as the Old Comic poets tell us), Furius must write things that reflect his nature and way of life (though Horace somewhat problematizes this viewpoint when he wonders, at *Sat.* 1.10.67–71, whether Lucilius would have honed his verse more had he been born into the Augustan age). Attesting to O'Sullivan's 1992 observations on the longevity of the stylistic categories seen in Aristophanes, Horace's description of Furius recalls that of Aeschylus in the *Frogs*, and prefigures that of an anonymous reciter at Persius 1.14 (cf. O'Sullivan 1992, 121).

52 On Horace's Callimacheanism, see Scodel 1987 and Thomas 1993.

Horace's style of literary criticism is, I argue, inherited from Old Comedy—both directly and via Lucilius. Like Aristophanes and Lucilius before him, Horace makes aesthetic judgments in the form of personal attacks. The characterizations of Plautus and Furius in Horace's *Epistles* and *Satires* not only entertain, but present a far more vivid—and thus engaging—picture of precisely what one might find objectionable in these writers than would a 'straight' critical assessment. Indeed, it is precisely because these portrayals are humorous that the satirist hopes the reader will be more open to them and, consequently, able to learn the lessons contained within them, as Horace explains at *Satires* 1.1.24–26.[53]

A second manifestation of Horace's Old Comic pretense that 'life and lifestyle ... are one and the same'[54] can be found in the fact that the prescriptions Horace issues for how one ought to live are applicable to writing, and those directed ostensibly at writing are likewise applicable to life.[55] In particular, the exhortations of the need for appropriateness (Hor. *Ars P.* 1–5, 23, 76–78, 89, 104–107, 112–119, 126–127) and the cautions against running to extremes (*Ars P.* 25–26, 31) recur throughout the *Ars Poetica* as well as elsewhere in Horace's oeuvre (*dum vitant stulti vitia, in contraria currunt*, Hor. *Sat.* 1.2.24; *extremi primorum, extremis usque priores, Sat.* 1.3.9–19, *Epist.* 2.2.194–204). So it is that Horace's 'ethical principles are fully consistent with his aesthetic principles' and 'every lesson he teaches on the proper style of life contains a second literary application on the proper style of poetry'.[56]

4.3. *Persius*

In the hands of Persius, the style of literary criticism practiced by Old Comedy and adopted wholesale into early Roman Satire takes on, as might be expected, a tortured, condensed and highly allusive form. Nevertheless,

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53 The irony is, of course, that if the satirist's targets correct their behavior in response to his criticisms, he is out of a job, and this fact exposes the didactic pose on which the poet insists as precisely that—a pose (cf. Rosen 2007, 239: 'when a satirist *claims* to be moralizing, we can never be entirely sure what these claims amount to, for to imagine a world in which there is nothing to complain about is to imagine a world without satire. And what satirist *qua* satirist (that is, in his *role* as the composer of his satirical verse, not, for example, as a historical individual) would really want a world in which the things he once complained about are "corrected"?)'.

54 Freudenburg 1993, 186.

55 Rutherford 2007 discusses this feature of Horace's poetry.

56 Freudenburg 1993, 186.

it is still governed by parody of the Senecan maxim,[57] *talis oratio qualis vita* (Sen. *Ep*. 114.1), 'style is the man'.[58]

Persius makes incisive literary evaluations while pretending to rant about the moral decline of society (and vice versa, one might point out). A prominent episode in his first satire is the attack on a writer whose recitation sexually titillates his audience. Though the writer remains unnamed, and even his genre is difficult to determine, a typically Old Comic and Horatian blurring of critical categories characterizes the passage (Pers. 1.13–21):

> We write shut in, that one verses, this one prose released from feet,
> some grandiose thing that one large of lung can pant out.
> Of course you, well-coifed, wearing a fresh toga,
> and, as a final touch, gleaming with your birthday sardonyx,
> will recite these things to the people from your lofty perch,
> once you have rinsed your throat supple with limpid modulation,
> your eye orgasmic but your body decrepit.
> Then you would see huge Tituses quivering in a manner not morally upright
> and with their voices not composed, when the poems enter their groins,
> and their itch in the most intimate of places is scratched by the verses.

> scribimus inclusi, numeros ille, hic pede liber,
> grande aliquid quod pulmo animae praelargus anhelet.
> scilicet haec populo pexusque togaque recenti
> et natalicia tandem cum sardonyche albus
> sede leges celsa, liquido cum plasmate guttur
> mobile conlueris, patranti fractus ocello.
> tunc neque more probo videas nec voce serena
> ingentis trepidare Titos, cum carmina lumbum
> intrant et tremulo scalpuntur ubi intima versu.

The Old Comic conceit that a connection exists between literary style and personal character permeates this passage. The image of the panting lung evokes wordy writing, which is, like its creator, by implication well coifed and dressed in distracting (and unmanly) flourishes. The reciter's ridiculous vocal exercises (17–18) are suggestive of writing that likewise aims at the virtuosic but falls short. Sexual imagery dominates as the verses uttered

[57] Cf. Bramble 1974, 18 and Tzounakas 2008, 98 (who also takes pains, 2005, 565, to point out that Stoicism connects Seneca and Persius). Sullivan 1985, 108 is among the very few who note that this idea connects not only Seneca and Persius, but also these two writers to Aristophanes.

[58] To borrow the famous phrase of Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon: 'le style c' est l'homme même'. Bramble 1974, 23–24 also notes versions of this idea in Plato, Menander, Terence, Cicero, et al.

are said literally to penetrate the listeners, those scathingly called 'huge Tituses',[59] who, as a result, 'tremble in a manner not morally upright'.[60] A second, similarly perverted reciter is described a moment later, as Persius speaks of a dinner party at which 'someone, about whose shoulders is draped a hyacinth-hued cloak, having uttered some rancid little thing from his lisping nose, dribbles out Phyllises, Hypsipyles, and whatever other pitiful thing the poets have, and trips up the words on his tender palate' (*hic aliquis, cui circum umeros hyacinthina laena est,/rancidulum quiddam balba de nare locutus/Phyllidas, Hypsipylas, vatum et plorabile siquid,/eliquat ac tenero subplantat verba palato*, Pers. 1.32–35). Persius' criticism of the reciter's dress (32), his manner of speaking (33, 35), and the subject matter of his compositions (34)[61] are interwoven, as the satirist once more employs homosexual stereotyping as the vehicle for his attack on both literary and moral decline. Throughout these passages it is difficult to distinguish firmly between the criticism of the men themselves and that of their favored style of literature—and this difficulty is precisely the point. Bramble, while recognizing the inextricability of the two categories,[62] privileges Persius' moral criticism over his literary criticism,[63] viewing the latter as little more than a

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[59] This phrase seems designed to emphasize the contrast between the outward characteristics of the listeners, brawny stereotypical Roman men with traditional names, and their effeminate, even hysterical, behavior; cf. Gildersleeve 1875, 82, and Harvey 1981, 22, who also sees an accusation of 'intellectual dullness' in the epithet.

[60] Harvey 1981, 21 sees the reciter figured as a 'passive homosexual' in lines 15–18, but I rather see the audience depicted as such: the reciter is certainly effeminate in his dress and vocal exercises, but surely he is the active party, as we are told that it is his verses that penetrate the orifices of his listeners. Reckford 2009, 41 is right, however, to point out the 'conflation of active and passive homosexual' roles. Freudenburg 2001, 151–172, aptly entitling his discussion of this poem 'Faking it in Nero's Orgasmatron: Persius 1 and the Death of Criticism', focuses on the purchased (since the reciter, with his 'birthday sardonyx', would appear to be extremely wealthy) and thus feigned nature of the audience's enjoyment, and sees the scene as alluding to Nero's coming-of-age ceremony.

[61] The subject matter critiqued—*Phyllidas, Hypsipylas* and *vatum plorabile siquid*—would appear to be elegy; cf. Mayer 1982, 307. The first two topics or titles (*Phyllidas, Hypsipylas*) are further objectionable for their Greek material.

[62] Bramble 1974, 16: 'the major part of the satire is composed of a subtle commerce between style and morals'. Cf. also his comment (69) on poem 1: 'the assault on bad literature has begun. And so, almost imperceptibly, has the assault on morality'. Korfmacher 1933, 276, on the other hand, would separate (erroneously, I believe) the literary criticism from the moral.

[63] Bramble 1974, 16–17: 'through criticism of style, the satirist effects another, more serious criticism—of morals'. The view that Persius' moral criticism trumps his literary is also put forth by, e.g., Semple 1961–1962, 163 ('the First Satire … is ostensibly a criticism of contemporary poetry, but to Persius these debased literary standards are symptomatic of a deeper and

vehicle for the former, but they may be better read the other way around. To my mind, Persius is in his first satire far less interested in the corruption of the society around him (which he knows he cannot change and seems rather resigned to) than in the devastation he perceives in his own field, literature. In describing the effete behavior of these reciters, Persius succeeds in conveying what I see as his true message: that contemporary poetry is characterized by a deplorable obsession with outward appearances—smoothness and preciousness, sound and appearance, have, to the detriment of literature, come to replace substance and sense.[64] Bramble states that 'Horace never had occasion to correlate style with the vices and follies which, as moralist, he felt moved to expose'.[65] Although I see some moralizing undertones to Horace's literary criticism (particularly in his attacks on Furius), Persius correlates moral and literary flaws to a far greater degree. Horace, like the Old Comic poets and Lucilius, is concerned with attacking individual known authors by name, exploiting their (supposed) negative physical characteristics humorously to reveal the commensurate shortcomings in their literary styles. Persius, however, as Juvenal is also to do, critiques entire groups or types, rarely named individuals, and in doing so still employs invective, but invective that has expanded its scope from the individual to society at large.[66]

Thus Persius, while his literary critical activities are, in broad outline, in keeping with those of Old Comedy and the earlier Roman Satirists, also innovates. Whereas his predecessors had expressed their critiques through personal invective directed at the poet, Persius at times elevates the work

more general malady') and Gowers 1993, 183 ('literary decadence ... [is] a symptom of a wider moral malaise'). Freudenburg 1993, 186 n. 7, on the other hand, commenting on the interrelation Horace crafts between style and life-style, is right to conclude, 'which he considered more important it is impossible to say', and he likewise says that Persius is 'explicit in the coherence of moral and aesthetic principles'.

64 While Horace seems to abhor bloatedness—a characteristic reminiscent of Aristophanes' Aeschylus—Persius seems rather to have taken up the opposite end of the spectrum, with his attacks recalling Euripides and Agathon as they are portrayed in Old Comedy (though at 1.76–78 it is Aeschylean characteristics in poetry that are his target).

65 Bramble 1974, 21.

66 I thus agree only in part with Bramble's 1974, 22–23 assessment that 'the method of Persius is distinctive, independent of anything in the literary-critical or programmatic satires of Horace. The types of metaphor deployed were not original creations; literary theory explains their pedigree. But what does appear to be original is the way in which he consistently accommodated these metaphors to moralistic ends'. See Bramble 34–59 for a discussion of motifs (among which he identifies disease, dress, and appearance, homosexuality and effeminacy, and food and drink) that are both moralizing and literary critical.

to the status of a person, whom he then attacks, and this personification constitutes his twist on his models.[67] The interlocutor[68] skeptically wonders, 'is there anyone now whom the veiny book of Dionysiac Accius captivates, and those whom Pacuvius and his warty *Antiope* captivate, her baleful heart propped up on troubles?' (*est nunc Brisaei quem venosus liber Acci,/sunt quos Pacuviusque et verrucosa moretur/Antiopa aerumnis cor luctificabile fulta?*, Pers. 1.76–78), and in doing so displays a distinctively Persian way of speaking[69] about literature: it is the book of Accius that is humanly 'veiny', and Pacuvius' play, *Antiope*, that is likewise 'warty' and 'baleful'. In addition to being human characteristics, and ones well within the scope of personal invective, these terms also have literary connotations: they convey an (Aeschylean) aged roughness and lack of polish.

A salient instance of the objectification of a literary work for critical purposes occurs at the beginning of Persius' fifth satire, where he employs the conceit that poets may be 'represented as doing what they describe as being done', which is, in the case of tragedians 'to cook children'.[70] The conceit that tragedy is something to be ingested is introduced already in the opening lines through repeated references to the mouth and its parts, as Persius details the irksome habit of *vates* 'to demand for themselves a hundred voices, a hundred mouths, and a hundred tongues for their songs, whether a tale that requires him to open wide is served up to a sad tragic actor, or the wounds of a Parthian drawing a sword from his thigh are described' (*centum sibi poscere voces,/centum ora et linguas optare in carmina centum,/fabula seu maesto ponatur hianda tragoedo,/volnera seu Parthi ducentis ab inguine ferrum*, Pers. 5.1–4). Such a work is, in keeping with the metaphor, described as *fabula … hianda* ('a tale that requires one to open wide'), and it is served up as a dish (*ponatur*) to the tragic actor. To these musings of the poet, the interlocutor, Cornutus, replies (Pers. 5.5–9):

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67 This approach is perhaps foreshadowed by Euripides' attribution of unappealing human characteristics to Aeschylus' words at Ar. *Ran.* 925, where he describes them as 'having eyebrows and tufts' (ὀφρῦς ἔχοντα καὶ λόφους); cf. also the reference to the 'sinews of tragedy' (τὰ νεῦρα τῆς τραγῳδίας, Ar. *Ran.* 862). Hunter 2009, 16 notes the tradition of treating the text as a body. Rudd 1976, 111–114 lists a series of personifications in Juvenal, some of which pertain to literature, e.g., Juv. 7.92, 7.160–161, and 7.226–227, though there are no obvious literary critical undertones present.

68 Jahn 1843, Gildersleeve 1875, and Kissel 1990 give these lines to Persius, Clausen 1992 to the interlocutor. Harvey 1981, 38 discusses the possible permutations of assignation and punctuation, concluding that all are in some way unsatisfactory.

69 Nisbet 1963, 56 ('Persius's characters … talk like Persius'); cf. Keane 2006, 122.

70 Harvey 1981, 127.

> To what end are you saying these things? Or what size flour-balls of robust poetry
> are you pouring forth that they require a hundred-fold gullet?
> Let men who are about to speak great things gather clouds on Helicon,
> if there are any for whom the pot of Procne or that of Thyestes
> will boil, to be dined on often by tasteless Glycon.
>
> quorsum haec? aut quantas robusti carminis offas
> ingeris, ut par sit centeno gutture niti?
> grande locuturi nebulas Helicone legunto,
> si quibus aut Procnes aut si quibus olla Thyestae
> fervebit saepe insulso cenanda Glyconi.

The opening oral imagery is thus immediately taken up by Cornutus, too:[71] he mockingly figures Persius' poetic output as 'flour-balls of robust poetry', replacing *voces*, *ora*, and *linguae* with their baser analogue, *guttur*. A tragedian is portrayed as someone who is able to bring 'the pot of Procne or of Thyestes' to a boil—a comically grim reference to the cannibalistic elements present in these two myths—while the hapless and talentless actor (*insulso … Glyconi*) is one who 'dines' on the dish the tragedian has cooked up.[72] This opening speech of Cornutus also ends on a culinary note, as Persius is encouraged to abandon the tables of Mycenae with their human body parts (*mensasque relinque Mycenis/cum capite et pedibus*, Pers. 5.17–18), and to instead 'get to know plebeian meals' (*plebeiaque prandia noris*, Pers. 5.18), that is, to write satire.[73] Personification, objectification, and personal invective are thus taken to an extreme in Satire 5, all for literary critical ends. Rather than treating a specific poet and his output as indistinguishable, and ridiculing the latter through an attack on the former, the poet's work is instead elevated to the status of an independent object, which is then subjected to criticism that, like the personal invective directed against the poets, redounds upon the genre and style of the work itself. What impression are we left with, then, of the sort of literature Persius despises? It is oversized and overweight, shapeless and lumpy, and can be ingested only by those who lack taste. The implied contrast that emerges has Persius,

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[71] Cf. Connor 1987, 64: 'the parallel of food and poetry taken up by Cornutus is initiated by tongues (2) and *fabula … hianda* ("a play to be gaped out", 3), and is sustained throughout much of the poem'.

[72] Harvey 1981, 128: 'playing the part of Tereus or Thyestes, the tragic actor Glycon dines regularly on the tragedians' hideous concoctions'.

[73] For satire's conventional self-characterization as food (playing on the etymology of the genre from *lanx satura*), cf., e.g., Gowers 1993 and Freudenburg 2001.

very much a satirist in the Horatian tradition, favoring a Callimachean aesthetic:[74] poetry should be innovative, and smooth and slender (though not, as we are told at 1.15–21 and 1.32–35, excessively so). Inasmuch as he is a Horatian satirist, Persius, like his predecessor, is also a follower of Old Comedy, and I would read his literary criticism, too, as informed by that of Aristophanes.

4.4. *Juvenal*

The literary criticism of Juvenal marks a departure from the tradition outlined here: all but gone are the substantial literary-critical passages with their elaborate personal invective and personification. The absence of such moments is perhaps all the more striking given the appearance of the Senecan maxim that governs literary criticism in Old Comedy and the earlier Roman Satirists in Juvenal's fourth satire: cataloguing the advisers summoned by Domitian, he describes Crispus as a man 'whose character was like his eloquence' (*cuius erant mores qualis facundia*, Juv. 4.82). Juvenal's literary criticism instead takes the form of a handful of largely incidental remarks, in which the influence of Old Comedy and of the earlier Roman Satirists is hardly visible.

The recitation scene that opens his first satire, highly reminiscent of Persius' first satire and, like it, concerned with groups of people and unnamed types, contains several such moments. Juvenal speaks, for example, with characteristic indignation of the thought that someone's recitations might use up his entire day with impunity (Juv. 1.1–6):

> Am I always to be only a listener? Shall I never retaliate,
> I who have been harassed so many times by hoarse Cordus' *Theseid*?
> Will that man therefore recite his toga-plays to me unpunished,
> this man his elegies? Will a huge *Telephus* have used up my day unpunished,
> or an *Orestes*, written in the already full margin at the end of the book
> and on the back and still not finished?

> semper ego auditor tantum? numquamne reponam
> vexatus totiens rauci Theseide Cordi?
> inpune ergo mihi recitaverit ille togatas,
> hic elegos? inpune diem consumpserit ingens
> Telephus aut summi plena iam margine libri
> scriptus et in tergo necdum finitus Orestes?

74 Gowers 1993, 44 and 124 is right to note Persius' Callimachean leanings.

The only literary-critical judgment here that masquerades as personal invective is the one-word description of Cordus himself as *raucus*—a term of abuse that presents not only a reciter rendered hoarse by the length of his composition, but also a poetic style that is rough and unfinished.[75] Just as he finds fault with these works for their excessive length, Juvenal, like his predecessors, whom he invokes, objects to epic (Juv. 1.51–54):[76]

> Should I not think these things are worthy of Horace's Venusian lantern?
> Should I not attack them? But what [should I attack] more? Heracles-epics
> or Diomedes-epics or the lowing of the labyrinth
> and the sea struck by the boy and the flying craftsman?
>
> haec ego non credam Venusina digna lucerna?
> haec ego non agitem? sed quid magis? Heracleas
> aut Diomedeas aut mugitum labyrinthi
> et mare percussum puero fabrumque volantem.

Juvenal mentions epic again some 100 lines later, when he rants about the dangers of writing satire, as compared to the safety of narrating, for example, the duel between Aeneas and Turnus (Juv. 1.162–164). Juvenal's scorn for hackneyed themes and derivative epics is apparent, but his criticisms, so direct and angry, betray little indication of what precisely he finds so objectionable in the works he singles out.

In his seventh satire, Juvenal rails against the state of literary patronage, and names Vergil and Statius among those who could not have written the works they did had they been hungry (Juv. 7.69–87). The target of Juvenal's ire in this passage is society's lack of support for poets, rather than those poets themselves. As Tennant notes 'it is difficult to believe that Juvenal is being anything other than sympathetic towards Rubrenus or that his *Atreus* is meant to invite ridicule'.[77] Statius alone seems to be attacked—Juvenal figures him as a pimp, forced to sell a virgin *Agave*/Agave in order to feed himself (*sed cum fregit subsellia versu/esurit, intactam Paridi nisi vendit Agaven*, Juv. 7.86–87)—but it is hard to see incisive literary judgments in this invective and personification.[78] Indeed, it may be society's very lack

[75] As Freudenburg 2001, 210–211 points out, we are wholly dependent on the satirist's claim that Cordus really was such a terrible poet, as he is otherwise unknown.

[76] It is noteworthy that at 1.52–54, Juvenal ridicules epic 'as a rhetorical foil for his own writing' (Powell 1999, 316): that is, the literary comments are not independent, as they predominantly are in Old Comedy, Horace, and Persius.

[77] Tennant 1996, 83. As Braund 1988, 59 points out, however, Rubrenus is the target of gentle mockery, through the 'ironic incongruity [of] the picture of Atreus pawning crockery and coat'.

[78] Cf. Tennant 1996, 84 and Reckford 2009, 171. Rudd 1976, 100 points out, however,

of support and respect for poets that is responsible for Juvenal's departure from the tradition established by his predecessors. The absence in Juvenal of any declaration of the truth-telling powers of humor, and the link he draws between his satire and tragedy (6.634) rather than Old Comedy, may be related to the view that emerges in his seventh satire of the poet as a tragic figure, an outsider, lacking the honor, and thus power, that once belonged to poets. Juvenal never openly adopts the literary persona of a teacher or savior of the people, but presents himself as a man at the fringes of a society deaf to aesthetic and moral value. As the claims made by his Roman Satiric predecessors for the role of Old Comedy in their satire and for the truth-telling powers of humor are, in my view, interrelated, by rejecting one, Juvenal also necessarily discards the other. Like Horace and Persius, this last of the Roman verse satirists was confronted with the need to write poetry that was recognizably satire, yet also original and his own, and, as he struggled with this perennial dilemma, he radically redefined the genre, for what would be the last time.

5. *Conclusion*

The notion that humorous writing possesses unique truth-telling powers is vital to understanding not only Roman Satire and Old Comedy individually, but, above all, their relation to one another, and it is through the practice of literary criticism that each genre plays out most systematically its claims to truth. With the exception of Juvenal literary criticism in these two genres is, as I have argued, not a rigidly delimited activity: it occupies a point on a spectrum of interrelated critical practices. As a result, for practitioners of Old Comedy and pre-Juvenalian Roman Satire, and for them alone among the ancient literary critics, literary criticism and personal invective or praise are one and the same: they are cognate manifestations of the underlying impulse fundamental to each of these two genres to speak the truth through humor. It is not simply that the Old Comic poets and Roman Satirists view literary style and personal character as connected (in such a view they would hardly be unique); rather, by formulating their literary critical

that Juvenal 'does not convey a simple emotion': while it is 'deplorable' that Statius is not rewarded adequately for his epic, the ironic representation of him as a pimp somewhat undermines our sympathy for him. Also in his seventh poem, Juvenal complains in the most general terms of historians' verboseness (*perit hic plus temporis atque olei plus*, Juv. 7.99).

judgments as personal ones, they exploit the Senecan *topos* to the point of absurdity. The satirist's laughter, however, does not end here, for the reader finds that the poet is laughing at him, as well as with him: the satirist refuses to be pinned down, and thus frustrates his reader at every turn—a dilemma instantiated by the conclusion of Horace's *Satires* 2, where the reader is abruptly dismissed from the feast he has been led to expect.[79] But it is precisely from, rather than in spite of, this instability that satire derives its distinctive meanings: although each literary critical comment issued is undermined by laughter in manifold ways, it nevertheless lingers in as an incisive aesthetic judgment.[80]

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[79] On this confounding ending, see Gowers 1993, 161–179 and Freudenburg 2001, 117–124.
[80] As this chapter is part of a larger book project, all those who have contributed to it over the better part of the past decade are too many to acknowledge here, but I single out Richard Thomas and Albert Henrichs as particularly worthy of thanks. More immediately, I am immensely grateful to the editors of this volume for their many invaluable suggestions.

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

CAPTIVE AUDIENCE? THE AESTHETICS OF *NEFAS* IN SENECAN DRAMA

Carrie Mowbray

1. *Introduction*

In the imperial Rome of Seneca's day, crowds seemed unable to resist grisly spectacles, and flocked to the arena in droves to witness all varieties of gladiatorial violence, torture, and death. Outside the arena, depictions of horror were part and parcel of the aesthetic world and featured prominently in literature, plastic art and painting, and drama.[1] Seneca's tragedies offer particularly vivid examples of graphic violence but present a different set of challenges than, for example, the gladiatorial spectacles, which featured not *just* representational but *real* violence.[2]

Tragedy possesses a special capacity to model a variety of moral and epistemic viewpoints, and dramatizes the process of choosing between them. As such, tragedy does not simply entertain but can also hold up potentially conflicting worldviews for scrutiny and critique. When the moral positions of the drama are coterminous with those of its spectators, no apparent disjunction arises. But tragic depictions of the underbelly of human nature activate some thorny issues of ethics and art. Seneca's plots teem with morally problematic characters who engage in filicide, self-mutilation, rape, incest, and cannibalism. Such acts are often described as *nefas* in Senecan drama,

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[1] Bartsch's lucid study (1994) analyzes the blurred boundaries between the categories of performer and audience in the early empire. Barton 1995 provides an indispensable account of gladiatorial spectacle. In an interesting link to tragedy, gladiatorial shows were often presented as staged mythological tableaux; see Coleman 1990. Boyle 1994 links these 'fatal charades' with Senecan tragedy.

[2] On the aesthetics of imperial violence in terms of fragmentation and physical dismemberment, see Most 1992. Scholarship has moved away from *roman à clef* readings of the tragedies where, for example, Atreus represents Nero—among other reasons, because the dating of the plays is so uncertain. Of course, theater can and does provide a window onto social *realia*, and the cruelty represented in Senecan tragedy has (perhaps rightly) been seen as reflecting that of emperors' inner circles.

where the tension between what should and should not be spoken is linguistically marked.[3] What is more, such scenes are often presented as inset dramas, with concomitant actor-, audience-, and playwright-roles among the *dramatis personae*.

The plays I will examine in this chapter (*Thyestes*, *Medea*, and *Troades*) all feature extensive metatragic 'staging', and the internal audiences share some form of 'captive' status—some are targets of revenge, while others embody a more subtle captivity. Jason and Thyestes are the intended victims of avengers who (as dramaturge figures) also force them to play the role of audience. The final act of *Troades* presents the most intricate picture of audience captivity: a *mise-en-abyme* of embedded audience- and actor-figures whose responses multiply and refract off each other as they negotiate the two 'performances' of murder-sacrifice.[4] The relationship between aesthetic and ethics is called into question by the rupture their disparate reactions engender. I would like to argue that Seneca's internal audiences provide potential models for, and dramatize the process of, the aesthetic judgment of *nefas*, and that the 'plays-within' actively challenge Seneca's own audience to contemplate what it means to enjoy or otherwise to respond to such representations.

2. *Audience Captivity: Setting the Stage*

How can an audience delight in witnessing an act in drama that it would consider morally abhorrent in reality? The evaluative markers involved in witnessing, say, cannibalism in tragedy are patently distinct from those of reality, as are the effects—we do not, of course, intervene to help the on-stage victim, nor do we fear that the actor-cannibal may come for us next. As the moral compass of art goes haywire, other factors can supervene, exercising a mysterious force on the audience—hence the age-old dilemma of to what extent morality is bound up with aesthetic evaluation of fiction.

Goldie has recently examined Matravers' notion of the 'fictional assent' involved in engaging with a work whose moral code is not in alignment with our own. Citing the example of Sade's *Juliette*, he asserts that in such cases (2003, 67; my emphasis):

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3 Schiesaro 2003 makes this persuasive claim. For the semantics and semiotics of *nefas*, *fari*, and related terms, see Bettini 2008.

4 See Busch 2007 on the 'dialogic' quality of Senecan drama which is especially conducive to representing a polyphony of viewpoints.

> … the discordance and tension between the narratively appropriate response and the ethically appropriate response can become almost unbearable: one tries to stop reading or to turn away one's eyes—not out of disgust or horror at the content of the narrative, but rather *because one knows one is being drawn in, like a moth to a flame*.

This view hints at the dizzying circularity of the ethics-aesthetics dilemma: while some recoil at the *substance*, others (also) recoil at the fact that their autonomy is being destabilized. But perhaps only a work potent enough to overcome one's better judgment can truly be called 'art'. Ancient rhetorical theory maintains that we can respond with a greater degree of empathic engagement to characters in a fiction than to those in real-life situations.[5] And one of the cardinal effects of dramatic poetry is that it causes the audience to be carried along—to identify with certain characters and possibly to adopt viewpoints which it would not dream of espousing in real life.[6] The 'emotional economy'[7] that subtends the Aristotelian model of tragic catharsis (i.e. feeling the right emotions—pity and fear—toward the appropriate characters) does not always bear out in Seneca's tragedies. Rather, ambivalent characters and graphic scenes[8] often produce the 'terrible fascination' that can lead to *aporia*, as receivers must decide how (or whether) to reconcile these with their moral code. The junctures which 'should' inspire emotional resistance are among the most productive for examining aesthetic response—and these can also strain the limits of tragic representation. It has been argued that the receiver is not ethically innocent when it comes to such scenes of debasement, and may be seen as 'colluding' with the author in perpetrating *nefas*—after all, it knows how the familiar plots will turn out.[9] In Seneca, the moments of moral ambiguity are among his richest,

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[5] Goldie decouples ethics from aesthetics: the receiver's emotional resistance can compromise the work's aesthetic qualities. But there are other works of art ('call them *dangerous*', Goldie's emphasis) which transcend ethical categories, and whose value can actually be *enhanced* by immoral qualities (Goldie 2003, 66). Bonzon 2003, 172 similarly decouples ethics from aesthetics.

[6] See Littlewood 2004, 172–173. Matravers 2003, 91ff. isolates 'fictional assent' as the phenomenon of deciding to engage with a work whose moral code differs from a person's real-life views.

[7] As Arenas 2004 observes in an article on Gibson's film 'The Passion of the Christ', aesthetically 'confusing' work causes fragmentation of audience response—the reactions she mentions range from leaving the theater to physical illness to religious conversion.

[8] The feast of Thyestes, for example, and the graphic description of Oedipus' self-blinding.

[9] Schiesaro 2003, 37 argues for the audience's collusion with the 'evil' characters in Senecan tragedy, claiming that we 'forfeit our naïve claim to innocence' if we continue to engage with a work despite knowing the *nefas* it will present.

and refuse to allow the audience the security of complacent spectatorship. The ways in which Seneca's internal audiences function as potential analogues for external ones, the mechanisms by which audiences are forced to negotiate scenes of *nefas*, and the extent to which audiences can be seen as 'captive' will be our focus in this chapter.

2.1. *Seized by the Hair: Power and* enargeia

Before we delve into Seneca's plays, I will discuss a few key mechanisms by which poetry can 'captivate'—a staple topic in ancient moral philosophy and in rhetorical/poetic theory. Senecan tragedy prioritizes the affective power of showing over telling, even in what is left to the imagination.[10] As a Stoic philosopher who was also steeped in rhetorical training, Seneca was well versed in the value of vivid expression. The power of the specific over the general, and of the visual over the verbal, forms a recurring theme in discussions of how best to affect the *proficiens*. To cite one famous example (Sen. *Ep*. 6.5):

> … [Y]ou ought to show up right to the scene-at-hand; first of all, because people trust their eyes more than their ears, and next, because the journey [to wisdom] is long through *praecepta*, but short and effective through *exempla*.[11]
>
> … in rem praesentem venias oportet, primum quia homines amplius oculis quam auribus credunt, deinde quia longum iter est per praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla.[12]

Seneca peppers his prose writings with inset narratives, and with poetic examples, for precisely this reason: because vivid, specific language is more arresting than commonplaces, it is an apt vehicle by which protreptic philosophy can illustrate and model human behavior.[13]

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[10] See Herington 1966, 442 for Seneca's 'visual imagination, and the manner in which it can illuminate and realize his Stoic cosmos'.

[11] A similar sentiment is expressed by Nussbaum's contrast between philosophers' thought experiments or other 'schematic' examples which offer 'cooked' results versus the more fluid, 'open-ended' flexibility of narrative, which promotes thinking that is not theory-dependent (Nussbaum 1990, 47). See also John 2003, 142–159. Cf. Seneca's translation of Cleanthes' maxim that poetry is the only way to express certain philosophical truths (*Ep.* 108.10).

[12] The text of Seneca's *Epistulae Morales* is Reynolds' *OCT*. The text of Seneca's tragedies is Zwierlein's OCT. Translations are mine.

[13] The power of the image also has a vital place in Stoic spiritual exercises. As Bartsch 2007, 94 aptly puts it: 'The Stoics were credited in antiquity with believing in the persuasive and pedagogic power of visualization, and learning to employ this technique appropriately provided part of the training, or *askêsis*, that a budding Stoic was encouraged to undertake—perhaps ironically, in order to vitiate the effects of the visual'.

According to ancient rhetorical and poetic theory, *enargeia* is a key component of powerful language that provokes affective response.[14] The combination of graphic visual detail with immediacy is said to lead to clarity and a sense of shared experience. Aristotle prescribed that poets describe 'most vividly' as if present at the actual event, to 'make what is absent present' (Arist. *Poet.* 1455a21–25). As Webb details in a valuable recent study, *ekphrasis* in particular 'makes the listeners into spectators'.[15] The picture need not be static, nor must it link to a referent that exists in actuality; it may well exist only in the speaker's imagination. What is key is that the image aims to effect a reaction: to rouse the emotive faculty, to engage the imagination, to persuade.[16] According to Quintilian, whereas plain speech only reaches the ear, *enargeia*-filled speech penetrates into the mind's eye (*oculis mentis*, Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.61–62). There, it not only exists but *does*.[17]

According to Stoic theory, the phenomenology of the process is as follows: first, the words produce a *phantasia*, or 'representational image in the mind',[18] which contains both propositional content and a moral component. Powerful *phantasiai* stir the emotional faculty (*to pathêtikon*) and produce *ekplêxis*, a state of stunned wonder.[19] Their force generates a *reflexive* rather than a rational reaction—an *ictus animi*. These involuntary responses are not, according to the Stoics, emotions *per se*. Because *phantasiai* contain

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14 Related terms in Greek include *phantasia*, while Latin glosses include *subiectio sub/ponere ante oculos*, *demonstratio*, *repraesentatio*, *visio*, *evidentia*; see Lausberg 1998, §§ 810–819. For simplicity's sake, I refer to all of the above under the rubric *enargeia*. All share some quality of putting an image (virtually) before the eyes. The body of writing, both ancient and modern, on *enargeia* is vast. On Roman representational images and vivid description, see Vasaly 1993; Webb 1997; Leigh 1997 and 2004; Ker 2007; and especially Webb's comprehensive study (2009).

15 Nikolaos, *Progym.* 68.II.9–10. *Enargeia* sets *ekphrasis* apart from regular narration (*diêgêsis*), according to Nikolaos. See Webb 2009, 8.

16 The effect as one of 'like-to seeing', according to Webb 2009, 38: 'What is imitated in ecphrasis and *enargeia* is not reality, but the perception of reality. The word does not seek to represent, but to have an effect in the audience's mind that mimics the act of seeing'. So, authors and speakers can present powerful images of what never actually occurred. As Ker 2007, 344–345 explains: '[V]ivid description tends toward realizing the fantasy that its medium has become the object, or at least substitutes for it—something beyond mere imitation'.

17 Webb 1998 and Bartsch 2007, in particular, isolate the *active force* of vivid language that is at play in Roman rhetorical theory.

18 Inwood 1985, 56.

19 *Ekplêxis* is often spoken of in terms of swift, violent impact. A nominalization from the verb ἐκπλήσσω, it suggests a 'shattering' effect, 'being moved', and 'confusion'. Aristotle refers to *ekplêxis* as the emotional impact of poetry (Arist. *Poet.* 1455a16–20).

moral implications, they also necessitate interpretation. At this point, the result will either be assent that leads to emotional involvement (and so, passions), or deliberate disengagement, in keeping with rationality.[20] The proper Stoic response is, of course, the latter—and the danger lies in responding to these as real emotions. Interestingly, Seneca uses a theatrical illustration to explain how passions work in the human soul, characterizing the initial reaction of an audience as an involuntary *ictus*: '… but these are all emotions of minds that do not wish to be moved; and they are not passions but the first preliminaries to passions' (*principia proludentia adfectibus*, Sen. *De Ira*, 2.2.2–6), where *proludentia* also signifies 'rehearsal'. There is a bidirectional relation at play, since one engages in the same process at a theatrical performance: 'quasi' emotions come first, but subsequent evaluation is also necessary.[21]

The critical language surrounding *enargeia* is often couched in terms of power on the part of the speaker figure, and lack of power on the part of the receiver. The one who harnesses these malleable, potent *phantasiai* is said to have a special influence over the emotions (Quint. *Inst.* 6.2.29):

> What the Greeks call '*phantasias*' (let's simply call them *visiones*), through which images of absent things are represented in the mind such that we seem to be able to perceive them with our eyes and have them right in front of us: whoever has a good grasp of these will have extreme power over the emotions of others.
>
> quas φαντασίας Graeci vocant (nos sane visiones appellemus), per quas imagines rerum absentium ita repraesentantur animo ut eas cernere oculis ac praesentes habere videamur, has quisquis bene ceperit is erit in adfectibus potentissimus.[22]

As Webb has shown, the impact of such images was so uniformly great that ancient writers and speakers thought that they could predict, and thus manipulate, audience response.[23] The mechanism was often expressed in terms of violence or enslavement. Sextus Empiricus claims that *phantasiai* have the capacity to 'all but seize us by the hair and drag us to assent'.[24] Along the same lines, according to Epictetus, *phantasiai* were notorious for inspiring action without thought and can 'take possession of you and go off with you wherever they will' (Epictetus *Disc.* 2.18.23) if one does not pause

[20] Bartsch 2007.
[21] Ibid. On this passage, see Leigh 1997, 30–31 and Webb 2009, 63. For similar passages in Seneca, cf. *De Ira* 2.2.1 and *Ep.* 71.29.
[22] The text of Quintilian's *Inst.* is Winterbottom's *OCT*.
[23] Webb 1997. See also Staley 2009, 62.
[24] On this quote, see Webb 2009, 116 and 119 and Staley 2009, 63.

for contemplation.[25] And pseudo-Longinus, who may have been roughly contemporary with Seneca, says that *phantasiai* 'do not only persuade but *enslave* the listener' ([Longinus] *Subl.* 15.9). Receivers are not just enslaved to an image that is present in the speaker's mind but also participate in making what is absent present through visualization and interpretation.[26]

The danger of emotional identification with a work or its characters and subsequent contamination of false or unethical ideas is a classic critique of art. On this view, over-identification leads to a complacency which is not conducive to reflecting on the work's applicability to real-world issues. But with a measure of detachment, the audience can step outside its own preoccupations in order to engage with a more critical eye. The notion of critical distance in the theater did not begin with Brecht but stretches back to Plato and Aristotle.[27] The line separating identification and alienation is thin—even perforated—especially in the over(t)ly theatricalized world of Seneca's day. The lines of perspective insist on veering close to the vanishing point, making clear distinctions difficult, as Blau similarly remarks of the 'double play of illusion, the relation of theater to theatricalized reality' in modern theater.[28]

3. *Playing the Victim: Thyestes and Jason*

With this background in place, we can now turn to examine a few of the tragedies themselves. In both of Seneca's major revenge tragedies, his *Medea* and *Thyestes*, the dénouement of the dramatic action unfolds in the fifth act as an *inset* play.[29] Both 'protagonists', Medea and Atreus, deploy the target of their revenge as simultaneously a captive audience of the tragic performance they engineer. The *Thyestes* contains an inset drama of criminal acts: after killing Thyestes' children in a ritual of murder-sacrifice,

[25] See Bartsch's article 2007, 18, whose title echoes this sentiment.

[26] Certain types of language are especially conducive to placing the image 'before the eyes', πρὸ ὀμμάτων, of the listener. See Arist. *Rh.* 1411b24–25; cf. *Poet.* 1455a23. Cf. Lopes 2003, 216 ff. on 'representational seeing'.

[27] See Schiesaro 2003, 247, and Tietze Larson 1989, 279 ff. on how Seneca drama foreshadows Brecht's 'epic theater' of detached spectatorship.

[28] Blau 1989, 94.

[29] Boyle 1997, 117 draws attention to Atreus' assumption of multiple roles—'character, actor, audience, and dramaturge'. Seneca's characters often seem to be aware of their literary 'selves'; so, Atreus' punning *Atreus iratus* can signal 'the title of a possible future play, like the *Hercules Furens*' (Braden 1970, 17). Medea's self-characterization similarly reflects her literary heritage and charts her progression to a fully actualized tragic heroine.

Atreus then stages a cannibalistic feast by Thyestes on his children, in the course of which he forces his brother to engage in a perversion of reversal and recognition. Medea kills one of her children in front of the Corinthians, then forces Jason to play spectator at the death of their second son, after which she flies off as *dea ex machina* in her own revenge tragedy. The third iteration of *nefas*, as I discuss below, does not actually occur within the dramatic action but is nevertheless crucial for examining how power and aesthetics interrelate in Senecan drama.

3.1. *Medea and Atreus: Take One … and Take Two*

Medea's revenge includes artistic as well as actual crimes. As she vacillates over whether to kill their son to make Jason pay, she exhorts her *animus* to commit the *nefas* in front of the populace and says that her retribution will not be complete without spectators (Sen. *Med.* 976–977). Here, she blatantly defies the precept found in Hellenistic literary criticism, and most recently in Horace, that Medea should not kill her children on stage.[30] So, the onstage filicide is also a *poetic* transgression,[31] and Seneca's audience might mentally rehearse how it would react to the actual crime as well as to its representation. In the reprise, Medea defers killing the second son until she can force Jason to be spectator (Sen. *Med.* 991–993).[32] The second killing allows for a re-performance, as Medea decides to 'improve' on the first take of her tragedy by the added viciousness of engaging a spectator who has no chance of critical distance. Medea, in fact, revels in the victimization of her 'captive', Jason, who is both target of her revenge and the ultimate *intended audience* of her drama.[33] Through Medea's actions, Seneca's audience is also forced to negotiate the horror of the dramatic action *vis-à-vis* such evaluatory criteria as innovation and other aspects of poetics.

In Seneca's *Thyestes*, Atreus also engineers his act of revenge as a tragedy that features an *agôn*, a reversal and recognition scene, and dramatic irony. The horrific act of child-slaughter is effected twice, with increasing gruesomeness:[34] first as an actual murder, and a second time as Thyestes unwit-

[30] *ne pueros coram populo Medea trucidet* … Hor. *Ars P.* 185.

[31] This obtains, I believe, even if the text is read or heard rather than seen, as the reader cannot help but imagine the horrific child-murder.

[32] Littlewood 2004, 181 draws attention to a victim's *recognition* (also a *sine qua non* of tragedy according to Aristotle's *Poetics*) as an essential component in revenge.

[33] Of course, her children are also victims—but the dramatic presentation subordinates the children's physical suffering to the anguish experienced by the target of her revenge, Jason.

[34] As Schiesaro 2003, 96 observes. This is in keeping with what Schiesaro dubs the '*maius*

tingly consumes them. The recognition scene is similarly bipartite. First, Atreus relishes Thyestes' reaction upon learning that his children are dead, asking 'do you recognize your children?' (Sen. *Thy*. 1005–1006) as their heads are revealed. This is not a true Aristotelian *anagnôrisis* but a perversion of one; Thyestes cannot possess the critical distance necessary to appreciate the events *qua* tragedy. Morally, Atreus' actions are repugnant, and yet his wit can be alluring.[35] Thyestes, on the other hand, is slow and naïve. Like the tragic poet who anticipates his audience's response, Atreus always stays several steps ahead of his brother, as is shown in their repartee which culminates in Thyestes' oblivious wish and Atreus' gleeful response (Sen. *Thy*. 974–977; 980):

> Believe it: your boys are right here in their father's embrace.
> Here they are and will remain; no portion of your offspring can be removed from you …
> … you'll be satiated, never fear!
>
> hic esse natos crede in amplexu patris.
> hic sunt eruntque; nulla pars prolis tuae tibi subtrahetur …
> … satiaberis, ne metue!

The double meanings are, of course, understood by the external audience all too well.[36] Even if the audience disapproves of Atreus' criminal deeds (as is ostensibly the case), it can be seduced into identifying with Atreus due to a congruent epistemic position and appreciation for rhetoric, humor, and other aspects of creativity.[37]

Atreus desires to watch the spectrum of verbal and bodily reactions from his captive 'audience' unfold (Sen. *Thy*. 903–907):[38]

> I relish seeing what colors he turns as he gazes
> upon his boys' heads, what utterances his first stab of pain
> spews forth, how, dumbstruck with the breath knocked out of him,
> his body stiffens. This is the fruit of my labor.
> I want to see him not in a wretched state, but as he's becoming wretched.

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motif' of Senecan tragedy, in which characters strive to outdo the (usually bad) exploits of their ancestors or their mytho-literary selves; cf. Seidensticker 1985 on *maius solito* in Senecan tragedy.

35 On Atreus' use of wit and double entendre, see Meltzer 1988; cf. Schiesaro 2003 on Atreus' 'irresistible' qualities.

36 See Holland 2000 for a provocative take on irony as encoding the divine perspective.

37 Which, as Matravers 2003, 104 points out, can lead to identification with fictional characters.

38 See Schiesaro 2003, 96 and Tarrant 1985, ad loc. On the descriptions of the killing and eating of the children, Poe 1969, 358: 'The poet invites his readers to participate vicariously in an experience which is both sadistic and masochistic'.

libet videre, capita natorum intuens
quos det colores, verba quae primus dolor
effundat aut ut spiritu expulso stupens
corpus rigescat. fructus hic operis mei est.
miserum videre nolo, sed dum fit miser.

His words emphasize that it is the process rather than the result that matters—in other words, he would like to experience the action-over-time phenomenon that is inherent in being a spectator at a play. When Atreus becomes audience of his own revenge tragedy, he is modeling a specific type of 'sadistic spectatorship'.[39] The self-conscious dramatic aside creates an intimacy between author-criminal and audience, and compels us to reflect on whether, and to what extent, we resemble these predacious characters. After all, we too are still caught up with the drama at this point, and some of us find ourselves enjoying the drawn-out misery of Thyestes as Atreus relishes it.

In Senecan tragedy, *nefas* is presented as consonant with such positive values as linguistic facility and wit.[40] The plays lack the 'emotional economy' that allows for an easy identification with morally upright characters, causing fragmentation of aesthetic response. The advantage of critical distance, then, is compromised through this discontinuity. As the brothers' criminal equivalence in the *Thyestes*, and Jason's previous crimes against Medea's current ones, fracture such binaries as 'good' and 'bad', and as the audience- and receiver-figures within the drama switch off, the apparent gap between audiences and authors is also called into question.

3.2. *Radical* enargeia*: Out of Sight, but Not Out of Mind*

Beyond an initial crime and a more intensely horrific reprise,[41] Seneca's *Medea* and *Thyestes* each feature a third iteration of *nefas*. This final element of the *tricolon crescens* does not occur in the dramatic action but is vividly described by the avenger as an imagined 'improvement'—in fact, as the apex of criminal horror itself. The plotting of this 'ultimate' version, I argue,

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39 Littlewood 2004, 215 ff.

40 Schiesaro 2003 1; 3; *et passim* has much to say about how the disjunction between the *nefas* the 'criminal geniuses' espouse and positive value of creativity leads to audience fragmentation. Similarly, Littlewood 2004, 213 sees this form of knowledge as 'essentially predatory'. According to Darwall's cognitive-affective model, we do not need to empathize with the characters in order to sympathize with them, but we must *care* about their difficulties (in Kieran 2003, 79–80).

41 See Most 1999, 216 on the rhetoric of accretion in Seneca's *Medea*. Medea calls the crime she is plotting the *ultimum scelus* (Sen. *Med.* 922).

functions as a commentary on how to captivate one's audience—one must first stun, then overwhelm and coopt the imagination. Initially, we witness Medea killing the first son *coram populo*, then the second son *coram patre*. There are no more children, and so the second filicide will constitute the play's final act of *nefas*—or so we think. But then Medea makes the shocking declaration that she would go further still to effect her revenge, killing any unborn fetus that might lurk in her womb (Sen. *Med.* 1009–1013):

> If my hand could have been satiated with one murder,
> It would have attempted none. Even after killing two,
> the number is still too small for my pain.
> If any token of love is hidden even now in this mother,
> I'll dig into my innards with a sword and extract it with the steel.

> si posset una caede satiari manus,
> nullam petisset. ut duos perimam, tamen
> nimium est dolori numerus angustus meo.
> in matre si quod pignus etiamnunc latet,
> scrutabor ense viscera et ferro extraham.

Foreknowledge of the plot does not prepare the audience for this gruesome imagined abortion, an apparent Senecan innovation that perhaps goes too far. Any previous sympathy for the Medea character is challenged in one swift stroke.

Similarly, the third and final element of Atreus' revenge occurs in the imaginary realm. Atreus revels in his success, which he says has set him on par with kings and gods.[42] But, still not fully satisfied, he envisions an alternative version in which his brother is 'knowing but nonetheless helpless'.[43] In retrospect, he should have had Thyestes feast on the sons willingly (with the mutilated boys also bizarrely aware), as he goes on to describe graphically (Sen. *Thy.* 1054–1056; 1060–1068):

> Right from the very wound into your mouth I should've
> funneled the hot blood so you could drink up the gore
> while they were still alive …
> I tore them into little bits and plunged some in
> boiling pots, let others simmer

42 Atreus would like the gods to be another audience of his revenge tragedy, but he has already made them retreat in horror; cf. Tarrant 1985, ad loc. Medea and Atreus are concerned with their 'tragedy's' reception: Medea wants the *hic-et-nunc* approval of an in-person audience, while Atreus wants subsequent audiences to continue to admire his work (Sen. *Thy.* 192–193). Such an attitude is indicative of the sublime poet, according to Schiesaro 2003; cf. Leigh 1997, 326 f. on the 'future of literary immortality'.

43 Littlewood 2004, 214.

on slow fires; I carved off limbs and sinews
from still-living bodies; after impaling the entrails
on a thin spit I watched them groan, and I heaped up fires
with my own hand. All these things their father could have
done better. My suffering proved fruitless.
He gnashed his own sons with his wicked teeth, but he did not realize it—
they did not realize it.

ex vulnere ipso sanguinem calidum in tua
defundere ora debui, ut viventium
biberes cruorem …
in parva carpsi frusta et haec ferventibus
demersi aenis; illa lentis ignibus
stillare iussi. Membra nervosque abscidi
viventibus, gracilique traiectas veru
mugire fibras vidi et aggessi manu
mea ipse flammas. Omnia haec melius pater
fecisse potuit, cecidit in cassum dolor:
scidit ore natos impio, sed nesciens,
sed nescientes.

Voluntarily or not, an audience cannot help but imagine these 'improvements'. In a kind of counterfactual *enargeia*-by-*praeteritio*, the unenacted version becomes magnified as it plays out in the imagination. Through his characters' graphic descriptions, Seneca assaults the mind's eye with an unsettling image and then compels us to complete the picture.[44] This reflects a subtle understanding of the ways in which a receiver collaborates with an author: first it co-creates the scene in the topography of the mind, and then it responds to the attendant moral and aesthetic implications.[45]

As orators do, Seneca harnesses the potential for visualizations to inhere in memory and to affect thought, emotion, and action. In his prose works, he often exhorts his interlocutor to imagine something in order to provide an analogy or illustrate a particular thought, saying to 'picture' this or that.[46] At first glance it might seem that to achieve the converse, a deliberate 'anti-visualization', one would simply have to cast out the thought. Yet it is not always quite so easy to banish certain ideas, especially those that

44 As Erasmo 2004, 128 f. points out.

45 See Webb 2009, 109 on the way in which an individual must supplement an ecphrastic description by 'filling in the gaps'; the process is productive of a kind of intimacy or shared mindset between the two. Cf. the supplemental function of Iser's reader-response theory, where reading is a dialogic process of creation and reception in which meaning is activated by the receiver rather than a top-down model of transmission.

46 *Propone*, *pictura*, and related imperatives are often used.

are emotionally charged. The *Troades* illustrates this phenomenon when Andromache demands that Astyanax erase the deeds of his exemplary ancestors from his memory (Sen. *Tro.* 712–714):

> Erase from your mind your kingly forefathers,
> and the magnificent old man famous for his laws through
> all the lands. Let Hector fall out of your memory,
> Play the captive …
>
> pone ex animo reges atavos
> magnique senis iura per omnes
> inculta terras. excidat Hector;
> gere captivum …

But in a paradoxical twist of cognition, this instantly calls to mind (his, hers, and ours) precisely what is supposed to be forgotten. The memory of her husband and countrymen inheres so firmly in Andromache's mind that it infuses her every thought and action. This obsessive attachment to the past mentally reenacts the Trojans' experience, which displaces, and becomes more real to her, than current lived experience. Immediately after telling Astyanax to put it out of his mind, she demands that the boy 'play' the role of captive (*gere captivum*). It seems as though Astyanax will indeed prove victim in every way, including with respect to his imagination, which makes the events of the final act (see below) even more astonishing.

In a similar vein, the *Thyestes*' messenger wants to forget the murder-sacrifice he has witnessed. Hoping the terrible image might be erased from his memory, he begs—twice—to be carried away in a cyclone, but instead perpetuates the *nefas* by re-telling it in graphic detail.[47] Seneca's Oedipus also exemplifies this phenomenon when, after his self-blinding, he longs for his ears to be removed.[48] But he is doomed to the bitter reality that the senses do not hold complete sway over perception—nor does force of will. Even with total sensory deprivation, knowledge of his past deeds would be inescapable due to the faculties of imagination and memory. The mind's eye does not easily close, as Seneca's tragic characters come to realize, and *pone ex animo* is not nearly as easy as *propone*—in fact, *both* commands lead to the continued force of the mental image.

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[47] Sen. *Thy.* 623–625; *Thy.* 635–638. Here the semantic link with *nefas* as 'unspeakable' is explicit: he dramatizes the tension between not wanting to tell the horror and perpetuating the evil by speaking out.

[48] 'The *nefas* still inheres in me and keeps bursting out again, and my ears burden me with all that my eyes have saved me from' (*inhaeret ac recrudescit nefas/subinde, et aures ingerunt quidquid mihi/donastis, oculi*, Sen. *Phoen.* 231–233).

Both Medea's imagined abortion and Oedipus' imagined self-mutilation foist images on the mind that, while repellent, are not inconceivable, and thus do not violate the strictures of tragic representation. But the example of over-the-top revenge Atreus concocts offers a paradox that strains the limits of plausibility. Atreus wants Thyestes to feast on his sons knowingly, but this would violate the laws of human nature, for one thing: even if he were somehow willing to consume his children, revulsion would take over. Cannibalism is the paradigmatic activity that generates reflexive disgust (*fastidium*) even by thinking of it.[49] Atreus' unenacted play, with Thyestes as eager cannibal, is also incompatible with tragic representation, since it would lack the crucial elements of reversal and recognition.[50] Atreus' description of his brother, then, not only shocks—it calls into question what tragedy is and does.[51]

Senecan revengers' obsessive desire to outdo stretches tragic representation to its breaking point. In these plays, even what is gruesome and unenacted—*especially* this—cannot remain hidden but continues to have an effect in the mind's eye, like a recurring nightmare. An audience that may have sympathized with the creative geniuses is compelled to renegotiate their original response. Time and again, Seneca makes it difficult for his receivers to be inert spectators; in the face of such *nefas*, his audience is challenged to evaluate what an 'appropriate' type of aesthetic response is to such 'inappropriate' acts.

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[49] Language centered around the eyes and stomach is indicative of reflexive *fastidium*, where the true locus seems to be the mind's eye. The three tracks along which Roman *per se fastidium* run, according to Kaster 2001, are incest, cannibalism, and boasting; Seneca's *Thyestes* engages with all three. In fact, it is Atreus' *superbia* which makes him confident that he can triumph over his brother's instinctive aversion to eating human flesh. Kaster isolates boasting as a Roman-specific trigger of *fastidium*. Both *ekplêxis* and *fastidium* provoke an instantaneous involuntary reaction, and both allow for a different response *after interpretation*; Kaster 2001, 150 terms this *fastidium* 'deliberative and ranking' and links it with the evaluatory faculties of taste (as for material objects, food, or art) and symbolic capital. Gendler 2003, 131–135 notes that the mere thought of a situation can provoke a strong, even physiological, response that approximates real instances ('affective transmission'). His example is of sexual fantasy generating actual arousal; analogously, hearing about or picturing something to which one has a phobia can cause symptoms of real fear, such as rapid heartbeat and sweating.

[50] Nor would it be a torture play, since (as Atreus makes clear) Thyestes would not be forced to devour his sons.

[51] The avengers' actions parallel those a 'belated' tragedian must undertake in order to create a version that is somehow better—by being 'worse' or more shocking than—literary models. Agapitos 1998, 232 and Schiesaro 2003, 127 ff. convincingly link poetic *aemulatio* with the desire for tragic revenge.

Seneca's tragedies remind us that we can be at the mercy of our own thoughts against our will, and that others can commandeer this power as well. Here the bounds of psychology, epistemology, and aesthetics collapse as we are almost palpably 'seized by the hair'. It is not, I argue, the image or even the disturbing content that is the most influential factor but the disturbing realization that one has participated in devising something worse (more horrific) than the *nefas* of a tragic poet and his vengeful characters. In the world of Seneca's dramas, 'out of sight' is anything but 'out of mind'.

4. Troades*: Crowd Control*

The final act of Seneca's *Troades* features embedded audiences who witness or hear about the deaths of the Trojan youths Polyxena and Astyanax, which are presented as dual performances. In this *mise-en-abyme*, slippage between performance and 'reality' also translates to the moral atmosphere, making distinctions between crime and upright actions difficult.[52] Many of the victorious Greeks are reluctant to have these youths killed, yet they realize that Trojan stock must be eradicated in order for the Greeks to return in final victory, as was decreed by fate. The deaths themselves occur offstage and are recounted to the Trojan women by one level of audience, the messenger, who describes them as if at a tragedy or gladiatorial spectacle.[53] While the crowd is ostensibly gathered not for a *representation* of an execution but for an actual one,[54] the messenger's focalization of the events as theater calls for examining this final act *vis-à-vis* aesthetic response. Like other Senecan plays, the *Troades* features a paradigmatic tension between speaking and being silent about crime.[55] When the messenger summarily announces to the Trojan women that the youths displayed exemplary bravery in dying, he might have stopped there. Instead, he expatiates on what he calls the *duplex nefas*. His speech is already, then, both a re-performance and a commentary.

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52 See the commentaries of Fantham 1982; Boyle 1994; and Keulen 2001; see especially Shelton 2000 and Erasmo 2004 on the metadramatic register of the deaths.

53 The whole event is called the 'final act' of falling Troy, *partem ruentis ultimam Troiae vident*; where *pars* can mean a 'role' in a play (*OLD*, s.v. 9). The theatrical paradigm suffuses the messenger's interpretation, while certain spectators respond as if to a gladiatorial display (see below). Ker 2009, 131 examines how Seneca 'multiplies death through an accumulation of distinct visual perspectives'.

54 Cf. Boyle 1994 110, who notes that 'There is much about the event that recalls the costumed executions, the fatal charades, of the Roman arena'.

55 See Schiesaro 2003.

4.1. Leve vulgus, ferus spectator

The presentation of audience response in this last act oscillates between individuals, collectivities, and audience segments in quasi-filmic sequences of cutting, panning, and zooming. Contrary to the vanquished Trojans, the victorious Greek spectators are not (any longer) in physical danger; thus at first glance they would seem prime candidates for embodying the critical distance necessary for responding to the deaths *qua* staged *mimeseis*. Indeed, cued into their roles as spectators, they display sorrow but do not intervene to prevent the deaths, similarly to how a theatergoing audience would refrain from leaping up to stop onstage violence. Their removed vantage point is also reflected in ready-made hillside theater of the landscape.[56] As Lawall observes, the 'birds-eye view' reflects the 'distanced perspective of the audience/reader'.[57] And yet the Greek response is not unilinear but fragmented, as some struggle with the competing drives of vengeance and pathos in apprehending a scene that is simultaneously performance and actuality. I believe that these discrete responses are made to suggest the ambivalence that underlies instances of representational cruelty.

The Greeks are characterized collectively as a 'shallow mob' (*leve vulgus*). Eager spectators jockey for prime viewing spots. Even as they weep collectively at the death of Astyanax, their gaze is immediately arrested by the next spectacle, that of the dying Polyxena (Sen. *Tro.* 1119–1120):[58]

> NU. The Greek mob wept at the *nefas* it committed;
> this same crowd went back for a second crime …
>
> NU. flevitque Achivum turba quod fecit *nefas*,
> idem ille populus aliud ad facinus redit …

Though they detest the act, by and large they cannot resist looking: 'the majority of the shallow mob detests the crime—and watches' (*magna pars vulgi levis/odit scelus spectatque*, Sen. *Tro.* 1128–1129).[59] This instance of seeing something awful but ineluctably irresistible recalls the corpses seen by Plato's Leontius, but this time a moral charge is activated.[60]

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[56] The hillside arises *theatri more* (Sen. *Tro.* 1125).

[57] Lawall 1982, 9.

[58] Littlewood 2004, 254.

[59] See Leigh 2004, 131–132 on *levitas* as a quality of crowds. On the *levis turba*, cf. Hor. *Carm.* 1.10.18f. *Levitas* is a difficult word to render into English; it can designate 'folly', 'triviality', 'shallowness', 'inconstancy'.

[60] Pl. *Resp.* 439e. The syntax also underscores the moral ambivalence: in Senecan tragedy this type of parataxis often accompanies moments of being torn between competing desires

The shallowness of crowds yields a familiar rhetorical and philosophical topos, as in the *levitas* of the *vulgus* watching a youth pitted against a lion.[61] The typical *vulgus* has a short attention span, is impulsive in judging, and is susceptible to the tide of popular opinion. One particularly inhumane individual in the *Troades*' mob, the *ferus spectator*, debases Hector's tomb by using it as a prime viewing box.[62] So far removed is this spectator that his savage interest in seeing the 'spectacle' trumps his basic humanity. Betraying no glimmer of empathic engagement, this individual merely clamors for more violence, like the common gladiatorial mob. As elsewhere in Senecan tragedy, the participatory function of the audience is aestheticized and colors the meaning of the performance as a whole. Within the faceless, non-critical *leve vulgus*, Seneca deploys the *ferus spectator* as an undeniably negative exemplum—but also as a potentially disconcerting mirror, as each member of his own audience is compelled to examine whether he or she, too, exhibits features of the *ferus spectator*. Finally, this hardened audience member makes one wonder what type of pathos (if any) might be able to move such a seemingly unreachable receiver.

4.2. *Greek Tears*

The outpouring of emotion from the Greeks in the final scene of the *Troades* has been interpreted variously, as an expression of collective guilt or a masking of triumphant glee. I would like to argue, however, that the picture of Greek (and Trojan) tears is less straightforward than has often been assumed, and that it provides a commentary on the complex interrelationships between internal and external audiences *vis-à-vis* aesthetic response. To give a basic sketch, the Greek spectators weep more profusely than the

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(or what should be competing desires), as it allows actions to stand in parallel, where a subordinating relationship—temporal, causal, or concessive—would prioritize one over another. Cf. Phaedra's *libet loqui pigetque* ('I desire to speak—and it shames me', Sen. *Phaed.* 637) and Cassandra's *video et intersum et fruor* (Sen. *Aga.* 873). On Senecan parataxis, see Schiesaro 2003, 241–242.

61 Sen. *Prov.* 2.7–9. In Seneca's *Hercules Furens* 169, the enthusiasm of the *mobile vulgus* is infectious. Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 2.17.24: *audientium mobiles animi et tot malis obnoxia veritas*.

62 *atque aliquis (nefas!)/tumulo ferus spectator Hectoreo sedet*, Sen. *Tro.* 1086–1087. *Ferus* suggests 'savage', 'barbarous', and 'animalistic' qualities. Shelton (1988) provides an excellent close reading of this scene, as do Mader 1997 and Littlewood 2004. Shelton 2000, 107f. sees the Greek crowd and this particular spectator as analogous to Romans spectacles: 'Their lofty positions ... produced the same symbolic distinctions between victor and vanquished which the Roman amphitheatres emphasized'. See also Littlewood 2004, 246 on the *ferus spectator* who blends together 'elements from within and without the dramatic illusion', where the *vulgus* is paradigmatic of an 'ambivalent spectatorship'.

timidi Trojans.[63] Some scholars see these Greek soldiers' tears as genuine, and suppose that they have learned from observing their enemies' demise.[64] Others believe that the Trojans' moderate reactions indicate that they, as well as the Greeks, are able to view the deaths of the youths as staged performance.[65] But I would resist taking both of these lines of thought as givens. For one thing, the Trojans' recent experience of grief and loss, as well as the exigencies of their new status as powerless under the Greeks, render a reflective response improbable. They cannot (understandably) muster the detachment necessary to respond to what they are seeing as anything other than an actual excruciating experience. That the Trojans, who have every reason to lament, utter tentative wails is telling. They cannot interpret the event as staged performance *and* they seem afraid to offer emotive expressions of their suffering in front of the Greek victors—a marked reminder of the power structures that underlie artistic production and consumption. The Trojans' response, then, can be seen as a potential model for the 'muting' that can occur when aesthetic response is policed.

On the other hand, in the Greeks' more emotive wailing can be seen the unrestrained tears of victors who occupy a safe position. At the same time, the Greeks seem hyper-aware of their dual roles as audience and performer—that is, as spectators who are themselves being watched—and strive to outdo others in affective display. The duality of being simultaneous performers and audience members is at home in imperial Rome, where the nature of a theater, and especially of an amphitheater, promotes the viewing of other spectators' reactions.[66] The crowd itself, as performing entity, vies with the stage or arena action for attention.[67] In the *Troades*, the Greeks certainly *seem* to be expressing actual emotion, but it is not unequivocally clear that this is the case. As Apollonius' dictum reminds, 'nothing dries more quickly than a tear'.[68] Are the Greeks genuinely moved by the pathos of what they are seeing, or do they cry quick-drying crocodile tears?

63 *timidum ... gemitum*, Sen. *Tro.* 1160. The Trojans are *pavidi metu* (Sen. *Tro.* 1130), yet they too throng about to witness Astyanax's death scene.

64 E.g. Shelton 2000, 110.

65 E.g. Schiesaro 2003.

66 Ahl 1976, 22–23 observes that Seneca describes the landscape as amphitheater-like, which allows spectators to view the 'myth-on-stage' tableau.

67 This is the central thesis of Bartsch's study on the fluidity of actor and audience roles, and the ubiquitous performativity of the early empire (1994).

68 Preserved in Latin quotation in *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* 2.50 and in Cic. *Inv.* 1.109. Cf. Quintilian's reference, Quint. *Inst.* 6.1.27: *nec sine causa dictum est nihil facilius quam lacrimas inarescere*. On this maxim, see Webb 2009, 138.

The Greeks' behavior, I submit, reflects the ancient line of thought that the *representation* of an emotion can in fact be more powerful than an actual emotion.[69] But one must have a good amount of distance from the situation in order to assume an emotion in a calculated way. This rhetorical commonplace is one that orators (poets and actors, too) could obviously manipulate to their advantage, as a relevant passage in Senecan prose illustrates (Sen. *De Ira* 2.17.1):

> 'The orator', he says, 'sometimes does better when angry'. No, rather when he feigns anger. For actors also move an audience ... not when angry, but when they play the role of angry man well; ... and wherever we must force our opinion on the minds of others, we pretend now anger, now fear, now pity, in order that we may excite these in others—and often the imitation of emotions has an effect which actual emotions would not engender.
>
> 'orator' inquit 'iratus aliquando melior est'. immo imitatus iratum; nam et histriones in pronuntiando non irati populum movent, sed iratum bene agentes; et ... ubicumque alieni animi ad nostrum arbitrium agendi sunt, modo iram, modo metum, modo misericordiam, ut aliis incutiamus, ipsi simulabimus, et saepe id quod veri adfectus non effecissent effecit imitatio adfectuum.[70]

Similarly, Quintilian asserts that emotions are not in our power (*neque enim sunt motus in nostra potestate, Inst.* 6.2.29). When he recommends the temporary rousing of emotions in oneself in order to affect an audience, he uses an example from the theater (Quint. *Inst.* 6.2.26; 6.2.35):

> For the indispensable part ... in rousing emotions resides in this: that we ourselves be stirred.
>
> ... Often I have observed actors and comedians, when they have taken off their mask after an especially challenging performance, leave the stage while still weeping.[71]
>
> summa enim ... circa movendos adfectus in hoc posita est, ut moveamur ipsi.
>
> ... vidi ego saepe histriones atque comoedos, cum ex aliquo graviore actu personam deposuissent, flentes adhuc egredi.

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[69] I follow Webb 2009, 72–73 in adducing the *De Ira* passage in the discussion of the 'put-on' emotions that stir an audience's emotions.

[70] The text of *De Ira* is Reynolds' *OCT*.

[71] 'And Quintilian himself has [...] been moved, has cried, has gone pale and has been gripped by a pain like to something real' (Webb 2009, 137–138). But Leigh 2004, skeptical of Quintilian's own motives and emotional state, complicates the picture, stressing the necessary artifices of Quintilian the speaking persona of the text versus Quintilian the real person.

The notion of a gap between the put-on emotions of the actor/reciter versus the authentic ones of the original speaker stretches back to Plato's *Ion*. The Greeks' response is more emotive (that is, mimetic of real unrestrained lament) than that of those who are actually suffering grief.[72] Another clue that there is more to the weeping Greeks than meets the eye lies in the fact that they begin crying *before* the deaths occur. In their anticipatory response, they occupy a pole opposite, but complementary to, that of the Trojan youths who forestall their killers. Ultimately, these Greek tears do not admit of an easy answer. In this powerfully resonant scene, theirs is among the most elusory of audience response in Senecan tragedy.

4.3. *Audience Alignment and the Power of* pathos

A vast divide separates the various embedded audiences' reactions in the final scene of Seneca's *Troades*. These strands of audience response dramatize emphatically the disjuncture that can stem from power dynamics and from close involvement in a situation. The single vantage point that had been careening in several directions due to competing drives of pathos, retribution, and fate finally veers into alignment—but only in the play's final moments, when the two Trojans actually go to meet their prescribed deaths.[73] The linchpin here is the youths' attitude toward their impending doom. Rather than display fear or cowardice, Polyxena and Astyanax meet death with calm self-assurance, which (seemingly paradoxically) leads to detachment. What is more, they do not just face their deaths willingly but anticipate their executioners in taking death into their own hands. In contrast to Pyrrhus, who is reluctant to deal the death-blow, Polyxena strides ahead of her executioner;[74] similarly, Astyanax leaps to his death of his own accord, before the stroke of Ulysses. Not surprisingly, the two are often adduced as Stoic exempla. Their extreme autonomy in contradistinction to the mindset of everyone else who was present is especially apparent in how

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72 This would also resonate with Romans who were used to seeing the claques of professional mourners hired to perform at funeral ceremonies. The adverb describing how Seneca's Greeks wept in comparison with the Trojans is also telling: *clarius* is normally translated as conveying volume level, but clarity is also a key component of *enargeia*.

73 Death can be an opportunity for a performance. See Ker 2009 for an in-depth analysis of Seneca's staging of his own death scene and its reception.

74 *Pyrrhum antecedit* (Sen. *Tro*. 1147); … *audax virago non tulit retro gradum/conversa ad ictum stat truci vultu ferox*, Sen. *Tro*. 1151–1152. Cf. Seneca's portrait of the ideal Stoic who is not dragged by, but keeps up with, and even precedes, fate: … *non trahuntur a fortuna, sequuntur illam et aequant gradus; si scissent, antecessissent* (Sen. *Prov*. 5.4).

they interact with their audiences. Astyanax turns the mirror to the audience, gazing defiantly at the spectacle of his spectators,[75] while Polyxena keeps her eyes modestly lowered as she radiates[76] beauty. It is clear that in the final moments, the two captivate their own captors. As the onlookers' loud wailing is momentarily quelled, dumbstruck as they suddenly are, the youths' unbroken silence is a striking accompaniment to the tragic scene. It reveals their steadfast resolve and perhaps also tacitly insists that the action (and its representation?) is *nefandum*. In the end, it seems, no words suffice to capture what they are experiencing.

The moment of greatest audience alignment occurs when Polyxena meets her death: *everyone* reacts with pity, fear, and wonder (Sen. *Tro.* 1143; 1146–1148):[77]

> NU. The entire crowd is stunned …
> Her brave spirit moves all as she strides before Pyrrhus
> to meet her death; the minds of all quake in fear,
> are awe-struck and feel pity.
>
> NU. stupet omne vulgus …
> movet animus omnes fortis et leto obvius
> Pyrrhum antecedit. omnium mentes tremunt,
> mirantur ac miserantur.

'Pity' and 'fear' explicitly gloss Aristotle's articulation of the emotions a tragedy should produce, but with an additional element of wonder injected. This wonder evokes the *ekplêxis* engendered by a powerfully arresting work. The way in which the two young Trojans meet and appropriate their impending death is unprepared-for by anything else in the drama, and, I believe, is presented as able to produce a uniform reaction in the various internal and external audiences. Regardless of their political allegiance or lived experience, *all* who are present experience this shared response. Even the executioners are overcome. Likewise, the *feri spectatores*, thinking that they are about to witness *mera homicidia*, become captivated by their captives.

The initially discordant reactions render the unilateral response that much more impacting in retrospect. No matter what mindset an audience

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75 *vultus huc et huc acres tulit / intrepidus animo*, Sen. *Tro.* 1092–1093.

76 Literally—the messenger describes her as a stunning sunset, Sen. *Tro.* 1138–1142.

77 Here again my reading runs a different track (or at a different pace) from that of Shelton 2000, 110, who observes with respect to these lines that 'Seneca's succinct Latin captures well the vacillating crowd's response'. I see the vacillation as occurring earlier, while here the responses are most *alike*.

brings to the performance,[78] even an aloof, savage *vulgus* can be affected by a scene of extreme pathos.[79] And on the other side of the divide, the Trojan women can put aside their own extreme grief, at least momentarily. Perhaps even Andromache and Hecuba can appreciate that their young relatives' deaths will resonate with the continued force of exempla. The last scene, then, offers a corrective to the *aporia* that subtends the fragmented audience response at the beginning of the act. As the focus of all internal and external audiences finally coalesces, the drama suggests that some instances of tragic beauty are so affecting that they eclipse all external variables.

4.4. *A Coda of Critical Response?*

In the final scene of the *Troades*, the spectators' reactions dovetail at the point of the deaths, and then again diverge. Among the multiplicity of aesthetic response models to tragic horror, one in particular most closely approximates a model of critical engagement—that is, not a purely visceral, emotive response, but one that is reflective. Various elements lead to this coda of critical response during Polyxena's last moments (Sen. *Tro*. 1142–1143):

> NU. Some are affected by her physical beauty,
> others by her young age; still others are moved by the shifting tides of life.
>
> NU. … hos movet formae decus,
> hos mollis aetas, hos vagae rerum vices.

The majority are moved by the proximate cause: a young woman who is about to be sacrificed. But others are affected by the more amorphous shifting tide of life's events—or by the vicissitudes of history—or by cosmic flux itself.[80] This last element, *vagae rerum vices*, is not grammatically in parallel with the first two elements that characterize Polyxena herself; but I believe

[78] For the importance of the 'right' mindset of the spectator, see Nussbaum 1993 and Bartsch 2007. As Bartsch 2007, 94 points out, the proper Stoic response is *not* to be emotionally affected after experiencing the initial *ekplêxis*, but she believes this constitutes the fundamental difference between rhetorical and poetic ecphrasis; cf. [Longinus] *Subl.* 15.2. Bartsch does not, however, go on to tease out the implications of this line of thought for Senecan tragedy, or for poetry more generally.

[79] In this assessment I differ from Schiesaro 2003, 241 who comments: 'By multiplying the internal points of reference, and thus (apparently) offering substantial stimuli for a critical analysis of the implications of spectatorship, the play finally leaves the audience alone with, and probably puzzled by, its own critical burden'.

[80] The ambiguous phrase *vagae rerum vices* makes for a malleable interpretation and translation.

that it is at the crux of larger issues of interpretation. While I agree with Shelton[81] that such a scene can inspire the didactic function of reflecting on one's mortality or rehearsing one's death, I see a difference in scope: she thinks that at this point in the play all spectators are engaged with these larger themes, while I maintain that only a few are presented as sensitive, thoughtful responders.[82] The spectators who contemplate *vagae rerum vices* are, I argue, deployed in the coda to model a critically engaged subset that is to be imitated.[83] This response model—reflective rather than merely reflexive—is consonant with a stoicizing reading, and most closely approximates the 'critical spectatorship' Nussbaum details as marked by 'a concerned but critical detachment' that is productive of philosophical thought. The critical spectator is 'vigilant rather than impressionable, actively judging rather than immersed, critical rather than trustful'.[84] What is more, he or she exemplifies an 'engaged' aesthetic evaluation that commandeers the faculties of emotion, cognition, and judgment. Everyone is taken unawares by a powerfully moving scene, yet it is an extraordinary spectator who continues to engage reflectively, beyond the initial emotional impact.[85] To ponder themes activated by this play but outside the tragic action itself would be the most philosophical and empathic course, and might include asking oneself how one would act in a similar situation as the one doomed to die, as executioner, or as witness. The final scene of the *Troades* reveals how difficult it is to negotiate a critical path through this type of representation due to over-involvement, on the one hand, or extreme detachment, on the other. The model espoused by the Stoics (and elucidated by Nussbaum)

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81 Shelton 2000, 112.

82 This also seems in alignment with the reflections on instability and fate by the Chorus, as when two odes offer completely opposite views of what happens after death (nothingness, or an afterlife). Seneca also presents the youths' deaths paratactically, allowing both alternatives to stand without prioritizing one over another or offering a single definitive meaning.

83 Because of over-involvement (emotional attachment), that is characterized by vengeful urges, sorrow, or other passions, on the one hand; or detachment, on the other hand. Significantly, Polyxena's words intimate the ability of artistic representation to transcend political distinctions: Seneca does not specify whether these few reflective audience members are Greeks, Trojans, or a mixture.

84 See Nussbaum 1993, 137.

85 See Schiesaro 2003, 243–244 on *ictus animi* and internal audiences. Here again, the mindset an audience brings to the performance is key: the noontime spectators at the gladiatorial games of Sen. *Ep.* 7 certainly did not attend the games with a critically engaged mindset. To cite another parallel from Senecan prose: the paradigmatic angry man who views his reflection in the mirror will cease being angry only if he is already resolved to change (Sen. *De Ira* 2.36.3), while those whose anger persists actually find their own distorted reflections attractive.

does not argue for total disengagement from the work, or for the irrelevance of emotion in art. Rather, it suggests that there is a potential reaction that can stem from the initial response—and that, after a process of interpretation and judgment, can transcend it.[86]

In this way, art—even and perhaps especially 'dangerous' or 'challenging' art—has its place alongside more explicitly instructive modes as a means of illustrating and inspiring thought.[87] Perhaps, then, there is a redemptive aspect of representational *nefas* in the work it does at one or more levels of remove. In offering their own performance that deviates from the script the Greeks were intending, Astyanax and Polyxena continue to have an effect beyond the onslaught of emotion their scene of pathos initially produces. These figures are both transformed and transformative: they extend the bounds of time and space beyond a discrete iteration when they are concretized into tragic exempla. Agents at the moment of death, they continue to affect at least certain segments of their audiences—within the tragedies and without.[88]

5. *Conclusion*

Senecan tragedy, with its graphic specificity, morally ambiguous *dramatis personae*, and blurred lines between reality and performance, does not encourage hard and fast answers. In particular, the multiple modalities of audience participation, with a kaleidoscope of possible responses, makes audience members aware that they (we), too, might play the role of captive audience. Seneca's own audience is hard pressed to approach these dramas with a mere 'theatergoing' attitude, as *securi spectatores*. We, the external receivers, are challenged to negotiate the dramatic action that plays out before our eyes (or mind's eye) along with the 'drama' of our own syntheses of emotions, thoughts, and judgments.

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[86] This is also consistent with the 'cognitive' branch of Stoicism which holds that one's emotions are 'evaluative judgments' and must be interpreted (Nussbaum 1993), as distinct from the 'non-cognitive' branch which deals with music and poetry as irrational elements.

[87] Cf. Seneca's prioritizing of *exempla* over *praecepta* in protreptic philosophy (Sen. *Ep.* 6.5).

[88] Polyxena acts this out physically, when her lifeless body falls angrily on the tomb of Achilles; even if the action does not affect Achilles' shade, it affects both her immediate audience and subsequent receivers (similarly with Astyanax's final actions: while he hopes there is an underworld so he can commune with his ancestors, Polyxena, fearing a marriage to Achilles' shade, hopes that there is not an afterlife).

In conclusion, Seneca's audiences exemplify various forms of captivities. According to one model, that of the actual victim overpowered by an author-criminal, the audience identifies with the 'protagonists' but hits up against the predatory aspects of artistic production and reception.[89] As Schiesaro asks,[90] '[C]an we really loathe Atreus if we enjoy *Thyestes*?'. Or, to turn the mirror a different way, are there elements of Atreus or Medea in all of us? The *mise-en-abyme* of audiences in the *Troades* offers a range of aesthetic responses as the viewpoint oscillates from individuals to collective entities, and to spectators reacting to other spectators. And the final scene offers a corrective to the fragmented audience response earlier on: some works engender an impact so powerful that they transect power dynamics and transcend lived experience.

One of the many paradoxes of Senecan tragedy is that what is not present can seem more real, and can affect more violently, than an actual occurrence. This is especially true in scenes of a morally ambiguous nature, where the receiver's imagination must itself play a role as interpreting co-creator.[91] In light of the disturbing subject matter and complexities of audience participation, it might be asked, why choose to engage with these tragedies at all? What is the value of seeing, reading, hearing, or imagining *nefas*? There appears to be something ineffable about representations of morally challenging events that exercise a terrible fascination on the imagination. Such works, however, can also be among the most productive of critically engaged reflection. Tragedy's built-in dialogic function, with its various strata of actor- and audience-figures, encourages—sometimes forces—its receivers to resist a simple response.

The external audience, in contrast to inscribed ones, has one fundamental power: to leave altogether. Yet if we as audience stay, we put ourselves at the mercy of the tragic poet in ways that are analogous to the vulnerabilities of internal audiences. Knowing that the play may well lead us into over-involvement, questionable ethical positions, dangerous knowledge, or

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89 To reiterate an earlier caveat, this chapter does not treat all the instances of Seneca's internal audiences but focuses on select 'captive' ones.

90 Schiesaro 2003, 244.

91 But, seemingly paradoxically, these specific fictional *personae* can also lead to more extrapolizing, or generalizing, thought in a way that a vague commonplace cannot. John 2003, 148 locates this possibility in the 'elusive presence of the literary'; this can account for the 'presence' of someone who is absent (or who only exists in one's imagination). 'Counterfactual' and 'modal' thinking is necessary for engaging with any work of fiction (John 2003, 150). What *might* or *could* happen also recalls Aristotle's view of tragic probability and necessity.

disillusionment, we enter into a kind of 'contractual captivity' whereby we agree ahead of time to relinquish some autonomy in order to reap the potential aesthetic benefits. Of course, we may terminate the contract at any time by refusing to finish the play. But like averting one's eyes from a fascinating sight, or attempting to drive a strong image from the mind's eye, it may prove quite difficult to break the spell. And finally, if the play holds us in thrall in the way that powerful art can, we may come to reflect on what can be an ultimate captivity: the extent to which each of us is bound to our own too-human faculties of cognition, emotion, and imagination.[92]

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

CREATING CHLOE: EDUCATION IN EROS THROUGH AESTHETICS IN LONGUS' *DAPHNIS AND CHLOE*

Caitlin C. Gillespie

1. *Introduction*

The relationship between beauty and pleasure lies at the heart of Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*.[1] Throughout the novel, Daphnis and Chloe grow in life and love, playing childish games that lead to the desire for marriage and a complete understanding of the works of Eros. Education, achieved primarily through nature, music, and mimetic activity, is intricately connected to their recognition of beauty; the anticipation of the pleasure of Eros drives their actions. Daphnis and Chloe learn about beauty naturally, but need human teachers to make the connection between aesthetics and *erôs*. The novel culminates with Chloe's sexual initiation on her wedding night. At the final moment, Chloe reinterprets her pastoral experiences as *paignia*, thereby inviting the reader to reread Longus' text from the beginning, and derive from his novel the utility of aesthetics as a means of erotic education. This chapter examines the relationship between aesthetics and gender in Longus' Second Sophistic text.

Scholarship on gender in the genre of the novel, as well as the place of aesthetics and mimesis in education within the Greek novels, has noted the distinct importance of Longus' project.[2] Longus' novel has attracted a number of studies focused on art, *mimêsis*, and education on account of the author's

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[1] For basic bibliography on Longus and the ancient novel: cf. Morgan's 1997 bibliographical survey; Anderson 1982, 174–180; Hägg 1983, 235–250.

[2] On fiction as a means of persuasion and a vehicle of didactic lessons, see Morgan 1993. On the explicit educational program of Longus' novel as 'a self-conscious exception to the norm' in Greek novels, see Morgan 1996, 188. For studies in various aspects of Daphnis and Chloe's education see Morgan 1996, 167 ff.; cf. Turner 1960; Winkler 1990; Zeitlin 1990; and Teske 1991.

innovative and forthright proposal of his work as a mimetic response to a painting, and his identification of the subject of his work as eroto-didactic.[3] Scholars have debated the relative importance of education provided by nature versus nurture, and argued for a symbiotic relationship as well as the primacy of each source.[4] Inset *muthoi* contribute to the didactic function of the novel,[5] and are symbolic of the violence of Chloe's imminent sexual initiation.[6] Haynes provides the most extensive study of the construction of the 'feminine' in the Greek novels, whose female protagonists may appear transgressive at times, but preserve a traditional, conservative politics of gender underneath.[7] Multiple studies have connected Longus' inner narrative to his authorial framework, proposed various lessons for his readership,[8] and suggested the possibility of reading the novel as a *Bildungsroman*.[9] The following chapter combines gender and education-focused methods of study, and adds an inquiry into the place of natural versus adorned physical beauty in education.

Longus' text is unique among extant Greek novels: although ecphrasis is a common motif in the novels and other Second Sophistic literature, Longus is the only author to present his entire work as an ecphrasis, an aesthetic

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3 On the mimetic nature of the text, see Zeitlin 1994, esp. 153 on the Prologue and Longus' program: 'As the narrator imitates the painting, and the narrative works its mimetic effects on its readers, so the premise of the work is that children learn about eros through mimesis'. For references to mimesis in the text, cf. *D&C* 1.3.1, 1.9.2, 1.11.2, 2.25.3, 2.35.4, 2.37.1, 3.14.5, 3.16.1, 3.21.4, 3.23.4, 4.2.3, 4.17.6.

4 Cf. Morgan 1996, 169 for a symbiosis of 'acquired knowledge and skill with nature', Epstein 2002 for nature as the primary provider of education in the novel (although the human, divine, and animal worlds all contribute), and Winkler 1990, 103 on the requirement of training to fulfill one's natural erotic instinct. Zeitlin 1994, 149 proposes that imitation allows the author to bridge the worlds of art and nature. Maritz 1991 focuses on the education and utility of music in the novel, and the mimetic nature of music that connects the realms of the gods, man, and nature.

5 E.g. Wiersma 1990; Morgan 1994, 70. On the educational aspects of the *muthoi*, cf. MacQueen 1990, 27; Morgan 1996, 171.

6 E.g. Winkler 1990.

7 Haynes 2003.

8 The question of the external intended readership and its socio-economic and gender make-up has a long history of scholarship. For issues of literacy in the Second Sophistic, see Harris 1989, 267 for possible percentages. On the readership of novels in particular, see Rohde 1914, 67 ff.; Perry 1967, 177; Reardon 1974, 28; Hägg 1983, 95 ff.; Wesseling 1988. On specifically female literacy, see Harris 1989; Egger 1990; Cole 1991; and esp. Bowie 1994, 438: 'Even on a pessimistic view it is likely that many women achieved some basic literacy … that would enable them to read the text of a novel'; cf. further Haynes 2003, 4–9 on internal and external evidence for a female readership.

9 Morgan 1996; cf. Egger 1999 and Haynes 2003 on lessons for a specifically female readership.

response to an artistic object.[10] Longus' response in the form of a novel engages with the concept of *mimêsis* both as an imitation of the painting that inspired his work, and on the level of intertextuality.[11] A myriad of allusions to Longus' Greek predecessors, literary and theoretical alike, gives the novel a sense of self-conscious belatedness in the aesthetic tradition, but also allows the work to present a rare perspective on the place of aesthetics in education.[12] Longus responds foremost to Plato, and his engagement with the *Symposium* introduces the connection between beauty and *erôs* central to his text.

Plato's *Symposium*, a dialogue that engages directly with the connection between beauty and Eros, aesthetics and erotics, resonates throughout Longus' text in thematic material and specific textual allusions. Agathon's speech in the *Symposium* is reflected in Longus' Prologue and in Philetas' speech regarding Eros.[13] Longus introduces his novel as an *anathêma* (an offering) to Pan and the Nymphs;[14] similarly, Plato's Agathon concluded his speech by offering it up as a dedication to the god Eros (τῷ θεῷ ἀνακείσθω, Pl. *Symp.* 197e6–7). Both Agathon's speech and Longus' work are presented as physical gifts to the gods, analogous to votive offerings, statues, or other representational images; in this way, Longus' novel is closely connected to the painting it imitates. The novel may also be interpreted as an encomium to Eros, similar to the speech of Plato's Socrates in the *Symposium*. Scholars have yet to examine how Longus offers a twofold reaction to Plato's conception of the form of the beautiful, as presented in Socrates' account of Diotima's speech. Diotima, having decided that Eros is 'of beautiful things', and that the lover cherishes beautiful things because he desires to possess them for himself (Pl. *Symp.* 204d5–6), then argues that love is giving birth in the

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10 On the unique nature of this presentation, cf. MacQueen 1990, 132 ff.; Zeitlin 1994, 148.

11 On the imitation of earlier authors and *paideia* in the Greek novels cf. Anderson 1984, 43–61; on the two strands of *mimêsis* present in Longus cf. Zeitlin 1990, 437.

12 For intertextual play in Longus' novel cf. Hunter 2008, 59–83; Zeitlin 1990, 438; Zeitlin 1994, 153–157; on Longus' relationship to the historians in his Prologue cf. MacQueen 1990, 155–159; on Theocritus, bucolic poetry, and Longus cf. Scarcella 1971; Cresci 1999; Schönberger 1980; Hunter 1983, 59–83, 116–117 n. 1 and 5, with bibliography; on the self-conscious 'belatedness' of Second Sophistic authors and the indebtedness of Longus to the history of work on Eros, cf. Zeitlin 1990, esp. 420 on Philetas and Eros at *D&C* 2.5.2.

13 On the engagement of Longus' novel with Plato, esp. *Symp.* 195b–c, 203b and Philetas' tale of Eros at *D&C* 2.4–7 cf. Hunter 2008, 32, 96; Morgan 2004, 179 ff.; Hunter 2008, 91 identifies the connection with Agathon's speech on Eros in *Symposium* as follows: 'The Platonic Agathon is a perfect model for the mixture of poetry and sophistry that we find in *D&C*, and it can hardly be doubted that Longus was influenced by this speech'.

14 *D&C Prol.* 3.

beautiful (Pl. *Symp.* 206e5). Diotima's entire proposition was to teach Socrates how to engage in 'correct pederasty' (τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδεραστεῖν, Pl. *Symp.* 211b5–6; cf. 210a4–5, 211b7–c1), denying women a role in her discussion of Eros from the beginning (although Diotima is a woman herself).[15] Her speech focuses on Eros as the creation of something new (Pl. *Symp.* 206e). In the end, Socrates asks his audience to regard his speech, and Diotima's lessons within it, as an encomium to Eros (Pl. *Symp.* 212c1).

Longus responds to the arguments in Diotima's speech in Plato's *Symposium* by asking his reader to recognize that his novel presents a different nuance on the function and power of Eros. Longus does not place the love of a woman on the bottom rung, as in Diotima's Ladder of Love, which culminates with the beautiful as the ultimate goal. Rather, Longus has his female protagonist recognize beauty first, and complete her education with sex. The story of Chloe reinterprets the precepts of Diotima concerning love, possession, and the creation of something new through love: Eros guides the metamorphosis of a maiden into a woman, and thus promotes her transformation.

In *Daphnis and Chloe*, Pan announces that Chloe is not just the protagonist, but the subject of a *muthos* Eros is making (*D&C* 2.27.2); thus, she serves as a metonym for Longus' *muthos*, a story of love. Through the character of Chloe, Longus represents two forms of mimesis as acceptable modes of learning for a young woman: the imitation of an artistic moment, as in the copying of a song, and the embodiment of a model *in propria persona*, as in the appropriation of the actions of Echo.[16] By examining Chloe's particular responses, the reader understands the implicit gendered reading to be gleaned from the text.

This chapter addresses issues surrounding aesthetics and gender as contributing factors in an education in Eros, as portrayed in *Daphnis and Chloe*. Music, nature, and *muthoi* all contribute to Chloe's erotic education, as does her recognition of the beautiful that instigates her desire to understand the works of Eros. The Prologue establishes the position of the author relative to his own work, and contextualizes the novel as a response to a history of aesthetic theory (section 2). Educational moments throughout the novel integrate nature and nurture in the upbringing of Daphnis and Chloe (section 3). Chloe's education is complemented by the *muthoi* told by Daphnis

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[15] Cf. Halperin 1990, 279 for Diotima's language, which encompasses ideas of birth and reproduction, as a 'feminine, gender-specific experience'.

[16] Cf. the way in which Chloe responds to Daphnis 'just like an echo' (καθάπερ ἠχώ, *D&C* 3.11.1).

(section 4). Chloe's eventual objectification into an adorned beauty questions the purpose of her education; her physical appearance is praised by the social elite, but renders her musical and mimetic skills unnecessary (section 5). The final scene in *Daphnis and Chloe* completes Chloe's sexual education and the promises made in the Prologue (section 6), while questioning the place of Longus' female protagonist as a learned artist and imitator within her domestic world (conclusion, section 7).

2. *The Prologue*[17]

In his Prologue, Longus securely situates his novel within the milieu of Second Sophistic texts that address issues of beauty and possible responses to an image.[18] The reader learns that the entire text may be interpreted as an elaborate ecphrasis, as the writer's reaction to a visual wonder (θέαμα), 'a representation of an image, a tale of love' (εἰκόνος γραφήν, ἱστορίαν ἔρωτος, *D&C Prol.* 1). The painting, viewed in a cave of the nymphs, inspired him with a sudden longing, *pothos*, to describe and even rival the work of art through language (Longus *D&C Prol.* 3):

> A desire held me, gazing and wondering, to respond to the painting in writing; and having sought out an interpreter of the picture, I worked hard on four books, an offering to Eros and the Nymphs and Pan, and, on the other hand, a delightful possession for all men, which will both heal the sick and comfort those in grief, which will remind the one who has loved, and will educate him who has not loved.
>
> ἰδόντα με καὶ θαυμάσαντα πόθος ἔσχεν ἀντιγράψαι τῇ γραφῇ, καὶ ἀναζητησάμενος ἐξηγητὴν τῆς εἰκόνος τέτταρας βίβλους ἐξεπονησάμην, ἀνάθημα μὲν Ἔρωτι καὶ Νύμφαις καὶ Πανί, κτῆμα δὲ τερπνὸν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὃ καὶ νοσοῦντα ἰάσεται καὶ λυπούμενον παραμυθήσεται, τὸν ἐρασθέντα ἀναμνήσει, τὸν οὐκ ἐρασθέντα προπαιδεύσει.[19]

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17 On the Prologue, see esp. Hunter 1983, 38 ff.; Pandiri 1985, 116–118; Zeitlin 1990, 417–464; Teske 1991, 25 ff.; cf. further MacQueen 1990, 19–30 on the structure of the Prologue.

18 Cf. Zeitlin 1994, 148: 'By taking a painting as a frame and a motive for the romantic tale, the text brings to the fore those traditional associations of pleasure and persuasive charm (*terpsis*, *thelxis*, *peithô*) that from Homer on unite eros and art in their mutual aesthetic concern with the beautiful (*to kalon*) and its seductive and mesmerizing effects (*thauma*) on the beholder. In this convergence, the work looks back to what has come before it; yet the value and power it gives to descriptions of works of art, and to the ecphrastic impulse in particular, mark the text as a child of its time, sharing an aesthetic that belongs to the Second Sophistic'.

19 All Greek passages are from Morgan's 2004 text of *Daphnis and Chloe* unless otherwise noted; translations are mine.

Daphnis and Chloe develops from Longus' own desire, as author and spectator, to imitate visual beauty in a different aesthetic form. He attributes value to a painting through its effect on him, the observer, and suggests that his novel forms an appropriate aesthetic response. Following the twofold aim of collections of images, *Eikones* or *Imagines*,[20] his novel is mimetic and didactic: it imitates the story of the painting and teaches other lovers, both experienced and neophyte. Longus' novel is a *mimêsis* of a painting, which is in turn a *mimêsis* of life. Longus' introduction establishes an implicit tension between modes of art: the reader must wonder whether the author views his writing as a better, stronger, more persuasive form of didactic *tekhnê* than a pictorial representation.[21] He draws attention to the different forms through the phrase *historia erôtos*, which may be an account of love, as in his novel, as well as a picture of love, and through the use of *graphê*, which can refer to both writing and painting.[22] He hopes his work will become a lasting possession, echoing the goal of Thucydides (κτῆμα ... ἐς αἰεί, Thuc. 1.22.4; κτῆμα ... τερπνόν, *D&C Prol.* 3);[23] however, Longus adds an idea of pleasure to his account, and emphasizes the status of his story as a *muthos*, not a *logos*.[24]

The author establishes the original painting as a 'good' work of art through the word *pothos*. One might compare the Prologue of *Daphnis and Chloe* to the comic Dionysus of Aristophanes' *Frogs*, struck with *pothos* for Euripides while reading his *Andromeda* (Ar. *Ran.* 52–54). Halliwell argues that *pothos* may signify sexual desire (as Heracles understands it in the *Frogs*) as well as a poetic motif present in Gorgias (*Encomium of Helen* 9), for Gorgias, poetry, and perhaps painting and the visual arts as well, can also be the object of desire.[25] Longus' use of *pothos* frames the impetus for his work as erotic, and bridges the gap between his Second Sophistic novel and a history of ideas on aesthetic value going back to the sophists. Longus' authorial *pothos* connects the Prologue to his erotic subject matter, and to the genre of the novel: as Whitmarsh has argued, the theme of

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20 On which cf. Zeitlin 1990, 432.

21 Cf. Whitmarsh 2011, 93–96 on the Greek word play between *graphê* as 'painting' and 'written text', and the prefix '*anti-*' as placing emphasis on the difference between the two and establishing a competition between the narrator and his source painting.

22 As noted by Hunter 2008, 44.

23 As noted by Pandiri 1985, 117–118 and n. 9; Zeitlin 1994, 152; Morgan 2004, 147; Hunter 2008, 47–50.

24 Hunter 2008, 48 f. suggests the inclusion of pleasure is meant to align Longus to Herodotus.

25 Cf. Halliwell 2011, 101–102.

pothos, as both a desire for sex and for identity, characterizes many of the Greek novels and guides the plot towards the fulfillment of desire and civilized marriage.[26] The lesson of Longus' Prologue is that 'good' art is both the object of desire, and the inspiration for an additional artistic product. Longus' response, and the means to satisfy his *pothos*, is the novel we are about to read.

In the Prologue, Longus positions himself as a non-specialist, thereby removing himself from the responsibility of making a final judgment on the events of his novel. He notes that he had to 'seek out' an 'exegete' to explain the painting. The active search for a specialist implies that an authority is necessary in order for anyone to have the 'correct' aesthetic response intended by the artist. Any casual observer of this painting may have an emotional response—such as Longus' *pothos*—but further explanation is required for Longus to have the desired intellectual response as well. In his novel, various exegetes, and a series of verbs formed from the *zêteô*-root that signifies active 'seeking', help guide the reader to identify moments indicating the didactic function of the arts, particularly music. Longus defines his own set of evaluative markers by his three goals for his reader: the experience of pleasure, efficacy as a healing device, and didactic utility for lovers. These desired results address conceptions of beauty, pleasure, and utility, three concerns related to aesthetic evaluation. Thus, in his ecphrastic frame, Longus places an emphasis on art, aesthetic response, the beauty of nature, and mimesis as primary themes of his novel, a work of both pleasure and utility.

3. *Beauty and Knowledge*

Throughout the course of the novel, both Daphnis and Chloe learn to love through nature and the arts. Both children become literate and learn about pastoral beauty from their fathers.[27] Although they are country dwellers, the foster fathers of both children are literate, and can pass this on to their children. In addition, they have an understanding of the beauty of nature and the importance of *mimêsis* in education (and of rivalry with the model). After Longus' Prologue, in which he proposed his work as an attempt to surpass an artistic product, itself an imitation of nature, the first mimetic

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[26] Whitmarsh 2011, 139–176 and esp. 145f. on *pothos* as both a desire for sex and for identity.

[27] *D&C* 1.8.1: καὶ γράμματα ἐπαίδευον καὶ πάντα ὅσα καλὰ ἦν ἐπ' ἀγροικίας ('they had taught them their letters and all the beautiful things, as many as there were in the countryside').

act in the novel is a direct imitation of nature: both foster fathers adopt their foundlings, copying the care given by herd animals for the children, lest they appear less generous than the animals.[28] Thus, from the beginning, formal education runs parallel to the lessons of nature. The parents' goal in teaching Daphnis and Chloe their *grammata* is that this knowledge will assist them in gaining a higher social status (*D&C* 1.8.1).

The early education of Daphnis and Chloe juxtaposes present and anticipated social position, nature and nurture, in ways that echo back and forth throughout the text. After their primary education, they turn to nature for their next lessons. They lead joyful lives through learning to copy and even compete with nature in music and play (Longus *D&C* 1.9.1–2):

> Now there was the buzzing of bees, the echo of musical birds, the skipping of newborn sheep; the lambs leapt on the mountains, the bees buzzed in the meadows, the birds sang throughout the thickets. And since everything was so full of the joy of spring, and since they were inexperienced and young, they imitated what they heard and saw: hearing the birds singing, they sang, seeing the lambs skipping about, they leapt lightly, and imitating the bees they gathered flowers.
>
> βόμβος ἦν ἤδη μελιττῶν, ἦχος ὀρνίθων μουσικῶν, σκιρτήματα ποιμνίων ἀρτιγεννήτων· ἄρνες ἐσκίρτων ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσιν, ἐβόμβουν ἐν τοῖς λειμῶσιν αἱ μέλιτται, τὰς λόχμας κατῇδον ὄρνιθες. τοσαύτης δὴ πάντα κατεχούσης εὐωρίας οἷα ἁπαλοὶ καὶ νέοι μιμηταὶ τῶν ἀκουομένων ἐγίνοντο καὶ βλεπομένων· ἀκούοντες μὲν τῶν ὀρνίθων ᾀδόντων ᾖδον, βλέποντες δὲ σκιρτῶντας τοὺς ἄρνας ἥλλοντο κοῦφα, καὶ τὰς μελίττας δὲ μιμούμενοι τὰ ἄνθη συνέλεγον.

In their imitation of nature, Daphnis and Chloe follow the precept of *mimêsis* in early education designated as 'natural' in Aristotle's *Poetics* (1448b5–19). Longus' style accomplishes a similar action; he describes the present actions of the birds, bees, and sheep, repeats this action with the addition of location, and repeats the same actions for a third time, with the addition of Daphnis and Chloe as imitators.[29] Longus' trio of animals in a tricolon of activity that finally results in the children's mimetic response offers a metaliterary comment on the process of education as repetitive and imitative.[30] Daphnis and Chloe respond to each creature in turn, and Longus attributes this to their being inexperienced and young. His characterization implies

[28] *D&C* 1.3 and 1.6, on Daphnis and Chloe, respectively; Chloe's foster mother, Nape, is noted as fearful that the ewe might seem a better mother than she (*D&C* 1.6.3).

[29] Cf. Morgan 2004, 157 on the intricate style of the passage.

[30] On Longus' style as broken up into pairs, symmetries, variations, assonances, clauses of equal length, etc., those qualities that are held to be conducive to *terpsis* in the rhetorical handbooks, cf. Zeitlin 1990, 441 n. 73.

that they will soon grow out of this phase of their education; by the end of winter, they are not imitating, but rather competing with the song of the nightingales (*D&C* 3.12.4).[31] The direct imitation of nature that leads to the creation of music, and the formal lessons from their fathers, are the first two steps in Daphnis and Chloe's development; once they have gained this knowledge, they begin to recognize and respond to the beautiful through agonistic activity. The competitive nature of Daphnis and Chloe's responses becomes thematic in both their musical education and their relationship with each other and other potential lovers. Starting from the lessons of the Prologue, imitation and competition with the model provide the cornerstones to the growth of Daphnis and Chloe as artists and lovers.

As they are educated both by nature and their foster parents, Daphnis and Chloe become capable of responding to the sounds and beauty of nature from both emotional and intellectual viewpoints. One might say that they have intellectual pursuits that run parallel in development to their 'more-than-rustic' beauty (κάλλος αὐτοῖς ἐνεφαίνετο κρεῖττον ἀγροικίας, *D&C* 1.7.1); that is, they have a 'better-than-rustic' education as well. The recognition and identification of unadorned physical beauty is the primary impetus for Daphnis and Chloe's falling in love; a thorough examination of the beauty ascribed to Daphnis and Chloe adds to the understanding of the function of *mimêsis* in the text, and of the aesthetic predilections of the author.

In the Prologue, the visual experience of beauty prompted the spectator's desire to create an image of equal or greater beauty; within the novel, the recognition of physical beauty makes the observer want to create it herself. However, where the author-spectator Longus responded by making his own work of art, the female observer of beauty in his novel responds by attempting to transform herself into a beautiful aesthetic object. Chloe attributes aesthetic value to Daphnis himself, although she does not understand its cause. Eventually, Daphnis recognizes Chloe's beauty, and it becomes clear that both children have an appreciation for beauty that enhances their desire for an education in *erôs*.

The search for the beautiful begins with Chloe. She sees Daphnis as beautiful, and tries to imitate the actions that she thinks may have produced this beauty (Longus *D&C* 1.13.2):

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[31] The interplay between nature and man-made art runs throughout the text; cf. *D&C* 1.23.2, where the rivers seem to sing, and the winds sound like the syrinx pipe.

> His hair was black and thick, his body burned by the sun; one might have supposed that he was colored by the shadow of his hair. To Chloe, observing, Daphnis seemed beautiful, and because then was the first time that he seemed beautiful to her, she thought that the bath was the cause of his beauty.
>
> ἦν δὲ ἡ μὲν κόμη μέλαινα καὶ πολλή, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἐπίκαυστον ἡλίῳ· εἴκασεν ἄν τις αὐτὸ χρῴζεσθαι τῇ σκιᾷ τῆς κόμης. ἐδόκει δὲ τῇ Χλόῃ θεωμένῃ καλὸς ὁ Δάφνις, ὅτι δὲ τότε πρῶτον αὐτῇ καλὸς ἐδόκει τὸ λουτρὸν ἐνόμιζε τοῦ κάλλους αἴτιον.

For Chloe, *mimêsis* is the correct response to the observable beauty of another: in this episode, she takes a bath. Later, in response to Daphnis' beautiful syrinx song, she plays music.[32] Physically, Daphnis has a sunburnt, rustic beauty; he is directly contrasted with both Dorcon, another herdsman who seeks Chloe as a lover, and Chloe herself. When Daphnis and Dorcon debate their various qualities, the contrasting conceptions of male versus female beauty emerge. While Daphnis is dark-haired and tan, Dorcon is as white as a woman from town (λευκὸς ὡς ἐξ ἄστεος γυνή, *D&C* 1.16.5). His pale features are criticized by Daphnis, whereas Chloe's own paleness is a mark of her beauty. Chloe's skin is compared to goat's milk, a pastoral reference to a product of Daphnis' herd (*D&C* 1.17.3);[33] the same paleness was noted as a quality of women from town in the critique of Dorcon, and is a quality of the child Eros observed in Philetas' garden (*D&C* 2.4.1). Chloe's beauty is thus assimilated to the god of love, and is a quality of a noblewoman more than a rustic shepherdess.

Daphnis praises Chloe in his contest with Dorcon (εἶ καλή, *D&C* 1.17.1); Chloe interprets his comment as an encomium to her (in a way reminiscent of Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* and the connection between beauty and the power of persuasive speech). Daphnis' final compliment is more important than the entirety of his deliberative speech, as it solidifies his victory in the debate (as judged by Chloe) and wins him a kiss.[34] Chloe's kiss, although untutored and artless (ἀδίδακτον … ἄτεχνον), nevertheless changes Daphnis

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32 *D&C* 1.13.4: καὶ ἐδόκει καλὸς αὐτῇ συρίττων πάλιν, καὶ αὖθις αἰτίαν ἐνόμιζε τὴν μουσικὴν τοῦ κάλλους, ὥστε μετ' ἐκεῖνον καὶ αὐτὴ τὴν σύριγγα ἔλαβεν, εἴ πως γένοιτο καὶ αὐτὴ καλή ('and in playing the syrinx he seemed again beautiful to her, and this time she thought that the music was the cause of his beauty, so that after him she took up the pipes to see if in any way she herself might become beautiful too').

33 Cf. Theoc. *Id.* 11.20f.; on which cf. Morgan 2004, 166 for the Theocritean and other sources for this reference.

34 *D&C* 1.17.1: οὐκέθ' ἡ Χλόη περιέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἡσθεῖσα τῷ ἐγκωμίῳ, τὰ δὲ πάλαι ποθοῦσα φιλῆσαι Δάφνιν, ἀναπηδήσασα αὐτὸν ἐφίλησεν, ἀδίδακτον μὲν καὶ ἄτεχνον, πάνυ δὲ ψυχὴν θερμᾶναι δυνάμενον. ('no longer did Chloe hesitate, but pleased by the encomium, as well as having longed to kiss Daphnis for a long time, she leapt up and kissed him, an untaught and artless kiss, but definitely able to warm the soul').

completely; after this kiss Daphnis truly *sees* Chloe. Longus says that it was just as if at this point Daphnis acquired eyes (ὥσπερ τότε πρῶτον ὀφθαλμοὺς κτησάμενος, *D&C* 1.17.3); here, Daphnis becomes an example of the precept at the end of Longus' Prologue, to the effect that no one escapes Eros as long as beauty exists and there are eyes to see (πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς Ἔρωτα ἔφυγεν ἢ φεύξεται μέχρις ἂν κάλλος ᾖ καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ βλέπωσιν, *D&C Prol.* 4).[35] Daphnis has acquired a new form of sight with the touch of Chloe's lips; now, he is able to see beauty, and is vulnerable to the pain of Eros.

For Chloe, the visual experience of seeing Daphnis naked formed her initial impression of physical beauty; for Daphnis, the touch of Chloe's kiss aroused his other senses, and his visual recognition of Chloe's physical beauty. A second bath solidifies Daphnis' view of Chloe as perfectly beautiful.[36] Both Daphnis and Chloe recognize each other's beauty, but it takes the explanation of Eros given by Philetas to connect the importance of physical beauty to an understanding of the place of aesthetics in erotic education. Philetas, a cowherd, excellent musician, and learned elder whose name is reminiscent of the Hellenistic poet, serves as a bucolic *praeceptor amoris* for the couple.[37] He tells them the story of Eros as a specifically didactic lesson in love, thereby granting authority to *muthoi* as stories used for educational purposes. The children take delight in his tale and ask questions, prompting Philetas to identify Eros (Longus *D&C* 2.7.1):[38]

> They were especially delighted, just as if hearing a *muthos*, not a *logos*, and they inquired whatever Love is, whether a child or a bird, and what was his power. Therefore Philetas spoke again, 'Eros is a god, children, young and beautiful and winged. On account of this, he delights in youth and pursues beauty and makes souls winged'.
>
> πάνυ ἐτέρφθησαν ὥσπερ μῦθον οὐ λόγον ἀκούοντες καὶ ἐπυνθάνοντο τί ἐστί ποτε ὁ Ἔρως, πότερα παῖς ἢ ὄρνις, καὶ τί δύναται. πάλιν οὖν ὁ Φιλητᾶς ἔφη· 'θεός ἐστιν, ὦ παῖδες, ὁ Ἔρως, νέος καὶ καλὸς καὶ πετόμενος. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ νεότητι χαίρει καὶ κάλλος διώκει καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναπτεροῖ'.

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35 Cf. Morgan 2004, 150 on the connection between this phrase and the 'Platonic conception of the genesis of love through the visual apprehension of beauty' in esp. Pl. *Phdr.* 249d ff.

36 *D&C* 1.32.1: καὶ αὐτὴ τότε πρῶτον Δάφνιδος ὁρῶντος ἐλούσατο τὸ σῶμα, λευκὸν καὶ καθαρὸν ὑπὸ κάλλους καὶ οὐδὲν λουτρῶν ἐς κάλλος δεόμενον ('and then for the first time she bathed her body in the sight of Daphnis, pale and pure by its beauty and not needing a bath to be beautiful').

37 Morgan 2004, 177 ff.

38 On the Platonic echoes in Philetas' description, esp. of *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, cf. Morgan 2004, 182.

The road to an education in Eros is fraught with minor challenges that postpone sexual fulfillment until Daphnis and Chloe are married. One additional passage solidifies the connection between Eros and beauty, identified by Philetas, and introduces Chloe's transformation as the eventual culmination of the lessons of the novel. After Chloe is captured by brigands, she is allowed to return home after a vision—an *eikôn*—of Pan appears and reprimands the captain of the ship (Longus *D&C* 2.27.2):

> You have torn away from a shrine a maiden of whom Eros intends to make a *muthos*, and you have neither respected the Nymphs looking on, nor me, Pan.
>
> ἀπεσπάσατε δὲ βωμῶν παρθένον ἐξ ἧς Ἔρως μῦθον ποιῆσαι θέλει, καὶ οὔτε τὰς Νύμφας ᾐδέσθητε βλεπούσας οὔτε τὸν Πᾶνα ἐμέ.

With these words, Pan credits Chloe with the role of protagonist in a *muthos* to be created by Eros. Pan subtly introduces the ambiguity of Chloe's position, as both a subject with personal agency, as well as the object of Eros' work: her agency is limited and contained within the framework of the artifex Eros' future creation, and Pan's comment hints at Chloe's aesthetic objectification that eventually occurs in the novel itself. In Philetas' speech regarding Eros, the elderly herdsman emphasized that Eros is beautiful, and pursues the beautiful. Chloe emerges as one of Eros' pursuits, and the subject of his erotic tale. In this statement, Chloe's beauty is confirmed: it holds not only in the eyes of Daphnis, but also in those of the god of love and the pastoral deities Pan and the Nymphs; in Eros' intent to make a *muthos* out of Chloe, readers are primed for her increasingly passive role in her tale.[39] The words of Pan compel readers to reexamine the other *muthoi* of the novel, and compare the protagonists and plots with Chloe's situation.

From this section, we may conclude that Chloe's beauty is a known entity from her early childhood, recognized by both human and divine audiences. As in the Prologue, the recognition of beauty creates desire in the observer to craft such beauty; while Longus produces another artistic object, Chloe, after noticing Daphnis' beauty, tries to fashion herself into a beautiful object. Thus Longus and Chloe both engage in mimetic activity as a way of responding to beauty. Chloe's education outside of her adaptation of the beautiful develops more gradually. The next section examines Chloe's education as provided by *muthoi*, and the second form of mimesis that is not pure imitation, but rather the adoption of another persona. Chloe's

[39] On Chloe as symbolic of Longus' *muthos* cf. Morgan 1994.

imitation of beauty in others and music created by others, as well as her assimilation to the women in *muthoi* told throughout the novel, result in Chloe's transformation into an aesthetic object.

4. *Chloe,* muthoi*, and* mimêsis

Mimêsis is the desired reaction to *muthoi*, which include both Philetas' tale and the three inset myths. The *muthoi* are necessary to Chloe's education: as a pupil of Daphnis and Philetas, she learns to become a woman. As Daphnis and Chloe herd their flocks together, natural occurrences such as birdsong or an echo occasion exegesis. However, the critical act is always gendered: as Daphnis interprets nature, Chloe interprets Daphnis, and responds emotionally, intellectually, and physically to his explanations. *Muthoi*, song, dance, and mimetic performance all serve as prefigurations of plot development. The inset myths of Phatta, Syrinx, and Echo, *muthoi* of the metamorphoses of young women like Chloe, directly effect Chloe's education and maturation.[40] Longus' own *muthos* ends in Chloe's transition into womanhood, which may be interpreted as a fourth and final metamorphosis. Chloe's transition leads to her new form of beauty, as wife and eventual mother.[41]

In *Daphnis and Chloe* 1 (1.27), Chloe and Daphnis are charmed (ἔτερψεν) by the bucolic song of a wood-dove (φάττα). Chloe asks for an explanation, and Daphnis obliges. This is the first *muthos* of the novel, and Daphnis' first act as exegete. Longus notes that Daphnis knows stories that are the subject of common talk (τὰ θρυλούμενα), and yet unknown to Chloe. Phatta is a beautiful maiden, *parthenos*, with musical ability, much like Chloe. Her song, like Chloe's, has the power to control her herd. However, she is

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40 Morgan 1996, 171 connects the stories to that of Chloe through the use of *muthos* and its cognates, which appears at *D&C* 1.27,1, 2.33.3, 2.35.1, 2.37.1, 3.22.4, 3.23.5, and is applied to Chloe at 2.27.2. On the escalation of violence in the inset myths, cf. Hunter 2008, 53 ff.; cf. Pandiri 1985, 130 n. 39 for additional sources on Chloe as compared to the women of the inset myths; cf. further Chalk 1960, 40–42; McCulloh 1970, 65 ff.; Deligiorgis 1974; Schönberger 1980, 161–162; Philippides 1980–1981, 193–199; Hunter 2008, 52–57; Pandiri 1985, 131 has a different perspective, comparing the inset myths to the real world: 'In a sense, these small framed vignettes embedded within the larger picture paradoxically present the nearest analogy to the real, and violent, world excluded from Longus' pastoral comedy'.

41 Morgan 2004, 13–14: 'Metamorphosis is an extreme form of transition, the loss of one's self, but in these myths it is the door to a kind of immortality, the prelude to a new beauty … From Chloe's transition arises new beauty, that of married love and family, through which she will be perpetuated'.

defeated in an *agôn* with a male singer and loses eight oxen. She begs the gods to transform her into a bird, and her wish is granted. The episode has multiple verbal and structural parallels with the Prologue; however, Chloe seeks out an exegete for a specific birdsong, a product of nature, whereas Longus wants to comprehend a man-made image.

In order to understand the song of Phatta, Chloe seeks an explanation from Daphnis. Daphnis' account emphasizes the girl's loss of a musical *agôn* to a boy. Phatta's material loss in oxen indicates a preference for the boy's music on multiple levels. Her loss of the musical contest results in a loss of control over her herd; although the audience of their contest (the herd) does not consist of informed judges of aesthetics, the oxen may symbolize an overall superiority of male music to that of a young girl. As exegete, Daphnis teaches Chloe a lesson on the loss of self that may result from a female competing in a musical *agôn* with a male. Daphnis' words influence Chloe; she plays the syrinx pipes by necessity rather than for pleasure, and does not compete with Daphnis. Rather, given the opportunity, she accompanies him with her voice (*D&C* 2.31.3). Her accompaniment demonstrates Chloe's understanding of the lesson intended by the story of Phatta. The partnership of Daphnis and Chloe as musicians foreshadows their eventual harmony in love and marriage; however, the loss of self that accompanies Phatta's metamorphosis has ominous undertones as well.

Phatta's story has wider implications for the relative value of different types of music: although Phatta sings beautifully, the boy sings loudly and charms away her oxen (θέλξας).[42] Longus' use of *thelgein* implies a musical power of enchantment that is potentially destructive, as with the song of the Sirens, or the persuasive power of certain forms of poetry defined in Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*.[43] *Thelgein* connects the story of Phatta to two additional actions: the method by which herdsmen control their herds,[44] and the way Chloe's father Dryas is tempted and eventually persuaded to betroth his foster daughter.[45] In this way, *thelgein* allies the herdsman of the Phatta story to Daphnis, a boy who controls his herd via song, and who convinces Dryas to

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[42] On the theme of the charms of music in this episode that links it to its narrative context cf. MacQueen 1990, 33; Philippides 1980–1981, 195; Deligiorgis 1974, 3.

[43] On the Siren song cf. Hom. *Od.* 12.39–40, 44.; Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 4.891–894. Cf. Gorg. *Hel.* 10: ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἐπῳδῆς ἔθελξε.

[44] Cf. *D&C* 1.22.2; 1.29.2.

[45] E.g. Dorcon attempts to charm Dryas with gifts (*D&C* 1.19.3); Dryas' wife Nape attempts to charm him into betrothing their daughter (*D&C* 3.25.3); the Nymphs promise to give Daphnis gifts that will bewitch Dryas (*D&C* 3.27.2).

allow him to marry Chloe through extravagant gifts. His story's artistic *agôn* foreshadows his own persuasive acts, by telling the tale of a girl much like Chloe.

As Daphnis continues to explain natural occurrences and articulate their cultural connections, Chloe becomes more closely allied with nature, and hence turns into an object for contemplation. The next inset myth occurs after the revelation that Eros is going to make a *muthos* out of Chloe. A group of herdsmen gather, and Lamon tells the *muthos* of Syrinx as a way to pass the time before Philetas plays music. Then, as Philetas plays a Dionysiac tune, Dryas performs a mimetic dance of the vintage and wins praise for his art. Immediately, Daphnis and Chloe perform their own imitative act through an interpretation of the Syrinx myth (Longus *D&C* 2.37.1–3):

> Similarly, the third old man was praised for his dance; he kissed Chloe and Daphnis, who then stood up rather swiftly and danced the *muthos* of Lamon. Daphnis imitated Pan, Chloe imitated Syrinx. He begged persuasively, she smiled without care; he chased and ran on the tops of his toenails, imitating hooves, while she appeared as the girl tiring in flight. Then Chloe hid herself in the wood as if in a marsh, while Daphnis, taking Philetas' great pipes, played a plaintive tune, like one in love, an erotic tune, like one wooing, a tune to recall someone, like one seeking, so that Philetas, in wonder, leapt up and gave him a kiss, and after kissing him offered the syrinx pipes as a gift, and prayed that Daphnis might leave them to an equal successor.
>
> τρίτος δὴ γέρων οὗτος εὐδοκιμήσας ἐπ' ὀρχήσει φιλεῖ Χλόην καὶ Δάφνιν, οἱ δὲ μάλα ταχέως ἀναστάντες ὠρχήσαντο τὸν μῦθον τοῦ Λάμωνος. ὁ Δάφνις Πᾶνα ἐμιμεῖτο, τὴν Σύριγγα Χλόη· ὁ μὲν ἱκέτευε πείθων, ἡ δὲ ἀμελοῦσα ἐμειδία· ὁ μὲν ἐδίωκε καὶ ἐπ' ἄκρων τῶν ὀνύχων ἔτρεχε τὰς χηλὰς μιμούμενος, ἡ δὲ ἐνέφαινε τὴν κάμνουσαν ἐν τῇ φυγῇ· ἔπειτα Χλόη μὲν εἰς τὴν ὕλην ὡς εἰς ἕλος κρύπτεται, Δάφνις δὲ λαβὼν τὴν Φιλητᾶ σύριγγα τὴν μεγάλην ἐσύρισε γοερὸν ὡς ἐρῶν, ἐρωτικὸν ὡς πείθων, ἀνακλητικὸν ὡς ἐπιζητῶν· ὥστε ὁ Φιλητᾶς θαυμάσας φιλεῖ τε ἀναπηδήσας καὶ τὴν σύριγγα χαρίζεται φιλήσας καὶ εὔχεται καὶ Δάφνιν καταλιπεῖν αὐτὴν ὁμοίῳ διαδόχῳ.

In this dramatic *mimêsis* of the *muthos* recently told by Lamon, both Daphnis and Chloe win praise. Daphnis emerges as superior through the addition of his musical expertise, whereas Chloe is an assistant to Daphnis' glory. Chloe disappears from view after playing her part in the drama, and she is replaced by Philetas' syrinx. This *muthos* shows an evolution from the story of Phatta: whereas Phatta engaged in an *agôn* with a male vocalist and eventually transformed into a singing bird with natural musical skills of her own, Syrinx becomes the man-made musical instrument itself. In their *mimêsis*,

Chloe defers to the musical skills of Daphnis: she begins to fade into the position of a 'supporting actress', the metaphorical 'instrument' of his success. *Muthos* leads to *mimêsis*, and dramatic *mimêsis* leads to music. Both children win praise for their dramatic performance, but only Daphnis wins a prize for his music. The *mimêsis* develops as a reaction to Lamon's story, and offers a challenge to Dryas' mimetic dance of the vintage. A hierarchy of different art forms emerges from their aesthetic evaluation, with music as highest among them. The educated young couple wins more praise than the shepherd Dryas; this indicates that the educated performers are perhaps better able to evoke an emotional *and* intellectual response and evaluation from their audience.

Although Daphnis and Chloe do not compete in a musical contest, they nevertheless engage in agonistic activity with each other. After their dramatization of the story of Syrinx, they make oaths about their love.[46] In their *agôn*, Daphnis swears by Pan, while Chloe swears by the Nymphs. The contest proves Chloe's girlish artlessness (τὸ ἀφελὲς ... ὡς κόρῃ, *D&C* 2.39.2), increases Daphnis' sense of self-importance, and supports the identification of Daphnis with the Pan of the *muthoi*, as well as the winner of verbal games.[47] Daphnis' power with words is unmatched by Chloe. As the novel progresses, she becomes Daphnis' echo: as they make oaths not to forget each other and love one another forever, Chloe responds to Daphnis just like an echo (καθάπερ ἠχώ, *D&C* 3.11.1).

Chloe's *aporia* and artlessness without the guidance of Daphnis is overwhelming. For example, the utilitarian skill of weaving holds no fascination for Chloe as an opportunity for creation or aesthetic expression, offering a contrast between Chloe and other female weavers from the time of Penelope onward. Nevertheless, Chloe has no way to escape from her mother's tutelage in domestic skills necessary to become a useful wife and caretaker of the *oikos* (Longus *D&C* 3.4.5):

> Chloe, on the one hand, was terribly at a loss and helpless; for her supposed mother was always with her, teaching her to card wool and to turn a spindle and mentioning marriage. Daphnis, on the other hand, since he had leisure time and was more intelligent than a girl, discovered this clever contrivance for seeing Chloe.

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[46] *D&C* 2.39.1: Καὶ τούτοις ἅπασι θερμότεροι γενόμενοι καὶ θρασύτεροι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἤριζον ἔριν ἐρωτικὴν καὶ κατ' ὀλίγον εἰς ὅρκων πίστιν προῆλθον ('having become both more enflamed and more bold by all this they competed with one another in an amorous strife and little by little progressed to swearing oaths as a means of proof').

[47] I.e. Daphnis' debate with Dorcon (*D&C* 1.16) and his self-defense (*D&C* 2.16 ff.).

> ἡ μὲν δὴ Χλόη δεινῶς ἄπορος ἦν καὶ ἀμήχανος· ἀεὶ γὰρ αὐτῇ συνῆν ἡ δοκοῦσα μήτηρ ἔριά τε ξαίνειν διδάσκουσα καὶ ἀτράκτους στρέφειν καὶ γάμου μνημονεύουσα· ὁ δὲ Δάφνις οἷα σχολὴν ἄγων καὶ συνετώτερος κόρης τοιόνδε σόφισμα εὗρεν ἐς θέαν τῆς Χλόης.

The episode is brief, but proves that while Chloe receives domestic lessons, Daphnis has time to learn and develop other skills. Leisure time and Daphnis' natural superior cleverness both lead to his contrived method of viewing Chloe. His masculine intellect discovers a *sophisma*, a term which connects Daphnis linguistically to Eros, a sophist and creator of sophists.[48] Thus the episode reinforces the idea of intellectual inequality between the genders as natural, and suggests a close connection between Daphnis and the god who is creating Chloe as a *muthos*.

Daphnis' final *muthos* is the story of Echo. As with the story of Phatta, Daphnis serves as Chloe's exegete for a well-known tale. The story is foreshadowed by a chorus of rowers heard singing in call and response (*D&C* 3.21.2, 21.4). Daphnis attempts to memorize their delightful tunes and adapt them for his syrinx, imitating one musical form with another. Chloe, however, fails to understand the echo. When she asks Daphnis for an explanation, he laughs, making of himself an Eros figure similar to the god of Philetas' garden, and demands a fee for this knowledge, prior to telling her the *muthos* of Echo (Longus *D&C* 3.22.4 and 3.23.5):

> Laughing sweetly and kissing her even more sweetly, and placing a crown of violets on her head, Daphnis began to tell her the *muthos* of Echo, demanding another ten kisses from her as payment if he taught her … After Daphnis told this *muthos*, Chloe gave him not just ten kisses, but many more; for even the echo said almost the same thing, as if bearing witness that he had told no lie.
>
> γελάσας οὖν ὁ Δάφνις ἡδὺ καὶ φιλήσας ἥδιον φίλημα καὶ τὸν τῶν ἴων στέφανον ἐκείνῃ περιθεὶς ἤρξατο αὐτῇ μυθολογεῖν τὸν μῦθον τῆς ἠχοῦς, αἰτήσας εἰ διδάξειε μισθὸν παρ' αὐτῆς ἄλλα φιλήματα δέκα … ταῦτα μυθολογήσαντα τὸν Δάφνιν οὐ δέκα μόνον φιλήματα ἀλλὰ πάνυ πολλὰ κατεφίλησεν ἡ Χλόη· μικροῦ γὰρ καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ εἶπεν ἡ ἠχὼ καθάπερ μαρτυροῦσα ὅτι μηδὲν ἐψεύσατο.

The story of Echo and Chloe's response provide the culmination for the themes of agonistic art forms, gendered interpretations of art, and the intended response to the inset myths.[49] Echo is a beautiful woman, taught by

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[48] Cf. *D&C* 4.18.1 on Astylus' comment to Gnothon that Eros makes great sophists (μεγάλους ὁ Ἔρως ποιεῖ σοφιστάς); cf. Ach. Tat. 1.10.1, 5.27.4 for Eros as a Sophist, as noted by Morgan 2004, 236.

[49] Note the echo of syrinx pipes that saved Chloe (*D&C* 2.26.3), and her herd of goats who act like a chorus of dancers (*D&C* 2.29.1), both of which prefigure Chloe's assimilation to an Echo figure.

the Muses to play the pipes and *aulos*. She dances with the Nymphs and sings with the Muses. The ultimate response to these female art forms is to inspire desire in a man; in this case, as with Syrinx, it is Pan. Yet, Pan loses the *agôn* for Echo's beauty; as a result, she is dismembered, loses her own voice, and becomes the echo of the sounds around her for eternity.[50] The death of Echo is brought about by her insistence on remaining chaste, and its story is the most violent of the inset *muthoi*. Chloe, as artist and musician dear to the Nymphs, is an analogous figure to Echo. However, Chloe's acceptance of the man who loves and desires her leads to a very different sort of transformation—that from girl to wife. Chloe, the audience of this *muthos*, pays for her new understanding. Her direct emotional response is the innumerable kisses she gives Daphnis; her mimetic response is to echo Daphnis. From this point on, Chloe's position as an artist fades. She becomes instead a work of art and object of the male gaze.

5. *Chloe and Aesthetic Objectification*

The swift transformation of Chloe from shepherdess to beautiful noblewoman illustrates the results of a gendered interpretation of the utility of natural versus adorned beauty, but also complicates this reading with the additional question of the influence of social status. Daphnis displays his musical skill before a variety of audiences, whereas Chloe, although also a musician, never performs without Daphnis (or on Daphnis' behalf) or speaks to a noble audience. Prior to being recognized by his parents, Daphnis performs in a theater of nature, as his parents sit just like an audience of a real theater (ὥσπερ θέατρον, *D&C* 4.15.2).[51] He controls his herd masterfully with his syrinx song, and receives praise and gifts from Cleariste, his (as yet unidentified) mother. By her gifts, Cleariste demonstrates that she is a noblewoman from town who has an appreciation for the arts. Her characterization suggests that women may serve as artistic exegetes among family and/or in rustic locales. She does not speak elsewhere in the novel, or engage in action independent from her husband. Cleariste thus prefigures the life Chloe may expect in the city, as the passive, silent companion to her husband in public, although she may retain an interest in the arts among family.

[50] On the connection between the Echo myth told here and Orpheus' dismemberment cf. MacQueen 1990, 79 ff.; Hunter 2008, 53; Morgan 2004, 215.

[51] Cf. Mowbray's discussion of *theatri more* (Sen. *Tro.* 1125) in this volume (p. 408), and the theater as a marker of civic performance.

Chloe is no longer an active performer, like Daphnis, although she is put on display. She is taken to the city in the hopes that she will discover her own true parentage; if she turns out to be noble, Daphnis' parents will approve the match. From this moment, Chloe becomes a beautiful object of contemplation. In the hands of the city folk, she is dressed and ornamented so that even Daphnis has trouble recognizing her (Longus *D&C* 4.32.1–2):

> Then it was possible to understand what beauty is when it is adorned. For after Chloe was dressed, her hair plaited, and her face washed, she appeared so much lovelier to all that even Daphnis scarcely recognized her. One would have sworn even without the recognition tokens that Dryas could not have been the father of such a girl.
>
> ἦν οὖν μαθεῖν οἷόν ἐστι τὸ κάλλος ὅταν κόσμον προσλάβηται. Ἐνδυθεῖσα γὰρ ἡ Χλόη καὶ ἀναπλεξαμένη τὴν κόμην καὶ ἀπολούσασα τὸ πρόσωπον εὐμορφοτέρα τοσοῦτον ἐφάνη πᾶσιν ὥστε καὶ Δάφνις αὐτὴν μόλις ἐγνώρισεν. ὤμοσεν ἄν τις καὶ ἄνευ τῶν γνωρισμάτων ὅτι τοιαύτης κόρης Δρύας οὐκ ἦν πατήρ.

From the beginning of the novel, Longus has emphasized the beauty of the two young lovers as beyond rustic. Chloe has milky white skin similar to that of a city woman, although she herds flocks. Daphnis' beauty does not resemble the country looks of his foster parents at all (*D&C* 3.32.1), and his recognition tokens provide the irrefutable proof of his foundling status and true parentage. Here, Chloe's beauty is the primary means of evidence that she is also a foundling; her tokens provide secondary support.[52]

Once Chloe is ornamented, her natural beauty is transformed into a product of cultural artifice. Daphnis' failure to recognize her completes Longus' meaning: in the transition from natural to adorned beauty, Chloe has begun her metamorphosis into the wife of a wealthy man's son. Her form, *morphê*, is motionless; her beauty is passively adorned, and she has no active role in enhancing her appearance. By the end of the process, she is a *thauma* to behold, an *eikôn* of beauty, resembling an Aphrodite statue more than a country dweller. One might compare her to Hesiod's Pandora, Pygmalion's Galatea, or Gorgias' Helen, born with a naturally godlike beauty.[53] In this phase of life, Chloe does not move, act, or assist in her beautification: she simply 'appears' (ἐφάνη) before everyone. In the

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52 Cf. Daphnis' recognition (*D&C* 4.27.2), and Chloe at *D&C* 4.30.4: μαρτυρεῖ μὲν καὶ τὸ κάλλος (ἔοικε γὰρ οὐδὲν ἡμῖν), μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ γνωρίσματα (πλουσιώτερα γὰρ ἢ κατὰ ποιμένα) ('both her beauty provides evidence (for she is in no way similar to us), and by the recognition tokens (for they are more rich than those suited to shepherds)').

53 Gorg. *Hel.* 4: τὸ ἰσόθεον κάλλος.

city, her objectification is completed; when they arrive, Daphnis is praised foremost as the son of the noble couple, whereas Chloe is praised for her beauty (Longus *D&C* 4.33.3–4):

> The men congratulated Dionysophanes on finding a son, especially upon seeing the beauty of Daphnis, and the women rejoiced with Cleariste at bringing home both a son and a bride; for Chloe presented a vision of unsurpassable beauty that struck even the women. So then the whole city was moved by the youth and the maiden, and already they were blessing them on account of their marriage, and praying that the girl's family would be discovered to be worthy of her beauty, and many women of great wealth prayed to the gods that they might be believed to be the mother of so beautiful a daughter.
>
> οἱ μὲν τῷ Διονυσοφάνει συνήδοντο παῖδα εὑρόντι καὶ μᾶλλον ὁρῶντες τὸ κάλλος τοῦ Δάφνιδος, αἱ δὲ τῇ Κλεαρίστῃ συνέχαιρον ἅμα κομιζούσῃ καὶ παῖδα καὶ νύμφην· ἐξέπλησσε γὰρ κἀκείνας ἡ Χλόη κάλλος ἐκφέρουσα παρευδοκιμηθῆναι μὴ δυνάμεμον. ὅλη δὲ ἄρα ἐκινεῖτο ἡ πόλις ἐπὶ τῷ μειρακίῳ καὶ τῇ παρθένῳ, καὶ εὐδαιμόνιζον μὲν ἤδη τοῦ γάμου, ηὔχοντο δὲ καὶ τὸ γένος ἄξιον τῆς μορφῆς εὑρεθῆναι τῆς κόρης, καὶ γυναῖκες πολλαὶ τῶν μέγα πλουσίων ἠράσαντο θεοῖς αὐταὶ πιστευθῆναι μητέρες θυγατρὸς οὕτω καλῆς.

In Daphnis and Chloe's advent to the city, Chloe is described as a 'vision of unsurpassable beauty' that physically strikes the women with wonder. *Exeplêsse* includes an idea of wonder that might affect someone viewing a *thauma*; this verb demonstrates the emotional impact on an audience viewing an arresting image or hearing a sublime piece of rhetoric, an effect pseudo-Longinus demarcates as stronger than persuasion or *kharis*.[54] The city folk are struck by the image of Chloe, as Longus was struck by a painted image in his Prologue. Rather than desiring to imitate such beauty in another art form, like Longus, the women desire to be credited with being the very agents of production, the artisans— mothers—of such beauty.

At the feast where Chloe is recognized, first her recognition tokens are brought out and praised, and then Chloe herself, suitably adorned, is brought out and praised. In the space of two pages of text, in the distance from country to city, and in the presence of nobles rather than peasants, Chloe has become a beautiful object of art, the cause of admiration and wonder, worthy of a noble family and marriage to Daphnis. This completes Chloe's process of transformation into an aesthetically pleasing object, and a complement to the beauty and nobility of Daphnis.

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[54] [Longinus], *Subl.* 1.4; cf. Arist. *Poet.* 1455a16–20.

6. *Playful Endings*

Daphnis and Chloe return to the country to marry and to live out their lives, raising their children in the same environment and manner of their own childhood. Their imitation of their own infancy imposed on their children adds one further mimetic act, and implies a certain degree of contentment and pleasure regarding their early education. In the last words of the novel, Daphnis completes his role as exegete. On their wedding night, the wedding party sings a raucous song in lieu of a marriage hymn; their music forms a harsh contrast to the beauty of Daphnis and Chloe's syrinx songs, separating the pair from their rustic neighbors. Their education in beauty and music separates them from the country folk, and their choice to live in the country separates them from the city dwellers as well. In this way, Longus draws a contrast between Daphnis and Chloe and both city and country populations; they are a liminal pair, unique in their upbringing and in their choice of lifestyle once married.

After the wedding, Daphnis and Chloe finally spend their first night together. Longus concludes his novel in this way (Longus *D&C* 4.40.3):

> And Daphnis did something of the things Lycaenion taught him, and at that moment Chloe understood for the first time that the things that happened near the wood were shepherd's games.
>
> καὶ ἔδρασέ τι Δάφνις ὧν αὐτὸν ἐπαίδευσε Λυκαίνιον, καὶ τότε Χλόη πρῶτον ἔμαθεν ὅτι τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης γενόμενα ἦν ποιμένων παίγνια.

The ending of *Daphnis and Chloe* completes the idea of pleasure central to Eros and beauty, introduced in Longus' Prologue.[55] Scholars have argued that the final word, *paignia*, alludes to Gorgias' ending of the *Encomium of Helen*.[56] As noted by Morgan, as a literary term *paignia* is also given as the title of a collection of poems by the Hellenistic poet Philetas (Stob. 2.4.5), and it was applied to the poems of Theocritus (Ael. *NA* 15.19).[57] Thus, Longus' final word may indicate the relationship between his novel and the Theocritean pastoral poetry from which the location and many other motifs of Longus' story derive. By using the literary meaning of *paignia*, Longus acknowledges the literary pedigree of his work in the final word, and

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[55] Cf. Hunter 2008, 50.

[56] Gorg. *Hel.* 21: ἐβουλήθην γράψαι τὸν λόγον Ἑλένης μὲν ἐγκώμιον, ἐμὸν δὲ παίγνιον ('I wanted to write the *logos* as an encomium of Helen and as a trifle for myself'); on which cf. Zeitlin 1994, 165; Hunter 2008, 50.

[57] Morgan 2004, 249.

perhaps displays a nostalgia for the bucolic simplicity encapsulated therein. Finally, *paignia* connects Chloe's moment of sexual initiation to the games of Eros, played in Philetas' garden (*D&C* 2.4.1).[58] Overall, Longus' use of *paignia* becomes an invitation to 'read backwards', to connect this final word to the beginning of the novel, and to the mimetic games and imitation of nature that added to Daphnis and Chloe's early education. *Paignia* compels the reader to reread the Prologue, and verify the connection between Longus' *pothos* and the history of aesthetic theory. In the end, Chloe's lessons in mimesis, music, and love seem mere games when compared to sex; however, they have all led her to this moment—her metamorphosis from girl to woman. Her transformation concludes her education; she fulfills Daphnis' desire in a way that includes both the erotic and aesthetic connotations of *pothos*, and provides the ending to Longus' eroto-didactic work.

7. *Conclusion*

Chloe's rite of passage into adulthood takes two significantly different steps. First, her advent to the city and the adornment of her beauty denies her a level of subjectivity, as she becomes the object of contemplation for both Daphnis and the city folk. Second, her sexual initiation on her wedding night completes her erotic education, and causes her to reinterpret her prior experiences as a series of *paignia*. Both events complement each other in questioning the ultimate role of aesthetics in erotic education, as well as Chloe's utility as artist and imitator after marriage. Although she enjoyed an education in music and engaged in various forms of *mimêsis* early in life, there is a tension in Chloe's realization that her educational experiences in nature may be reinterpreted as a series of pastoral games. Her final exegetical act—the explanation of her own past—implies that she understands the importance of music and mimetic activity in education, even though such lessons can never fulfill her desire for complete knowledge of Eros.

Longus' entire novel occupies the brief interim between early childhood and maturation, in which the recognition of beauty leads quickly to love and the desire to fully understand the workings of Eros. Until the final moment of *Daphnis and Chloe*, Longus' protagonists occupy a transitional place, one including the promise of pleasure, the anticipation of happiness, and, therefore, constituting a place of beauty. Their roles in the realm of aesthetics are

[58] Zeitlin 1994, 165.

determined by gender, and influenced by social class (as they make the transition from peasants to nobles) as well as location (as they traverse between country and city). In the end, Chloe realizes that nature and the arts have provided a conduit for her education, and she, beautiful herself, has played the roles of spectator and spectacle, judge and imitator. Her transformation into a *muthos* displays the tangible results of her personal interactions with natural and man-made beauty. Understanding is only attained at the end of the novel, in the realization of sexual fulfillment. Beauty, however, figures throughout, and guides the protagonists to their marriage and the promise of erotic fulfillment. Beauty provides the motivation for betrothal and marriage, and Chloe's transition from childhood learning and naiveté to adulthood. However, the reader is left to wonder about the function of aesthetics after her metamorphosis. Longus leaves room for the possibility of beauty and its attainment after the wedding night of Daphnis and Chloe, but fails to commit. He has suggested that women can learn about Eros through aesthetics, and play the roles of both aesthetic subjects and objects in the world of his novel, but the question is left open as to whether his reader can, too.[59]

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INDEX OF GREEK TERMS

ἀγρεῖος, 21, 28+n.
ἀγροικία, 42+n., 427n., 429
ἄγροικος, 21, 28
ἀγροιώτας, 28n.
ἀγών, 77n., 162, 175, 188, 199, 206, 400, 434, 435, 438
ἀγωνίζεσθαι, 209n.
ἀδίδακτος, 430+n.
ἀείδω, 22
ᾄδειν, 208, 212n., 213, 214, 428
ἀηδία, 259
ἀηδής, 361
ἀθετεῖσθαι, 219n., 221
ἀθέτησις, 219+n., 221, 229n., 230
᾿Αθηναῖοι vs. ᾿Αττικοί, 251
ἀθύρωτος, 373
αἰδώς, 131n.
αἰνίττεσθαι, 3
αἵρειν, 59
αἰσθάνεσθαι, 1, 39n., 76
αἴσθησις, 39+n., 48, 63, 116+n., 160, 161n., 165, 197, 198, 199, 200
αἰσθητικός, 287
αἰσχρός, 118, 119, 120, 207, 374
αἰσχύνη, 208, 209, 210, 213, 218
ἀκήλητος, 65
ἀκούειν, 168n., 175, 177, 428, 431
ἀκρατής, 373
ἀκριβολογέω, 201n.
ἀκροᾶσθαι, 166, 168
ἀκροατής, 185, 194, 202
ἀλαζονία, 255
ἀλαζών, 244
ἅλλεσθαι, 428
ἄλογος, 51
ἄλυρος, 26+n.
ἀμαθής, 34n., 36n.
ἀμαθία, 34n., 40
ἁμαρτία, 186, 192, 208+n., 210+n.
ἀμουσία, 7, ch. 2 *passim*; ἀμουσία, and demagogues, 35n.; ἀμουσία, and dress, 28n.
ἄμουσος, 17+n., 19+n., 20+n., 21, 28+n., 31, 33, 34, 37, 38+n., 40+n.
ἀμούσωτος, 19n.
ἀναβιοτή, 190
ἀναγνώρισις, 401
ἀνάθημα, 423, 425
ἀναισθησία, 19n., 255
ἀνάπαυσις, 206
ἀνάρμοστος, 203n.
ἀνδρεία, 6, 115, 118, 168, 192n., 216
ἀνδρεῖος, 209
ἀνδρών, 76n., 99, 102, 275
ἀντ(ι)-, 81n.
ἀοιδός, 22
ἀπαίδευτος, 20, 115
ἁπαλός, 428
ἀπάνθρωπος, 202
ἀπειροκαλία, 39
ἀπεργασία, 179n.
ἀπεριλάλητος, 373
ἀπληστία, 129+n.
ἀπόμουσος, 18, 19+n.
ἀπορία, 395, 436
ἀποσεμνύνεσθαι, 373
ἀπρεπές, τό, 198
ἀπῳδός, 21
ἀργύρεος, 299n.
ἀρέσκον, τό, 250
ἀρετή, 49, 160, 161, 166, 175+n.
ἁρμονία, 38, 116, 118, 119+n., 120, 124, 125, 128+n., 163, 164, 165, 168n., 177n., 180, 191, 192+n., 198n., 203+n., 205n., 206, 211n., 217n., 218n., 221+n.
ἀρρυθμία, 40
ἀσεβής, 205
ἀσθένεια, 188, 193
ἄσκησις, 396n.
ἀσχημοσύνη, 39

ἀσχήμων, 40n.
ἄτεχνος, 430+n.
αὐλός, 163n.
αὐτοψία, 228
ἀφιλοκαλία, 183n.
ἀχάλινος, 373
ἄχαρις, 21
ἀχαριστία, 40
ἀχόρευτος, 115
ἄχορος, 26

βάθος, 56
βάναυσος, 175
βλέπειν, 428, 432
βομβαλοβομβάξ, 30
βομβάξ, 30
βομβεῖν, 428
βόμβος, 428
βροντᾶν, 340n.

γελᾶν, 437
γέρων, 22, 190, 195, 206, 214, 435; γέροντες, 8, 216, 225
γῆρας, 190, 197
γνήσιος, 219, 221, 231
γνώμη, 374
γράμματα, 427n., 428
γραμματικόν, 80
γραφή, 426+n.
γραφική, 122n.
γυμναστική, 162n.

δασύς, 28
δειλότης, 118
δεινότης, 223
δέξιος, 20+n.
δημόσια, τά, 223
διαγωγή, 174n., 176n.
διάθεσις, 269n.
διακρίνειν, 236
διαλλαγή, 190
διαλλάττειν, 184n.
διήγησις, 397n.
δίκαιον, τό, 367, 369n.
δικαίως, 189
διορθοῦν, 234
δοκησίσοφος, 3
δυστυχία, 192n.

ἔθος, 161, 218
εἶδος, 186, 266n.; εἴδη, 39
εἰκός, τό, 209
εἰκών, 39, 122+n., 179n., 207, 425, 432, 439
ἐκβαίνειν, 60
ἔκπληξις, 53, 56, 397+n., 406n.
ἐκπλήσσειν, 397n., 440
ἔκστασις, 54, 56
ἔκφρασις, 397+n., 404n., 422, 425
ἐλεοπί, 78
ἔλεος, 178n., 223
ἑλληνίζειν, 258, 259, 260
ἐνάργεια, 270+n., 396, 397+n., 398, 402 ff., 404, 412n.
ἐναρμόνιος, 161n., 199, 203
ἐνθουσιασμός, 166
ἐνθουσιαστικός, 166
ἔνρυθμος, 161n., 199, 203
ἐξαπατᾶν, 120
ἑόρτασις, 162
ἐπᾴδειν, 125n., 129n., 162+n., 212n., 213
ἐπανορθοῦν, 113n.n.
ἐπανορθωτικός, 121
ἐπέκεινα, 61
ἐπιεικής, 170n., 171n., 206n.
ἐπίχαρις, 256
ἐπῳδή, 117, 125, 434n.
ἐρᾶν, 435
ἐργάζεσθαι, 35, 36n.
ἐρίζειν, 436n.
ἑρμηνεία, 121n., 126n.
ἐρώμενος, 76n.
ἔρως, 39, ch. 17 *passim*
ἐρωτικός, 435, 436n.; ἐρωτικά, τά, 40
ἐσθής, 374
εὐ-, 81n.
εὖ, τό, 123+n., 125
εὐαισθήτως ἔχειν, 124, 211n.
εὐαρμοστία, 36
εὐάρμοστος, 118
εὔμορφος, 439
εὐμουσία, 29
εὔμουσος, 29n.
εὐπρεπής, 255
εὐρυθμία, 36

εὔρυθμος, 118
εὐσχημοσύνη, 39, 41, 119, 120
εὐσχήμων, 119, 120, 255
εὐτελής, 248
εὐφροσύνη, 190, 221n.
εὔχρως, 118
εὐωρία, 428

ζητεῖν, 427
ζωγραφία, 269

ἥβη, ἥβα, 22, 23
ἥδεσθαι, 124, 125, 126+n.
ἡδονή, 2, 116+n., 118, 119, 125, 127, 129+n., 160, 161n., 162, 165, 171, 175, 176, 178+n., 179n., 188, 190, 195, 197, 199, 201n., 202+n., 206, 208+n., 219, 220n., 221+n., 222, 223+n., 251, 252; ἡδονὴ φυσική, 165, 173, 180
ἡδύς, 22, 166, 208, 248, 251, 437
ἥδυσμα, 165+n.
ἦθος, 162n., 163n., 164n., 165, 166+n., 167, 168+n., 169, 170+n., 171n., 174, 175, 176, 177+n., 178n., 179, 180, 184, 192n., 201, 202+n., 204, 211, 217, 218n.
ἦχος, 428
ἠχώ, 424+n., 436, 437+n.

θαῦμα, 256, 425n., 439, 440
θαυμάζειν, 33, 184n., 425, 435
θαυμάσιον, τό, 53
θαυμαστόν, 51, 62, 209, 249, 251n.
θέα, 249, 250, 251, 437
θέαμα, 425
θεᾶσθαι, 252, 272+n.
θεατής, 3, 175, 188, 201n., 202, 206
θέατρον, 186, 188, 204, 211, 438
θεῖον, τό, 68
θέλγειν, 434+n.
θέλξις, 425n.
θεραπεύειν, 202
θεωρία, 206
θεωρεῖν, 162, 179n., 207, 249
θεωρός, 185
θηριώδης, 85
θηρίον, 40
θίασος, 275
θόρυβος, 340n.
θρῆνος, 190
θρυλούμενα, τά, 433

ἰᾶσθαι, 425
ἰδιότης, 236
ἵμερος, 2n.
ἰσηγορία, 105n.
ἰσονομία, 100, 105n.
ἱστορία ἔρωτος, 426

κάθαρσις, 36n., 223, 224, 395
καιρός, 54, 55n.
καιρίως, 54
κακία, 160
κακός, 31, 374; κακῶς, 123+n.
κάλλος, τό, 265, 429, 430+n., 431+n., 439+n., 440
καλός, 68, 82+n., 118, 119, 120, 123+n., 125, 170, 173, 207, 374, 375, 430+n., 431; καλός τε μέγας τε, 67+n.; καλή, 430+n.; καλή (inscriptions), 73n.; καλός (inscriptions), 73n., 87n., 95, 97+n., 99; καλόν, τό, 40, 49, 116, 123, 125, 207, 425n.; καλά, τά, 29n., 170; καλλίστη τραγῳδία, 187, 208 f.; καλῶς, 204; κάλλιστος, 248, 253; κάλλιστος vs. κράτιστος, 193 ff.; κάλλιστον, 62
κανών, 265
κατᾴδειν, 428
κατακοσμεῖν, 16n.
κατακόσμησις, 203n.
κατάπληξις, 249
κελαδεῖν, 22
κόβαλα, 32
κοινός, 165, 173+n.
κομποφακελορρήμων, 373
κομψός, 21
κόσμιος, 192n.
κόσμος, 439
κράτιστον, 194, 197, 199, 200
κρίνειν, 170+n., 171n., 185, 222, 236
κρίσις, 215+n., 218, 236, 237
κριτής, 185
κριτικός, 121n., 126n., ch. 10 *passim*; κριτικόν, τό, 215n.; κριτικὴ δύναμις, 123n.

κτῆμα, 425, 426
κυκλικός, -ῶς, 220+n., 221, 222+n., 223, 225
κύκλιος, 224
κῶμος, 77

λαμπρός, 254
λεπτός, 272+n.
λευκός, 430, 431n.
λυπεῖσθαι, 206, 425
λύπη, 115, 116, 118, 160, 178n., 197, 202+n.
λύρα, 33
λυπηρός, 207

μαίνεσθαι, 2n., 20
μανία, 3
μανθάνειν, 179n.
μάρτυς, 226
μεγαλοφροσύνη, 51, 58n., 59
μέγεθος, 51, 55, 57
μελετᾶν, 175
μέλος, 118, 121n., 124n., 125, 127, 128n., 163+n., 164, 166, 168+n., 173, 177+n., 180, 206, 209
μελῳδεῖν, 207
μελῳδία, 192n.
μεταβάλλειν, 192
μετάβασις, 191
μεταφορά, 353
μετεωρολογία, 58+n.
μιαρός, 205+n., 208
μιμεῖσθαι, 207, 435
μίμημα, 115n., 119, 125, 168+n., 176, 177, 179n., 180, 191, 192n., 204
μίμησις, 115+n., 119, 121, 126, 166, 168n., 179+n., 191, 192n., 204, 212n., 221n., 266+n., 268+n., 288n., 408, 421, 423, 424, 426, 427, 428, 429, 433, 436, 442
μισεῖν, 166
μισοπονηρία, 254
μῖσος, 160
μολπά, 23
μορφή, 439, 440
μοῦσα, 23, 215, 216; see also Muse
μουσίζεσθαι, 21
μουσική, 7, 8, 16, 17, 18, 19n., 24, 25, 27+n., 28, 31, 32+n., 33+n., 34+n., 35n., 36, 37, 38, ch. 5 *passim*, ch. 6 *passim*, ch. 7 *passim*, 206, 430n.
μουσικός, 28n., 32+n., 36n., 37, 39, 121n., 126n.; (of birds), 428
μοχθηρία, 194
μυθολόγος, 211, 212, 217
μυθολογεῖν, 437
μῦθος, 422, 424, 426, 431, 432, 433+n., 435, 437, 443

νέος, 23, 428, 431; νέοι, 38n., 170, 196; νεώτερος, 30n., 220+n., 223
νεότας, 22; νεότης, 162, 170, 431
νοθεύειν, 219
νόθος, 219
νόμος, 8, 128n., 129+n., 190, 192 f.+n., 194, 195, 206, 209, 216, 217, 219, 220n., 223, 224

οἰκειότης, 124n.
οἰκονομεῖν, 187
οἰκονομία, 54
ὄμμα, πρὸ ὀμμάτων, 399n.
ὁμοίωμα, 168+n., 191, 192n.
ὁρᾶν, 431n., 440
ὀργή, 166n., 168, 177, 178n.
ὀρθός, 119, 120, 187, 206, 220; ὀρθῶς, 122+n., 123, 124n., 160, 166, 170+n., 171+n., 190, 197, 198n., 202, 424
ὀρθότης, 117n., 118, 119, 122n., 124+n., 126, 187n., 202, 209, 210, 220+n., 221
ὀρχεῖσθαι, 129n., 435
ὄρχησις, 114, 118, 127, 161n., 194n., 204, 435
οὐ πρὸς ὠφελείαν, 219
ὄψις, 48, 192

παθητικόν, τό, 397
πάθος, 56, 166+n., 167n., 168n., 176, 177+n., 178+n., 179, 190, 191+n., 192, 412, 414, 416
παίγνιον, 421, 441+n., 442
παιδεία, 160, 175, ch. 5 *passim*, 423
παιδεραστεῖν, 424
παιδευτικός, 121
παιδιά, 129n., 162, 176n., 224+n.
παμπόνηρος, 32
παμφαλᾶν, 273

παρακεχρωσμένος, 180
παραλλάττειν, 252
παραμυθεῖσθαι, 425
παρέκβασις, 180, 206
παρρησία, 6
πειθώ, 425n.
περιμήκης, 55n.
περισσός, 219
ποθεῖν, 430n.
πόθος, 2+n., 425, 426, 427+n., 442
ποιεῖν, ἐποίεσε(ν), 82, 83; ἐποίησεν, 75
ποίημα, 121n., 122n., 126n., 287n.
ποικιλία, 129+n.
πολυ-, 81n.
πολυτέλεια, 269
πολυτελής, 249
πονηρία, 209, 253
πονηρός, 208
πόνος, 29, 224
πραότης, 167n., 168, 177
πρέπειν, 128
πρέπον, τό, 6, 125, 163n., 354n.
πρεπόντως, 162
πρεσβύς, πρεσβύτεροι, 170; πρεσβύτατοι, 206
πρὸ ὀμμάτων, 399n.
προπαιδεύειν, 425
προσαρμόττειν, 128+n.
προσήκειν, 124+n., 125, 128+n., 197
προσηκόντως, 125
πρὸς οὐδέν, 219+n.
πρωτεύειν, 49, 53, 253
πτωχοποιός, 373

ῥυθμός, 118, 119n., 120, 124n., 125, 128+n., 163, 164, 165, 168, 173, 198n., 211n., 269n.

σκαιός, 20+n., 21
σκαιότης, 40, 42+n.
σκηπτός, 54
σκιρτᾶν, 428
σοφός, 20+n.
σπουδαιογέλοιον, 369
στύειν/στύεσθαι, 87+n.
συγκαταμείγνυναι, 22, 24n.
συγχαίρειν, 440
συλλογίζεσθαι, 179n., 207
συμμετρία, 265
συμπαθής, 166
συμφωνεῖν, 116, 197
συμφωνία, 115, 116, 161, 197, 203n.
συνᾴδειν, 171n.
συνεθίζεσθαι, 166, 170n.
συνήδεσθαι, 440
σύντονος, 180
συοβαύβαλος, 34n.
σύστασις, 188
σχῆμα, 162n., 168n., 269
σῴζειν, 221
σωτηρία, 196
σωφροσύνη, 115, 168+n., 178n.

τάξις, 54, 68n., 198+n., 199n., 209, 221
τέλος, 186
τερατεύεσθαι, 373
τέρπειν, 205, 431, 433
τερπνός, 425, 426
τέρψις, 425n., 428n.
τέχνη, 175n., 266, 286, 426
τεχνίτης, 175
τίμιος, 181
τόνος, 202n.
τραγικώτατος, 187
τραγῳδία ἡ ἀληθεστάτη, 219, 223, 224
τρόπος, 177n., 192n., 195, 204, 205+n., 206, 207, 210, 212, 214, 218, 223, 225
τρυγῳδία, 367, 368, 369n.
τύχη, 270

ὕμνος, 127, 129n.
ὑομουσία, 34
ὑπέρ, 53; ὑπέρ-words, 54
ὑπεραίρειν, 55+n., 56n., 57, 61
ὑπερβαίνειν, 55n.
ὑπερβάλλειν, 54n., 56
ὑπέρβασις, 55+n.
ὑπέρβατον, 55+n.
ὑπερβιβάζειν, 55n.
ὑπερβολή, 54+n., 55n., 56
ὑπερβολικῶς, 60
ὑπερέκπτωσις, 55+n.
ὑπερήμερος, 55

ὑπερμεγέθης, 55+n., 56
ὑπερουράνιος, 61
ὑπεροχή, 55+n.
ὑπερτείνεσθαι, 55n.; ὑπερτεταμένα, 55+n.
ὑπερφυής, 55; ὑπερφυᾶ, τά, 54+n.
ὑποκριτής, 261
ὕφος, τό, 54
ὑψηγορία, 51
ὑψηλόνους, 58
ὑψηλός, 55n., 57, 58n.; ὑψηλόν, τό, 51
ὕψος, 53, 54, 55+n., 56+n., 57, 58, 59

φαντασία, 266, 397, 398, 399
φαυλός, 206n.
φιλανθρωπία, 195–197, 203
φιλάνθρωπος, 9, 195–197, 209; φιλάνθρωπον, 195, 196, 197, 205n., 238
φιλεῖν, 166
φιλία, 160
φιλο-compounds, 195
φιλοκαλία, 34+n.
φιλόμουσος, 64
φόβος, 178n., 223
φορτικός, 175, 194, 206
φρόνησις, 219, 225

χαίρειν, 118, 119, 120, 162, 166, 170+n., 171+n., 173+n., 179n., 206, 207, 208, 431; χαῖρε, 75
χαλᾶσθαι, 171
χάλκεος, 299n.
χαρά, 116+n., 161n., 190, 204+n.
χαρακτηρ, 235
χαρίεις, 198n., 272; χαριέντως, 198+n.
χάρις, 53, 116n., 195, 198n., 219, 220+n., 221, 222, 223+n., 225, 440
χάριτες, 22
χορεία, 127, ch. 5 *passim*, 161, 162n., 171, 195, 196+n., 202, 203, 204, 207, 210, 212n., 217
χορεύειν, 23, 162, 207
χορευτής, 212, 215n.
χορηγεῖν, 161n., 204
χορός, 68n., ch. 5 *passim*, esp. 116 f.+n., 161n., 204+n.
χρήσιμος, 248
χροία, 179n.
χρύσειος, 299n.
χρῶμα, 168n.
χωλοποιός, 373

ψευδεπίγραφος, 219
ψυχαγωγία, 362
ψυχρός, 374

ᾠδή, 114, 118, 127, 129, 161n., 204, 211+n., 215, 216, 217n.
ὠφελεία, οὐ πρὸς ὠφελείαν, 219
ὠφελία, 117n., 127
ὠφέλιμος, 193, 215, 220

INDEX OF LATIN TERMS

abiectus, 249n.
adfectus, 398, 411; adfectuum imitatio, 411
adnotare, 233+n.
aemulatio, 406n.
aenus, 299
aereus, 299
aes, 299, 334
aetas, 414
afficere, 347n.
agere, 411
agnoscere, 302
animus, 400
arbiter elegantiae, 356
arduus, 334
ars, 286, 289, 290, 292, 293, 310
artifex, 300
aspicere, 333n.
audax, 412n.
audire, 339
aureus, 296
aurum, 308

bacchari, 352

caedes, 403
caelare, 308
caespites, 331
callida iunctura, 369
canina littera, 368, 369n.
cena, 358
cernere, 398
clarus, 412n.
colossus, 333
comoedia prisca, 368, 369n.
conciliare, 349n.
conspicere, 302
conspuere, 378
contortus, 372
conveniens, 220
coram populo, 400n., 403
corruptus, 351+n., 352
criticus, 220+n.
culpa, 369+n.
cyclicus, 222

dea ex machina, 400
decor, 316n.
decorum, 6, 354+n., 355, 356, 357, 359, 362
decus, 414
delectare, 347+n., 349+n., 350, 352, 377n.
delectatio, 349n., 350, 353
deliciae, 352, 353
demonstratio, 397n.
dicere, 293n.
diffindere, 377
dignus, 269
diligentia, 318n.
discere, 370
dispositio, 316+n.
distinguere, 233n.
distributio, 316n.
divinus, 289
docere, 347+n., 349n.
doctor, 370
doctus, 347, 369, 372
dolor, 402, 403, 404

ecphrasis, see ἔκφρασις
effigies, 333
elegantia, 356
eloquendi deverticulum, 348, 351, 359, 361n.
eloquentia, 351n.
emendare, 232, 233n., 234
emendatio, 233+n.
enarratio poetarum, 359+n.
epistula, 366n.
equus Domitiani, 332
eruditus, 356
eurythmia, 316n.

evidentia, 397n.
exactio, 316
exemplum, 360n., 396, 416n.
exultare, 352

fabrilis, 316, 317
facere: fecit, 318
facies, 372+n.
facilis, 289
facinus, 408
facundia, 385
fagus, 289, 290
falsus, 227, 348, 351, 361n.; falso inscripti, 219
fari, 394n.
fastidium, 406+n.
ferox, 412n.
ferus, 413
festinare, 337
fictus, 352, 359
fingere, 359
flere, 408, 411
flosculus, 352
fluere, 336, 337, 372
forma, 414
fragor, 337, 338, 340n.

gemere, 301
gemitus, 302
genuinus, 219
genus grande, 50
gerere, 405
grammaticus, 359+n.
gravitas, 220, 372
guttur, 384

historia, 359+n.
histrio, 411
homicidium, 413

ictus (animi), 397, 398, 415n.
ignoscere, 354
imitatio, adfectuum, 411
immodicus, 352
imperitus, 352
imprimere, 308
inanis, 301, 306, 352
incredibilis, 348, 351, 359, 361n.
indignatio, 369
indoctus, 350
inpensae, 316
insanire, 352
intelligenter, 347
ira, 411
iratus, 411
iucunditas, 361
iudicare, 238
iudicium, 215, 219, 227
iugulare, 377
iunctura, 369

labor, 300, 318n., 334, 336
lacrima, 410n.
lacrimare, 301, 302
laetitia, 304
lascivia, 352, 353, 357
lascivire, 352
lenire, 300
lentus, 289
levitas, 408n., 409
libertas, 348, 352; specie libertatis, 352
licentia, 348, 352; mentiendi, 351
lingua, 383, 384
litteratissimus, 238
ludere, 377
ludus, 369n.
lumen, 333n.
lustrare, 300
luteus, 377
luxuria, 357
luxus, 356

magnificentia, 316, 317
maius, 400n.
manus, 300, 333, 334, 335
medium, 307; in medio, 307
melius, 292, 293, 294
mendacium, 351
mendosus, 234
mendum, 233
mentiri, 351
metus, 304, 410n., 411
mirari, 296, 300, 301, 334, 336, 413
miserari, 413

misericordia, 411
mobilis, 409n.
moles, 315, 333
mollis, 292, 293, 294, 414; mollior viro, 349n.; mollius, 292, 293, 294
mordax, 369+n.
mos, maiorum, 360n., mores, 385
motus, 411
movere, 347, 349n., 411
mugire, 339, 340n., 404
mugitus, 386
multitudo, 352
munificentia, 318n.

nefandum, 413
nefas, 11, ch. 16 *passim*
negotium, 355+n., 356, 357, 359
neotericus, 220
nitere, 352
nota, 220
notare, 220, 234+n., 238
nuper, 336

oculi, 405n.; oculi mentis, 397
officium, 352; officia oratoris, 347, 349, 350
opus, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337; opus quadratum, 331
os, oris, 382, 384
orbis, 222
ordinatio, 316n.
ordo, 219, 225
ornatus, 353, 357
ostentatio, 348
otium, 355+n., 357, 359

pars, 407n.
pauci, 348
pavidus, 410n.
pecunia sua, 318n.
perlegere oculis, 306
persona, 411
pictura, 301, 306, 404n.
poema, 287n.
pondus, 308
pone ex animo, 405
popularis, 352
populus, 408
potentissimus, 398
praeceptor amoris, 431
praeceptum, 396, 416n.
praeteritio, 404
pravus, 350
probatio, 316
proficiens, 396
proludere, 398
propone, 404n.
proportio, 316
prospectare, 333n.
pulcher, 353
pulchritudo, 288n.

radere, 369
raucus, 385, 386
recitare, 385
recusatio, 339+n.
reficere: reficit, 318+n.
repraesentatio, 397n., 398
restituere: restituit, 318
ridere, 367, 368, 369+n., 372
ridiculum, 367, 368
rusticus, 352

salus, 298n., 300
satura, 366+n., 367, 372n., 384n.
scelus, 402n., 408
scriptor cyclicus, 222
securus, 416
senectus, 140n.
senex, ch. 6 *passim*
sententia, 350, 351
sententiae, 357
sermo, 365
servus currens, 376n.
simplicius, 352
sonare, 339, 340n., 368
specie libertatis, 352
spectaculum, 306
spectare, 408
spectator, 413, 416; spectator ferus, 408, 409+n.
sperare, 300
spirare, 292
splendere, 357n.

statim, 337
strepere, 339
studere, 357
studium, 358n.
stupere, 302, 402, 413
subitus, 337; subito, 336
sublimis, 352
sublimitas, 53
subtilitas, 316, 317
superbia, 406n.
symmetria, 316+n.

talis oratio qualis vita, 380; ch. 15 *passim*
tenuitas, 378
theatri more, 408, 438n.
timidus, 410+n.
timor, 300
tralatio, 353
tremere, 413
trucidare, 400n.
tueri, 333n.
tumor, 352
turba, 408+n.
turgescere, 352
turgidus, 377, 378

vagae rerum vices, 414+n., 415
velox, 336
venustus, 316
verborum licentia, 352
verum, 367, 368, 369+n.
vetustas, 318n.
videre, 301, 333n.
visio, 397n., 398
vitiosus, 352
vitium, 378
vivus, 292
voces, 383, 384
voluptas, 346, 348, 349n., 350, 352, 355n., 356
vulgaris, 361
vulgus, 347, 349, 361, 413, 414; vulgus, leve, 408, 409+n.
vultus, 333n.

INDEX LOCORUM (SELECTIVE)

Achaeus
TrGF 20 F 33 (*Omphale*) 80

Achilles Tatius
1.10.1 437 n. 48
5.27.4 437 n. 48

[Acro]
In Hor. Ars Poetica
132 222 n. 28

Aelian
De Natura Animalium
4.46 85 n. 42
15.19 441
Varia Historia
13.14 226 n. 35

Aelius Aristides
In Defence of the Four
p. 256 Jebb 201 n. 45

Aeschylus
Agamemnon
242 18 n. 10
801 18 n. 9
Persae
577 18 n. 8

Aesop
Fables
1 64 n. 37

Agatharchides
CGM i.129–141, frr. 31–49 85 n. 42

Alexis
fr. 272 KA 80

Anacreon
359 *PMG* 75 n. 9
Anthologia Palatina
11.10 358 n. 38
11.130.1–2, 7–8 224 (Pollianus)
11.140 358 n. 38
11.442 226 n. 35

Apollonius
FGrH 369 T1 246 f.

Apollonius Rhodius
Argonautica
4.891–894 434 n. 43

Aratus
1.43 67 n. 41
1.210 67 n. 41
1.244 67 n. 41
1.397 67 n. 41

Aristides Quintilianus
1.12 134 n. 3
2.5 143 n. 30
2.12–14 134 n. 3

Aristophanes of Byzantium
Second Hypothesis to Alc.
27–31 Méridier 190
Second Hypothesis to Hipp.
28–32 Méridier 198
Second Hypothesis to Or.
11–25 Chapoutier 189

Aristophanes
Acharnenses
377–382 367 n. 10
379–382 373 n. 36
499–500 368

Acharnenses (*cont.*)
500 367, 370
502–503 367 n. 10
628–664 35 n. 58
971 35 n. 58
Aves
782 24 n. 26
Ecclesiasuzae
974a 24 n. 26
Equites
8–10 93 f.
21–34 93
85–114 93
95–96 94
188–193 35 n. 56
505–506 33 n. 49
576–594 35 n. 58
626–628 373 n. 36
812 34
884 34
984–991 33 f., 34 n. 54
1375–1380 373 n. 36
Fragmenta
fr. 347–348 KA 33 n. 49
fr. 348 KA 24 n. 26
Lysistrata
1194–1215 35 n. 58
Nubes
649 21
655 21, 28 n. 39, 42 n. 74
972 30 n. 43
1364–1378 30
1366 ff. 3 n. 10
1370 30 n. 43
Pax
43–48 3
751–759 370 n. 24
759 35 n. 58
775 33 n. 49
803–805 376 n. 43
816 33 n. 49
928 34 n. 51
1077–1079 85 n. 40
Ranae 98 n. 67
52–54 426
53 ff. 2 n. 5
58 2 n. 5
62–64 32 n. 47
72 31
73–87 32
77 32
83–84 31
103 2 n. 5
105 32
107 32
356 33 n. 49
674 33 n. 49
686–687 370 n. 24
727–733 35 n. 57
771–778 3 n. 8
797 25 n. 29, 32 n. 48
833–834 373
837–839 373 + n. 35
841–842 373
846 373
862 383 n. 67
873 32 n. 48
876 33 n. 49
925 383 n. 67
1054–1055 370 n. 24
1491–1499 33 n. 50, 42
Thesmophoriazusae
45 30
48 30
50 30
57 30
58 28 n. 40
62 30
98 373
112 29 n. 42
136–145 30
148–152 373
153 374
153–160 28 f. + n. 37
154–156 373 f.
157–158 374
160 28 n. 39
165–170 374
168–170 32
215–246 28 n. 40
352–371 35 n. 58
785–845 35 n. 58
Vespae
35–36 34 n. 51

959 34 n. 54
989 34 n. 54
1013 20 + n. 16
1028 33 n. 49
1029–1030 370 n. 24
1122–1173 21 n. 19
1183 20
1265–1266 20 n. 16 + 17

Aristotle
Metaphysics
1072b3–4 62
1072b25 62
1072b32 62
1074b34–35 62
Nicomachean Ethics
1103a30 f. 169 n. 22
1103b7 f. 175 n. 37
1105b23 178 n. 44
1106b21 177 n. 40
1125b27 f. 166 n. 15
1126a26 f. 177 n. 41
1174b14–23 49 n. 7
1176a9–15 209 n. 68
1181a19–21 171 n. 25
1340a20 177 n. 41
On Coming to Be and Passing Away (*De generatione et corruptione*)
319b25–30 28 n. 38
On the Soul
408a5–10 166 n. 14
Poetics
13 9, 190 ff., 194, 203, 205 n. 58, 208
14 9, 191 f., 194, 205 n. 58, 208 n. 66
1448a16–18 190
1448a30–32 189 n. 11
1448b4–19 207, 428
1448b8–9 179
1448b10–19 179 n. 48
1449a6–8 186
1449a19–20 210 n. 72
1450b16 165 n. 12
1450b23–25 135 n. 4
1451a30–34 135 n. 4
1451b26 207 n. 63
1451b35–37 189 n. 10
1452b32–34 155 n. 56
1452b34 192
1452b36–38 195
1453a1–4 196
1453a2 195
1453a9 192
1453a12–23 186 f.
1453a13 192
1453a24 189
1453a24–26 203
1453a26–30 187
1453a30–36 188
1453b8–11 206 n. 60
1454a5–9 191
1454b30–35 208 n. 66
1455a16–20 397 n. 19, 440 n. 54
1455a16–22 208 n. 66
1455a20 195
1455a21–25 397
1455a23 399 n. 26
1456a18–25 209
1459a30–b2 221
1461b25–1462a4 206 n. 60
Politics
8 8, ch.7 *passim*, 156 n. 57
1263b15 195
1281b3–10 211
1336b20–21 164 n. 9
1337b34–1338a7 176 n. 38
1338b9–38 162 n. 7
1339a 120 n. 27
1339a29 173 n. 34
1339a42–1339b4 142 n. 27
1339b 274
1339b15–44 176 n. 38
1339b20 164 n. 10
1339b20–21 163 n. 8
1339b25 174 + n. 36
1340a1 181
1340a2–6 164 f., 173 n. 32
1340a4 141 n. 21
1340a5 173

Politics (*cont.*)
1340a8–18 166
1340a10 163 n. 8
1340a13 168 n. 18
1340a17 f. 164 n. 10
1340a18 166 n. 15, 170 n. 23, 171 n. 27
1340a18–23 167 f.
1340a23 168 n. 20
1340a25 167
1340a28–b19 134 n. 1
1340a32–35 168 n. 19
1340a33 135 n. 4
1340a38–b13 135 n. 4
1340a39 166 n. 15
1340a39–b4 176 f.
1340a40 168 n. 18
1340a42 168 n. 20
1340b 120 n. 26
1340b8 177 n. 39
1340b17 173 + n. 34
1340b17–19 165
1340b20 163 n. 8
1340b22–26 169
1340b33 169 n. 21
1340b36–40 169 f.
1341a13–17 172 f.
1341a17 f. 163 n. 8
1341a25 163 n. 8
1341b9–14 179
1341b9–19 174 f.
1341b14–18 189 n. 10
1342a14 155
1342a18–28 206
1342a23–26 180
1342b3 177 n. 39
1342b5–6 163 n. 8
1342b17–33 143 n. 30
Protrepticus
B 73 Düring 48
B 89–90 Düring 48
Rhetoric
2 207
1357b1–5 187 n. 7
1358a35–b8 185 f.
1366a33–34 126 n. 52
1367b8–11 209 n. 67
1371b4–11 207 n. 62
1375b 226
1378a20–23 178 n. 44
1382a12–13 178 n. 45
1382a21 178 n. 46
1385a20–b10 178 n. 45
1386b9–15 207 n. 64
1389b26–32 207 n. 64
1403b6–1404a13 194
1404a28–29 348 n. 11
1411b24–25 399 n. 26

[Aristotle]
On the Cosmos
391a1–5 57 f.
Problems
19.28 (919b38) 135 n. 7
19.48 (922b10–28) 135 n. 4

Aristoxenus
apud Themistius, Orationes
33.36c 196
Fragmenta
fr. 26 Wehrli 36 n. 59
fr. 46 Wehrli 121 n. 28
fr. 123 Wehrli 121 n. 30
Harmonica
44.3–6 Da Rios 124 n. 44

Asconius
On Cicero, Pro Scauro
45 297 n. 35

Athenaeus
Deipnosophistae
1.3a 183 n. 1
1.21.26–38 Kaibel 230 n. 40
10 *passim* 98 n. 68
11.466d–e 80

Callimachus (Pfeiffer)
Aetia
fr. 1.20 340 n. 79

fr. 1.30–31 340 n. 79
3 337 n. 68
Epigrams
6 224
27.1 225
27.4 225
28 223
Fragments
fr. 1 340 n. 78
fr. 465 225

Catullus
95.1–3 340 n. 78

Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi
4

Cicero
Brutus
183–185 347 n. 8
191 347 f.
De divinatione
1.2 291 n. 21
36 291 n. 21
93 291 n. 21
De finibus
5.58 140 n. 19
De inventione
1.109 410 n. 68
De officiis
1.93–151 354 n. 26
De oratore
1.144 354 n. 26
3.137 226 n. 35
3.155 353
3.159 353 n. 24
3.171 372 n. 32
Epistulae ad Atticum
1.4.3 278 n. 41
1.1.5 278 n. 41
1.6.2 278 n. 41
1.8.2 278 n. 41
1.9.2 278 n. 41
1.10.3 278 n. 41
Epistulae ad familiares
3.11.59 220
9.16.3–4 237 f.
In Verrem
2.1.50 278 n. 41
2.1.61 278 n. 41
2.2.84 278 n. 41
2.4.123 278 n. 41
Orator
70 354 n. 26
149 372 n. 32
230 249 n. 16
Pro Sestio
23 355 n. 29

CIL
V 3329 318 n. 11
V 6513 318 n. 11
VI 607 323 n. 25
VI 960 = *ILS* 294
320 + n. 18
VIII 2658 318 n. 11
X 3821 = *ILS* 3662
323 n. 25
X 6849 329 n. 48

Cratinus
fr. 345 KA 34 n. 51

Ctesias
FGrH 688 F 45.37
85 n. 42

Demosthenes
De corona
188 292 n. 23

Demetrius
On Style
169 210 n. 72

Dicaearchus
Fragments
fr. 101 Mirhady = fr. 80 Wehrli
197
fr. 102 Mirhady 204 n. 55
fr. 104 Mirhady = fr. 84 Wehrli
184 n.2
Second Hypothesis to OT
197

Diodorus Siculus
3.15–21 85 n. 42
4.76.1 269 n. 9
16.92.3 58 n. 29

Diogenes Laertius
9.113 234

Dionysius of Halicarnassus
On Demosthenes
50 51 n. 12
On Dinarchus
7 235 f.

Dionysius Thrax
1.1 215 n. 5

Donatus
Life of Vergil
41 232 + n. 48

Empedocles
31 B74 DK 18

Ephippus
fr. 23 KA 21 n. 19, 42 n. 74

Epictetus
Discourses
2.18.23 398

Eupolis
Demoi
fr. 99.29 KA 368
Fragments
fr. 208 KA 35 n. 56
fr. 398 KA 183 n. 1

Euripides
Alcestis
760 19 n. 13, 31 n. 46
760–762 19 n. 13
Cyclops
425–426 19 n. 13
426 19 n. 13
488–493 21 n. 18
489–490 19 n. 13
Electra
294 19 n. 14
Fragments (*TrGF* vol. 4 Radt)
fr. 185 29 n. 41
fr. 188 29
fr. 198.2 29 n. 41
fr. 199 29 n. 41
fr. 407 (*Ino*) 19 n. 14
fr. 565 31
fr. 663 21, 28 n. 37
fr. 907 19 n. 13, 31 n. 46
fr. 1028 [*Antiope*?] 23
fr. 1033 20, 21
Hecuba
838 269 n. 9
Heracles Furens
299–300 20 n. 16
348–441 25
436–441 22
637–700 (esp. 673–686) 22 f. + nn. 21–22
657 23
657–666 24 n. 24
674–675 24 n. 26
676 25
682 24
692 24
694–695 25
696–700 25
763–814 25
871 25 n. 30
879 25 n. 30
889–890 25 n. 30
895 25 n. 30
925 25 n. 30
1022 26 n. 31
1025–1027 26 n. 31
1303–1304 25 n. 30
Heraclidae
458–459 20 n. 16
Ion
184–219 5 + n. 16
526 20
Medea
298–299 20 n. 16

1085 19 n. 11
1089 19 n. 11
Phoenician Women
807 19 n. 13
Suppliants
201–204 85

Eustathius
On Homer, Iliad
1.32.21–26 Van der Valk 230 n. 40
FGrH
369 T1 (Apollonius) 246 f.
369a (Heraclides) F1–3 ch. 10 *passim*
392 F13 34 n. 54
688 F 45.37 (Ctesias) 85 n. 42
392 F13 (Ion of Chios) 34 n. 54

Furius
fr. 15 Courtney 378

Gellius
Noctes Atticae
2.22.2 358 n. 36
3.3.11 377 n. 45
3.19.3–5 358 n. 36
9.9.4 358 n. 36
19.7.2 358 n. 36

Gorgias
Encomium of Helen
(82 B11 DK) 4 439 n. 53
8–14 98 n. 67, 193 n. 20
9 426
10 434 n. 43
21 441 n. 56
Fragments
82 B23 DK 193 n. 20

Heliodorus
Aethiopica
1.14.4–7 203 n. 50

Heraclides *FGrH*
369a F1–3 ch. 10 *passim*

Hermias
On Plato, Phaedrus
216.1–10 Couvreur 64

Hermogenes (Rabe)
On Types of Style
246.17–18 62
248.1 62
On Invention
4.11 62
200.18–19 62

Herodas
Mimes
4 271 ff., 315, 333 n. 59

Herodotus
2.113.1 228 n. 37
2.116.1 228 n. 37
2.117 228
2.118 228 n. 37
2.120 228 n. 37
2.175 55 n. 18
4.23.2 86
4.32 227
4.106 86
4.183.4 86
4.191 55 n. 18
6.21 184
7.126 55 n. 18
8.144.2 86

Hesiod
Theogony
64 24 n. 26

Homer
Iliad
6.289–292 228
15 60, 66
15.78–83 59
21.108 67 n. 41

Odyssey
6.276 67 n. 41
7.14–17 303
7.142–143 303
7.81–94 299
7.91–94 300 n. 43
8.367–369 301
8.491 228 f.
8.521–530 301
8.83–86 2 n. 5
8.83–91 299 n. 42
8.83–92 301
10.223 272
12.165–200 2 n. 5
12.39–40 434 n. 43
12.44 434 n. 43
24 26
24.60–62 26 n. 33

Horace
Ars Poetica
1–5 379
1–23 376 n. 42
15–16 357 n. 35
23 379
25–26 379
31 379
76–78 379
89 379
99–100 370 n. 24
104–107 379
112–119 379
126–127 379
136–142 222
182–195 376 n. 42
185 400 n. 30
335–337 376 n. 42
343–344 370 n. 24
374–376 356 n. 34
445–450 234 n. 53
Carmina
1.1.35–36 226
1.10.18 f. 408 n. 59
1.11.2 291 n. 21
2.1.17–18 376 n. 43
2.3.16–24 297 n. 32
Epistulae
1.2 297 n. 33
2.1 376
2.1.118–138 370 n. 24
2.1.157–158 291 n. 20
2.1.170–176 376
2.2.194–204 379
Sermones
1.1.23–25 368 + n. 15
1.1.24–25 367, 370
1.1.24–26 379
1.1.25–26 370
1.2.24 379
1.3.9–19 379
1.4.1–2 369 n. 16
1.4.1–7 366
1.4.8–13 377 n. 48
1.4.9–10 340 n. 78, 377 n. 45
1.4.11 372
1.4.14–16 377 n. 45
1.4.24 377 n. 47
1.4.56–57 366 n. 3, 377 n. 47
1.4.65 377 n. 47
1.9.23–24 377 n. 45
1.10 233
1.10.14–15 370
1.10.14–17 367 f.
1.10.36–37 377 + n. 46
1.10.48 366 n. 3
1.10.50–54 372
1.10.59–61 377 n. 45
1.10.67–71 378 n. 51
1.10.67–73 377 n. 48
2 388
2.1.28–29 377 n. 47
2.1.29 366 n. 3
2.1.62–63 377 n. 47
2.1.75 366 n. 3
2.1.85 369 n. 18
2.5.39–41 377 f.

[Horace]
Sermones
1.10.1–3 234

Iamblichus
Life of Pythagoras
64 113 n. 1

ILS
294 = *CIL* VI 960 320 + n. 18
3662 = *CIL* X 3821 323 n. 25

Ion of Chios
FGrH 392 F13 34 n. 54
36 B5 DK 139 n. 15

Isocrates
Evagoras
9 348 n. 11
61 55 n. 18

Josephus
Bellum Judaicum
7.158–159 335 n. 62

Juvenal
1–6 385
1.51–54 386 + n. 76
1.79 369
1.162–164 386
4.82 385
6.448–454 358 n. 38
6.634 367, 387
7.69–87 386
7.92 383 n. 67
7.99 387 n. 78
7.160–161 383 n. 67
7.226–227 383 n. 67

[Longinus]
On the Sublime
1.1 51
1.3–4 53 f.
1.4 54 n. 13, 56, 58, 440 n. 54
3.4 55 n. 20, 56 n. 26
5.1 54 n. 14
7.1–2 54
7.3 58 n. 32
8.1 58 n. 32
9.1–4 58 n. 32
9.3 51
9.4 54 n. 13
9.5 54 n. 13 + 14, 56
10.1 55 n. 22
12.1 51
12.5 55 n. 22
14.1 51
14.3 55 n. 23
15.2 414 n. 78
15.8 55 n. 20 + 24
15.9 399
15.11 55 n. 17
16.2 54 n. 13 + 14, 56
22.1 55 n. 15
22.2 55 n. 17
22.3 55 n. 15 + 16 + 17
22.4 55 n. 16
23.4 54 n. 14
33.2 55 n. 18
35.4 60
36.1 58 n. 32, 59 f.
36.3 57
36.4 55 n. 19 + 21
38.1 55 n. 22
38.1–6 54 n. 14
38.4 55 n. 21
39.4 58 n. 32, 292 n. 23
43.2 54 n. 13 + 14
44.1 55 n. 18

Longus
Daphnis and Chloe
Prol. 425 ff., 429
Prol. 3 423 n. 14
Prol. 4 431
1.3 428 n. 28
1.6 428 n. 28
1.7.1 429
1.8.1 427 n. 27, 428
1.9.1–2 428
1.13.2 429 f.
1.13.4 430 n. 32
1.16 436 n. 47
1.16.5 430
1.17.1 430 + n. 34

Daphnis and Chloe (*cont.*)
1.17.3 430, 431
1.19.3 434 n. 45
1.22.2 434 n. 44
1.23.2 429 n. 31
1.27 433
1.27.1 433 n. 40
1.29.2 434 n. 44
1.32.1 431 n. 36
2.4.1 430, 442
2.4–7 423 n. 13
2.5.2 423 n. 12
2.7.1 431
2.26 ff. 436 n. 47
2.26.3 437 n. 49
2.27.2 424, 432, 433 n. 40
2.29.1 437 n. 49
2.31.3 434
2.33.3 433 n. 40
2.35.1 433 n. 40
2.37.1 433 n. 40
2.37.1–3 435
2.39.1 436 n. 46
2.39.2 436
3.4.5 436 f.
3.11.1 424 n. 16, 436
3.12.4 429
3.21.2 437
3.21.4 437
3.22.4 433 n. 40, 437
3.23.5 433 n. 40, 437
3.25.3 434 n. 45
3.27.2 434 n. 45
3.32.1 439
4.15.2 438
4.18.1 437 n. 48
4.27.2 439 n. 52
4.30.4 439 n. 52
4.32.1–2 439
4.33.3–4 440
4.40.3 441

Lucian
The Dream
1 18 n. 8
How to Write History
10–11 201 n. 47
Zeus Tragoidos
7–10 274

Lucilius (Krenkel)
fr. 5 369 n. 18
frr. 74–75 372
frr. 182–213 366 n. 7
frr. 367–370 369 n. 18
fr. 474 372
frr. 605–606 372
frr. 610–616 372
frr. 842–844 372
frr. 982–983 369 n. 20
fr. 1122 367 n. 12

Lucretius
2.20–36 297 n. 32
3.28–29 292
4.11–22 370
5.727 291 n. 21
6.429 291 n. 21

Manilius
1.25–65 293 n. 24

Nepos
Atticus
14.1–2 358 n. 37

Ovid
Fasti
1.295–310 293 n. 24

Pausanias
7.26.13 226 n. 35

Persius
1.5–7 370 n. 24
1.13–21 380
1.14 378 n. 51
1.15–18 381 n. 60
1.15–21 385
1.32–35 381, 385
1.76–78 382 n. 64, 383
1.107–108 370
1.107–110 368
1.123–126 366

5.1–4 383
5.5–9 383 f.
5.14–16 369, 370 + n. 24
5.17–18 384

Petronius
3 350 n. 18
39.3 358 n. 38
48 358 n. 38
53 358 n. 38
55 358 n. 38
59 358 n. 38
68 358 n. 38

Philodemus
On Music (Delattre)
4, col. 125.33–37 34 n. 54
4, col. 140.14–27 42 n. 76
4, col. 144.1–6 42 n. 76

Phrynichus
fr. 32 KA 375

Pindar
Fragments (Snell-Maehler)
fr. 31 16 n. 5
Olympian Ode
14.5–6 24 n. 27
14 24

Plato
Cratylus
408c 106
Hippias Major
292c 20 n. 15, 37 n. 62
298a 126 n. 52
303e 126 n. 48
Laches
188d 34 n. 52
Laws
1 147 n. 37, 150 f.
2 114 n. 6, 116, 117 n. 18, 133, 135 ff., 147 n. 37, 156
7 114 + n. 6, 127 f., 136 + n. 9
624b2 151 n. 47
626d 251 n. 20
630d9–631d2 151
631c5–d2 139 n. 16
643e 114 n. 5
652–653 137 ff.
653 115 f., 116 n. 16, 139 n. 12 + 16, 140 + n. 19, 141 + n. 25, 146, 160, 161 + n. 4, 171
654 115 n. 7, 116 n. 16, 117 f., 118 n. 20, 139 f., 142 f., 144, 160, 161 + n. 4
655 115 n. 9 + 10, 117 ff., 135 n. 4 + 5, 143 ff.
656 117, 119 n. 23, 129 n. 66, 144 f., 146
657 117, 121 n. 32, 146, 162
658a–e 133
658e 143 + n. 29, 152, 155
659 117, 143 n. 29, 144, 152, 162 n. 5
660d11–663e4 136
662c–663b 117 n. 19
663d9 136 n. 8
663e3–664a3 150
664 147 + n. 35, 151, 161
664e3–665a3 140
664e8–665e1 139 n. 14
664f3 ff. 141 n. 22
665 129 n. 63, 130 + n. 67, 139 n. 14, 147 n. 35 + 36, 148 + n. 38 + 39, 149, 150, 162
666 122, 129 n. 62, 130 n. 67, 147 n. 35, 151 n. 45, 150
667 117 n. 18, 126 n. 48, 127 n. 54, 150, 152 f., 154
667b–671a 117, 122
668 118 n. 22, 122 + n. 33 + 36, 123 n. 37 + 38 + 39, 126 n. 50, 143

Laws (*cont.*)
669 122 n. 34, 123 + n. 38 + 39 + 40, 124 n. 42, 162 n. 7
670 37 n. 62, 123 n. 39, 124 ff., 147 n. 35
671a 124 ff.
672a 130 n. 67
672c8–d1 140
672e 162 n. 7
673a 117 n. 17
699c 126 n. 53
700a–701b 128 n. 55
700a7–701b3 135 + n. 7
720a1 151 n. 48
722a7–723a7 151 n. 48
734e5 135 n. 7
739a–740c 114 n. 4
773e5 151 n. 48
775b4 135 n. 7
776a7 147 n. 35
799a–b 127 f.
799e 129 n. 61
799e10 ff. 135 n. 7
802c–d 121 n. 31
802e 115 n. 11, 128 n. 57
803e 128
812 125 n. 47, 128 n. 56, 129 n. 64, 147 n. 35
814d7–816d2 135 n. 4
814e 128 n. 58
816c 128 n. 56
817c5 152
817e 128 n. 58
831d 129 n. 65
880a7 151 n. 48
885b3 151 n. 48
896e4–897d1 146 n. 34
923c2 151 n. 48
927c7–8 151 + n. 48
963 140 n. 18

Meno
97 269 n. 9

Phaedo
60d–61b 35, 36 n. 60
61a 36, 40
61a3 151 n. 45
93 165 n. 14
100d 65
105e 37 n. 62

Phaedrus
230c2–3 65
244b–249e 3 n. 6
245a 3 n. 6
246a4–5 62
246d8–e1 68
247a2–7 68 n. 42
247a–d 61
248a–e 61 f.
248d 36 n. 59
258e–259d 64 n. 37
258e7–259a1 65
259a6–7 65
259b7–8 65
259b7–c1 65 n. 39
266a 20 n. 16
269e–270a 58 n. 31
270 58 n. 30

Philebus
48a 184
51d6 65
53a–b 65
62c 15, 23

Protagoras
322e2 ff. 141 n. 23
324d6 ff. 141 n. 23
326b 36 + n. 61

Republic
3 38, 39 n. 68, 40 + n. 69
8 37, 41
10 41 f.
335c 37 n. 62
349e 37 n. 62
373b 38 n. 66
383c 38 n. 66
398a 361
398d–400d 113
398e1–400e3 135 n. 4
398e10 142 n. 25
399a 34 n. 52
399a–c 115 n. 11, 135 n. 6
399b3–c2 151 n. 48

399e–401a 38
399e9–400a1 135 n. 6
400a 113 n. 3
400a7–8 135 n. 6
401–403 41 n. 71
401a 39, 41 n. 70
401c 38 n. 65
401d–402a 119 f.
401e1–402a4 140 n. 17
401e3 39 n. 68
402b–c 39
402c5 39 n. 68
402d 39
403c 39 f.
411a–b 40
411c 27 n. 36
411c–e 40
411d5 39 n. 68
411e 34 n. 53
411e2 20 n. 16
412b 38 n. 66
424c3–6 135 + n. 7
439e 408 n. 60
440e–441a 115 n. 12
455e 37 n. 62
486d 40 n. 69
509b9 61
522a3–b2 140 n. 20
546d 38 n. 63
591d 36 n. 59
606c 30 n. 44
607b–c 42
607c6 42
607c7 42
607d7 42 + n. 76

Sophist
253b 37 n. 62

Statesman
299d–e 130 n. 69

Symposium
195b–c 423 n. 13
197e6–7 423
203b 423 n. 13
204d5–6 423
206e 424
206e5 424
210a4–5 424
211b1–2 62 n. 35
211b5–6 424
211b7–c1 424
211e 65
212c1 424

Theaetetus
144e 37 n. 62
166c 34 n. 51

Timaeus
33b–43b 65
47d–e2 142 n. 26
80a6–b8 154 n. 52
87c 120 n. 25
88c 36 n. 59
88c5 151 n. 45

Plato Comicus
fr. 115 KA 367 n. 10

Pliny the Elder
Naturalis historia
Pr.7 376 n. 41
2.162 246
34.54 273 n. 30
34–36 269
35.65 269
35.103 270 n. 14

Pliny the Younger
Epistulae
1.15.3 357
2.3.3 347 n. 9
3.1.9 358 n. 36
9.17.2–3 358
Panegyricus
51 338 n. 69

Plutarch
Lives
Cimon
9.1 34 n. 54
Demosthenes
31 269 n.9
Themistocles
2.4 34 n. 54
Theseus
27 250 n. 17

Moralia
19E 205
301F 276 n. 39
346F 18 n. 10
748A 18 n. 10
756B–C 205 n. 59
785C 276 n. 39
854A 201 n. 47
1097C 276 n. 39

[Plutarch]
On Music
1133B–C 135 n. 7
1142B–C 121 n. 28
1142B–F 123 n. 41
1143C 124 n. 43
1144B–C 124 n. 46
1144D–1145A 126 n. 49

Pollux
Onomasticon
88 55 n. 18

Porcius Licinus
fr. 1 Blänsdorf 291 n. 20

Porphyrio
On Horace, Ars Poetica
132 222 n. 29
On Horace, Epistulae
1.1.1 366 n. 7
On Horace, Sermones
1.10.53 372 n. 30

Porphyry
On Homer, Iliad
(*Od.*) 18.79 55 n. 18
On Ptolemy, Harmonica
76 64 n. 37

Posidonius
fr. 284 Edelstein–Kidd
227

Propertius
4.1.77 291 n. 21

Quintilian
Institutio Oratoria
1.4.2 359 n. 39
1.4.3 218 f., 225
1.8.9 350 n. 18
1.8.14 354
1.8.15–16 359 n. 39
1.8.18 359 n. 39
1.8.21 359 n. 39
2.10.9 351
2.10.10 351 n. 21
2.12.6 350
2.17.24 409 n. 61
2.17.27 351
3.5.2 349 n. 14
4.2.89 351
5.11.19 352
5.12.17 351 n. 21
5.14.34 353
6.1.27 410 n. 68
6.2.26 411
6.2.29 398, 411
6.2.35 411
8.pr.7 349 n. 14
8.pr.25 351
8.3.61–62 397
8.3.62 354 n. 27
8.5.28 357
8.6.4 353
8.6.14 353
8.6.17 348 n. 11
8.6.19 353
8.6.34 357
10.1.28 346
10.1.28–29 348
10.1.30 357
10.1.43 352
10.1.53 361
10.1.90 361 n. 49
10.4 233
11.1.3 357
12.2.11 349 n. 14
12.10.12 347 n. 10, 349 n. 15
12.10.47 357
12.10.48 350
12.10.59 349 n. 14
12.10.73 351 f.

Rhetorica ad Herennium
2.50 410 n. 68

Scholia on Aristophanes, *Frogs*
1124 210 n. 72

Scholia on Clemens Alexandrinus, *Protrepticus*
2, 30, 5 222 n. 29

Scholia on Dionysius Thrax
170.7–9 Hilgard 215 n. 5

Scholia on Euripides
Medea
922 201 n. 47
Orestes
1691 189 f.

Scholia on [Hesiod]
Aspis Hypothesis 231

Scholia on Homer
Iliad
3.423a Arist. A 229 n. 39
5.734–736 Arist. A 219 n. 20
6.58–59 ex. bT 202
8.385–387a Arist. A 219 n. 20
9.222a Arist. A 221
9.222b1 Did. A 222 + n. 26
13.63 D (van Thiel) 55 n. 18
15.80 Arist. A 60
15.610–614a Arist. A 221
17.719 Arist. A 223

Scholia on Sophocles, *Ajax*
762 202

Seneca the Younger
Agamemnon
873 409 n. 60
De ira
2.2.1 398 n. 21
2.2.2–6 398
2.17.1 411
2.36.3 415 n. 85
De providentia
2.7–9 409 n. 61
5.4 412 n. 74
Epistulae
6.5 396, 416 n. 87
7 415 n. 85
67.11 355 n. 29
71.29 398 n. 21
90.31 227
108.10 396 n. 11
114.1 349 n. 16, 380
114.2 357
115.14–15 204
Hercules Furens
169 409 n. 61
Medea
922 402 n. 41
976–977 400
991–993 400
1009–1013 403
Phaedra
637 409 n. 60
Phoenissae
231–233 405 n. 48
Thyestes
192–193 403 n. 42
623–625 405 n. 47
635–638 405 n. 47
903–907 401 f.
974–977 401
980 401
1005–1006 401
1054–1056 403 f.
1060–1068 403 f.
Troades
712–714 405
1086–1087 409 n. 62
1092–1093 413 n. 75
1119–1120 408
1125 408 n. 56, 438
1128–1129 408
1130 410 n. 63

Troades (*cont.*)
1138–1142 413 n. 76
1142–1143 414
1143 413
1146–1148 413
1147 412 n. 74
1151–1152 412 n. 74
1160 410 n. 63

Seneca the Elder
Controversiae
1.pr.10 350 n. 18
1.pr.22 350 n. 18

[Septem Sapientes] *Apophthegmata*
1.9.3 55 n. 18

Servius
On the Aeneid
1.22–23 233 n. 50
1.488 302 n. 45
4.418 233
5.871 232
6.pr 232
8.731 220

Sextus Empiricus
Against the Professors
6.48–49 135 n. 4

Sophocles
Fragments
(*TrGF* vol. 5 Kannicht) fr. 762
18 n. 8
fr. 819 19 n. 12
Oedipus at Colonus
1222 26

Statius
Silvae
1.pr.3–4 337
1.pr.13–14 337
1.pr.17–20 332
1.1 332 ff.
1.1.2–3 337
3.pr.9–10 337
3.1 332 ff.
3.5.35–36 340 n. 78
4.2 338 n. 70
4.3 337 n. 67
4.3.1–8 338 n.72
4.7.26 340 n. 78
Thebaid
12.810–812 340 n. 78

Stobaeus
2.4.5 441

Strabo
1.2.3 121 n. 30
9.1.10.1–8 226
9.1.16 248
9.5.1 259
10.3.9 131 n. 73
14.1.18 224 n. 33

Suda
ν 478 Adler III 477
135 n. 7
σ 815 Adler IV 420
201 n. 45

Tacitus
Annales
16.18 356
Dialogus de oratoribus
35.5 350 n. 18

Themistius
Orationes
33.36c 196

Theocritus
Idylls
1.27–60 290 n. 18
1.29–31 289 n. 12
11.20 f. 430 n. 33
15 271 ff., 315

Theognis
695 93 n. 54
939 93 n. 54

Theophrastus
Characters
23.2 244

Thucydides
1.3 259
1.22.4 426
2.40.1 34 n. 55
3.37.3–4 34 n. 53
3.37–38 34 n. 53

TrGF
vol. 1 Snell
p. 13 199 n. 39
20 F 33 (Achaeus' *Omphale*) 80
vol. 2 Kannicht–Snell
127 58 + n. 29
705b.11 18 n. 8
vol. 4 Radt, Euripides
fr. 185 29 n. 41
fr. 188 29
fr. 198.2 29 n. 41
fr. 199 29 n. 41
fr. 407 (*Ino*) 19 n. 14
fr. 565 31
fr. 663 21, 28 n. 37
fr. 907 19 n. 13, 31 n. 46
fr. 1028 [*Antiope*?] 23
fr. 1033 20, 21
vol. 5 Kannicht, Sophocles
fr. 762 18 n. 8
fr. 819 19 n. 12

Valerius Maximus
3.7 *ext.* 1 205 n. 59

Varro
De re rustica
1.23.4 349 n. 13

Vergil
Aeneid
1.32 306
1.242 302 n. 45
1.297–304 299
1.335–370 297 n. 34
1.427–429 297
1.430–436 298
1.441–493 286
1.446–459 299
1.450–459 300 f.
1.463 298
1.464 306
1.465 301
1.466–496 302
1.513–515 304 + n. 46
1.520–560 303
1.579–581 304
1.586–588 303
1.657–697 299
1.697–741 296
1.741–746 293 n. 24
2.30–33 305
2.567–588 218 n. 15
5.250–257 286 n. 3
5.827–871 306
6.14–41 286
6.33–34 306
6.37 306
6.149–235 306
6.847–853 290 f.
7.1–4 306
7.406–414 308 n. 54
7.789–796 308 n. 54
8.416–453 307
8.608–731 286
8.617–625 307
8.675 307
8.698–706 305 n. 47
8.729–731 307
8.806–728 307
10.495–500 286
10.496–499 308
12.490–952 286
Eclogues
3 308
3.32–43 288 f.
3.41 291
Georgics
2.458–540 297 n. 32
2.475–486 293 n. 24, 337 + n. 68
4.153–169 298 n. 37

Vita Euripidis (Méridier)
24–25 204 n. 55
80–85 204 n. 55
86–87 204 n. 56
118–121 204
135 198 n. 34

Vitruvius
De architectura
1.2.1–9 316
5.6.9 297 n. 35
6.8.9 316

Xenophon
Hellenica
5.4.4–7 276 n. 39
Hiero
6.2 24 n. 26
Memorabilia
1.4.8 55 n. 18

[Xenophon]
Respublica Atheniensium
1.13 27 n. 35

GENERAL INDEX

abortion, 403, 406
absorption, 309
action, and art, 3, 10, 285, 308, 309
actor(s), 135n., 144, 152, 394, 410n., 411
administrative prowess, as aesthetic value, 301
Aegisthus, 188
Aeneas, and aesthetic responses, 10; and experiencing art, ch. 12 *passim*
aesthetic, evaluation, 3, 295, 427; object, 5; response, 303, 308, 395, 409, 410, 417, 426, 427; subject, 3, 5; value(s), 1+n., 5, 6, 7, 12, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34+n., 35+n., 36n., 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 47 ff., 53, 66, 67, 68, 130, 239, 316, 429 (see also administrative prowess, appropriateness, beauty, costliness, effort, engineering, ethics, financial might, harmony, proportion, style, symmetry, workmanship); see also art appreciation; experience; judgment
aesthetic, the, 1, 16, 185, 285, 345+n.
aesthetics, and art, 285, 286 ff.; and education, 12; and erotics, ch. 17 *passim*; and ethics, 8, 135, 394 ff.; and gender, ch. 17 *passim*; and ideology, 243; and metaphysics, 40; and politics, 11, 243, ch. 14 *passim*; applied, 10, 244; broadly/narrowly conceived, 67, 68; modern, 1, 16; Neoplatonist, 64; no equivalent in Greek, 52; of authenticity, 9; philosophical, 17, 40; Platonic, 64; poetic, 272; practical, 4; value of, 1, 4, 7, ch. 2 *passim*, 47
age, ch. 6 *passim*; 143+n., 152; and pleasure, 165; see also elder(s); old; young
ageing, 23, 137, 140
agonistic, 49, 188; imagery, 275; see also competition; contest
amateur, view of art, 274
amazement, 53, 54
ambiguity, 75n.
amusement, 176n.
'ancient quarrel', 41
ancient, as authentic, 229
anger, 166n., 168, 177, 178, 184, 254, 309, 415n.; feigned, 411
animals, and music, 172, 173; language, 85 f.+n.
anonymity, of work of art, 295n.
anti-*polis*, symposium as, 72, 104
anti-values, 6 f.
anxiety, 259
Apelles, 236, 273
Aphrodite, 229n., 273n., 275, 276, 277, 278, 301, 439
Apollo, 5, 25, 36, 140, 142+n., 147, 225, 275, 286, 305, 310
applause, 352
appropriate(ness), 123, 124, 126, 152; see also πρέπον, τό
architecture, 11, 39, 41+n., 297, ch. 13 *passim*
arena, 393
art, *passim*; and action, 3, 10, 285, 308, 309; and aesthetics, 285, 286 ff.; and attention, 6, 48, 303, 304; and chance, 270+n.; and education, 6, 7, ch. 6 *passim*, ch. 7 *passim*; and healing, 6; and hopeful interpretation, 286n.; and immorality, 11; and passivity, 303; and physical reaction, 301; and women, 271; appreciation, see art appreciation; as a separate domain, 290; as luxury, 5; as protocol for production, 292; communal, 274; gendered interpretation of, 437;

art (*cont.*), history, 266, 267; 'liking', 1; paralyzing effect of, 302, 303; private, 272, 274; production vs. reception, 287+n.; public discourse on, 274; responding to, 286 (see also aesthetic response; art appreciation; reception)
art appreciation, 4, 268, 315; because of administrative prowess, 301; because of engineering, 301; because of financial might, 301; because of workmanship, 301; criteria for, 290; personal, ch. 11 *passim*; terminology for, 49, 289, 293; see also aesthetic values: administrative prowess, appropriateness, beauty, costliness, effort, engineering, ethics, harmony, proportion, style, symmetry, workmanship)
artifact, 307; as spur to action, 308, 309
artist, 274; as craftsman, 270; as creator, 270
artist's name, 83, 274, 290+n., 308, 398
artistic merit, 269
arts, 47, 48
arts, fine vs. practical, 293
Asianic, 347n.
Asianism, 57, 354n.
astronomy, 292, 293
Astyanax, 405, 407, 408, 410n., 412, 413, 416+n.
attacks, personal, ch. 15 *passim*
attention, 48, 303, 304; shared, 6
Atticists, 350+n., 357
audience, 126, 168, 169, 175, 186, 338, 393n., 394, 395, 396, 400, 402, 403n., 406, 410, 411; and level of education, 206+n.; captive, ch. 16 *passim*; embedded, 407, 412, 417; fragmentation, 402+n.; internal, 12; of philosophers, 209+n.; pleasing the, 179; qualified, 143; reaction, 184, 186, 202, 208n., 401, 414, 416; reception, 184, 186, 201; response, 395n., 408, 412, 413n.; taste, 196; typology of, 185 ff., 206; weakness of, 188, 193, 194
aulos, 87 ff., 95
austerity, 357
authenticity, 5, 9, ch. 9 *passim*, 290; and aesthetics, 9, ch. 9 *passim*; as an aesthetic value, 217; see genuine
authorship, 9, 227, 228
autonomy, 349, 412

bad literature, 235 ff.
baldric, of Pallas, 10, 286, 295n., 305, 308 ff.
banquets, 357, 358+n.
barbarians, 85, 86n., 87, 94
'bastards', 219
beautiful style, of art, 267
beautiful, 170, 265, 278, 315, 424; vs. good, 185
beauty, 2, 5, 11, 12, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29n., 30, 34, 37, 39, 41, 49, 50, 51, 52, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 121, 183n., 198n., 243, 274, 297, 316, 413, 414, 421, 423, 425, 427, 429, 432, 439; and knowledge, 427 ff.; classical, 57; physical, 430
Bellerophon, 204
belt, of Pallas, see baldric
'best tragedy', criteria for, 191 ff.
Bildungsroman, 422
bloatedness, 382+n.
blog, 245 f.
boasting, 406n.
bodily shudder, 292
body, 162+n., 168n., 383n., 384
boredom, 75, 358
brilliance, 357
bronze work, 289 f., 291
bronze, 299, 300+n., 307, 334
Brygos Painter, 94 ff., 97n., 99
builder's name, 318, 323
building, evaluating of, ch. 13 *passim*; images of, 321 ff.; inscription, 317 ff.; process, ch. 13 *passim*; program, 297; projects, 298; scenes, 321 ff.; sound of, 335; speed of, 337+n., 338; time, 318, 320

Callimacheanism, 340+n., 378n., 385+n.
cannibalism, 393, 394, 400, 406+n.

canon, 217, 218, 219, 225 ff., 230, 237
captivating, the audience, ch. 16 *passim*
Carthaginians, and Phaeacians, 297; as aesthetes, 296, 297n.
catharsis, 56, 395; see also κάθαρσις
celebration, 24
censorship, 113, 362
ceremonial viewing, 272, 273
chance, and art creation, 270+n.
charity, principle of, 5n.
charm, 50, 52, 172, 434+n.
children, 179n.; and music, 172+n., 173
choral culture, 38n.
chorus, 35, 68, 122, 126, 135n., 147, 148, 150+n., 151, 161+n., 437+n.; of Dionysus, 122, 124+n., 125n., 126, 127, 129, 142, 147+n., 148
citizen behavior, 78
citizenship, and art, 6
city, 12, 440; and countryside, 6, 297n., 430, 439, 441, 443
city-dweller, 251
class hierarchy, 181
class (social), 8, 9, 12, 72n., 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 159, 176+n., 180, 209n., 244, 347, 348, 353, 358, 361, 422n., 443
classical, 267
classicism, 56
clothing, 373, 374; luxurious, 357
cognition, 3, 302, 415, 418; and art, 10, 305, 307, 308
coinnoisseur, 4, 290, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296
coinnoisseurship, 4, 10, 285, 288, 295, 306; lexicon of, 293; Roman, 294
collector(s), 268, 290
collusion, between audience and author, 395+n.
color, 50, 65, 123n., 168n., 307
Colossus, 57
column of Trajan, 327 ff.
columns, 297+n., 298
communal, private, art, 274
comparative judgment, 292
competency, technical, 39
competition, 77n., 133, 135, 136, 175, 179, 199, 206, 209n., 429, 433, 434, 435, 436, 438; see also contest, ἀγών
consistency, 228, 229, 230, 376n.
construction, see building
construction, speed of, 337+n., 338
contemplation, of art, 302
contest, 49, 162, 188, 197, 201; see also competition, ἀγών
copies, of statues, 281
copy, 216n., 217n.
corporeal, the, 281
correct, 180
correctness, 117+n., 124, 149n., 152, 153+n., 169, 171, 172, 174, 175, 198n.
corruption through music, 174n.
cosmology, 52, 58
costliness, 6, 11, 249, 268, 269, 297, 308, 317n., 318
costume, see dress
countryside, 12, 21, 28, 427+n.; and city, 6, 297n.
courage, 6, 39, 140n., 168, 177, 178+n.
cowardice, 412
craftsman, 307; craftsmen's competition, 77+n.
crane, 323
creating, 429
creation, 287, 436
creativity, 30, 401, 402n.
crime, 400, 401, 402, 407, 408
criteria, for good architecture, 315; for good art, 1, 4, 5, 7, 290; for good music, 121 ff.
critic, non-specialist, 268; professional, 268
critical distance, 6n., 399, 400, 401, 402, 408
critical spectatorship, 415
criticism, and food, 378+n.; comparison in, 49; non-professional, 269, 278; popular, 269; professional, 279; see literary criticism
critics, 148n.; professional, 265; vs. general public, 193
crowd, 348, 408, 409, 413+n.; judgment of, 347

cruelty, 393n.
culture, contempt of, 34n.
Cupid, 299
cyclic poetry, 220 ff.

Daedalus, 269, 286, 295n., 305+n., 306+n.
Damon, 38+n., 135n., 165+n.
dance, 2, 5, 24, 25+n., 37, 38+n., 40, 78, ch. 5 *passim*, 136, 142, 143, 144, 147, 148, 150+n., 161n., 162, 163, 172n., 435
danger, 386
death, 393; transcendence of, 23, 25
debasement, 395
decadence, 351, 357, 358, 359, 362; literary, 382n.; style, 352
declamations, 350 f.; and poetry, 351
decoration, domestic, 274 f., 278+n., 281
dedicator, 274
degenerate, 267
democracy, and performance, 35+n.
democratization of values of *mousikê*, 27
derivativeness, 223, 225, 231
desire, 425, 426, 432
detachment, 301, 307
Dido, 299; as patron, 295n., 296, 297
difficulty, 6
Dionysus, 2, 27n., 31+n., 32+n., 33n., 81, 122, 124+n., 125n., 126, 127, 129, 130n., 142+n., 147+n., 148+n., 249, 261, 278+n., 279, 426
Diotima, 423 f.
dirt, 317
disease, 382n.
disgust, 395, 406
disinclination, to *mousikê*, 37
display, 281; of wealth and taste, 275, 278
dithyramb, 134n.
divinity, 59
domestic, decoration, 274 f.; religion, 275+n.
donkeys, 238, 239
Dorian mode, 124+n., 134n., 135n., 170n., 171n., 177n.
Doryphorus, 57, 281
dress, 21, 28, 380, 381, 382n., 439; and the poets, 28, 29n.; sign of *amousia*, 28n.; see also clothing
drink, 382n.
drunkenness, 101
Duris, 269+n., 270+n.
dying swan, 24, 25

eating, of children, 401n., see also cannibalism
Echtheitskritik, 215+n., 217, 218n., 220, 226, 229, 230, 235, 236, 237, 239
economic value, of art, 5, 47, 48
ecphrasis, 5n.; in *Aeneid*, ch. 12 *passim*; see also ἔκφρασις
ecstasy, 52, 53, 54, 56, 66
education, 9, ch. 5 *passim*, 159, 160, 161, 162n., 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 173n., 175, 176, ch. 17 *passim*; and pleasure, ch. 7 *passim*; erotic, 12, 424, 425, 442; musical, 33, 35+n., 36, 38
effeminacy, 30, 347n., 349n., 381n., 382n.
effort, 323, 332; see sweat; toil
Egypt, 149n.
elation, 307
elder(s), 8, 24, 25, 122, 124, 125, 126, ch. 6 *passim*; see also age; old
electrum, 307
elegance, 358
elevated values, see highbrow, 30
elite, 5, 11, 27+n., 100, 101+n., 102+n., 104, 105, 194, 353, 360, 361, 425; identity, 355; taste, 347+n.
elitism, 35
embossing, 308
embroidery, 5, 296
emendation, 239
emotion, 2, 3, 10, 21, 57, 131, 134n., 138, 139, 140n., 155, 160, 161, 162n., 163, 164, 166+n., 167+n., 169, 174, 177, 178+n., 180, 194, 207n., 287, 302, 303, 304, 309, 395, 397, 398, 404, 409, 410, 411+n., 412, 414+n., 415, 416, 418; representation of, 411
emotional, connection, 5; education, 160; effect, 176; insensitivity, 19;

reaction, 194, 286n., 305, 307, 308; response, 294, 299, 300, 301, 427, 433
empathizing, with art, 270, 402n.
empathy, 395, 409, 415
enactment, 169, 171n.
enchantment, 65, 117
encomium, 423
engineering, 301, prowess, 321, 328; scenes, 332n.
enjoy correctly, 175
enthusiasm, 166, 167n., 177, 178
Epeleius Painter, 97n.
epiphany, 54
Eros, and poetry, 21
eros, ch. 17 *passim*
erotic education, 442
erotics, 31; and aesthetics, ch. 17 *passim*; of beauty, 40
ethics, 25; and aesthetics, 8, 394 ff.; and music, 39
ethnicity, 106
Euripides, critical reactions to, 187 ff.+n., 203 ff.; popularity of, 204n.; unpopularity of, 203, 204
Euthymides amphora, 77 ff., 103n.
evaluation, aesthetic, see aesthetic evaluation; of art, see art appreciation; of buildings, ch. 13 *passim*; of Sophocles' tragedies, ch. 8, esp. 190 ff., 199, 200, 208+n.
Execias, 83, 99, 101
exercises, vocal, 380, 383n.
exertion, 6
expenditure, 316; see costliness
experience (aesthetic), 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 21, 25, 29, 31, 32, 39+n., 41, 42, 48, 58, 59, 60n., 63, 64, 72, 77, 79 ff., 86n., 98n., 119, 121, 124n., 129n., 137, 142, 154n., 155, 156n., 159, 160, 162, 163, 165, 166, 167n., 168, 172n., 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 185, 206, 207, 208, 271, 272, 273, 281, 285, 287+n., 302, 305, 309, 334, 338, 346n., 362, 397, 401n., 402, 413, 424n., 427, 429, 431
expense, see costliness
experts, 2, 4; judgment of, 347
expressiveness, 37
eye-witness, 248
eyewitnessing, as authenticating device, 228

failure, 200
fandom, 32
fans, 2, 3, 4
fashion, 243
fear, 140n., 178, 194+n., 195, 196, 304, 395, 406n., 411, 412, 413
female, viewership, 72n.
feminine, 422
femininity, 349, 374
festivals, civic, 35
figures, of speech, 359; of thought, 359
filicide, 393, 400, 403
financial might, 301
financing, 326n.
fine arts, vs. practical arts, 293
food, 382n., 383, 384+n., 406n.; and criticism, 378+n.; and music, 165+n.
force, 336
forgery, 278n., 281
form, 37, 39, 97, 101, 107, 126, 131, 191, 193, 194, 229, 265, 266+n., 269, 295, 297, 300, 308, 352, 439; see also shape; ἀσχημοσύνη, εἶδος. εὐσχήμων, εὐσχημοσύνη, μορφή, *forma*
formal criteria, 269
formal, vs. popular value, 194
formalism, aesthetic, 266n.
fragmentation, 408
free speech, 6
functional criteria, 5
funeral, 72n., 73n.

garland, 22, 24
gazing, 338+n., 413, 425
gender, 12, 72n., 104, 106, 123 f., 129n., 143+n., 149, 434, 443; and aesthetics, ch. 17 *passim*; inequality, 437; gendered response, 433; gendered interpretation of art, 437, 438
general audience taste vs critical taste, 201

genres, low, 375
gentleness, 168
genuine, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 222, 231, 233, 236, 237; see also authenticity
gladiatorial spectacle, 407+n.
gladiators, 393+n., 409, 415n.
gold, 300n., 306+n., 307, 308, 357
Graces, 24+n., 25
grand style, of art, 267
grandeur, 62
grief, 184, 307, 309, 410, 414
gymnasium, 72n.
gymnastics, 38

habituation, 160, 161, 163, 166, 167+n., 169, 171, 172, 174n., 180
hairiness, 28+n.
happiness, 117
hard work, 317
harmony, 5, 36, 161n., 163+n., 165+n., 166n., 170n., 180, 206, 376n.
hatred, 160, 166, 178n.
healing, 425, 427
hearing, 339n.
Heracles, 19+n., 22, 24, 25, 26, 31+n., 32+n., 33
Hercules, 332, 335, 336+n., 337n., 339
Hesiod, 148, 151
highbrow, 2, 3, 9, 183, 244
home-decorating, 278+n., 281
Homer, 148, 151+n.
homosexuality, 381, 382n.
hopeful reading, 298
hoplite class, 103n.
horror, 400, 402, 414, ch. 16 *passim*
hospitality, 298n.
House of the Mosaics, 275
humor, 101, 365, 367 ff., 387, 388, 401

Iastian mode, 142n.
identification, 401n., 402
ignorance, 307+n.
illiteracy, 75+n.
imagery, 306
images, as spur to action, 303; of construction, 321 ff.
imagination, 403, 405, 418
imitation, 176, ch. 17 *passim*; of Greek sculpture, 291n.; of nature, 269n., 270
imitative style, of art, 267
immaterial sublime, 7
immorality, of poetic style, 352 ff.
inaction, 309
inappropriate, 148+n.
inauthenticity, 222
incest, 393, 406n.
inconsistency, 229, 230, 231
inconvenience, 317
indignation, 207n., 385
individual, in history of art, 267
inscriptions, as viewing instruction, 317; on pots, ch. 4 *passim*, esp. 81 ff.; καλός- / καλή-, 73n.
insensitivity, 19, 32, 39, 41, 183
inspiration, 270
intensity, 7, 25, 54, 58, 59, 66, 67
invective, 383, 384
Ionian, 3, 4; mode, 142n.
iron, 307
irrationality, 2, 51+n., 116, 131
Ixion, 205

jokes, 76n.
joy, 190, 304
judge (of art), 175, 181, 185, 186, 189n., 197, 211; as performer, 169, 170+n., 172
judging (art), 154, 169, 171, 236, 292, 293, 358, 415
judgment, 39, 233, 234, 237, 238, 239, 243, 245, 370, 415; and the critic, 233, 234; comparative, 292; of crowd, 347; of taste, 287, 293; Roman, 293 f.
Juno, 294 ff., 305
jury, 204
justice, 117, 253

killing, 401n.
kindness, 178n.
kottabos-game, 105

labor, 297, 298; manual, 328
lack of refinement, 37
leisure, 174n., 355
Leontius, 408

license, 348
lieu de mémoire, Athens as, 249
lifestyle, 29
life-value, *mousikê* as, 26, 27, 31, 34, 38, 40
Linus, 31
listeners, see audience
literacy, 75n., 76n., 100+n.
literary criticism, 50, ch. 15 *passim*; and disease, 382n.; and dress, 382n.; and drink, 382n.; and effeminacy, 382n.; and food, 382n., 383; and homosexuality, 382n.; see criticism
literature, 66; and morality, 381 f.+n.; as food, 383 f.+n.; bad, 235 ff.; human characteristics of, 383n.
Little Master lip cup, 83, 87 f., 94, 99
loss, 410
loudness, in poetry, 339, 340; see also noise; sound
low genres, 375
lowbrow, 4
luxury, 296n., 297n., 355 ff.
Lydian mode, 94, 134n.
Lysippus, 269, 270n.

made-ness, as a value, 341
madness, 25
maenad, 278
magic, 73n.
magnificence, 316, 338
'making special', 2n., 5
manliness, 6
manpower, 320
market, for classical antiquities, 268
masculinity, 30, 349, 355, 374, 381n.
material sublime, 7; ch. 3 *passim*
material, 289, 295, 296, 307, 308, 318
materiality, of art, 5; of artifact, 300, 302
materials, 297, 303, 306n.; costly, 297
matter, special, 2
medium (artistic), 295+n.
melody, 8, 39, 65, 115, 118, 120, 122, 123, 125, 128n., 129n., 134, 139n., 143n., 163+n., 164n., 168, 173+n., 176, 180, 206
Menelaus, 190
Mercury, 299
metaphor, 353+n.
metaplasm, 354
metatheatrical, 368
meter, 377
metrics, 21
Michelangelo, 266
middle-brow, 2, 10; aesthetics, ch. 10 *passim*; thinker, 259
mimesis, 39+n., 207, ch. 17 *passim*; see μίμησις
mimetic pleasure, 179, 181
miraculous qualities, 268, 269
Mixolydian, 134n., 177n.
mob, 408, 409
mockery, 11
mode of construction, 11
modern poets, 30n.
modes, musical, 34n., 177n.; Dorian, 124+n., 134n., 135n., 170n., 171n., 177n.; Iastian, 142n.; Ionian, 142n.; Lydian, 94, 134n.; Mixolydian, 134n., 177n.; Phrygian, 94, 134n., 163n., 177n.
money, 317, 320
monuments, 11, 248, 249
moral, and aesthetic, 350n.; correctness, 175; habituation, see habituation; outrage, of audience, 204; pleasure, see pleasure; preoccupation, in criticism, 199; satisfaction, 193, 194, 196, 207, 209; truth, 236;
morality, and literature, 381 f.+n.
mortality, 23, and song
mosaic, 76+n., 270n., 275
mousikê, value of, 36, 37
multi-media, 76
murder, 399, 403, 405
Muse(s), 6, 7, 15, 16+n., 17, 19n., 22, 23+n., 24+n., 25, 26, 27, 29, 30n., 33n., 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42, 61, 64, 114, 123n., 142+n., 147, 291n., 337n., 438
music, 8, 15 ff., 19, 38+n., 39, 76, ch. 5 *passim*, 421, 427, 429; and animals, 172, 173; and behavior, 134 f.; and character, 19, 133 ff.+n.; and children, 172+n., 173; and education, ch. 6 *passim*; and ethics, 38; and food, 165+n.; and humanity, 15 f.;

music (*cont.*), and morality, ch. 7 *passim*; and philosophy, 36+n., 40; and politics, 8, 135 ff.; and slaves, 172, 173; as life-value, 17, ch. 2 *passim*; aulos, 87 ff., 95; for men, 123; for women, 123
musical judgment, 117 ff., 121 ff.+n.

name, artist's, 83, 274, 290+n., 308, 398; builder's, 318, 323; poet's, 32, 380, 382
natural, pleasure, see pleasure
nature, 427, 428, 433, 435, ch. 17 *passim*; imitating, 269n., 270, 428 f.+n.; resistant, 336; vs. nurture, 424, 428
New Philology, 216
new, as spurious, 229
Nicosthenes Painter, 97n.
noise, 21, 86n., 334, 337, 338+n., 339, 340+n.; see also building; loudness; poetry; sound
non-elite taste, 10, see middle-brow, popular
non-professional aesthetic criticism, 10, 278
nonsense, 8, ch. 4 *passim*
non-specialist, 270
nostalgia, 298n.
note, 65

objectification, 383, 384, 425, 432 ff., 438 ff., 440
obscenity, 30
obtuseness, 20
Odysseus, 2n., 65, 193n., 223, 228, 301, 303, 305
old, age, 22, 27; and dancing, 435; citizens, 130, ch. 6 *passim*; men, 162; representations of, 100; style, of art, 267; see also elders
Old Comedy, ch. 15 *passim*
Oltus, 97n., 103n.
Ontario Pork Congress, 261
oratory, and poetry, 348+n.
order, 26, 68, 152, 153, 331
Orestes, 188, 190
original, 5, 216, 218, 231
originality, 50, 225, 236, 245
ornamentation, 353
Orpheus, 438n.
over-identification, 399
oversized, 384
overweight, 384

paean, 25
pain, 48, 54, 115 f., 118, 138, 144, 160, 167, 173n., 174, 178+n., 179, 180
painters, 129n., 130n.
painting, 18+n., 38, 41+n., 50, 122n., 123n., 265, 270n., 273, 275, 294, 300, 303, 422+n., 423, 425+n., 426
paradoxography, 58, 244, 246
parody, 8, 32, 84, 94, 102+n.
Parrhasius, 269
passions, 415n.
paternity, lexicon of, 219n.
patronage, 47, 295n., 296, 297; literary, 386
Pausanias, and popular criticism, 269
pedagogy, 8
pedantry, 358
perception, 3, 39, 48, 58, 67, 76, 287, 302, 405
performance, 1, 2, 9, 25, 35, 133, 145, 154, 155, 164, 169, 394, ch. 7 *passim*; choral, 24; judging, 136
performer, 6, 162, 393n., 410
periodization, of art, 267
personal, art appreciation, 10, ch. 11 *passim*; attacks, 379, ch. 15 *passim*; invective, 370, 383, 384; responses, 273; statuary, 274; taste, ch. 11, *passim*
perversion, 25, 350, 381
Phaeacians, and Carthaginians, 297
Pheidias, 236
philistinism, 7, ch. 2 *passim*, esp. 31, 32, 41, 245
philosophy, and *mousikê*, 35, 36n., ch. 5 and 6 *passim*
Phrygian mode, 94, 134n., 163n., 177n.
physical judgment, 370
physical reaction, 2+n., 3, 301, 401, 433
physical work, 29
physicality, 11
piety, 278

pig, cultural, 33, 34; see also swinishness
pimp, poet as, 386, 387n.
Pisistratus, 226
pity, 178, 194+n., 195, 196, 207n., 298n., 395, 411, 413
plausibility, 228n.
pleasure, 6, 8, 11, 16n., 24, 25, 48, 49, 54, 87, 115 ff.+n., 118, 119, 120, 124, 126n., 128n., 130, 133, 137, 138, 142, 143, 144, 153, 155, 160+n., 161, 163, 164, 172, 173+n., 174+n., 178, 180, 184, 188, 190, 206, 208, 250, 307, 346, 348, 349, 421, 427; and education, ch. 7 *passim*; and poetry, 358; moral, 8, ch. 7 *passim*, esp. 172, 174, 177, 178+n.; musical, ch. 7 *passim*; natural, 8, ch. 7 *passim*, esp. 167+n., 172, 174, 176, 177, 178+n.
pleasure, perverse, 350
poet, as pimp, 386, 387n.; lifestyle matches poetry, ch. 15 *passim*; looks match poetry, 28; name of, 32, 380, 382; sartorial (in)elegance of, 28
poetic, contests, 4+n., 194; justice, 195, 196, 200, 202, ch. 8 *passim*, esp. 207; license, 229; madness, 3+n.; pleasure, ch. 14 *passim*
poetry, 2, 19, 37, 38+n., 39, 40, 41, 164; and luxury, 355 ff.; and oratory, 348+n., 350; and pleasure, 346 ff., 349; and power, 193+n., 194; equated with poet, ch. 15 *passim*, 374, 377; immoral, 351; silent, 18n.; speed of writing, 337+n., 340+n.; value of, ch. 2 *passim*
political nonsense, 77, 98 ff.
politics, and aesthetics, ch. 14 *passim*
Polycleitus, 236, 265
Polyxena, 408, 412, 413, 414, 415n., 416+n.
popular, 9, 189, 195, 196; aesthetic value, 208; aesthetics, 10, 11, ch. 11 *passim*; criticism, 268, 269; moral value, 208; poetic taste, 9; poets, 350; reception of art, 315; success, 188; taste, 4, 5, 200, 203, 211, 347, ch. 8 *passim*; tyranny, 100
popularity, 352; of Euripides, 204n.
populism, 347
pots, Attic, ch. 4 *passim*
potter-portraits, 103+n.
power, 398; and aesthetics, 400; of the image, 396+n.
Praxiteles, 278+n.
Prioritätskritik, 231
prizes, 200; literary, 198+n.
production, vs. reception, 287+n.
professional, criticism, 279
proportion, 5, 316
propriety, 354
Protagoras, and musical education, 36
public, discourse, on art, 274; discussion, of sculpture, 270, 271; display, of art, 270, 271, 272n.
puppet show, 133, 143
purpose, of art, 5
puzzle, 75n.
Pylades, 189
Pythagorean *mousikê*, 36n.
Pythagoreanism, 113

quality of life, ch. 2 *passim*

rape, 393
Raphael, 267
realism, 5, 268, 269, 273, 292n.
reality, of art, 273
reception, 292; aesthetics, 77, 79 ff.; readerly, 286n.; vs. production, 287+n.; vs. quality, 190
recitation, 385
reconciliation, 184, 190
Relevance Theory, 4n.
religion, 52, 66, 67, 72n., 127, 128n., 129n., 130; domestic, 275+n.
renovation, 318n.
representation, 170, 171n., 172, 178, 180, 407
resistant nature, 336
response model, 415
response, aesthetic, see aesthetic response; affective, 397; emotional, 300, 438; excessive, 304
revenge, 394, 399, 406+n.; tragedy, 400, 402, 403n.
rhapsode, 148

rhetoric, 56, 58, 401
rhythm, 8, 21, 36, 38, 39, 113n., 116, 118, 119, 122, 123, 125, 126n., 128, 129n., 134, 135+n., 139n., 142, 153, 161n., 163+n., 164n., 165, 168+n., 170n., 172, 173+n.
rustic(ity), 21, 28+n., 30, 251, 430

sadness, 178
safety, 386
Sappho Painter, 97n.
satire, 11, 33; Roman, ch. 15 *passim*; seriousness of, 371+n.
satyr, 278
satyr-play, 210+n.
scent, 72
schemata, 354
sculptor, 306n.
sculpture, 10, 123n., 265, 270+n., 271, 291, 294, 300, 303, 315n., 332n.; public discussion of, 270, 271
seeing, see viewing; visual
self-discipline, 39
self-mutilation, 393, 406
senior citizens, 6, ch. 6 *passim*, see also elders, old
sensation, 2, 48, 59, 63, 67, 68, 115, 116, 117, 137, 138, 141, 146n., 152, 153, 154, 160, 287, 339n., 405
sensitivity, 39, 137, 140, 152
sex, 39, 424; and recitation, 380 f.
sexual initiation, 421, 422, 442
shape, 5, 8, 61, 65, 73+n., 75n., 78, 82, 93, 97, 99n., 101, 123n., 168n., 269; see also form
shoes, white, 243
shudder, 292
sight, 48, 72
sight lines, 275
Silen, 278
silver, 300n., 307
sing, 150+n., 151
singing, 129, 130, 163
Sirens, 2n., 65, 193n., 434+n.
skill, 286
slaves, 94, 124, 126n., 129n., 149; and music, 172, 173
slender, 385
Smicrus, 87 ff., 99, 103n.
snob, 244
social, class, see class; decorum, 6; position, 428
sociology of pleasure, 174–176
Socrates, as composer, 36
solemnity, 62
song, 2, 5, 8, 16n., 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 37, 38, 76, 90, 100, 137, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 161+n., 167+n., 168, 172n., 178; for men, 127 f.; for women, 127 f.; power of, 24;
sophists, and musical education, 36+n.
sound, 50, 72, 337, 338, 339; of construction, 335; see loudness; noise
space, aesthetic, 71
Sparta, 150+n.
Spartans, 142n.
speaking names, 78, 97n.
'special', language, 4, 7; matter, 2, 7
spectacle, 68, 408, 413; grisly, 393+n.
spectator(s), 6, 162, 185, 186, 188, 193, 194, 338n., 393, 397, 400, 401, 402, 406, 407, 408, 409, 413, 414, 415; sparing the, 202
spectatorship, 303, 396
speech, specifically human, 85
speed, of building, 318, 320, 332, 335+n., 336, 337n., 338; of (poetic) production, 6, 337+n., 340+n.
spuria, as illegitimate children, 219
spurious, 9, 217, 218, 219, 225, 226, 227, 228, 234, 237
standards, aesthetic vs. practical, 193; audience, 185 ff.; critical, 185 ff.; see aesthetic values
statuary, personal, 274
statue, 275, 292; statues, copies of, 281
status, 72n., 102, 124, 278, 428, 438
stereotyping, 255, 381
stock characters, 376
Stratford Shakespeare festival, 261
Strepsiades, 3, 4, 21, 30+n.
style, decadent, 352; Hellenistic, 287; high, 50; judgment of, 376; of art, 267
sublime, 3+n., 7, ch. 3 *passim*, 57 ff., 243, 292, 293n., 403n.;

success, 200
superhuman, 57
sweat, 6; see effort; toil
swinishness, 34n., 35; see also pig
symmetry, 52, 265, 316
symposium, 8, 20, 21, 98+n., 100 ff., ch. 4 *passim*, 275, 278; as democratic institution, 100 ff., 104; sympotic competition, 83

tactile, 308
taste, 72, 198n., 201, 209n., 237, 238, 243, 244, 268, 275, 278, 281, 287, 293, 361, 384, 406n.; as social marker, 244; of audience, 196; elite, 347+n.; personal, ch. 11 *passim*; popular, 347
teacher, poet as, 370n.
teamwork, 331
tears, 301, 302, 409, 410
technique, 290
Telephus Painter, 97n.
temperance, 168, 177
text, as a body, 383n., 384
textiles, 273
theater, 297+n., 411; as a metaphor, 136
Thyestes, 394, 395n.
time, role in aesthetic perception, 58
toil, 6; see effort
torture, 393, 406n.
touch, 72
tourist, 251
touristic gaze, 5
tragedy, 393
tragic theory, 56
Trajan, column of, 327 ff.
transcendence, 56
transgression, 54, 56, 362, 400, 422
tropes, 359
truth, 228+n., 229
truth-telling, 365, 367 ff., 387, 388
typology of audiences, 206

ugliness, 39; ugly, 50, 52, 67, 120, 315
uneducated, 352, 353
unoriginal, 235
unoriginal, 236
unpopularity, of Euripides, 203, 204
Ur-Text, 216
use of art, 5
useful, 5
utility, 117+n., 181, 198n., 427; in poetry, 354

value(s), *passim*; aesthetic, see aesthetic value(s); of aesthetics, see aesthetics; lexicon of, 49; valuing others, 7; see also life-value
Vasari, 266, 267
Venus, 299
verbal one-upmanship, 86
verboseness, 387n.
vessels, see pots; shapes, 99+n., 101
vice, 160
victory hymns, 24
viewing, experience, 77, 79 ff.; instruction(s), 11, 272, 273, 317, 410
violence, 192, 393, 422, 433n.; aesthetics of, ch. 16 *passim*
Virgilian criticism, 231 ff.
virtue, 160, 161, 176
virtuosity, 37n.
vision, 49
visual, 39, 71, 338; arts, 168+n.; effect, 192; experience, 431
visualization, 396n., 399, 404
vivid, 5
vocal exercises, 380, 383n.
vulgar, 206, 209n., 361; pleasure, 175; public, 211; taste, 172n.
vulgarity, 29, 30, 175, 183, 296

wealth, 275, 278, 281, 297
weaving, 38, 41+n., 85, 436
weeping, 2n., 19+n., 184, 301, 305, 408, 409, 411, 412
weight, 308
Winckelmann, 266, 267, 278
wine, 151n.
wit, 401n., 402
women, 72n., ch. 17 *passim*; and art, 271; beauty of, 430; evaluations of, 255 f.; learned, 358n.
wonder, 52, 53, 54, 62, 302, 397, 413, 425
word-image game-playing, 98

workmanship, 5, 290, 295, 296, 301, 303, 306, 316, 318
writing-image boundary, 79

Xenocrates, 269+n.

young, 21, 23, 24, 27, 38+n., 120, 124, 125+n., 147, 162, 163, 170n., 181; young men, representations of, 100; young poets, 30n.

Zeuxis, 269